Children's competence or adults' incompetence: different developmental trajectories in different tasks

Present simple and continuous: emergence of self-regulation and contextual sophistication in adolescent decision-making

Sophisticated, intentional decision-making is a hallmark of mature, self-aware behaviour. Although neural, psychological, interpersonal, and socioeconomic elements that contribute to such adaptive, foresighted behaviour mature and/or change throughout the life-span, here we concentrate on relevant maturational processes that take place during adolescence, a period of disproportionate developmental opportunity and risk. A brief, eclectic overview is presented of recent evidence, new challenges, and current thinking on the fundamental mechanisms that mature throughout adolescence to support adaptive, self-controlled decision-making. This is followed by a proposal for the putative contribution of frontostriatal mechanisms to the moment-to-moment assembly of evaluative heuristics that mediate increased decision-making sophistication, promoting the maturation of self-regulated behaviour through adolescence and young adulthood.

Developmental reversals in risky decision making: intelligence agents show larger decision biases than college students

Intelligence agents make risky decisions routinely, with serious consequences for national security. Although common sense and most theories imply that experienced intelligence professionals should be less prone to irrational inconsistencies than college students, we show the opposite. Moreover, the growth of experience-based intuition predicts this developmental reversal. We presented intelligence agents, college students, and postcollege adults with 30 risky-choice problems in gain and loss frames and then compared the three groups' decisions. The agents not only exhibited larger framing biases than the students, but also were more confident in their decisions. The postcollege adults (who were selected to be similar to the students) occupied an interesting middle ground, being generally as biased as the students (sometimes more biased) but less biased than the agents. An experimental manipulation testing an explanation for these effects, derived from fuzzy-trace theory, made the students look as biased as the agents. These results show that, although framing biases are irrational (because equivalent outcomes are treated differently), they are the ironical output of cognitively advanced mechanisms of meaning making.