Trainability of affordance judgments in right and left hemisphere stroke patients

Whenever we are confronted with action opportunities in everyday life, e.g., when passing an opening, we rely on our ability to precisely estimate our own bodily capabilities in relation to the environmental conditions. So-called affordance judgments can be affected after brain damage. Previous studies with healthy adults showed that such judgments appeared to be trainable within one session. In the current study, we examined whether stroke patients with either right brain damage (n = 30) or left brain damage (n = 30) may similarly profit from training in an aperture task. Further, the role of neuropsychological deficits in trainability was investigated. In the administered task, stroke patients decided whether their hand would fit into a presented opening with varying horizontal width (Aperture Task). During one training session, patients were asked to try to fit their hand into the opening and received feedback on their decisions. We analyzed accuracy and the detection theory parameters perceptual sensitivity and judgment tendency. Both patients with right brain damage and patients with left brain damage showed improved performance during training as well as post training. High variability with differential profiles of trainability was revealed in these patients. Patients with impaired performance in a visuo-spatial or motor-cognitive task appeared to profit considerably from the target-driven action phase with feedback, but the performance increase in judgments did not last when the action was withdrawn. Future studies applying lesion analysis with a larger sample may shed further light on the dissociation in the trainability of affordance judgments observed in patients with versus without visuo-spatial or motor-cognitive deficits.

Calibration of perception fails to transfer between functionally similar affordances

Prior work shows that the calibration of perception and action transfers between actions depending on their functional similarity: Practising (and thus calibrating perception of) one affordance will also calibrate perception for an affordance with a similar function but not for an affordance with a disparate function. We tested this hypothesis by measuring whether calibration transferred between two affordances for passing through openings: squeezing sideways through doorways without becoming stuck and fitting sideways through doorways while avoiding collision. Participants wore a backpack to alter affordances for passage and create a need for perceptual recalibration. Calibration failed to transfer between the two actions (e.g., practising squeezing through doorways calibrated perception of squeezing but not fitting). Differences between squeezing and fitting affordances that might have required different information for perception and recalibration are explored to understand why calibration did not transfer. In light of these results, we propose a revised hypothesis-calibration transfers between affordances on the basis of both functional and informational similarity.

Influences of Experience and Visual Cues of Virtual Arm on Distance Perception

Egocentric distance perception refers to the perception of distance from a target to a perceiver, which is an important component of visual space perception. It is important to activities in virtual environments and influenced by several factors, such as action capacities and visual cues. However, few studies have investigated such aspects. Hence, Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the effect of using experience and visual cues, respectively, of virtual arms on egocentric distance perception in near and far spaces at equal, prolonged, and shortened lengths of a virtual arm. Results revealed that using experience and visual cues of the virtual arm had a significant effect on egocentric distance perception when the length of virtual arm was equal to the real arm and prolonged but not when shortened. The egocentric distance perception on the conditions of having using experience and virtual arm was most precise. The findings provide implications for the design and implementation of virtual body self-representation in virtual environments.

What Perceivers Know About Their Own Affordance Perception: Post Hoc Evaluations of Perceptual Processes Do Not Relate to Accuracy

In 2 studies, we sought to investigate participants’ awareness of their own cognitive process when perceiving affordances (i.e., action capabilities) and whether their evaluations of this process relate to affordance perception accuracy. In Study 1, we combined data from 8 experiments and created a coding scheme designed to capture the unique features of different affordance perception theories within these post hoc evaluations. We then tested whether the perceptual process that participants reported was related to the accuracy of their judgments. We found that evaluations were distributed fairly evenly across the themes. We also found no relationship between the evaluations and accuracy. In Study 2, we conducted an experiment that specifically addressed our hypotheses about awareness and affordance perception accuracy, while controlling for confounds in Study 1. The greater detail participants gave about their cognitive strategy produced reports that largely did not relate to affordance perception theories. Participants used one of a few strategies aimed at estimating their body dimensions. Our results suggest that awareness of the perceptual process has no influence on the accuracy of affordance perception. It is likely that subjective reports of affordance perceptual process, though clear to the perceiver, are not related to the process itself.

