Do people's motives influence their susceptibility to imagination inflation?

Repeated recall on source misattribution in Alzheimer's disease

We assessed the effect of repeated recall on item memory and source monitoring in Alzheimer's disease (AD). AD patients and controls were instructed to either look at or imagine items. They then had to either retrieve the items without indicating their source in three consecutive free recall tests, or to remember the source of the retrieved items in three consecutive source tests. Results showed a significant increase in item memory across all three free recall tests and all three source monitoring tests in control participants, but not in AD patients. More source misattributions were observed in AD patients and controls in the third source test than in the first and second tests. The absence of beneficial effect of repeated recall on item memory in AD patients may be attributed to compromise in memory consolidation processes, while the increase in source misattributions due to repetitions may be attributed to the inflation effect.

Induction of false beliefs and false memories in laboratory studies-A systematic review

Psychological interventions often use guided discovery and other techniques for diagnostic exploration and intervention planning. This way, memories may arise in the person, which may be true or false. False memories of earlier events can be harmful and result in real suffering, similar to actual traumatic memories. Based on cognitive psychological and psycho-traumatological findings, there is pronounced dissent in the academic disciplines regarding the conceptualization, relevance and research of false memories. This review contributes to the basic question of how often false beliefs and false memories may be induced within the frame of different interactional techniques. A systematic review has been conducted of 59 articles from (quasi-)experimental studies and two qualitative sources from 30 data bases. Three main methods of memory induction provide the basis for reporting: imagination inflation, false feedback, and memory implantation. Due to the conceptual and methodological diversity of the studies, the results appear to be heterogeneous. Free and guided imagery, as well as suggestive statements, could induce false beliefs or false memories in, on average, 20%-50% of the participants who underwent experimental manipulation concerning false past events. A false belief induction may occur after dream interpretation or hypnosis in more than 50% of participants. Personalized suggestion is more effective in inducing memory than the general plausibility of the suggested events. Further research questions are which therapeutic actions seem appropriate in cases of harmful false memories. This depends not only on whether there are veridical elements in the false memory but also on the quality and meaning of the memory for the person's life and ability to cope with burdens.

Reasons to Doubt the Reliability of Eyewitness Memory: Commentary on Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (2018)

Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (this issue) take issue with the common trope that eyewitness memory is inherently unreliable. They draw on a large body of mock-crime research and a small number of field studies, which indicate that high-confidence eyewitness reports are usually accurate, at least when memory is uncontaminated and suitable interviewing procedures are used. We agree with the thrust of Wixted et al.'s argument and welcome their invitation to confront the mass underselling of eyewitnesses' potential reliability. Nevertheless, we argue that there is a comparable risk of overselling eyewitnesses' reliability. Wixted et al.'s reasoning implies that near-pristine conditions or uncontaminated memories are normative, but there are at least two good reasons to doubt this. First, psychological science does not yet offer a good understanding of how often and when eyewitness interviews might deviate from best practice in ways that compromise the accuracy of witnesses' reports. Second, witnesses may frequently be exposed to preinterview influences that could corrupt reports obtained in best-practice interviews.

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator‐based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self‐reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

What is the cause of confidence inflation in the Life Events Inventory (LEI) paradigm?

Briefly imagining, paraphrasing, or explaining an event causes people to increase their confidence that this event occurred during childhood-the imagination inflation effect. The mechanisms responsible for the effect were investigated with a new paradigm. In Experiment 1, event familiarity (defined as processing fluency) was varied by asking participants to rate each event once, three times, or five times. No inflation was found, indicating that familiarity does not account for the effect. In Experiment 2, richness of memory representation was manipulated by asking participants to generate zero, three, or six details. Confidence increased from the initial to the final rating in the three- and six-detail conditions, indicating that the effect is based on reality-monitoring errors. However, greater inflation in the three-detail condition than in the six-detail condition indicated that there is a boundary condition. These results were also consistent with an alternative hypothesis, the mental workload hypothesis.

Timing does matter: examining imagery's impact on the temporal origins of false beliefs

In the current study imagination inflation effects were revisited, giving special attention to decreases in confidence ratings following imagery. Reexamining false beliefs, 151 participants were instructed to rate their confidence that they experienced specific childhood events before and after imagery. No significant imagery effects emerged when examining differences in confidence ratings. However, imagery differentially enhanced (26.27%) and diminished (15.45%) belief ratings for specific events. Content analysis of participants' imagery descriptions revealed that only diminished false beliefs were distinguishable from genuine belief accounts, containing less affective and contextual detail as well as fewer words, but remaining comparable in the presence of cognitive operations. These findings suggest that deflation effects provide a route to studying the potentially positive impact of imagery on false beliefs. Because diminished false beliefs cannot be mistaken as veridical memories reconstructed during imagery, they are less subject to criticisms of traditional false belief studies using self-report measures.

The false memory syndrome: experimental studies and comparison to confabulations

False memories, or recollections that are factually incorrect but strongly believed, remain a source of confusion for both psychiatrists and neurologists. We propose model for false memories based on recent experimental investigations, particularly when analyzed in comparison to confabulations, which are the equivalent of false memories from neurological disease. Studies using the Deese/Roedinger-McDermott experimental paradigm indicate that false memories are associated with the need for complete and integrated memories, self-relevancy, imagination and wish fulfillment, familiarity, emotional facilitation, suggestibility, and sexual content. In comparison, confabulations are associated with the same factors except for emotional facilitation, suggestibility, and sexual content. Both false memories and confabulations have an abnormal sense of certainty for their recollections, and neuroanatomical findings implicate decreased activity in the ventromedial frontal lobe in this certainty. In summary, recent studies of false memories in comparison to confabulations support a model of false memories as internally-generated but suggestible and emotionally-facilitated fantasies or impulses, rather than repressed memories of real events. Furthermore, like confabulations, in order for false memories to occur there must be an attenuation of the normal, nonconscious, right frontal "doubt tag" regarding their certainty.