Categorization of Above and Below Spatial Relations by Tufted Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella)

High-Speed Videography Reveals How Honeybees Can Turn a Spatial Concept Learning Task Into a Simple Discrimination Task by Stereotyped Flight Movements and Sequential Inspection of Pattern Elements

Honey bees display remarkable visual learning abilities, providing insights regarding visual information processing in a miniature brain. It was discovered that bees can solve a task that is generally viewed as spatial concept learning in primates, specifically the concept of “above” and “below.” In these works, two pairs of visual stimuli were shown in the two arms of a Y-maze. Each arm displayed a “referent” shape (e.g., a cross, or a horizontal line) and a second geometric shape that appeared either above or below the referent. Bees learning the “concept of aboveness” had to choose the arm of the Y-maze in which a shape–any shape–occurred above the referent, while those learning the “concept of belowness” had to pick the arm in which there was an arbitrary item beneath the referent. Here, we explore the sequential decision-making process that allows bees to solve this task by analyzing their flight trajectories inside the Y-maze. Over 368 h of high-speed video footage of the bees' choice strategies were analyzed in detail. In our experiments, many bees failed the task, and, with the possible exception of a single forager, bees as a group failed to reach significance in picking the correct arm from the decision chamber of the maze. Of those bees that succeeded in choosing correctly, most required a close-up inspection of the targets. These bees typically employed a close-up scan of only the bottom part of the pattern before taking the decision of landing on a feeder. When rejecting incorrect feeders, they repeatedly scanned the pattern features, but were still, on average, faster at completing the task than the non-leaners. This shows that solving a concept learning task could actually be mediated by turning it into a more manageable discrimination task by some animals, although one individual in this study appeared to have gained the ability (by the end of the training) to solve the task in a manner predicted by concept learning.

Same or different? Abstract relational concept use in juvenile bamboo sharks and Malawi cichlids

Sorting objects and events into categories and concepts is an important cognitive prerequisite that spares an individual the learning of every object or situation encountered in its daily life. Accordingly, specific items are classified in general groups that allow fast responses to novel situations. The present study assessed whether bamboo sharks Chiloscyllium griseum and Malawi cichlids Pseudotropheus zebra can distinguish sets of stimuli (each stimulus consisting of two abstract, geometric objects) that meet two conceptual preconditions, i.e., (1) “sameness” versus “difference” and (2) a certain spatial arrangement of both objects. In two alternative forced choice experiments, individuals were first trained to choose two different, vertically arranged objects from two different but horizontally arranged ones. Pair discriminations were followed by extensive transfer test experiments. Transfer tests using stimuli consisting of (a) black and gray circles and (b) squares with novel geometric patterns provided conflicting information with respect to the learnt rule “choose two different, vertically arranged objects”, thereby investigating (1) the individuals’ ability to transfer previously gained knowledge to novel stimuli and (2) the abstract relational concept(s) or rule(s) applied to categorize these novel objects. Present results suggest that the level of processing and usage of both abstract concepts differed considerably between bamboo sharks and Malawi cichlids. Bamboo sharks seemed to combine both concepts—although not with equal but hierarchical prominence—pointing to advanced cognitive capabilities. Conversely, Malawi cichlids had difficulties in discriminating between symbols and failed to apply the acquired training knowledge on new sets of geometric and, in particular, gray-level transfer stimuli.

Can old-world and new-world monkeys judge spatial above/below relations to be the same or different? Some of them, but not all of them

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with the aid of token training can achieve analogical reasoning, or the ability to understand relations-between-relations (e.g., Premack, 1976; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997). However, extraordinarily few numbers of old- and new-world monkeys have demonstrated this ability in variants of relational matching to sample tasks. Moreover, the rarity of replications leaves open the question of whether the results are normative for other captive colonies of the same species. In experiment one we attempted to replicate whether old world rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) might demonstrate the same level of proficiency on a spatial above/below relational matching task as reported for old world baboons (Papio papio). None of the rhesus monkeys attained above chance performances over 10,000 training trials. In experiment two we attempted to replicate results demonstrating that new-world capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) match above/below relations. The capuchin monkeys performed above chance only in the absence of 'Clever Hans' controls for cuing of the correct choice by the experimenters. These failures to replicate previously reported results demonstrate that some, but definitely not all monkeys can judge the equivalence of abstract 'relations between relations' and warrant further investigations into the behavioral and cognitive characteristics that underlie these similarities and differences within population and between individuals of different primate species.

