Neuroscience in court: The painful truth

Measuring the mental

Many philosophers have argued that the subjective character of conscious experience results in a fundamental deficit of third-person (henceforth: extrospective) access to first-person experience. By comparing extrospective measurement techniques with measurement techniques in the natural sciences, we will argue that extrospective methods suffer from no such deficit. After a rejection of some principled objections against extrospective methods, a historical comparison with the development of measurement techniques in the natural sciences will show that extrospective measuring methods are still in an early stage of development. However, they can be significantly improved by way of a bootstrapping strategy, similar to that which has proven successful in the development of physical measurement techniques. One reason to expect such improvement is the availability of multiple sources of evidence, which should allow for substantial advances in extrospective measurement techniques. Finally, we will discuss new developments in pain measurement in order to show that the bootstrapping strategy is already bearing fruit.

Brain dysfunction in chronic pain patients assessed by resting-state electroencephalography

Chronic pain is a common and severely disabling disease whose treatment is often unsatisfactory. Insights into the brain mechanisms of chronic pain promise to advance the understanding of the underlying pathophysiology and might help to develop disease markers and novel treatments. Here, we systematically exploited the potential of electroencephalography to determine abnormalities of brain function during the resting state in chronic pain. To this end, we performed state-of-the-art analyses of oscillatory brain activity, brain connectivity, and brain networks in 101 patients of either sex suffering from chronic pain. The results show that global and local measures of brain activity did not differ between chronic pain patients and a healthy control group. However, we observed significantly increased connectivity at theta (4-8 Hz) and gamma (>60 Hz) frequencies in frontal brain areas as well as global network reorganization at gamma frequencies in chronic pain patients. Furthermore, a machine learning algorithm could differentiate between patients and healthy controls with an above-chance accuracy of 57%, mostly based on frontal connectivity. These results suggest that increased theta and gamma synchrony in frontal brain areas are involved in the pathophysiology of chronic pain. Although substantial challenges concerning the reproducibility of the findings and the accuracy, specificity, and validity of potential electroencephalography-based disease markers remain to be overcome, our study indicates that abnormal frontal synchrony at theta and gamma frequencies might be promising targets for noninvasive brain stimulation and/or neurofeedback approaches.

The search for pain biomarkers in the human brain

Non-invasive functional brain imaging is used more than ever to investigate pain in health and disease, with the prospect of finding new means to alleviate pain and improve patient wellbeing. The observation that several brain areas are activated by transient painful stimuli, and that the magnitude of this activity is often graded with pain intensity, has prompted researchers to extract features of brain activity that could serve as biomarkers to measure pain objectively. However, most of the brain responses observed when pain is present can also be observed when pain is absent. For example, similar brain responses can be elicited by salient but non-painful auditory, tactile and visual stimuli, and such responses can even be recorded in patients with congenital analgesia. Thus, as argued in this review, there is still disagreement on the degree to which current measures of brain activity exactly relate to pain. Furthermore, whether more recent analysis techniques can be used to identify distributed patterns of brain activity specific for pain can be only warranted using carefully designed control conditions. On a more general level, the clinical utility of current pain biomarkers derived from human functional neuroimaging appears to be overstated, and evidence for their efficacy in real-life clinical conditions is scarce. Rather than searching for biomarkers of pain perception, several researchers are developing biomarkers to achieve mechanism-based stratification of pain conditions, predict response to medication and offer personalized treatments. Initial results with promising clinical perspectives need to be further tested for replicability and generalizability.

Identifying Criteria for the Evaluation of the Implications of Brain Reading for Mental Privacy

Contemporary brain reading technologies promise to provide the possibility to decode and interpret mental states and processes. Brain reading could have numerous societally relevant implications. In particular, the private character of mind might be affected, generating ethical and legal concerns. This paper aims at equipping ethicists and policy makers with conceptual tools to support an evaluation of the potential applicability and the implications of current and near future brain reading technology. We start with clarifying the concepts of mind reading and brain reading, and the different kinds of mental states that could in principle be read. Subsequently, we devise an evaluative framework that is composed of five criteria-accuracy, reliability, informativity, concealability and enforceability-aimed at enabling a clearer estimation of the degree to which brain reading might be realistically deployed in contexts where mental privacy could be at stake. While accuracy and reliability capture how well a certain method can access mental content, informativity indicates the relevance the obtainable data have for practical purposes. Concealability and enforceability are particularly important for the evaluation of concerns about potential violations of mental privacy and civil rights. The former concerns the degree with which a brain reading method can be concealed from an individual's perception or awareness. The latter regards the extent to which a method can be used against somebody's will. With the help of these criteria, stakeholders can orient themselves in the rapidly developing field of brain reading.

