Rotational displacement skills in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Individual differences in sociocognitive traits in semi-free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Characterizing individual differences in cognition is crucial for understanding the evolution of cognition as well as to test the biological consequences of different cognitive traits. Here, we harnessed the strengths of a uniquely large, naturally-living primate population at the Cayo Santiago Biological Field Station to characterized individual differences in rhesus monkey performance across two social cognitive tasks. A total of n = 204 semi-free-ranging adult rhesus monkeys participated in a data collection procedure, where we aimed to test individuals on both tasks at two time-points that were one year apart. In the socioemotional responses task, we assessed monkeys' attention to conspecific photographs with neutral versus negative emotional expressions. We found that monkeys showed overall declines in interest in conspecific photographs with age, but relative increases in attention to threat stimuli specifically, and further that these responses exhibited long-term stability across repeated testing. In the gaze following task we assessed monkeys' propensity to co-orient with an experimenter. Here, we found no evidence for age-related change in responses, and responses showed only limited repeatability over time. Finally, we found some evidence for common individual variation for performance across the tasks: monkeys that showed greater interest in conspecific photographs were more likely to follow a human's gaze. These results show how studies of comparative cognitive development and aging can provide insights into the evolution of cognition, and identify core primate social cognitive traits that may be related across and within individuals.

Advancing methods for the biodemography of aging within social contexts

Several social dimensions including social integration, status, early-life adversity, and their interactions across the life course can predict health, reproduction, and mortality in humans. Accordingly, the social environment plays a fundamental role in the emergence of phenotypes driving the evolution of aging. Recent work placing human social gradients on a biological continuum with other species provides a useful evolutionary context for aging questions, but there is still a need for a unified evolutionary framework linking health and aging within social contexts. Here, we summarize current challenges to understand the role of the social environment in human life courses. Next, we review recent advances in comparative biodemography and propose a biodemographic perspective to address socially driven health phenotype distributions and their evolutionary consequences using a nonhuman primate population. This new comparative approach uses evolutionary demography to address the joint dynamics of populations, social dimensions, phenotypes, and life history parameters. The long-term goal is to advance our understanding of the link between individual social environments, population-level outcomes, and the evolution of aging.

Eye-tracking as a window into primate social cognition

Over the past decade, noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking research with primates has transformed our understanding of primate social cognition. The use of this technology with many primate species allows for the exploration and comparison of how these species attend to and understand social agents and interactions. The ability to compare and contrast the cognitive capacities of various primate species, including humans, provides insight into the evolutionary mechanisms and selective pressures that have likely shaped social cognition in similar and divergent ways across the primate order. In this review, we begin by discussing noninvasive behavioral methods used to measure primate gaze and attention before the introduction of noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking methodologies. Next, we focus on findings from recent eye-tracking research on primate social cognition, beginning with simple visual and search mechanisms. We then discuss the results that have built on this basic understanding of how primates view images and videos, exploring discrimination and knowledge of social agents, following social cues, tracking perspectives and predicting behavior, and the combination of eye-tracking and other behavioral and physiological methods. Finally, we discuss some future directions of noninvasive eye-tracking research on primate social cognition and current eye-tracking work-in-progress that builds on these previous studies, investigating underexplored socio-cognitive capacities and utilizing new methodologies.

The application of noninvasive, restraint-free eye-tracking methods for use with nonhuman primates

Over the past 50 years there has been a strong interest in applying eye-tracking techniques to study a myriad of questions related to human and nonhuman primate psychological processes. Eye movements and fixations can provide qualitative and quantitative insights into cognitive processes of nonverbal populations such as nonhuman primates, clarifying the evolutionary, physiological, and representational underpinnings of human cognition. While early attempts at nonhuman primate eye tracking were relatively crude, later, more sophisticated and sensitive techniques required invasive protocols and the use of restraint. In the past decade, technology has advanced to a point where noninvasive eye-tracking techniques, developed for use with human participants, can be applied for use with nonhuman primates in a restraint-free manner. Here we review the corpus of recent studies (N=32) that take such an approach. Despite the growing interest in eye-tracking research, there is still little consensus on "best practices," both in terms of deploying test protocols or reporting methods and results. Therefore, we look to advances made in the field of developmental psychology, as well as our own collective experiences using eye trackers with nonhuman primates, to highlight key elements that researchers should consider when designing noninvasive restraint-free eye-tracking research protocols for use with nonhuman primates. Beyond promoting best practices for research protocols, we also outline an ideal approach for reporting such research and highlight future directions for the field.