Effectiveness of adults' spontaneous exploration while perceiving affordances for squeezing through doorways

When motor abilities change, people need to generate information to recalibrate their perception through active exploration. Most prior research has focused on observers' ability to update perception by executing experimenter-specified exploratory behaviors, however, the question of how observers spontaneously choose how to explore has been overlooked. We asked how effectively adults decide to explore when adapting to changes in their ability to squeeze through doorways. Results revealed that participants made efficient decisions about when to explore by approaching and practicing-they most often explored doorways that were near the limit of their abilities, and participants explored less often as their perceptual calibration improved. However, participants made sub-optimal decisions about how to explore, which resulted in a failure to fully recalibrate. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the processes of perceptual-motor recalibration that underlie real-world behavior.

Exploratory behaviors and recalibration: What processes are shared between functionally similar affordances?

Recalibration of affordance perception allows observers to adapt to changes in the body's size or abilities that alter possibilities for action. Of key interest is understanding how exploratory behaviors lead to successful recalibration. The present study was designed to test a novel hypothesis-that the same processes of exploration and recalibration should generalize between affordances that share a similar function. Most affordances for fitting the body through openings are recalibrated without feedback from practicing the action; locomotion exploration is sufficient. The present study used a different fitting task, squeezing through doorways, to determine whether locomotor experience was sufficient for recalibrating to changes in body size that altered affordances. Participants were unable to recalibrate from locomotor experience, demonstrating that exploratory behaviors do not necessarily generalize between functionally similar affordances. Participants only recalibrated following action practice or after receiving feedback about judgment accuracy, suggesting that the informational requirements of the squeezing task may differ from those of other fitting tasks. Implications for affordance theory are discussed.

Nesting in perception of affordances for stepping and leaping

Perception of affordances for a given behavior typically reflects the task-specific action capabilities of the perceiver. However, many experiments have shown a discrepancy between the perceptual and behavioral boundaries for a given behavior. One possibility for such a discrepancy is that the context of many experimental tasks transformed what is typically a dynamic perception-action task into an analytical or reflective judgment. We investigated this hypothesis with respect to perception of maximum stepping and leaping distance. For both behaviors, perception of these affordances more closely reflected action capabilities when the perceptual task was nested within a superordinate task than when it was not (regardless of whether the behavior itself was performed). Additionally, verbal reports of perception of maximum leaping distance more closely reflected action capabilities when there was an explicit time limit on such reports. The results are discussed in the context of the ecological principle of nesting and in attentional focus during motor control tasks.

Discovering your inner Gibson: reconciling action-specific and ecological approaches to perception-action

Both the action-specific perception account and the ecological approach to perception-action emphasize the role of action in perception. However, the action-specific perception account demonstrates that different percepts are possible depending on the perceiver's ability to act, even when the same optical information is available. These findings challenge one of the fundamental claims of the ecological approach--that perception is direct--by suggesting that perception is mediated by internal processes. Here, we sought to resolve this apparent discrepancy. We contend that perception is based on the controlled detection of the information available in a global array that includes higher-order patterns defined across interoceptive and exteroceptive stimulus arrays. These higher-order patterns specify the environment in relation to the perceiver, so direct sensitivity to them would be consistent with the ecological claims that perception of the environment is direct and animal-specific. In addition, the action-specific approach provides further evidence for the theory of affordances, by demonstrating that even seemingly abstract properties of the environment, such as distance and size, are ultimately perceived in terms of an agent's action capabilities.

Perception of maximum stepping and leaping distance: Stepping affordances as a special case of leaping affordances

Successfully performing everyday behaviors requires perceiving affordances-possibilities for behavior that depend on the fit between environmental properties and action capabilities. Whereas affordances for some behaviors are primarily constrained by relatively static geometric properties of the perceiver (non-launching behaviors such as stepping), others are additionally constrained by dynamic force production capabilities of the perceiver (launching behaviors such as leaping). This experiment used a transfer of calibration paradigm to investigate whether visual perception of launching and non-launching behaviors represent independent perception-action tasks. In particular, we investigated whether calibration of visual perception of maximum leaping distance transferred to visual perception of maximum stepping distance, and/or vice versa. The results showed that calibration of perception of maximum leaping distance transferred to perception of maximum stepping distance, suggesting that perception of launching and non-launching are not independent. Rather, perception of stepping affordances may be a special case of perception of leaping affordances.

