Piagetian liquid conservation in the great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, and Pongo pygmaeus)

Smoke and mirrors: Testing the scope of chimpanzees' appearance-reality understanding

The ability to make appearance-reality (AR) discriminations is an important higher-order cognitive adaptation in humans but is still poorly understood in our closest primate relatives. Previous research showed that chimpanzees are capable of AR discrimination when choosing between food items that appear, due to the effects of distorting lenses, to be smaller or larger than they actually are (Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). In the current study, we investigated the scope and flexibility of chimpanzees' AR discrimination abilities by presenting them with a wider range of illusory stimuli. In addition to using lenses to change the apparent size of food items (Experiment 1), we used a mirror to change the apparent number of items (Experiment 2), and tinted filters to change their apparent color (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, some chimpanzees were able to maximize their food rewards by making a choice based on the real properties of the stimuli in contrast to their manifest apparent properties. These results replicate the earlier findings for size illusions and extend them to additional situations involving illusory number and color. Control tests, together with findings from previous studies, ruled out lower-level explanations for the chimpanzees' performance. The findings thus support the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of making AR discriminations with a range of illusory stimuli.

Defining value through quantity and quality-Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) undervalue food quantities when items are broken

Decision-making largely is influenced by the relative value of choice options, and the value of such options can be determined by a combination of different factors (e.g., the quantity, size, or quality of a stimulus). In this study, we examined the competing influences of quantity (i.e., the number of food items in a set) and quality (i.e., the original state of a food item) of choice items on chimpanzees' food preferences in a two-option natural choice paradigm. In Experiment 1, chimpanzees chose between sets of food items that were either entirely whole or included items that were broken into pieces before being shown to the chimpanzees. Chimpanzees exhibited a bias for whole food items even when such choice options consisted of a smaller overall quantity of food than the sets containing broken items. In Experiment 2, chimpanzees chose between sets of entirely whole food items and sets of initially whole items that were subsequently broken in view of the chimpanzees just before choice time. Chimpanzees continued to exhibit a bias for sets of whole items. In Experiment 3, chimpanzees chose between sets of new food items that were initially discrete but were subsequently transformed into a larger cohesive unit. Here, chimpanzees were biased to choose the discrete sets that retained their original qualitative state rather than toward the cohesive or clumped sets. These results demonstrate that beyond a food set's quantity (i.e., the value dimension that accounts for maximization in terms of caloric intake), other seemingly non-relevant features (i.e., quality in terms of a set's original state) affect how chimpanzees assign value to their choice options.

Chimpanzees sometimes see fuller as better: judgments of food quantities based on container size and fullness

The context in which food is presented can alter quantity judgments leading to sub-optimal choice behavior. Humans often over-estimate food quantity on the basis of how food is presented. Food appears larger if plated on smaller dishes than larger dishes and liquid volumes appear larger in taller cups than shorter cups. Moreover, smaller but fuller containers are preferred in comparison to larger, but less full containers with a truly larger quantity. Here, we assessed whether similar phenomena occur in chimpanzees. Four chimpanzees chose between two amounts of food presented in different sized containers, a large (2 oz.) and small (1 oz.) cup. When different quantities were presented in the same-sized cups or when the small cup contained the larger quantity, chimpanzees were highly accurate in choosing the larger food amount. However, when different-sized cups contained the same amount of food or the smaller cup contained the smaller amount of food (but looked relatively fuller), the chimpanzees often showed a bias to select the smaller but fuller cup. These findings contribute to our understanding of how quantity estimation and portion judgment is impacted by the surrounding context in which it is presented.