Macaque species with varying social tolerance show no differences in understanding what other agents perceive

A growing body of work demonstrates that a species' socioecology can impact its cognitive abilities. Indeed, even closely related species with different socioecological pressures often show different patterns of cognitive performance on the same task. Here, we explore whether major differences in social tolerance in two closely related macaque species can impact a core sociocognitive ability, the capacity to recognize what others see. Specifically, we compared the performance of Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus, n = 80) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta, n = 62) on a standard test of visual perspective understanding. In contrast to the difference in performance, one might expect from these species' divergent socioecologies that our results show similar performance across Barbary and rhesus macaques, with both species forming expectations about how another agent will act based on that agent's visual perspective. These results suggest that differences in socioecology may not play as big of a role in the evolution of some theory of mind capacities as they do in other decision-making or foraging contexts.

The evolutionary origins of natural pedagogy: Rhesus monkeys show sustained attention following nonsocial cues versus social communicative signals

The natural pedagogy hypothesis proposes that human infants preferentially attend to communicative signals from others, facilitating rapid cultural learning. In this view, sensitivity to such signals is a uniquely human adaptation and as such nonhuman animals should not produce or utilize these communicative signals. We test these evolutionary predictions by examining sensitivity to communicative cues in 206 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) using an expectancy looking time task modeled on prior work with infants. Monkeys observed a human actor who either made eye contact and vocalized to the monkey (social cue), or waved a fruit in front of her face and produced a tapping sound (nonsocial cue). The actor then either looked at an object (referential look) or looked toward empty space (look away). We found that, unlike human infants in analogous situations, rhesus monkeys looked longer at events following nonsocial cues, regardless of the demonstrator's subsequent looking behavior. Moreover younger and older monkeys showed similar patterns of responses across development. These results provide support for the natural pedagogy hypothesis, while also highlighting evolutionary changes in human sensitivity to communicative signals.

Rhesus macaques use probabilities to predict future events

Humans can use an intuitive sense of statistics to make predictions about uncertain future events, a cognitive skill that underpins logical and mathematical reasoning. Recent research shows that some of these abilities for statistical inferences can emerge in preverbal infants and non-human primates such as apes and capuchins. An important question is therefore whether animals share the full complement of intuitive reasoning abilities demonstrated by humans, as well as what evolutionary contexts promote the emergence of such skills. Here, we examined whether free-ranging rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) can use probability information to infer the most likely outcome of a random lottery, in the first test of whether primates can make such inferences in the absence of direct prior experience. We developed a novel expectancy-violation looking time task, adapted from prior studies of infants, in order to assess the monkeys' expectations. In Study 1, we confirmed that monkeys (n = 20) looked similarly at different sampled items if they had no prior knowledge about the population they were drawn from. In Study 2, monkeys (n = 80) saw a dynamic 'lottery' machine containing a mix of two types of fruit outcomes, and then saw either the more common fruit (expected trial) or the relatively rare fruit (unexpected trial) fall from the machine. We found that monkeys looked longer when they witnessed the unexpected outcome. In Study 3, we confirmed that this effect depended on the causal relationship between the sample and the population, not visual mismatch: monkeys (n = 80) looked equally at both outcomes if the experimenter pulled the sampled item from her pocket. These results reveal that rhesus monkeys spontaneously use information about probability to reason about likely outcomes, and show how comparative studies of nonhumans can disentangle the evolutionary history of logical reasoning capacities.

What do monkeys know about others' knowledge?

Recently, comparative psychologists have suggested that primates represent others' knowledge states. Evidence for this claim comes from studies demonstrating that primates expect others to maintain representations of objects when those objects are not currently visible. However, little work has explored whether nonhuman primates expect others to share the more sophisticated kinds of object knowledge that they themselves possess. We therefore investigated whether primates attribute to others knowledge that is acquired through the mental transformation of a static object representation. Specifically, we tested whether rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) expected a human demonstrator to solve a difficult rotational displacement task. In Experiment 1, monkeys watched a demonstrator hide a piece of fruit in one of two boxes. The monkey and the demonstrator then watched the boxes rotate 180°. We found that monkeys looked longer when the demonstrator reached into the box that did not contain the fruit, indicating that they expected her to be able to track the fruit to its current location. In Experiment 2, we ruled out the possibility that monkeys simply expected the demonstrator to search for the food in its true location. When the demonstrator did not witness the rotation event, monkeys looked equally long at the two reaching outcomes. These results are consistent with the interpretation that rhesus macaques expect others to dynamically update their representations of unseen objects.

