Computational models of episodic-like memory in food-caching birds

Selective consolidation of learning and memory via recall-gated plasticity

In a variety of species and behavioral contexts, learning and memory formation recruits two neural systems, with initial plasticity in one system being consolidated into the other over time. Moreover, consolidation is known to be selective; that is, some experiences are more likely to be consolidated into long-term memory than others. Here, we propose and analyze a model that captures common computational principles underlying such phenomena. The key component of this model is a mechanism by which a long-term learning and memory system prioritizes the storage of synaptic changes that are consistent with prior updates to the short-term system. This mechanism, which we refer to as recall-gated consolidation, has the effect of shielding long-term memory from spurious synaptic changes, enabling it to focus on reliable signals in the environment. We describe neural circuit implementations of this model for different types of learning problems, including supervised learning, reinforcement learning, and autoassociative memory storage. These implementations involve synaptic plasticity rules modulated by factors such as prediction accuracy, decision confidence, or familiarity. We then develop an analytical theory of the learning and memory performance of the model, in comparison to alternatives relying only on synapse-local consolidation mechanisms. We find that recall-gated consolidation provides significant advantages, substantially amplifying the signal-to-noise ratio with which memories can be stored in noisy environments. We show that recall-gated consolidation gives rise to a number of phenomena that are present in behavioral learning paradigms, including spaced learning effects, task-dependent rates of consolidation, and differing neural representations in short- and long-term pathways.

Sequence representation as an early step in the evolution of language

Human language is unique in its compositional, open-ended, and sequential form, and its evolution is often solely explained by advantages of communication. However, it has proven challenging to identify an evolutionary trajectory from a world without language to a world with language, especially while at the same time explaining why such an advantageous phenomenon has not evolved in other animals. Decoding sequential information is necessary for language, making domain-general sequence representation a tentative basic requirement for the evolution of language and other uniquely human phenomena. Here, using formal evolutionary analyses of the utility of sequence representation we show that sequence representation is exceedingly costly and that current memory systems found in animals may prevent abilities necessary for language to emerge. For sequence representation to evolve, flexibility allowing for ignoring irrelevant information is necessary. Furthermore, an abundance of useful sequential information and extensive learning opportunities are required, two conditions that were likely fulfilled early in human evolution. Our results provide a novel, logically plausible trajectory for the evolution of uniquely human cognition and language, and support the hypothesis that human culture is rooted in sequential representational and processing abilities.

A test of memory for stimulus sequences in great apes

Identifying cognitive capacities underlying the human evolutionary transition is challenging, and many hypotheses exist for what makes humans capable of, for example, producing and understanding language, preparing meals, and having culture on a grand scale. Instead of describing processes whereby information is processed, recent studies have suggested that there are key differences between humans and other animals in how information is recognized and remembered. Such constraints may act as a bottleneck for subsequent information processing and behavior, proving important for understanding differences between humans and other animals. We briefly discuss different sequential aspects of cognition and behavior and the importance of distinguishing between simultaneous and sequential input, and conclude that explicit tests on non-human great apes have been lacking. Here, we test the memory for stimulus sequences-hypothesis by carrying out three tests on bonobos and one test on humans. Our results show that bonobos' general working memory decays rapidly and that they fail to learn the difference between the order of two stimuli even after more than 2,000 trials, corroborating earlier findings in other animals. However, as expected, humans solve the same sequence discrimination almost immediately. The explicit test on whether bonobos represent stimulus sequences as an unstructured collection of memory traces was not informative as no differences were found between responses to the different probe tests. However, overall, this first empirical study of sequence discrimination on non-human great apes supports the idea that non-human animals, including the closest relatives to humans, lack a memory for stimulus sequences. This may be an ability that sets humans apart from other animals and could be one reason behind the origin of human culture.