Transfer of the nonmatch-to-goal rule in monkeys across cognitive domains

To solve novel problems, it is advantageous to abstract relevant information from past experience to transfer on related problems. To study whether macaque monkeys were able to transfer an abstract rule across cognitive domains, we trained two monkeys on a nonmatch-to-goal (NMTG) task. In the object version of the task (O-NMTG), the monkeys were required to choose between two object-like stimuli, which differed either only in shape or in shape and color. For each choice, they were required to switch from their previously chosen object-goal to a different one. After they reached a performance level of over 90% correct on the O-NMTG task, the monkeys were tested for rule transfer on a spatial version of the task (S-NMTG). To receive a reward, the monkeys had to switch from their previously chosen location to a different one. In both the O-NMTG and S-NMTG tasks, there were four potential choices, presented in pairs from trial-to-trial. We found that both monkeys transferred successfully the NMTG rule within the first testing session, showing effective transfer of the learned rule between two cognitive domains.

Learning to navigate in a three-dimensional world: from bees to primates

We discuss the idea that environmental factors influence the neural mechanisms that evolved to enable navigation, and propose that a capacity to learn different spatial relationship rules through experience may contribute to bicoded processing. Recent experiments show that free-flying bees can learn abstract spatial relationships, and we propose that this could be combined with optic flow processing to enable three-dimensional navigation.

Taï chimpanzees use botanical skills to discover fruit: what we can learn from their mistakes

Fruit foragers are known to use spatial memory to relocate fruit, yet it is unclear how they manage to find fruit in the first place. In this study, we investigated whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus) in the Taï National Park make use of fruiting synchrony, the simultaneous emergence of fruit in trees of the same species, which can be used together with sensory cues, such as sight and smell, to discover fruit. We conducted observations of inspections, the visual checking of fruit availability in trees, and focused our analyses on inspections of empty trees, so to say "mistakes". Learning from their "mistakes", we found that chimpanzees had expectations of finding fruit days before feeding on it and significantly increased inspection activity after tasting the first fruit. Neither the duration of feeding nor density of fruit-bearing trees in the territory could account for the variation in inspection activity, which suggests chimpanzees did not simply develop a taste for specific fruit on which they had fed frequently. Instead, inspection activity was predicted by a botanical feature-the level of synchrony in fruit production of encountered trees. We conclude that chimpanzees make use of the synchronous emergence of rainforest fruits during daily foraging and base their expectations of finding fruit on a combination of botanical knowledge founded on the success rates of fruit discovery, and a categorization of fruit species. Our results provide new insights into the variety of food-finding strategies employed by primates and the adaptive value of categorization capacities.

Understanding the functional properties of tools: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) attend to tool features differently

We examined whether eight capuchins and eight chimpanzees were able to retrieve a reward placed inside a tube, of varying length, by selecting the correct stick from different sets of three sticks differing in length (functional feature) and handle (non-functional feature). Moreover, to investigate whether seeing the stick inside the tube (visual feedback) improves performance, half of the subjects were tested with a transparent apparatus and the other half with an opaque apparatus. Phase 1 included (a) Training 1 in which each stick had a different handle and (b) Transfer 1 in which the handles were switched among sticks, so that the functional tool had the same length but a different handle than before. The seven chimpanzees and one capuchin that passed Transfer 1 received Transfer 2. The other subjects received (a) Training 2, which used the same sticks from Phase 1 with handles switched in every trial, and (b) Transfer 2 in which the tube was longer, all sticks had the same new handle, and the formerly longest tool became intermediate in length. Eight chimpanzees and three capuchins passed Transfer 2. Results showed that (1) chimpanzees applied relational structures in tool using tasks more quickly than capuchins and (2) capuchins required more varied experience to attend to the functional feature of the tool. Interestingly, visual feedback did not improve performance in either species.

Same/different concept learning by capuchin monkeys in matching-to-sample tasks

The ability to understand similarities and analogies is a fundamental aspect of human advanced cognition. Although subject of considerable research in comparative cognition, the extent to which nonhuman species are capable of analogical reasoning is still debated. This study examined the conditions under which tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) acquire a same/different concept in a matching-to-sample task on the basis of relational similarity among multi-item stimuli. We evaluated (i) the ability of five capuchin monkeys to learn the same/different concept on the basis of the number of items composing the stimuli and (ii) the ability to match novel stimuli after training with both several small stimulus sets and a large stimulus set. We found the first evidence of same/different relational matching-to-sample abilities in a New World monkey and demonstrated that the ability to match novel stimuli is within the capacity of this species. Therefore, analogical reasoning can emerge in monkeys under specific training conditions.

