The Effect of Money Priming on Self-Focus in the Imitation-Inhibition Task

Automatic imitation in school-aged children

Children imitate others for different reasons: To learn from others and to reach social goals such as affiliation or prosociality. So far, imitative acts have been measured using diverging methods in children and adults. Here, we investigated whether school-aged children's imitation can be measured via their automatic imitation with a classical imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al., 2000) as has been used in adults. To this end, we measured automatic imitation in N=94 7-8-year-olds and N=10 adults. The results were similar in children and adults: Observing actions that are incongruent with participants' actions interferes with their responses resulting in increased reaction times and error rates. This shows that assessing automatic imitation via the imitation-inhibition task is feasible in children, and creates the basis for future studies to compare the behaviour of different age groups with the same imitation task.

Group membership does not modulate goal- versus movement-based imitation

It is often put forward that in-group members are imitated more strongly than out-group members. However, the validity of this claim has been questioned as recent investigations were not able to find differences for the imitation of in- versus out-group members. A central characteristic of these failed replications is their mere focus on movement-based imitation, thereby neglecting to take into consideration the superior goal of the movements. By using a computerised version of the pen-and-cups task, we disentangled movement- from goal-based imitation to shed further light onto the link between group membership and imitation. As previous research demonstrated that out-group members (as compared with in-group members) are represented psychologically distant and as psychological distance shifts the degree to which participants engage in goal- versus movement-based imitation, we predicted that in-group members (as compared with out-group members) shift the degree to which individuals imitate movements versus goals. The results did not confirm our predictions, as group membership does not modulate the degree of movement- versus goal-based imitation. Theoretical implications and the question whether imitative behaviour is socially modulated are discussed.

EXPRESS: Market mindset hinders interpersonal trust: The exposure to market relationships makes people trust less through elevated proportional thinking and reduced state empathy

In a series of five experiments, we provided evidence that evoking the market mindset negatively affects trust. We found that the market mindset reduces trust compared to the communal mindset (Experiment 1) and a neutral condition (Experiment 2). Next, we examined the psychological mechanisms behind the detrimental effect of the market mindset on trust and found that this effect was mediated by enhanced proportional thinking (Experiments 3 and 4) and reduced state empathy (Experiments 4 and 5). Finally, in a preregistered Experiment 5, we showed that these two psychological mechanisms are relatively independent.

Imitation and interindividual differences: Belief in free will is not related to automatic imitation

It is well known that individuals have the tendency to automatically imitate each other and that such imitative behavior is fostered by perceiving intentions in others' actions. That is, past research has shown that perceiving an action as internally driven enhances the shared representation of observed and executed actions increasing automatic imitation. An interpersonal factor that increases the perception that a behavior is internally driven is belief in free will. Consequently, we hypothesized that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they automatically imitate others. To test this prediction, we conducted two high-powered (total N = 642) and preregistered studies in which we assessed automatic imitation with the imitation-inhibition task. Contrary to our predictions, belief in free will did not correlate with automatic imitation. This finding contributes to current findings challenging the assumption that automatic imitation is modulated by interindividual differences. Further theoretical implications are discussed.

Smaller Than Expected

Abstract. In two pre-registered studies, we investigated whether processes of imitative action regulation are facilitated after experiencing an episode of social exclusion. We reasoned that imitative action regulation effects should be more pronounced for participants who were socially excluded, providing them with an “automatic means” to socially reconnect with others. Participants played a virtual ball-tossing game to experimentally induce social exclusion or inclusion experiences. Subsequently, pairs of two participants engaged in an observational stimulus–response (SR) binding paradigm modeled after Giesen et al. (2014): Participants observed color categorization responses in their interaction partner (trial_n-1) and then executed (in)compatible responses in the subsequent trial (trial_n), with observation and responding occurring in alternation. Stimulus relation (repetition vs. change) from trial_n-1 to trial_n was orthogonally manipulated. In both studies, stimulus-based retrieval effects of observationally acquired SR bindings were descriptively larger in socially excluded (compared with socially included) participants. However, none of the effects were statistically significant. Even a joint analysis of both experiments did not show the expected modulation. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on social exclusion effects on imitative action regulation processes.