When less is more: like humans, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) misperceive food amounts based on plate size

We investigated whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) misperceived food portion sizes depending upon the context in which they were presented, something that often affects how much humans serve themselves and subsequently consume. Chimpanzees judged same-sized and smaller food portions to be larger in amount when presented on a small plate compared to an equal or larger food portion presented on a large plate and did so despite clearly being able to tell the difference in portions when plate size was identical. These results are consistent with data from the human literature in which people misperceive food portion sizes as a function of plate size. This misperception is attributed to the Delboeuf illusion which occurs when the size of a central item is misperceived on the basis of its surrounding context. These results demonstrate a cross-species shared visual misperception of portion size that affects choice behavior, here in a nonhuman species for which there is little experience with tests that involve choosing between food amounts on dinnerware. The biases resulting in this form of misperception of food portions appear to have a deep-rooted evolutionary history which we share with, at minimum, our closest living nonhuman relative, the chimpanzee.

What counts for 'counting'? Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, respond appropriately to relevant and irrelevant information in a quantity judgment task

Nonhuman animals quantify all manner of things, and the way in which this is done is fairly well understood. However, little research has been conducted to determine how they know what is or is not relevant in the instances in which they quantify stimuli. We assessed how four chimpanzees chose between two sets of food items when the items were distributed across separate spatial arrays. Each item was covered by a container, and then was revealed in sequence so that neither whole set was visible at one time. After all containers were revealed, some were revealed again. The chimpanzees should have ignored items that were seen a second time and instead enumerated each item only once. In another test, some of the items were transposed in location and then uncovered again. Here, the chimpanzees needed to recognize that the newly shown food items were ones they already had seen. Overall, the chimpanzees were successful in selecting the truly larger array of items despite these potential distracting re-presentations of items. Discrimination performance also reflected analogue magnitude estimation because comparisons of sets that differed by larger amounts were easier than comparisons that differed by smaller amounts. Thus, chimpanzee quantity judgments for nonvisible sets of items are inexact, but they include an aspect of control for determining when items are uniquely presented versus re-presented.

Differences in the cognitive skills of bonobos and chimpanzees

While bonobos and chimpanzees are both genetically and behaviorally very similar, they also differ in significant ways. Bonobos are more cautious and socially tolerant while chimpanzees are more dependent on extractive foraging, which requires tools. The similarities suggest the two species should be cognitively similar while the behavioral differences predict where the two species should differ cognitively. We compared both species on a wide range of cognitive problems testing their understanding of the physical and social world. Bonobos were more skilled at solving tasks related to theory of mind or an understanding of social causality, while chimpanzees were more skilled at tasks requiring the use of tools and an understanding of physical causality. These species differences support the role of ecological and socio-ecological pressures in shaping cognitive skills over relatively short periods of evolutionary time.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) accurately compare poured liquid quantities

Although many studies have shown that nonhuman animals can choose the larger of two discrete quantities of items, less emphasis has been given to discrimination of continuous quantity. These studies are necessary to discern the similarities and differences in discrimination performance as a function of the type of quantities that are compared. Chimpanzees made judgments between continuous quantities (liquids) in a series of three experiments. In the first experiment, chimpanzees first chose between two clear containers holding differing amounts of juice. Next, they watched as two liquid quantities were dispensed from opaque syringes held above opaque containers. In the second experiment, one liquid amount was presented by pouring it into an opaque container from an opaque syringe, whereas the other quantity was visible the entire time in a clear container. In the third experiment, the heights at which the opaque syringes were held above opaque containers differed for each set, so that sometimes sets with smaller amounts of juice were dropped from a greater height, providing a possible visual illusion as to the total amount. Chimpanzees succeeded in all tasks and showed many similarities in their continuous quantity estimation to how they performed previously in similar tasks with discrete quantities (for example, performance was constrained by the ratio between sets). Chimpanzees could compare visible sets to nonvisible sets, and they were not distracted by perceptual illusions created through various presentation styles that were not relevant to the actual amount of juice dispensed. This performance demonstrated a similarity in the quantitative discrimination skills of chimpanzees for continuous quantities that matches that previously shown for discrete quantities.

Can chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) discriminate appearance from reality?