Prefrontal cortex activity during the discrimination of relative distance

To compare with our previous findings on relative-duration discrimination, we studied prefrontal cortex activity as monkeys performed a relative-distance discrimination task. We wanted to know whether the same parts of the prefrontal cortex compare durations and distances and, if so, whether they use similar mechanisms. Two stimuli appeared sequentially on a video screen, one above a fixed reference point, the other below it by a different distance. After a delay period, the same two stimuli reappeared (as choice stimuli), and the monkeys' task was to choose the one that had appeared farther from the reference point during its initial presentation. We recorded from neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (area 46) and the caudal prefrontal cortex (area 8). Although some prefrontal neurons encoded the absolute distance of a stimulus from the reference point, many more encoded relative distance. Categorical representations ("farther") predominated over parametric ones ("how much farther"). Relative-distance coding was most often abstract, coding the farther or closer stimulus to the same degree, independent of its position on the screen. During the delay period before the choice stimuli appeared, feature-based coding supplanted order-based coding, and position-based coding-always rare-decreased to chance levels. The present results closely resembled those for a duration-discrimination task in the same cortical areas. We conclude, therefore, that these areas contribute to decisions based on both spatial and temporal information.

Great apes' strategies to map spatial relations

We investigated reasoning about spatial relational similarity in three great ape species: chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans. Apes were presented with three spatial mapping tasks in which they were required to find a reward in an array of three cups, after observing a reward being hidden in a different array of three cups. To obtain a food reward, apes needed to choose the cup that was in the same relative position (i.e., on the left) as the baited cup in the other array. The three tasks differed in the constellation of the two arrays. In Experiment 1, the arrays were placed next to each other, forming a line. In Experiment 2, the positioning of the two arrays varied each trial, being placed either one behind the other in two rows, or next to each other, forming a line. Finally, in Experiment 3, the two arrays were always positioned one behind the other in two rows, but misaligned. Results suggested that apes compared the two arrays and recognized that they were similar in some way. However, we believe that instead of mapping the left-left, middle-middle, and right-right cups from each array, they mapped the cups that shared the most similar relations to nearby landmarks (table's visual boundaries).

Conceptual thresholds for same and different in old-(Macaca mulatta) and new-world (Cebus apella) monkeys

Learning of the relational same/different (S/D) concept has been demonstrated to be largely dependent upon stimulus sets containing more than two items for pigeons and old-world monkeys. Stimulus arrays containing several images for use in same/different discrimination procures (e.g. 16 identical images vs. 16 nonidentical images) have been shown to facilitate and even be necessary for learning of relational concepts (Flemming et al., 2007; Wasserman et al., 2001; Young et al., 1997). In the present study, we investigate the threshold at which a new world primate, the capuchin (Cebus apella) may be able to make such a discrimination. Utilizing a method of increasing entropy, rather than conventional procedures of decreasing entropy, we demonstrate unique evidence that capuchin monkeys are readily capable of making 2-item relational S/D conditional discriminations. In another experiment, we examine the supposed level of difficulty in making S/D discriminations by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Whereas pigeons (Columba livia) and baboons (Papio papio) have shown marked difficulty simultaneously discriminating same from different arrays at all when composed of fewer than 8 items each, rhesus monkeys seem to understand that pairs of stimuli connote sameness and difference just the same (Flemming et al., 2007). With sustained accurate performance of 2-item S/D discriminations, both experienced and task-naïve rhesus monkeys appear quite certain in their conceptual knowledge of same and different. We conclude that learning of the same/different relational concept may be less dependent upon high levels of entropy contrast than originally hypothesized for nonhuman primates.

Conceptualization of above and below relationships by an insect

Relational rules such as 'same' or 'different' are mastered by humans and non-human primates and are considered as abstract conceptual thinking as they require relational learning beyond perceptual generalization. Here, we investigated whether an insect, the honeybee (Apis mellifera), can form a conceptual representation of an above/below spatial relationship. In experiment 1, bees were trained with differential conditioning to choose a variable target located above or below a black bar that acted as constant referent throughout the experiment. In experiment 2, two visual stimuli were aligned vertically, one being the referent, which was kept constant throughout the experiment, and the other the target, which was variable. In both experiments, the distance between the target and the referent, and their location within the visual field was systematically varied. In both cases, bees succeeded in transferring the learned concept to novel stimuli, preserving the trained spatial relation, thus showing an ability to manipulate this relational concept independently of the physical nature of the stimuli. Absolute location of the referent into the visual field was not a low-level cue used by the bees to solve the task. The honeybee is thus capable of conceptual learning despite having a miniature brain, showing that such elaborated learning form is not a prerogative of vertebrates.

