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Cai Y, Jin Z, Zhai C, Wang H, Wang J, Tang Y, Kwok SC. Time-sensitive prefrontal involvement in associating confidence with task performance illustrates metacognitive introspection in monkeys. Commun Biol 2022; 5:799. [PMID: 35945257 PMCID: PMC9363445 DOI: 10.1038/s42003-022-03762-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/29/2021] [Accepted: 07/22/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Metacognition refers to the ability to be aware of one's own cognition. Ample evidence indicates that metacognition in the human primate is highly dissociable from cognition, specialized across domains, and subserved by distinct neural substrates. However, these aspects remain relatively understudied in macaque monkeys. In the present study, we investigated the functionality of macaque metacognition by combining a confidence proxy, hierarchical Bayesian meta-d' computational modelling, and a single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation technique. We found that Brodmann area 46d (BA46d) played a critical role in supporting metacognition independent of task performance; we also found that the critical role of this region in meta-calculation was time-sensitive. Additionally, we report that macaque metacognition is highly domain-specific with respect to memory and perception decisions. These findings carry implications for our understanding of metacognitive introspection within the primate lineage.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yudian Cai
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China.,Division of Natural and Applied Sciences, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, 215316, China.,State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China
| | - Zhiyong Jin
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China.,Division of Natural and Applied Sciences, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, 215316, China.,State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China
| | - Chenxi Zhai
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China
| | - Huimin Wang
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China.,NYU-ECNU Institute of Brain and Cognitive Science at NYU Shanghai, Shanghai, 200062, China.,Shanghai Changning Mental Health Center, Shanghai, 200335, China
| | - Jijun Wang
- Brain Science and Technology Research Center, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200030, China.,CAS Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology (CEBSIT), Chinese Academy of Science, Shanghai, 200031, China.,Shanghai Key Laboratory of Psychotic Disorders, Shanghai Mental Health Center, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, 200030, China
| | - Yingying Tang
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Psychotic Disorders, Shanghai Mental Health Center, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, 200030, China.
| | - Sze Chai Kwok
- Shanghai Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics, Key Laboratory of Brain Functional Genomics Ministry of Education, Shanghai Key Laboratory of Magnetic Resonance, Affiliated Mental Health Center (ECNU), School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200062, China. .,Division of Natural and Applied Sciences, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, 215316, China. .,State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China. .,Shanghai Changning Mental Health Center, Shanghai, 200335, China.
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Garzorz I, Deroy O. Why There Is a Vestibular Sense, or How Metacognition Individuates the Senses. Multisens Res 2020; 34:261-280. [PMID: 33706282 DOI: 10.1163/22134808-bja10026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2019] [Accepted: 05/23/2020] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Should the vestibular system be counted as a sense? This basic conceptual question remains surprisingly controversial. While it is possible to distinguish specific vestibular organs, it is not clear that this suffices to identify a genuine vestibular sense because of the supposed absence of a distinctive vestibular personal-level manifestation. The vestibular organs instead contribute to more general multisensory representations, whose name still suggest that they have a distinct 'sensory' contribution. The vestibular case shows a good example of the challenge of individuating the senses when multisensory interactions are the norm, neurally, representationally and phenomenally. Here, we propose that an additional metacognitive criterion can be used to single out a distinct sense, besides the existence of specific organs and despite the fact that the information coming from these organs is integrated with other sensory information. We argue that it is possible for human perceivers to monitor information coming from distinct organs, despite their integration, as exhibited and measured through metacognitive performance. Based on the vestibular case, we suggest that metacognitive awareness of the information coming from sensory organs constitutes a new criterion to individuate a sense through both physiological and personal criteria. This new way of individuating the senses accommodates both the specialised nature of sensory receptors as well as the intricate multisensory aspect of neural processes and experience, while maintaining the idea that each sense contributes something special to how we monitor the world and ourselves, at the subjective level.