A direct test of the similarity assumption - Focusing on differences as compared with similarities decreases automatic imitation

Individuals automatically imitate a wide range of different behaviors. Previous research suggests that imitation as a social process depends on the similarity between interaction partners. However, some of the experiments supporting this notion could not be replicated and all of the supporting experiments manipulated not only similarity between actor and observer, but also other features. Thus, the existing evidence leaves open whether similarity as such moderates automatic imitation. To directly test the similarity account, in four experiments, we manipulated participants' focus on similarities or differences while holding the stimulus material constant. In Experiment 1, we presented participants with a hand and let them either focus on similarities, differences, or neutral aspects between their own hand and the other person's hand. The results indicate that focusing on similarities increased perceived similarity between the own and the other person's hand. In Experiments 2 to 4, we tested the hypothesis that focusing on similarities, as compared with differences, increases automatic imitation. Experiment 2 tested the basic effect and found support for our prediction. Experiment 3 and 4 replicated this finding with higher-powered samples. Exploratory investigations further suggest that it is a focus on differences that decreases automatic imitation, and not a focus on similarities that increases automatic imitation. Theoretical implications and future directions are discussed.

Group membership does not modulate automatic imitation

Individuals have the automatic tendency to imitate each other. A key prediction of different theories explaining automatic imitation is that individuals imitate in-group members more strongly than out-group members. However, the empirical basis for this prediction is rather inconclusive. Only a few experiments have investigated the influence of group membership using classic automatic imitation paradigms and these experiments led to mixed results. To put the group membership prediction to a critical test, we carried out six high-powered experiments (total N = 1538) in which we assessed imitation with the imitation-inhibition task and manipulated group membership in different ways. Evidence across all experiments indicates that group membership does not modulate automatic imitation. Moreover, we do not find support for the idea that feelings of affiliation or perceived similarity moderate the effect of group membership on automatic imitation. These results have important implications for theories explaining automatic imitation and contribute to the current discussion of whether automatic imitation can be socially modulated.

The Effects of Online Status on Self-Other Processing as Revealed by Automatic Imitation

High status individuals have been found to be less attuned to the behavior of others in the social environment. An important question is whether social status in an online setting affects social information processing in a way that resembles the known effects of real-world status on such processing. We examined differences in automatic imitation between Instagram “leaders” and “followers.” In Experiment 1, we found that followers exhibited more automatic imitation than leaders. Experiment 2 sought to establish whether this effect depended on status being salient, or whether it would occur spontaneously in the absence of priming. Results confirmed that thinking about status prior to the task is necessary for producing the pattern of effects in which high status individuals exhibit less automatic imitation than lower status individuals. We discuss our findings in relation to the effects of online status on self-other processing as assessed in the automatic imitation task.

Dynamic emotional expressions do not modulate responses to gestures

The tendency to imitate the actions of others appears to be a fundamental aspect of human social interaction. Emotional expressions are a particularly salient form of social stimuli (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001) but their relationship to imitative behaviour is currently unclear. In this paper we report the results of five studies which investigated the effect of a target's dynamic emotional stimuli on participants' tendency to respond compatibly to the target's actions. Experiment one examined the effect of dynamic emotional expressions on the automatic imitation of opening and closing hand movements. Experiment two used the same basic paradigm but added gaze direction as an additional factor. Experiment three investigated the effect of dynamic emotional expressions on compatibility responses to handshakes. Experiment four investigated whether dynamic emotional expressions modulated response to valenced social gestures. Finally, experiment five compared the effects of dynamic and static emotional expressions on participants' automatic imitation of finger lifting. Across all five studies we reliably elicited a compatibility effect however, none of the studies found a significant modulating effect of emotional expression. This null effect was also supported by a random effects meta-analysis and a series of Bayesian t-tests. Nevertheless, these results must be caveated by the fact that our studies had limited power to detect effect sizes below d = 0.4. We conclude by situating our findings within the literature, suggesting that the effect of emotional expressions on automatic imitation is, at best, minimal.

Challenges and opportunities for top-down modulation research in cognitive psychology

Studying social modulation of cognitive processes holds much promise for illuminating how, where, when and why social factors influence how we perceive and act in the world, as well as providing insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This is no small objective; it reflects an ambitious programme of research. At present, based on the modal theoretical and methodological approach, we suggest that several challenges exist to achieving such lofty aims. These challenges span an overreliance on a simplistic dichotomy between "top-down" and "bottom-up" modulation, a lack of specificity about mechanisms that renders clear interpretations difficult, and theories that largely test against null hypotheses. We suggest that these challenges present several opportunities for new research and we encourage the field to abandon simplistic dichotomies and connect much more with existing research programmes such as semantics, memory and attention, which have all built diverse research platforms over many decades and that can help shape how social modulation is conceptualised and studied from a cognitive and brain perspective. We also outline ways that stronger theoretical positions can be taken, which avoid comparing to null hypotheses, and endorse methodological reform through fully embracing proposals from the open science movement and "credibility revolution". We feel that by taking these opportunities, the field will have a better chance of reaching its potential to build a cumulative science of social modulation that can inform understanding of basic cognitive and brain systems, as well as real-life social interactions and the varied abilities observed across the Autism Spectrum.