Navigating two-dimensional mazes: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and capuchins (Cebus apella sp.) profit from experience differently

We examined whether navigation is impacted by experience in two species of nonhuman primates. Five chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and seven capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) navigated a cursor, using a joystick, through two-dimensional mazes presented on a computer monitor. Subjects completed 192 mazes, each one time. Each maze contained one to five choices, and in up to three of these choices, the correct path required moving the cursor away from the Euclidean direction toward the goal. Some subjects completed these mazes in a random order (Random group); others in a fixed order by ascending number of choices and ascending number of turns away from goal (Ordered group). Chimpanzees in both groups performed equivalently, demonstrated fewer errors and a higher rate of self-correcting errors with increasing experience at solving the mazes, and made significantly fewer errors than capuchin monkeys. Capuchins were more sensitive to the mode of presentation than chimpanzees; monkeys in the Ordered group made fewer errors than monkeys in the Random group. However, capuchins' performance across testing changed little, and they remained particularly susceptible to making errors when the correct path required moving away from the goal. Thus, these two species responded differently to the same spatial challenges and same learning contexts. The findings indicate that chimpanzees have a strong advantage in this task compared to capuchins, no matter how the task is presented. We suggest that differences between the species in the dynamic organization of attention and motor processes contribute to their differences in performance on this task, and predict similar differences in other tasks requiring, as this one does, sustained attention to a dynamic visual display and self-produced movements variably towards and away from a goal.

Do capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) use tokens as symbols?

In the absence of language, the comprehension of symbols is difficult to demonstrate. Tokens can be considered symbols since they arbitrarily stand for something else without having any iconic relation to their referent. We assessed whether capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) can use tokens as symbols to represent and combine quantities. Our paradigm involved choices between various combinations of tokens A and B, worth one and three rewards, respectively. Pay-off maximization required the assessment of the value of each offer by (i) estimating token numerousness, (ii) representing what each token stands for and (iii) making simple computations. When one token B was presented against one to five tokens A (experiment 1), four out of ten capuchins relied on a flexible strategy that allowed to maximize their pay-off, i.e. they preferred one token B against one and two tokens A, and they preferred four or five tokens A against one token B. Moreover, when two tokens B were presented against three to six tokens A (experiment 2), two out of six capuchins performed summation over representation of quantities. These findings suggest that capuchins can use tokens as symbols to flexibly combine quantities.

Disconnect in concept learning by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): Judgment of relations and relations-between-relations

The authors investigated the role that entropy measures, discriminative cues, and symbolic knowledge play for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in the acquisition of the concepts of same and different for use in a computerized relational matching-to-sample task. After repeatedly failing to perceive relations between pairs of stimuli in a 2-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys rapidly learned to discriminate between 8-element arrays. Subsequent tests with smaller arrays, however, suggested that, although important for the initial acquisition of the concept, entropy is not a variable on which monkeys are dependent. Not only do monkeys choose a corresponding relational pair in the presence of a cue, but they also choose the cue itself in the presence of the relational pair--in essence, labeling those relations. Subsequent failure in the judgment of relations-between-relations, however, suggests that perhaps a qualitatively different cognitive component exists that prevents monkeys from behaving analogically.

Generalization of conditioned food aversions in grazing sheep and its implications for food categorization

When grazing on heterogeneous pastures, herbivores may rely on food item generalization and categorization processes for reducing information processing while selecting their diet. The objective of this study was to assess the generalization of an aversion by grazing sheep for items differing by one or two criteria from an item against which they were negatively conditioned. Four items cultivated in pots were offered to the animals, resulting from the combination of an intrinsic criterion, i.e. grass species (ryegrass and fescue) and a transitory criterion, i.e. sward height (tall and short). We assessed the generalization process by comparing binary choices between the initially preferred tall ryegrass and the three other items, before and after animals had been partially conditioned against tall ryegrass. This method proved useful in assessing the generalization of an aversion. Sheep did not generalize their aversion on the basis of sward height but rather on species: they increased their preference for tall fescue and decreased their instantaneous preference for short ryegrass after having been conditioned against tall ryegrass. The generalization of an aversion through different states of a same species could indicate the possibility of a species-based categorization by grazing herbivores.

Local advantage in the visual processing of hierarchical stimuli following manipulations of stimulus size and element numerosity in monkeys (Cebus apella)

Previous studies suggest that monkeys process local elements of hierarchical visual patterns more quickly and more accurately than they process the global shape. These results could be indicative of differences between relatively high visual functions of humans and non-human primates. It is, however, important to rule out that relatively low-level factors can explain these differences. We addressed this issue with two experiments carried out on capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) using matching-to-sample tasks featuring hierarchical stimuli. The first experiment assessed whether manipulations of stimulus size can affect the local advantage so far observed in this New World monkey species. An overall local versus global advantage still emerges in capuchins, irrespectively of the amplitude of the visual angle subtended by the hierarchical shapes. Moreover, a local-to-global interference, indicative of a strong local advantage, was observed for the first time. In the second experiment, we manipulated size and numerosity of the local elements of hierarchical patterns, mimicking procedures that in human perception relegate the local elements to texture and enhance a global advantage. Our results show that in capuchin monkeys, a local advantage emerges clearly even when these procedures are used. These results are of interest since extensive neurophysiological research is carried out on non-human primate vision, often taking for granted a similarity of visual skills in human and non-human primates. These behavioural results show that this assumption is not always warranted and that more research is needed to clarify the differences in the processes involved in basic visual skills among primates.