The Theory Crisis in Psychology: How to Move Forward

Meehl argued in 1978 that theories in psychology come and go, with little cumulative progress. We believe that this assessment still holds, as also evidenced by increasingly common claims that psychology is facing a “theory crisis” and that psychologists should invest more in theory building. In this article, we argue that the root cause of the theory crisis is that developing good psychological theories is extremely difficult and that understanding the reasons why it is so difficult is crucial for moving forward in the theory crisis. We discuss three key reasons based on philosophy of science for why developing good psychological theories is so hard: the relative lack of robust phenomena that impose constraints on possible theories, problems of validity of psychological constructs, and obstacles to discovering causal relationships between psychological variables. We conclude with recommendations on how to move past the theory crisis.

The Past, Present, and Future of Ego Depletion

Abstract. At the center of social psychology just a few years ago, ego depletion is now widely seen as a controversial topic, one of the chief victims of the replication crisis. Despite over 600 studies of apparent support, many are now asking if ego depletion is even real. Here, we comment on the articles included in this Special Issue: Ego Depletion and Self-Control: Conceptual and Empirical Advances. Specifically, we delineate the contributions and limitations of these articles by embedding them in a brief history of ego depletion, describing the current state of uncertainty about ego depletion’s scientific status, and outlining necessary steps for the study of ego depletion to have a healthy future. To us, the most troubling aspect of this controversy is not what it suggests about ego depletion, but what it suggests about social psychology more broadly. If the mere existence of ego depletion is seriously doubted by many, what can be confidently regarded as real in social psychology? By increasing the precision of our theories, continuously validating our manipulations and measures, and practicing the full suite of open science practices, we have the potential to identify legitimate and robust effects and build a cumulative and trustworthy psychological science.