Neuroscience and Social Problems: The Case of Neuropunishment

Neuroscientific interventions are increasingly proposed as solutions for social problems, beyond their application in biomedicine. For example, there is increasing interest, particularly from outside commentators, in harnessing neuroscientific advances as an alternative method of punishing criminal offenders. Such neuropunishments are seen as a potentially more effective, less costly, and more humane alternative to incarceration, with overall better results for offender, communities, and societies. This article considers whether neuroscience as a field should engage more actively with such proposals, and whether more research should be done to explore the use of neurointerventions for punishment. It concludes that neuroscientists and those working at the intersection of neuroscience and the clinic should actively shape these debates.

Legal Evidence of Subjective States: A Brain-Based Model of Chronic Pain Increases Accuracy and Fairness in Law

Advances in structural and functional neuroimaging offer new ways to conceptualize chronic pain disorders and to prevent, diagnose, and treat chronic pain. Advances in pain science, though, do not entail changes in the concepts of chronic pain in law and culture. Authoritative legal and cultural conceptions of chronic pain continue to promote abstruse theories, characterizing these disorders as arising out of everything from a person's unmet need for love to resistance to "patriarchy." These constructs have consequences, impeding treatment and affecting whether individuals with chronic pain can obtain legal redress. Legal systems themselves are disadvantaged, as adjudicators struggle to make sense of regulations and presumptions at odds with the medical evidence that they must evaluate. Law's pain schema is so misdescriptive that, paradoxically, it can reward fraudulent claims and disadvantage legitimate ones. This review discusses advances in neuroimaging and related sciences that are contributing to an emerging neurological model of chronic pain. It then describes doctrines and cases in the United States and United Kingdom, demonstrating how law's pre-neurological model of pain complicates the legal process for all participants. It concludes with suggestions for doctrinal revisions, which may have broader effects on law's long-standing dualistic conception of body versus mind.

Asymmetries in reciprocal baroreflex mechanisms and chronic pain severity: Focusing on irritable bowel syndrome

BACKGROUND

Objective measures of pain severity remain ill defined, although its accurate measurement is critical. Reciprocal baroreflex mechanisms of blood pressure (BP) control were found to impact differently on pain regulation, and thus their asymmetry was hypothesized to also connect to chronic pain duration and severity.

METHODS

Seventy-eight female patients with irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) and 27 healthy women were assessed for IBS severity and chronicity, negative affect, and various measures of resting autonomic function including BP, heart rate and its variability (HRV), baroreceptor-sensitivity to activations and inhibitions, gains of brady- and tachy-cardiac baro-responses, gains of BP falls/rises, and BP start points for these spontaneous baroreflexes.

KEY RESULTS

IBS directly and indirectly (through increased negative affect) was associated with asymmetry between baroreceptor activations/inhibitions compared to symmetrical baroreflex reciprocity in the healthy women. In the IBS group, independently of specific IBS symptoms, pain chronicity was associated with (i) decreased BP falls coupled with either (a) decreased tachycardia associated with lower disease severity (earlier "pain resilience" mechanism), or (b) decreased bradycardia associated with higher disease severity (later "pain decompensation" mechanism), or (ii) increased BP start point for baroreceptor activations coupled with either (a) BP increase (delayed "pain adaptation" mechanism) or (b) affect-related HRV decrease (delayed "pain aggravation" mechanism).

CONCLUSION AND INFERENCES

We anticipate the findings to be a starting point for validating these autonomic metrics of pain suffering and pain coping mechanisms in other chronic pain syndromes to suggest them as biomarkers of its severity and duration for profiling and correct management of chronic pain patients.

Brain imaging tests for chronic pain: medical, legal and ethical issues and recommendations

Chronic pain is the greatest source of disability globally and claims related to chronic pain feature in many insurance and medico-legal cases. Brain imaging (for example, functional MRI, PET, EEG and magnetoencephalography) is widely considered to have potential for diagnosis, prognostication, and prediction of treatment outcome in patients with chronic pain. In this Consensus Statement, a presidential task force of the International Association for the Study of Pain examines the capabilities of brain imaging in the diagnosis of chronic pain, and the ethical and legal implications of its use in this way. The task force emphasizes that the use of brain imaging in this context is in a discovery phase, but has the potential to increase our understanding of the neural underpinnings of chronic pain, inform the development of therapeutic agents, and predict treatment outcomes for use in personalized pain management. The task force proposes standards of evidence that must be satisfied before any brain imaging measure can be considered suitable for clinical or legal purposes. The admissibility of such evidence in legal cases also strongly depends on laws that vary between jurisdictions. For these reasons, the task force concludes that the use of brain imaging findings to support or dispute a claim of chronic pain - effectively as a pain lie detector - is not warranted, but that imaging should be used to further our understanding of the mechanisms underlying pain.

