Information normally considered task-irrelevant drives decision-making and affects premotor circuit recruitment

Lost in time: Relocating the perception of duration outside the brain

It is well-accepted in neuroscience that animals process time internally to estimate the duration of intervals lasting between one and several seconds. More than 100 years ago, Henri Bergson nevertheless remarked that, because animals have memory, their inner experience of time is ever-changing, making duration impossible to measure internally and time a source of change. Bergson proposed that quantifying the inner experience of time requires its externalization in movements (observed or self-generated), as their unfolding leaves measurable traces in space. Here, studies across species are reviewed and collectively suggest that, in line with Bergson's ideas, animals spontaneously solve time estimation tasks through a movement-based spatialization of time. Moreover, the well-known scalable anticipatory responses of animals to regularly spaced rewards can be explained by the variable pressure of time on reward-oriented actions. Finally, the brain regions linked with time perception overlap with those implicated in motor control, spatial navigation and motivation. Thus, instead of considering time as static information processed by the brain, it might be fruitful to conceptualize it as a kind of force to which animals are more or less sensitive depending on their internal state and environment.

The Secondary Motor Cortex-striatum Circuit Contributes to Suppressing Inappropriate Responses in Perceptual Decision Behavior

The secondary motor cortex (M2) encodes choice-related information and plays an important role in cue-guided actions. M2 neurons innervate the dorsal striatum (DS), which also contributes to decision-making behavior, yet how M2 modulates signals in the DS to influence perceptual decision-making is unclear. Using mice performing a visual Go/No-Go task, we showed that inactivating M2 projections to the DS impaired performance by increasing the false alarm (FA) rate to the reward-irrelevant No-Go stimulus. The choice signal of M2 neurons correlated with behavioral performance, and the inactivation of M2 neurons projecting to the DS reduced the choice signal in the DS. By measuring and manipulating the responses of direct or indirect pathway striatal neurons defined by M2 inputs, we found that the indirect pathway neurons exhibited a shorter response latency to the No-Go stimulus, and inactivating their early responses increased the FA rate. These results demonstrate that the M2-to-DS pathway is crucial for suppressing inappropriate responses in perceptual decision behavior.

Chronic alcohol exposure alters action control via hyperactive premotor corticostriatal activity

Alcohol use disorder (AUD) alters decision-making control over actions, but disruptions to the responsible neural circuit mechanisms are unclear. Premotor corticostriatal circuits are implicated in balancing goal-directed and habitual control over actions and show disruption in disorders with compulsive, inflexible behaviors, including AUD. However, whether there is a causal link between disrupted premotor activity and altered action control is unknown. Here, we find that mice chronically exposed to alcohol (chronic intermittent ethanol [CIE]) showed impaired ability to use recent action information to guide subsequent actions. Prior CIE exposure resulted in aberrant increases in the calcium activity of premotor cortex (M2) neurons that project to the dorsal medial striatum (M2-DMS) during action control. Chemogenetic reduction of this CIE-induced hyperactivity in M2-DMS neurons rescued goal-directed action control. This suggests a direct, causal relationship between chronic alcohol disruption to premotor circuits and decision-making strategy and provides mechanistic support for targeting activity of human premotor regions as a potential treatment in AUD.

Orbitofrontal cortex populations are differentially recruited to support actions

The ability to use information from one's prior actions is necessary for decision-making. While orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been hypothesized as key for inferences made using cue and value-related information, whether OFC populations contribute to the use of information from volitional actions to guide behavior is not clear. Here, we used a self-paced lever-press hold-down task in which mice infer prior lever-press durations to guide subsequent action performance. We show that the activity of genetically identified lateral OFC (lOFC) subpopulations differentially instantiate current and prior action information during ongoing action execution. Transient state-dependent lOFC circuit disruptions of specified subpopulations reduced the encoding of ongoing press durations but did not disrupt the use of prior action information to guide future action performance. In contrast, a chronic functional loss of lOFC circuit activity resulted in increased reliance on recently executed lever-press durations and impaired contingency reversal, suggesting the recruitment of compensatory mechanisms that resulted in repetitive action control. Our results identify a novel role for lOFC in the integration of action information to guide adaptive behavior.