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Lenfesty H, Mathew S, Fikes T, Ross CT, Boyd R. Third-party arbitration and forgiving strategies increase cooperation when perception errors are common. Proc Biol Sci 2024; 291:20240861. [PMID: 39013425 PMCID: PMC11251755 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2024.0861] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2024] [Accepted: 06/05/2024] [Indexed: 07/18/2024] Open
Abstract
Humans cooperate in groups in which mutual monitoring is common, and this provides the possibility of third-party arbitration. Third-party arbitration stabilizes reciprocity in at least two ways: first, when it is accurate, it reduces the frequency of misunderstandings resulting from perception errors, and second, even when it is inaccurate, it provides a public signal that allows pairs to align their expectations about how to behave after errors occur. Here, we describe experiments that test for these two effects. We find that in an iterated, sequential Prisoner's Dilemma game with errors, players with the highest average payoffs are those who make use of third-party arbitration and who also employ forgiving strategies. The combination of these two behaviours reduces the detrimental effects of errors on reciprocity, resulting in more cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hillary Lenfesty
- School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA
- Institute of Human Origins, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA
| | - Sarah Mathew
- School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA
- Institute of Human Origins, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA
| | - Thomas Fikes
- EdPlus Action Lab, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA
| | - Cody T. Ross
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
| | - Robert Boyd
- School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA
- Institute of Human Origins, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA
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Redhead D, Gervais M, Kajokaite K, Koster J, Hurtado Manyoma A, Hurtado Manyoma D, McElreath R, Ross CT. Evidence of direct and indirect reciprocity in network-structured economic games. COMMUNICATIONS PSYCHOLOGY 2024; 2:44. [PMID: 39242753 PMCID: PMC11332088 DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00098-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/09/2023] [Accepted: 05/06/2024] [Indexed: 09/09/2024]
Abstract
Formal theoretical models propose that cooperative networks can be maintained when individuals condition behavior on social standing. Here, we empirically examine the predictions of such models of positive and negative indirect reciprocity using a suite of network-structured economic games in four rural Colombian communities (Nind = 496 individuals, Nobs = 53,876 ratings/transfers). We observe that, at a dyadic-level, individuals have a strong tendency to exploit and punish others in bad standing (e.g., those perceived as selfish), and allocate resources to those in good standing (e.g., those perceived as generous). These dyadic findings scale to a more generalized, community level, where reputations for being generous are associated with receipt of allocations, and reputations for being selfish are associated with receipt of punishment. These empirical results illustrate the roles that both positive and negative reciprocity, and costly punishment, play in sustaining community-wide cooperation networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel Redhead
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.
- Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.
- Inter-University Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS), University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.
| | - Matthew Gervais
- Division of Psychology, Department of Life Science, Brunel University, London, UK
| | - Kotrina Kajokaite
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Jeremy Koster
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Arlenys Hurtado Manyoma
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Danier Hurtado Manyoma
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Richard McElreath
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Cody T Ross
- Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.
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Stewart AJ, Pilgrim C, Raihani NJ. Resolving selfish and spiteful interdependent conflict. Proc Biol Sci 2024; 291:20240295. [PMID: 38593846 PMCID: PMC11003781 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2024.0295] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/04/2024] [Accepted: 03/06/2024] [Indexed: 04/11/2024] Open
Abstract
Interdependence occurs when individuals have a stake in the success or failure of others, such that the outcomes experienced by one individual also generate costs or benefits for others. Discussion on this topic has typically focused on positive interdependence (where gains for one individual result in gains for another) and on the consequences for cooperation. However, interdependence can also be negative (where gains for one individual result in losses for another), which can spark conflict. In this article, we explain when negative interdependence is likely to arise and, crucially, the role played by (mis)perception in shaping an individual's understanding of their interdependent relationships. We argue that, owing to the difficulty in accurately perceiving interdependence with others, individuals might often be mistaken about the stake they hold in each other's outcomes, which can spark needless, resolvable forms of conflict. We then discuss when and how reducing misperceptions can help to resolve such conflicts. We argue that a key mechanism for resolving interdependent conflict, along with better sources of exogenous information, is to reduce reliance on heuristics such as stereotypes when assessing the nature of our interdependent relationships.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Charlie Pilgrim
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
| | - Nichola J. Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
