Sensory cortex plasticity supports auditory social learning

Auditory cortical regions show resting-state functional connectivity with the default mode-like network in echolocating bats

Echolocating bats are among the most social and vocal of all mammals. These animals are ideal subjects for functional MRI (fMRI) studies of auditory social communication given their relatively hypertrophic limbic and auditory neural structures and their reduced ability to hear MRI gradient noise. Yet, no resting-state networks relevant to social cognition (e.g., default mode-like networks or DMLNs) have been identified in bats since there are few, if any, fMRI studies in the chiropteran order. Here, we acquired fMRI data at 7 Tesla from nine lightly anesthetized pale spear-nosed bats (Phyllostomus discolor). We applied independent components analysis (ICA) to reveal resting-state networks and measured neural activity elicited by noise ripples (on: 10 ms; off: 10 ms) that span this species' ultrasonic hearing range (20 to 130 kHz). Resting-state networks pervaded auditory, parietal, and occipital cortices, along with the hippocampus, cerebellum, basal ganglia, and auditory brainstem. Two midline networks formed an apparent DMLN. Additionally, we found four predominantly auditory/parietal cortical networks, of which two were left-lateralized and two right-lateralized. Regions within four auditory/parietal cortical networks are known to respond to social calls. Along with the auditory brainstem, regions within these four cortical networks responded to ultrasonic noise ripples. Iterative analyses revealed consistent, significant functional connectivity between the left, but not right, auditory/parietal cortical networks and DMLN nodes, especially the anterior-most cingulate cortex. Thus, a resting-state network implicated in social cognition displays more distributed functional connectivity across left, relative to right, hemispheric cortical substrates of audition and communication in this highly social and vocal species.

Causation in neuroscience: keeping mechanism meaningful

A fundamental goal of research in neuroscience is to uncover the causal structure of the brain. This focus on causation makes sense, because causal information can provide explanations of brain function and identify reliable targets with which to understand cognitive function and prevent or change neurological conditions and psychiatric disorders. In this research, one of the most frequently used causal concepts is 'mechanism' - this is seen in the literature and language of the field, in grant and funding inquiries that specify what research is supported, and in journal guidelines on which contributions are considered for publication. In these contexts, mechanisms are commonly tied to expressions of the main aims of the field and cited as the 'fundamental', 'foundational' and/or 'basic' unit for understanding the brain. Despite its common usage and perceived importance, mechanism is used in different ways that are rarely distinguished. Given that this concept is defined in different ways throughout the field - and that there is often no clarification of which definition is intended - there remains a marked ambiguity about the fundamental goals, orientation and principles of the field. Here we provide an overview of causation and mechanism from the perspectives of neuroscience and philosophy of science, in order to address these challenges.