Quantifying backflash radiation to prevent zero-error attacks in quantum key distribution

Dynamic-quenching of a single-photon avalanche photodetector using an adaptive resistive switch

One of the most common approaches for quenching single-photon avalanche diodes is to use a passive resistor in series with it. A drawback of this approach has been the limited recovery speed of the single-photon avalanche diodes. High resistance is needed to quench the avalanche, leading to slower recharging of the single-photon avalanche diodes depletion capacitor. We address this issue by replacing a fixed quenching resistor with a bias-dependent adaptive resistive switch. Reversible generation of metallic conduction enables switching between low and high resistance states under unipolar bias. As an example, using a Pt/Al2O3/Ag resistor with a commercial silicon single-photon avalanche diodes, we demonstrate avalanche pulse widths as small as ~30 ns, 10× smaller than a passively quenched approach, thus significantly improving the single-photon avalanche diodes frequency response. The experimental results are consistent with a model where the adaptive resistor dynamically changes its resistance during discharging and recharging the single-photon avalanche diodes.

A Review of Security Evaluation of Practical Quantum Key Distribution System

Although the unconditional security of quantum key distribution (QKD) has been widely studied, the imperfections of the practical devices leave potential loopholes for Eve to spy the final key. Thus, how to evaluate the security of QKD with realistic devices is always an interesting and opening question. In this paper, we briefly review the development of quantum hacking and security evaluation technology for a practical decoy state BB84 QKD system. The security requirement and parameters in each module (source, encoder, decoder and detector) are discussed, and the relationship between quantum hacking and security parameter are also shown.

Magnetic Carbon Nanofiber Mats for Prospective Single Photon Avalanche Diode (SPAD) Sensing Applications

Electrospinning enables simple and cost-effective production of magnetic nanofibers by adding nanoparticles to a polymer solution. In order to increase the electrical conductivity of such nanofibers, the carbonization process is crucial. In this study, the chemical and morphological properties of magnetic nanofiber mats prepared from polyacrylonitrile (PAN)/magnetite were investigated. In our previous studies, PAN/magnetite nanofiber mats were carbonized at 500 °C, 600 °C, and 800 °C. Here, PAN/magnetite nanofiber mats were carbonized at 1000 °C. The surface morphology of these PAN/magnetite nanofiber mats is not significantly different from nanofiber mats thermally treated at 800 °C and have remained relatively flexible at 1000 °C, which can be advantageous for various application fields. The addition of nanoparticles increased the average fiber diameter compared to pure PAN nanofiber mats and improved the dimensional stability during thermal processes. The high conductivity, the high magnetization properties, as well as shielding against electromagnetic interference of such carbonized nanofibers can be proposed for use in single photon avalanche diode (SPAD), where these properties are advantageous.

An approach for security evaluation and certification of a complete quantum communication system

Although quantum communication systems are being deployed on a global scale, their realistic security certification is not yet available. Here we present a security evaluation and improvement protocol for complete quantum communication systems. The protocol subdivides a system by defining seven system implementation sub-layers based on a hierarchical order of information flow; then it categorises the known system implementation imperfections by hardness of protection and practical risk. Next, an initial analysis report lists all potential loopholes in its quantum-optical part. It is followed by interactions with the system manufacturer, testing and patching most loopholes, and re-assessing their status. Our protocol has been applied on multiple commercial quantum key distribution systems to improve their security. A detailed description of our methodology is presented with the example of a subcarrier-wave system. Our protocol is a step towards future security evaluation and security certification standards.

Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic secure key as long as the device performs as assumed in the theoretical model. One of the assumptions is an absence of information leakage about individual photon detection outcomes of the receiver unit. Here we investigate the information leakage from a QKD receiver due to photon emission caused by detection events in single-photon detectors (backflash). We test commercial silicon avalanche photodiodes and a photomultiplier tube, and find that the former emit backflashes. We study the spectral, timing and polarization characteristics of these backflash photons. We experimentally demonstrate on a free-space QKD receiver that an eavesdropper can distinguish which detector has clicked inside it, and thus acquire secret information. A set of countermeasures both in theory and on the physical devices are discussed.

Breakdown flash at telecom wavelengths in InGaAs avalanche photodiodes

Quantum key distribution (QKD) at telecom wavelengths (1260 - 1625 nm) has the potential for fast deployment due to existing optical fibre infrastructure and mature telecom technologies. At these wavelengths, Indium Gallium Arsenide (InGaAs) avalanche photodiode (APD) based detectors are the preferred choice for photon detection. Similar to their Silicon counterparts used at shorter wavelengths, they exhibit fluorescence from recombination of electron-hole pairs generated in the avalanche breakdown process. This fluorescence may open side channels for attacks on QKD systems. Here, we characterize the breakdown fluorescence from two commercial InGaAs single photon counting modules, and find a spectral distribution between 1000 nm and 1600 nm. We also show that by spectral filtering, this side channel can be efficiently suppressed.