A milestone in human development is coming to recognize that how something looks is not necessarily how it is. We tested appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with a task requiring them to choose between a small grape and a big grape. The apparent relative size of the grapes was reversed using magnifying and minimizing lenses so that the truly bigger grape appeared to be the smaller one. Our Lens test involved a basic component adapted from standard procedures for children, as well as several components designed to rule out alternative explanations. There were large individual differences in performance, with some chimpanzees' responses suggesting they appreciated the appearance-reality distinction. In contrast, all chimpanzees failed a Reverse Contingency control test, indicating that those who passed the Lens test did not do so by learning a simple reverse contingency rule. Four-year-old children given an adapted version of the Lens test failed it while 4.5-year-olds passed. Our study constitutes the first direct investigation of appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees and the first cross-species comparison of this capacity.

Its own reward: lessons to be drawn from the reversed-reward contingency paradigm

This is a review of the reversed-reward contingency (RRC) paradigm in animals and the cognitive functions on which it is founded. I shall present the RRC basic paradigm and the ensuing modifications it underwent, the animals tested, the results obtained and the analyses offered within the literature. Then I would the claim that RRC is a case of a compound cognitive behavior, one that is the result of interactions between three other cognitive functions: crude numerical assessment and economic choice (uniting value assignment and behavioral inhibition). I will present data concerning these three fields and will demonstrate how they are both affecting and affected by the findings of the RRC scheme. RRC is treated here as a test case for a broader type of analysis, one which, hopefully, will show that in order to fully understand composite and complex behavior we need to meticulously explore its building blocks and their dynamic interplay.

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) succeed in a test of quantity conservation

Nonhuman animals demonstrate a number of impressive quantitative skills such as counting sets of items, comparing sets on the basis of the number of items or amount of material, and even responding to simple arithmetic manipulations. In this experiment, capuchin monkeys were presented with a computerized task designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity. Monkeys first were trained to select from two horizontal arrays of stimuli the one with the larger number of items. On some trials, after a correct selection there was no feedback but instead an additional manipulation of one of those arrays. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array but not the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made a second selection from the two arrays of items. Previous research had shown that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) succeeded with this task. However, there was no condition in that study in which items were added to the smaller array without increasing its quantity to a point where it became the new larger array. This new condition was added in the present experiment. Capuchin monkeys were sensitive to all of these manipulations, changing their selections when the manipulations changed which array contained the larger number of items but not when the manipulations changed the physical arrangement of items or increased the quantity in one array without also reversing which of the two arrays had more items. Therefore, capuchin monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the arrays. The data indicate that capuchins are sensitive to simply arithmetic manipulations that involve addition of items to arrays and also that they can conserve quantity.

Tracking the displacement of objects: a series of tasks with great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) and young children (Homo sapiens)

The authors administered a series of object displacement tasks to 24 great apes and 24 30-month-old children (Homo sapiens). Objects were placed under 1 or 2 of 3 cups by visible or invisible displacements. The series included 6 tasks: delayed response, inhibition test, A not B, rotations, transpositions, and object permanence. Apes and children solved most tasks performing at comparable levels except in the transposition task, in which apes performed better than children. Ape species performed at comparable levels in all tasks except in single transpositions, in which chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) performed better than gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmeaus). All species found nonadjacent trials and rotations especially difficult. The number of elements that changed locations, the type of displacement, and having to inhibit predominant reaching responses were factors that negatively affected the subjects' performance.

