The transfer of category knowledge by macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens)

Primate cognition in zoos: Reviewing the impact of zoo-based research over 15 years

Primate cognition research is reliant on access to members of the study sp ecies and logistical infrastructures to conduct observations and experiments. Historically founded in research centers and private collections, and spreading to modern zoos, sanctuaries, and the field, primate cognition has been investigated in diverse settings, each with benefits and challenges. In our systematic review of 12 primatology, animal behavior, and animal cognition journals over the last 15 years, we turn a spotlight on zoos to quantify their current impact on the field and to highlight their potential as robust contributors to future work. To put zoo-based research in context, we compare zoos to three other site types: university-owned or independent research centers, sanctuaries, and field sites. We assess the contributions of zoos across several critical considerations in primate cognition research, including number of investigations, species diversity, sample size, research topic diversity, and methodology. We identified 1119 publications reporting studies of primate cognition, almost 25% of which report research conducted in zoos. Across publications, zoo-based research has greater species diversity than research centers and covers a diverse range of research topics. Although our review is merely a snapshot of primate cognition research, our findings suggest that zoos may present advantages to researchers regarding species diversity, and lack some of the methodological constraints of field sites, allowing greater ease of access to a diverse range of subjects for cognition investigations. We suggest that zoos have great potential as key contributors for future investigations in primate cognition. Finally, we shed light on the symbiotic relationship that can emerge between researchers and zoos, forming partnerships that bring unique advantages to both parties.

Applying Insights on Categorisation, Communication, and Dynamic Decision-Making: A Case Study of a ‘Simple’ Maritime Military Decision

A complete understanding of decision-making in military domains requires gathering insights from several fields of study. To make the task tractable, here we consider a specific example of short-term tactical decisions under uncertainty made by the military at sea. Through this lens, we sketch out relevant literature from three psychological tasks each underpinned by decision-making processes: categorisation, communication and choice. From the literature, we note two general cognitive tendencies that emerge across all three stages: the effect of cognitive load and individual differences. Drawing on these tendencies, we recommend strategies, tools and future research that could improve performance in military domains – but, by extension, would also generalise to other high-stakes contexts. In so doing, we show the extent to which domain general properties of high order cognition are sufficient in explaining behaviours in domain specific contexts.

A Dissociative Framework for Understanding Same-Different Conceptualization

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been interested in humans' and animals' ability to respond to abstract relations. Cross-species research has used relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which participants try to find stimulus pairs that "match" because they express the same abstract relation (same or different). Researchers seek to understand the cognitive processes that underlie successful matching, and the cognitive constraints that create species differences in these tasks. Here we describe a dissociative framework drawn from cognitive neuroscience. It has strong potential to illuminate the area of same-different conceptualization. It has already influenced comparative research on categorization and metacognition. This dissociative framework also shows that species differences in same-different conceptualization have resonance with species differences in other comparative domains.

Within-session dynamics of categorical and memory mechanisms in pigeons

The current experiments used categorical mid-session reversal (MSR) to examine how eight pigeons utilized categorical and item-specific mechanisms to learn and solve a novel variation of this task. Employing a fixed order of trial-unique pictorial items from two categories (flowers and cars) on each simultaneous discrimination trial, categorical and item-specific information was available during each session's 80 trials. Choices to one category were rewarded for the first 40 trials, after which the correct category was reversed (e.g., car correct early → flower correct late). This procedure selectively impacts the time-modulated utility of categorical identification, but leaves exclusively item-specific information intact. Results revealed that categorical control emerged rapidly and before item-specific memorization, which came after extended experience. Both types of control occurred within a session, with control modulated by their time-based relative utility. The implications for the timing, ordering, and attention by animals to categorical and item-specific information is considered.

Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) learn two-choice discriminations under displaced reinforcement

To explain animal learning, researchers invoke a dominant associative construct. In contrast, researchers freely acknowledge humans' explicit-declarative learning capacity. Here, we stretched animals' learning performance toward the explicit pole of cognition. We tested four macaques (Macaca mulatta) in new discrimination-learning paradigms. Monkeys learned a series of two-choice discrimination tasks. But immediate reinforcement was denied. Instead, reinforcement was lagged-monkeys received feedback for trial N only after seeing and responding to the N + 1-trial stimulus. Theory suggests that lagged reinforcement will eliminate a dominant form of implicit discrimination learning. Yet monkeys still learned successfully. Thus, monkeys may have alternative learning algorithms usable when reinforcement is displaced and reinforcement learning undermined. This learning may, as in humans, take a more explicit form. This and related methods that disable associative learning-fostering a possible transition to explicit cognition-could have empirical utility and theoretical significance within comparative psychology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Monkey Metacognition Could Generate More Insight

Monkeys demonstrate metacognition by avoiding memory tests when they forget, seeking information when ignorant, and gambling sensibly after making judgments. Some of this metacognition appears to be based on introspection of private mental states. It is likely that nonhuman cognitive systems, like human systems, differ in accessibility to such introspective metacognition, and the extent to which differences in access map to explicit and implicit cognition will be an important topic for future work. It will be exciting to learn more about the distribution of metacognition among species, and the conditions under which metacognition evolves.

Pigeon category learning: Revisiting the Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) tasks

In a seminal study, Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961; henceforth SHJ) assessed potential mechanisms involved in categorization learning. To do so, they sequentially trained human participants with 6 different visual categorization tasks that varied in structural complexity. Humans' exceptionally strong performance on 1 of these tasks (Type 2, organized around exclusive-or relations) could not be solely explained by structural complexity, and has since been considered the hallmark of rule-use in these tasks. In the present project, we concurrently trained pigeons on all 6 SHJ tasks. Our results revealed that the structural complexity of the tasks was highly correlated with group-level performance. Nevertheless, we observed notable individual differences in performance. Two extensions of a prominent categorization model, ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992), suggested that disparities in the discriminability of the dimensions used to construct the experimental stimuli could account for these differences. Overall, our pigeons' generally weak performance on the Type 2 task provides no evidence of rule-use on the SHJ tasks. Pigeons thus join monkeys in the contingent of species that solve these categorization tasks solely on the basis of the physical properties of the training stimuli. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Selective attention in rat visual category learning

A prominent theory of category learning, COVIS, posits that new categories are learned with either a declarative or procedural system, depending on the task. The declarative system uses the prefrontal cortex (PFC) to learn rule-based (RB) category tasks in which there is one relevant sensory dimension that can be used to establish a rule for solving the task, whereas the procedural system uses corticostriatal circuits for information integration (II) tasks in which there are multiple relevant dimensions, precluding use of explicit rules. Previous studies have found faster learning of RB versus II tasks in humans and monkeys but not in pigeons. The absence of a learning rate difference in pigeons has been attributed to their lacking a PFC. A major gap in this comparative analysis, however, is the lack of data from a nonprimate mammalian species, such as rats, that have a PFC but a less differentiated PFC than primates. Here, we investigated RB and II category learning in rats. Similar to pigeons, RB and II tasks were learned at the same rate. After reaching a learning criterion, wider distributions of stimuli were presented to examine generalization. A second experiment found equivalent RB and II learning with wider category distributions. Computational modeling revealed that rats extract and selectively attend to category-relevant information but do not consistently use rules to solve the RB task. These findings suggest rats are on a continuum of PFC function between birds and primates, with selective attention but limited ability to utilize rules relative to primates.

Testing analogical rule transfer in pigeons (Columba livia)

Categorization is an essential cognitive process useful for transferring knowledge from previous experience to novel situations. The mechanisms by which trained categorization behavior extends to novel stimuli, especially in animals, are insufficiently understood. To understand how pigeons learn and transfer category membership, seven pigeons were trained to classify controlled, bi-dimensional stimuli in a two-alternative forced-choice task. Following either dimensional, rule-based (RB) or information integration (II) training, tests were conducted focusing on the "analogical" extension of the learned discrimination to novel regions of the stimulus space (Casale, Roeder, & Ashby, 2012). The pigeons' results mirrored those from human and non-human primates evaluated using the same analogical task structure, training and testing: the pigeons transferred their discriminative behavior to the new extended values following RB training, but not after II training. Further experiments evaluating rule-based models and association-based models suggested the pigeons use dimensions and associations to learn the task and mediate transfer to stimuli within the novel region of the parametric stimulus space.