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Affiliation(s)
- Isabelle Garzorz
- Faculty of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany.,German Center for Vertigo and Balance Disorders (DSGZ), University Hospital of Munich, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany
| | - Ophelia Deroy
- Faculty of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany.,Munich Center for Neuroscience, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany.,Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, UK
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3
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Beck B, Peña-Vivas V, Fleming S, Haggard P. Metacognition across sensory modalities: Vision, warmth, and nociceptive pain. Cognition 2019; 186:32-41. [PMID: 30739057 PMCID: PMC6411924 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.01.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/23/2018] [Revised: 01/25/2019] [Accepted: 01/28/2019] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
The distinctive experience of pain, beyond mere processing of nociceptive inputs, is much debated in psychology and neuroscience. One aspect of perceptual experience is captured by metacognition—the ability to monitor and evaluate one’s own mental processes. We investigated confidence in judgements about nociceptive pain (i.e. pain that arises from the activation of nociceptors by a noxious stimulus) to determine whether metacognitive processes contribute to the distinctiveness of the pain experience. Our participants made intensity judgements about noxious heat, innocuous warmth, and visual contrast (first-order, perceptual decisions) and rated their confidence in those judgements (second-order, metacognitive decisions). First-order task performance between modalities was balanced using adaptive staircase procedures. For each modality, we quantified metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’)—the degree to which participants’ confidence reports were informed by the same evidence that contributed to their perceptual judgements—and metacognitive bias (mean confidence)—the participant’s tendency to report higher or lower confidence overall. We found no overall differences in metacognitive efficiency or mean confidence between modalities. Mean confidence ratings were highly correlated between all three tasks, reflecting stable inter-individual variability in metacognitive bias. However, metacognitive efficiency for pain varied independently of metacognitive efficiency for warmth and visual perception. That is, those participants who had higher metacognitive efficiency in the visual task also tended to have higher metacognitive efficiency in the warmth task, but not necessarily in the pain task. We thus suggest that some distinctive and idiosyncratic aspects of the pain experience may stem from additional variability at a metacognitive level. We further speculate that this additional variability may arise from the affective or arousal aspects of pain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brianna Beck
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
| | - Valentina Peña-Vivas
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Stephen Fleming
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom; Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Patrick Haggard
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Metacognitive-like information seeking in lion-tailed macaques: a generalized search response after all? Anim Cogn 2014; 17:1313-28. [PMID: 24913068 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-014-0767-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/10/2014] [Revised: 05/22/2014] [Accepted: 05/30/2014] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
Abstract
Previous research has demonstrated that Old World primates (both apes and monkeys) seek information about the location of a hidden food item, unless they are privy to the hiding process. This has been cited as evidence of metacognition. However, these results could also be interpreted using non-metacognitive accounts, including a generalized search response to uncertainty, in which subjects reach for food when it is seen, or search for food until it is spotted. In the present research, lion-tailed macaques were tested on an object-choice task. Conditions varied with respect to the visibility of the baiting process, and whether the location of the hidden food could be inferred by logical exclusion. Additionally, the hidden food could be located visually before a choice was made, by peering under the objects through a Plexiglas tray. Across conditions, monkeys consistently looked for the food when it had not been seen, even if its location could be inferred, despite the fact that these monkeys are capable of inference by exclusion. This suggests that apparently 'metacognitive' information seeking in monkeys may instead reflect a generalized search strategy. Alternatively, it is possible that monkeys only have metacognitive access to certain types of knowledge, including that obtained visually. Results are discussed with respect to the likelihood of metacognition in this species and the evolutionary emergence of metacognition across species.
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Marsh HL, MacDonald SE. Information seeking by orangutans: a generalized search strategy? Anim Cogn 2011; 15:293-304. [PMID: 21918872 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-011-0453-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2011] [Revised: 07/08/2011] [Accepted: 08/31/2011] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Recent empirical work has suggested that some species of non-human primates may be aware of their knowledge states. One finding to support this claim is that they seek information about the location of a hidden food item when they are unsure of its location, but not when they already know where it is, which purportedly demonstrates metacognition. However, this behaviour may instead reflect a generalized search strategy, in which subjects reach for food when they see it, and search for it when they do not. In this experiment, this possibility was addressed by testing orangutans in three conditions in which the location of a food item was sometimes known to subjects, and other times required subjects to visually seek the missing information. All subjects exhibited behaviour consistent with a metacognitive interpretation in at least two of the three conditions. Critically, in two of the conditions, subjects refrained from seeking visual information, and correctly found the hidden food item without ever seeing it, using inference by exclusion. The results suggest that animals that succeed in this information-seeking task are not merely acting according to a generalized search strategy, and instead seek information adaptively according to their knowledge states.
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Affiliation(s)
- Heidi L Marsh
- Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
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Abstract
The human response to uncertainty has been well studied in tasks requiring attention and declarative memory systems. However, uncertainty monitoring and control have not been studied in multi-dimensional, information-integration categorization tasks that rely on non-declarative procedural memory. Three experiments are described that investigated the human uncertainty response in such tasks. Experiment 1 showed that following standard categorization training, uncertainty responding was similar in information-integration tasks and rule-based tasks requiring declarative memory. In Experiment 2, however, uncertainty responding in untrained information-integration tasks impaired the ability of many participants to master those tasks. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that the deficit observed in Experiment 2 was not because of the uncertainty response option per se, but rather because the uncertainty response provided participants a mechanism via which to eliminate stimuli that were inconsistent with a simple declarative response strategy. These results are considered in the light of recent models of category learning and metacognition.
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