Apes know that hidden objects can affect the orientation of other objects

Four bonobos, seven gorillas, and six orangutans were presented with two small rectangular boards on a platform. One of the boards had a piece of food under it so that it acquired an inclined orientation whereas the other remained flat on the platform. Subjects preferentially selected the inclined board. In another experiment, subjects were initially presented with two inclined boards and a transformation took place in which one of the boards fell flat to the platform while the other remained inclined. Subjects also preferred the board that remained inclined. Two additional experiments highlighted some of the possible limitations of their reasoning in this task. Presented with two inclined boards, one of which was visibly supported by a piece of wood, they failed to systematically select the unsupported one whose only reason for being inclined was the presence of the reward. Another experiment presented two rewards in each trial (instead of the customary one) in one of the following two combinations: large banana vs. small carrot or small banana vs. large carrot. Prior to the test, E presented both rewards to the subject and then hid each of them under one of the boards so that both boards were differentially inclined due to the different sizes of the rewards involved. Although subjects selected the board that showed a greater inclination (thus securing the larger reward), they disregarded the type of food that was involved. This often meant that they chose the large carrot over the small banana even though they reversed such a choice when the rewards were not occluded by the boards. Providing subjects with a 'reminder' of the type of reward hidden under the boards did not alter the original results. There was no evidence of learning throughout the various experiments and control tests ruled out the possibility of inadvertent cuing by the experimenter, poor performance due to a lack of motivation, or good performance due to a predisposition to select objects with sloped surfaces. It is concluded that subjects made some inferences about the reason for the inclined orientation of the boards, and not simply associated an inclined orientation with the presence of the reward.

Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful in using human communicative cues such as the pointing gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the 2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes' adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs' adaptations, during the domestication process, for cooperative communication with humans.

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) succeed on a computerized test designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity

Conservation of quantity occurs through recognition that changes in the physical arrangement of a set of items do not change the quantity of items in that set. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were presented with a computerized quantity judgment task. Monkeys were rewarded for selecting the greater quantity of items in one of two horizontal arrays of items on the screen. On some trials, after a correct selection, no reward was given but one of the arrays was manipulated. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array without changing the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made another selection from the two rows of items. Monkeys were sensitive to these manipulations, changing their selections when the number of items in the rows changed but not when the arrangement only was changed. Therefore, monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the sets.

How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task

To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180 degrees rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions.

What does an intermediate success rate mean? An analysis of a Piagetian liquid conservation task in the great apes

The study investigates what an intermediate success rate means in bonobos, chimpanzees, and orangutans. Apes participated in liquid conservation experiments where they had to track the larger of two different quantities of juice after various kinds of transformations [Suda, C., & Call, J. (2004). Piagetian liquid conservation in the great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, and Pongo pygmaeus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 118, 265-279). When making a decision, apes sometimes demonstrated hesitant behavior, concurrently pointing to both alternatives or successively changing their choice. Moderately successful apes showed more hesitation than highly successful or unsuccessful apes. The results are consistent with the cognitive conflict model: The experiments created a higher degree of cognitive conflict on moderately successful apes than on very successful or unsuccessful apes. This indicates that an intermediate performance reflects the joint operation and potential conflict between two different cognitive strategies (identity and appearance) inherent to the Piagetian conservation task.

How the great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) perform on the reversed contingency task: The effects of food quantity and food visibility

S. T. Boysen and G. G. Berntson (1995) found that chimpanzees performed poorly on a reversed contingency task in which they had to point to the smaller of 2 food quantities to acquire the larger quantity. The authors compared the performance of 4 great ape species (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) on the reversed contingency task while manipulating food quantity (0-4 or 1-4) and food visibility (visible pairs or covered pairs). Results showed no systematic species differences but large individual differences. Some individuals of each species were able to solve the reversed contingency task. Both quantity and visibility of the food items had a significant effect on performance. Subjects performed better when the disparity between quantities was smaller and the quantities were not directly visible.

Piagetian conservation of discrete quantities in bonobos (Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)

This study investigated whether physical discreteness helps apes to understand the concept of Piagetian conservation (i.e. the invariance of quantities). Subjects were four bonobos, three chimpanzees, and five orangutans. Apes were tested on their ability to conserve discrete/continuous quantities in an over-conservation procedure in which two unequal quantities of edible rewards underwent various transformations in front of subjects. Subjects were examined to determine whether they could track the larger quantity of reward after the transformation. Comparison between the two types of conservation revealed that tests with bonobos supported the discreteness hypothesis. Bonobos, but neither chimpanzees nor orangutans, performed significantly better with discrete quantities than with continuous ones. The results suggest that at least bonobos could benefit from the discreteness of stimuli in their acquisition of conservation skills.