Embodied Perception: A Proposal to Reconcile Affordance and Spatial Perception

Proffitt's embodied approach to perception is deeply indebted to Gibson's ecological approach to visual perception, in particular the idea that the primary objects of perception are affordances or what the environment offers for action. Yet, rather than directly addressing affordance perception, most of the empirical work evaluating Proffitt's approach focuses on the perception of spatial properties of the environment. We propose that theoretical and empirical efforts should be directed toward an understanding of the relationship between affordance perception and spatial perception, keeping in mind that this relationship is nontrivial because affordance perception is dichotomous, whereas the perception of spatial properties is gradual. We argue that the perception of spatial properties of the environment is enslaved by affordance perception, most notably at the critical boundaries for action. To empirically scrutinize this proposition, and to solve issues raised regarding the validity of several empirical findings, we call for joint research efforts to further understanding of embodied perception.

Affordances as Probabilistic Functions: Implications for Development, Perception, and Decisions for Action

We propose a new way to describe affordances for action. Previous characterizations of affordances treat action possibilities as binary categories-either possible or impossible-separated by a critical point. Here, we show that affordances are probabilistic functions, thus accounting for variability in motor performance. By measuring an affordance function, researchers can describe the likelihood of success for every unit of the environment. We demonstrate how to fit an affordance function to performance data using established psychophysical procedures and illustrate how the threshold and variability parameters describe different possibilities for action. Finally, we discuss the implications of probabilistic affordances for development, perception, and decision-making.

Perception-action development from infants to adults: perceiving affordances for reaching through openings

Perceiving possibilities for action-affordances-requires sensitivity, accuracy, and consistency. In the current study, we tested children of different ages (16-month-olds to 7-year-olds) and adults to examine the development of affordance perception for reaching through openings of various sizes. Using a psychophysical procedure, we estimated individual affordance functions to characterize participants' actual ability to fit their hand through openings and individual decision functions to characterize attempts to reach. Decisions were less accurate in younger children (16-month-olds to 5-year-olds); they were more likely to attempt impossible openings and to touch openings prior to refusing, suggesting a slow developmental trend in learning to perceive affordances for fitting through openings. However, analyses of multiple outcome measures revealed that the youngest participants were equally consistent in their decision making as the oldest ones and that every age group showed sensitivity to changes in the environment by scaling their attempts to opening size.

Ledge and wedge: younger and older adults' perception of action possibilities

The current study investigated whether younger (college-age) and older adults (60+ years) differ in their ability to perceive safe and unsafe motor actions. Participants decided whether to walk through openings varying in width in two penalty conditions: In the doorway condition, if participants attempted to squeeze through impossibly narrow openings, the penalty for error was entrapment. In the ledge condition, if participants attempted to inch along impossibly narrow ledges, the penalty for error was falling. Results showed that across the lifespan, people consider falling to be a more severe penalty than getting stuck: Both younger and older adults made more conservative decisions when the penalty for error was falling, and older women were especially leery of falling. In both age groups, abilities and decisions were based on dynamic properties of the body, such as compressed body size in the doorway condition and balance in the ledge condition. Findings indicate that failure to perceive possibilities for action is unlikely to be the cause of the increased prevalence of falling in older adults.

Visuomotor control of human adaptive locomotion: understanding the anticipatory nature

To maintain balance during locomotion, the central nervous system (CNS) accommodates changes in the constraints of spatial environment (e.g., existence of an obstacle or changes in the surface properties). Locomotion while modifying the basic movement patterns in response to such constraints is referred to as adaptive locomotion. The most powerful means of ensuring balance during adaptive locomotion is to visually perceive the environmental properties at a distance and modify the movement patterns in an anticipatory manner to avoid perturbation altogether. For this reason, visuomotor control of adaptive locomotion is characterized, at least in part, by its anticipatory nature. The purpose of the present article is to review the relevant studies which revealed the anticipatory nature of the visuomotor control of adaptive locomotion. The anticipatory locomotor adjustments for stationary and changeable environment, as well as the spatio-temporal patterns of gaze behavior to support the anticipatory locomotor adjustments are described. Such description will clearly show that anticipatory locomotor adjustments are initiated when an object of interest (e.g., a goal or obstacle) still exists in far space. This review also show that, as a prerequisite of anticipatory locomotor adjustments, environmental properties are accurately perceived from a distance in relation to individual’s action capabilities.