- School of Psychology, University of Auckland, 23 Symonds Street, Auckland, 1011, New Zealand
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Yaman A, Leibo JZ, Iacca G, Wan Lee S. The emergence of division of labour through decentralized social sanctioning. Proc Biol Sci 2023; 290:20231716. [PMID: 37876187 PMCID: PMC10598450 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2023.1716] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/31/2023] [Accepted: 09/19/2023] [Indexed: 10/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Human ecological success relies on our characteristic ability to flexibly self-organize into cooperative social groups, the most successful of which employ substantial specialization and division of labour. Unlike most other animals, humans learn by trial and error during their lives what role to take on. However, when some critical roles are more attractive than others, and individuals are self-interested, then there is a social dilemma: each individual would prefer others take on the critical but unremunerative roles so they may remain free to take one that pays better. But disaster occurs if all act thus and a critical role goes unfilled. In such situations learning an optimum role distribution may not be possible. Consequently, a fundamental question is: how can division of labour emerge in groups of self-interested lifetime-learning individuals? Here, we show that by introducing a model of social norms, which we regard as emergent patterns of decentralized social sanctioning, it becomes possible for groups of self-interested individuals to learn a productive division of labour involving all critical roles. Such social norms work by redistributing rewards within the population to disincentivize antisocial roles while incentivizing prosocial roles that do not intrinsically pay as well as others.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anil Yaman
- Computer Science Department, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | | | - Giovanni Iacca
- Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
| | - Sang Wan Lee
- Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon 34141, Republic of Korea
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Unmaking egalitarianism: Comparing sources of political change in an Amazonian society. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2022.09.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
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Evidence for third-party mediation but not punishment in Mentawai justice. Nat Hum Behav 2022; 6:930-940. [PMID: 35534707 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-022-01341-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/11/2021] [Accepted: 03/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Researchers argue that third parties help sustain human cooperation, yet how they contribute remains unclear, especially in small-scale, politically decentralized societies. Studying justice among Mentawai horticulturalists in Indonesia, we examined evidence for punishment and mediation by third parties. Across a sample of 444 transgressions, we find no evidence of direct third-party punishment. Most victims and aggrieved parties demanded payment, and if a transgressor faced punishment, this was never imposed by third parties. We find little evidence of indirect sanctions by third parties. Nearly 20% of transgressions were followed by no payment, and as predicted by dyadic models of sanctions, payments were less likely when transgressions were among related individuals. Approximately 75% of non-governmental mediators called were third parties, especially shamans and elders, and mediators were called more as cooperation was threatened. Our findings suggest that, among the Mentawai, institutionalized penalties function more to restore dyadic cooperation than to enforce norms.
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Spurious normativity enhances learning of compliance and enforcement behavior in artificial agents. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2022; 119:2106028118. [PMID: 35022231 PMCID: PMC8784148 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2106028118] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/13/2021] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
The fact that humans enforce and comply with norms is an important reason why humans enjoy higher levels of cooperation and welfare than other animals. Some norms are relatively easy to explain: They may prohibit obviously harmful or uncooperative actions. But many norms are not easy to explain. For example, most cultures prohibit eating certain kinds of foods, and almost all societies have rules about what constitutes appropriate clothing, language, and gestures. Using a computational model focused on learning shows that apparently pointless rules can have an indirect effect on welfare. They can help agents learn how to enforce and comply with norms in general, improving the group’s ability to enforce norms that have a direct effect on welfare. How do societies learn and maintain social norms? Here we use multiagent reinforcement learning to investigate the learning dynamics of enforcement and compliance behaviors. Artificial agents populate a foraging environment and need to learn to avoid a poisonous berry. Agents learn to avoid eating poisonous berries better when doing so is taboo, meaning the behavior is punished by other agents. The taboo helps overcome a credit assignment problem in discovering delayed health effects. Critically, introducing an additional taboo, which results in punishment for eating a harmless berry, further improves overall returns. This “silly rule” counterintuitively has a positive effect because it gives agents more practice in learning rule enforcement. By probing what individual agents have learned, we demonstrate that normative behavior relies on a sequence of learned skills. Learning rule compliance builds upon prior learning of rule enforcement by other agents. Our results highlight the benefit of employing a multiagent reinforcement learning computational model focused on learning to implement complex actions.
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