Studying primate cognition in a social setting to improve validity and welfare: a literature review highlighting successful approaches

BACKGROUND

Studying animal cognition in a social setting is associated with practical and statistical challenges. However, conducting cognitive research without disturbing species-typical social groups can increase ecological validity, minimize distress, and improve animal welfare. Here, we review the existing literature on cognitive research run with primates in a social setting in order to determine how widespread such testing is and highlight approaches that may guide future research planning.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Using Google Scholar to search the terms "primate" "cognition" "experiment" and "social group," we conducted a systematic literature search covering 16 years (2000-2015 inclusive). We then conducted two supplemental searches within each journal that contained a publication meeting our criteria in the original search, using the terms "primate" and "playback" in one search and the terms "primate" "cognition" and "social group" in the second. The results were used to assess how frequently nonhuman primate cognition has been studied in a social setting (>3 individuals), to gain perspective on the species and topics that have been studied, and to extract successful approaches for social testing.

RESULTS

Our search revealed 248 unique publications in 43 journals encompassing 71 species. The absolute number of publications has increased over years, suggesting viable strategies for studying cognition in social settings. While a wide range of species were studied they were not equally represented, with 19% of the publications reporting data for chimpanzees. Field sites were the most common environment for experiments run in social groups of primates, accounting for more than half of the results. Approaches to mitigating the practical and statistical challenges were identified.

DISCUSSION

This analysis has revealed that the study of primate cognition in a social setting is increasing and taking place across a range of environments. This literature review calls attention to examples that may provide valuable models for researchers wishing to overcome potential practical and statistical challenges to studying cognition in a social setting, ultimately increasing validity and improving the welfare of the primates we study.

A decade of theory of mind research on Cayo Santiago: Insights into rhesus macaque social cognition

Over the past several decades, researchers have become increasingly interested in understanding how primates understand the behavior of others. One open question concerns whether nonhuman primates think about others' behavior in psychological terms, that is, whether they have a theory of mind. Over the last ten years, experiments conducted on the free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) living on Cayo Santiago have provided important insights into this question. In this review, we highlight what we think are some of the most exciting results of this body of work. Specifically we describe experiments suggesting that rhesus monkeys may understand some psychological states, such as what others see, hear, and know, but that they fail to demonstrate an understanding of others' beliefs. Thus, while some aspects of theory of mind may be shared between humans and other primates, others capacities are likely to be uniquely human. We also discuss some of the broader debates surrounding comparative theory of mind research, as well as what we think may be productive lines for future research with the rhesus macaques of Cayo Santiago.

Comparative developmental psychology: how is human cognitive development unique?

The fields of developmental and comparative psychology both seek to illuminate the roots of adult cognitive systems. Developmental studies target the emergence of adult cognitive systems over ontogenetic time, whereas comparative studies investigate the origins of human cognition in our evolutionary history. Despite the long tradition of research in both of these areas, little work has examined the intersection of the two: the study of cognitive development in a comparative perspective. In the current article, we review recent work using this comparative developmental approach to study non-human primate cognition. We argue that comparative data on the pace and pattern of cognitive development across species can address major theoretical questions in both psychology and biology. In particular, such integrative research will allow stronger biological inferences about the function of developmental change, and will be critical in addressing how humans come to acquire species-unique cognitive abilities.

Comparative developmental psychology: how is human cognitive development unique?

The fields of developmental and comparative psychology both seek to illuminate the roots of adult cognitive systems. Developmental studies target the emergence of adult cognitive systems over ontogenetic time, whereas comparative studies investigate the origins of human cognition in our evolutionary history. Despite the long tradition of research in both of these areas, little work has examined the intersection of the two: the study of cognitive development in a comparative perspective. In the current article, we review recent work using this comparative developmental approach to study non-human primate cognition. We argue that comparative data on the pace and pattern of cognitive development across species can address major theoretical questions in both psychology and biology. In particular, such integrative research will allow stronger biological inferences about the function of developmental change, and will be critical in addressing how humans come to acquire species-unique cognitive abilities.