Perception of passage through openings depends on the size of the body in motion

Walkers need to modify their ongoing actions to meet the demands of everyday environments. Navigating through openings requires gait modifications if the size of the opening is too small relative to the body. Here we ask whether the spatial requirements for navigating horizontal and vertical openings differ, and, if so, whether walkers are sensitive to those requirements. To test walkers' sensitivity to demands for gait modification, we asked participants to judge whether they could walk through horizontal openings without shoulder rotation and through vertical openings without ducking. Afterward, participants walked through the openings, so that we could determine which opening sizes elicited gait modifications. Participants turned their shoulders with more space available than the space they left themselves for ducking. Larger buffers for horizontal openings may reflect different spatial requirements created by lateral sway of the body during walking compared to vertical bounce. In addition, greater variability of turning from trial to trial compared with ducking may lead walkers to adopt a more conservative buffer to avoid errors. Verbal judgments accurately predicted whether openings required gait modifications. For horizontal openings, participants' judgments were best predicted by the body's dynamic abilities, not static shoulder width. The differences between horizontal and vertical openings illustrate that walkers account for the dynamic properties of walking in addition to scaling decisions to body dimensions.

Athletic experience influences shoulder rotations when running through apertures

In order to pass through apertures safely and efficiently, individuals must perceive the width of the aperture relative to (1) the width of the person-plus-object system and to (2) their (anticipated) movement speed. The present study investigated whether athletes who have extensive experience playing sports that require running through narrow spaces while wearing shoulder pads control their shoulder rotations differently while performing this behavior than athletes who lack such experience. Groups of athletes with experience competing in different sports (American football, rugby, and control athletes) performed a behavioral task in which they ran or walked between two tucking dummies with or without wearing shoulder pads. They also performed a psychophysical task in which they reported perceived width of the body and shoulder pads. When running through the apertures, the athletes who played American football exhibited smaller magnitudes and later onset of shoulder rotations than control athletes. No such difference was found when walking through the apertures. There was no difference in perception of the width of the shoulder pads among three groups. These findings suggest that performance of this behavior is action-scaled and task-specific.

Nested prospectivity in perception: perceived maximum reaching height reflects anticipated changes in reaching ability

Perception of possibilities for behavior is a necessarily prospective (i.e., forward-looking) act. Such prospectivity is highlighted by the fact that, in general, behaviors are nested within behaviors over a number of spatial and temporal scales. Participants reported their maximum vertical reaching height when they expected to walk across the room and (1) reach for an object while standing on the floor, (2) step up on a step stool and then reach for the object, and (3) pick up a plastic rod and use it to reach for the object. The results show that perception of maximum reaching height was action scaled both when participants expected to perform a nested behavior that would change their action capabilities and when they expected to perform a nested behavior that would not do so. Moreover, the results suggest that nested behaviors that change reaching ability in functionally equivalent ways may bring about functionally equivalent changes in perception of maximum reaching height.

Duck! Scaling the height of a horizontal barrier to body height

Recent research shows that the body is used to scale environmental extents. We question whether the body is used to scale heights as measured by real actions (Experiments 1 and 2) or by judgments about action and extent made from a single viewpoint (Experiments 3 and 4). First, participants walked under barriers naturally, when wearing shoes, or when wearing a helmet. Participants required a larger margin of safety (they ducked at shorter heights) when they were made taller. In follow-up experiments, participants visually matched barrier heights and judged whether they could walk under them when wearing shoes or a helmet. Only the helmet decreased visually matched estimates; action judgments were no different when participants' eye height increased. The final experiment suggested that the change in matched estimates may have been due to lack of experience wearing the helmet. Overall, the results suggest that perceived height is scaled to the body and that when body height is altered, experience may moderate the rescaling of height.

Adults' perception of children's height and reaching capability

This study investigated the influence of some characteristics of the task, the model, and the observer, in the estimation errors of adults while judging children's affordances. One hundred and eighteen adults, divided in 4 height groups, estimated height and vertical reaching capability of 3 girls (3.55-, 4.74- and 7.06-years old), in the presence and in the absence of the model. Constant errors (CE) (estimation-real value), absolute percent errors (APE) (/1--estimation/real value/ x 100), and error tendency (underestimations, right judgments, or overestimations) were calculated. A model and a condition effect were verified on APE. APE for the younger model were greater than for the other models (p<0.001), and APE in the absence of the model were greater than in her presence (p<0.05). Generally, adults underestimated height (51.8% of underestimations vs. 32.3% of overestimations) and overestimated reachability (51.3% of overestimations vs. 37.7% of underestimations). The overestimation of reachability was more notorious for the younger model, which might reflect adults' difficulty to consider the specificity of younger children's body proportions. Actually, the overestimation bias may suggest that adults perceive young children as on the basis of adult's geometrical proportions.