Design principles for risk-pooling systems

More Satisfaction, Less Equality: Distributive Effects of Transparent Needs in a Laboratory Experiment

Societies are confronted with the dilemma that need satisfaction requires transparent individual needs. We study the effect of information about others' needs on the distribution of a joint endowment in a three-player network exchange game in a laboratory experiment. Need levels are exogenously given and either transparent (known to all three network members) or opaque (only known to the players themselves). The three players negotiate in dyads until two players agree on a distribution. We expect that the transparency of need thresholds raises need satisfaction but lowers equality. The results suggest that the members of the dyad who agree on the distribution can satisfy their own need thresholds even when information about thresholds is opaque. The effect of transparency on the remaining network member is antithetical: while transparency increases the rate of need satisfaction, it decreases the average share of allocations when needs are low. In the opaque condition, allocated shares are larger, but need satisfaction is lower. This reveals the ambivalent distributive effects of transparent need thresholds: Transparency helps those with the highest need thresholds, but it can hurt those with lower need thresholds, and it barely affects the ones with the most influence on the decision.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11211-024-00434-0.

Resolving selfish and spiteful interdependent conflict

Interdependence occurs when individuals have a stake in the success or failure of others, such that the outcomes experienced by one individual also generate costs or benefits for others. Discussion on this topic has typically focused on positive interdependence (where gains for one individual result in gains for another) and on the consequences for cooperation. However, interdependence can also be negative (where gains for one individual result in losses for another), which can spark conflict. In this article, we explain when negative interdependence is likely to arise and, crucially, the role played by (mis)perception in shaping an individual's understanding of their interdependent relationships. We argue that, owing to the difficulty in accurately perceiving interdependence with others, individuals might often be mistaken about the stake they hold in each other's outcomes, which can spark needless, resolvable forms of conflict. We then discuss when and how reducing misperceptions can help to resolve such conflicts. We argue that a key mechanism for resolving interdependent conflict, along with better sources of exogenous information, is to reduce reliance on heuristics such as stereotypes when assessing the nature of our interdependent relationships.

The importance of need-altruism and kin-altruism to blood donor behaviour for black and white people

BACKGROUND

Need-altruism (a preference to help people in need) and kin-altruism (a preference to help kin over non-kin) underlie two hypotheses for voluntary blood donation: (i) Need-altruism underlies motivations for volunteer blood donation and (ii) Black people express a stronger preference for kin-altruism, which is a potential barrier to donation. This paper tests these hypotheses and explores how need- and kin-altruism are associated with wider altruistic motivations, barriers, and strategies to encourage donation.

METHODS

We assessed need- and kin-altruism, other mechanisms-of-altruism (e.g., reluctant-altruism), barriers, strategies to encourage donation, donor status, and willingness-to-donate across four groups based on ethnicity (Black; White), nationality (British; Nigerian), and country-of-residence: (i) Black-British people (n = 395), and Black-Nigerian people (ii) in the UK (n = 97) or (iii) across the rest of the world (n = 101), and (v) White-British people in the UK (n = 452). We also sampled a Black-Nigerian Expert group (n = 60).

RESULTS

Need-altruism was higher in donors and associated with willingness-to-donate in non-donors. Levels of kin-altruism did not differ between Black and White people, but need-altruism was lower in Black-British people. Kin-altruism was associated with a preference for incentives, and need-altruism with a preference for recognition (e.g., a thank you) as well as an increased willingness-to-donate for Black non-donors. Need-altruism underlies a blood-donor-cooperative-phenotype.

CONCLUSION

Need-altruism is central to blood donation, in particular recruitment. Lower need-altruism may be a specific barrier for Black-British people. Kin-altruism is important for Black non-donors. The blood donor cooperative phenotype deserves further consideration. Implications for blood services are discussed.

Is undisciplined behavior antithetical to cooperation, or is it part and parcel of it?

This commentary raises three points in response to the target article. First, what appear to be victimless behaviors in highly individualistic, post-industrial societies might have a direct impact on group members in small-scale societies. Second, many societies show marked tolerance or ambivalence toward intemperate behavior. Third, undisciplined behavior is not antithetical to cooperation but can be used to cooperative ends.

Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals' behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.

The evolution of peace

While some species have affiliative and even cooperative interactions between individuals of different social groups, humans are alone in having durable, positive-sum, interdependent relationships across unrelated social groups. Our capacity to have harmonious relationships that cross group boundaries is an important aspect of our species' success, allowing for the exchange of ideas, materials, and ultimately enabling cumulative cultural evolution. Knowledge about the conditions required for peaceful intergroup relationships is critical for understanding the success of our species and building a more peaceful world. How do humans create harmonious relationships across group boundaries and when did this capacity emerge in the human lineage? Answering these questions involves considering the costs and benefits of intergroup cooperation and aggression, for oneself, one's group, and one's neighbor. Taking a game theoretical perspective provides new insights into the difficulties of removing the threat of war and reveals an ironic logic to peace - the factors that enable peace also facilitate the increased scale and destructiveness of conflict. In what follows, I explore the conditions required for peace, why they are so difficult to achieve, and when we expect peace to have emerged in the human lineage. I argue that intergroup cooperation was an important component of human relationships and a selective force in our species history beginning at least 300 thousand years. But the preconditions for peace only emerged in the past 100 thousand years and likely coexisted with intermittent intergroup violence which would have also been an important and selective force in our species' history.

Social status does not predict in-camp integration among egalitarian hunter-gatherer men

In the last few decades, there has been much research regarding the importance of social prestige in shaping the social structure of small-scale societies. While recent studies show that social prestige may have important health consequences, little is known about the extent to which prestige translates into actual in-person interactions and proximity, even though the level of integration into such real-life social networks has been shown to have important health consequences. Here, we determine the extent to which two different domains of social prestige, popularity (being perceived as a friend by others), and hunting reputation (being perceived as a good hunter), translate into GPS-derived in- and out-of-camp proximity networks in a group of egalitarian hunter-gatherer men, the Hadza. We show that popularity and hunting reputation differ in the extent to which they are translated into time spent physically close to each other. Moreover, our findings suggest that in-camp proximity networks, which are commonly applied in studies of small-scale societies, do not show the full picture of Hadza men’s social preferences. While men are in camp, neither popularity nor hunting reputation is associated with being central in the proximity network; however, when out of camp, Hadza men who are popular are more integrated in the proximity networks while men with better hunting reputations are less integrated. Overall, our findings suggest that, to fully understand social preferences among hunter-gatherers, both in-camp and out-of-camp proximity networks should be considered.