Neuroscience of Childhood Poverty: Evidence of Impacts and Mechanisms as Vehicles of Dialog With Ethics

Several studies have identified associations between poverty and development of self-regulation during childhood, which is broadly defined as those skills involved in cognitive, emotional, and stress self-regulation. These skills are influenced by different individual and contextual factors at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., individual, family, social, and cultural). Available evidence suggests that the influences of those biological, psychosocial, and sociocultural factors on emotional and cognitive development can vary according to the type, number, accumulation of risks, and co-occurrence of adverse circumstances that are related to poverty, the time in which these factors exert their influences, and the individual susceptibility to them. Complementary, during the past three decades, several experimental interventions that were aimed at optimizing development of self-regulation of children who live in poverty have been designed, implemented, and evaluated. Their results suggest that it is possible to optimize different aspects of cognitive performance and that it would be possible to transfer some aspects of these gains to other cognitive domains and academic achievement. We suggest that it is an important task for ethics, notably but not exclusively neuroethics, to engage in this interdisciplinary research domain to contribute analyses of key concepts, arguments, and interpretations. The specific evidence that neuroscience brings to the analyses of poverty and its implications needs to be spelled out in detail and clarified conceptually, notably in terms of causes of and attitudes toward poverty, implications of poverty for brain development, and for the possibilities to reduce and reverse these effects.

Legal and ethical issues of using brain imaging to diagnose pain

Pain, by definition, is a subjective experience, and as such its presence has usually been based on a self-report. However, limitations of self-reports for pain diagnostics, particularly for legal and insurance purposes, has led some to consider a brain-imaging-based objective measure of pain. This review will provide an overview of (1) differences between pain and nociception, (2) intersubject variability in pain perception and the associated brain structures and functional circuits, and (3) capabilities and limitations of current brain-imaging technologies. I then discuss how these factors impact objective proxies of pain. Finally, the ethical, privacy, and legal implications of a brain-imaging-based objective measure of pain are considered as potential future technological developments necessary to create a so-called "painometer test."

Painful Issues in Pain Prediction

How perception of pain emerges from neural activity is largely unknown. Identifying a neural 'pain signature' and deriving a way to predict perceived pain from brain activity would have enormous basic and clinical implications. Researchers are increasingly turning to functional brain imaging, often applying machine-learning algorithms to infer that pain perception occurred. Yet, such sophisticated analyses are fraught with interpretive difficulties. Here, we highlight some common and troublesome problems in the literature, and suggest methods to ensure researchers draw accurate conclusions from their results. Since functional brain imaging is increasingly finding practical applications with real-world consequences, it is critical to interpret brain scans accurately, because decisions based on neural data will only be as good as the science behind them.

The dorsal posterior insula is not an island in pain but subserves a fundamental role - Response to: "Evidence against pain specificity in the dorsal posterior insula" by Davis et al

An interesting and valuable discussion has arisen from our recent article (Segerdahl, Mezue et al., 2015) and we are pleased here to have the opportunity to expand on the various points we made. Equally important, we wish to correct several important misunderstandings that were made by Davis and colleagues that possibly contributed to their concerns about power when assessing our paper (e.g. actual subject numbers used in control experiment and the reality of the signal-to-noise and sampling of the multi-TI technique we employed). Here, we clarify the methods and analysis plus discuss how we interpret the data in the Brief Communication noting that the extrapolation and inferences made by Davis and colleagues are not consistent with our report or necessarily, in our opinion, what the data supports. We trust this reassures the F1000Research readership regarding the robustness of our results and what we actually concluded in the paper regarding their possible meaning. We are pleased, though, that Davis and colleagues have used our article to raise an important discussion around pain perception, and here offer some further insights towards that broader discussion.

Evidence against pain specificity in the dorsal posterior insula

The search for a “pain centre” in the brain has long eluded neuroscientists.  Although many regions of the brain have been shown to respond to painful stimuli, all of these regions also respond to other types of salient stimuli. In a recent paper, Segerdahl et al. (Nature Neuroscience, 2015)  claims that the dorsal posterior insula (dpIns) is a pain-specific region based on the observation that the magnitude of regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) fluctuations in the dpIns correlated with the magnitude of evoked pain.  However, such a conclusion is, simply, not justified by the experimental evidence provided.  Here we discuss three major factors that seriously question this claim.