Like chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), pigeons (Columba livia domestica) match and Nash equilibrate where humans (Homo sapiens) do not

Matching Behaviours and Rewards

Matching describes how behaviour is related to rewards. The matching law holds when the ratio of an individual's behaviours equals the ratio of the rewards obtained. From its origins in the study of pigeons working for food in the laboratory, the law has been applied to a range of species, both in the laboratory and outside it (e.g., human sporting decisions). Probability matching occurs when the probability of a behaviour equals the probability of being rewarded. Input matching predicts the distribution of individuals across habitats. We evaluate the rationality of the matching law and probability matching, expose the logic of matching in real-world cases, review how recent neuroscience findings relate to matching, and suggest future research directions.

Learning, exploitation and bias in games

We focus on learning during development in a group of individuals that play a competitive game with each other. The game has two actions and there is negative frequency dependence. We define the distribution of actions by group members to be an equilibrium configuration if no individual can improve its payoff by unilaterally changing its action. We show that at this equilibrium, one action is preferred in the sense that those taking the preferred action have a higher payoff than those taking the other, more prosocial, action. We explore the consequences of a simple 'unbiased' reinforcement learning rule during development, showing that groups reach an approximate equilibrium distribution, so that some achieve a higher payoff than others. Because there is learning, an individual's behaviour can influence the future behaviour of others. We show that, as a consequence, there is the potential for an individual to exploit others by influencing them to be the ones to take the non-preferred action. Using an evolutionary simulation, we show that population members can avoid being exploited by over-valuing rewards obtained from the preferred option during learning, an example of a bias that is 'rational'.

Behavioural Isomorphism, Cognitive Economy and Recursive Thought in Non-Transitive Game Strategy

Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for mutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under pressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees the lack of exploitation is to perform randomly in accordance with mixed-strategy. However, such behavior is thought to be outside bounded rationality and so decision-making can become deterministic, predictable, and ultimately exploitable. This review identifies similarities across economics, neuroscience, nonlinear dynamics, human, and animal cognition literatures, and provides a taxonomy of RPS strategy. RPS strategies are discussed in terms of (a) whether the relevant computations require sensitivity to item frequency, the cyclic relationships between responses, or the outcome of the previous trial, and (b) whether the strategy is framed around the self or other. The negative implication of this taxonomy is that despite the differences in cognitive economy and recursive thought, many of the identified strategies are behaviorally isomorphic. This makes it difficult to infer strategy from behavior. The positive implication is that this isomorphism can be used as a novel design feature in furthering our understanding of the attribution, agency, and acquisition of strategy in RPS and other game spaces.