1
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Kurokawa S. Persistence in repeated games encourages the evolution of spite. Theor Popul Biol 2024; 158:109-120. [PMID: 38823527 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2024.05.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/06/2023] [Revised: 05/24/2024] [Accepted: 05/28/2024] [Indexed: 06/03/2024]
Abstract
Social behavior is divided into four types: altruism, spite, mutualism, and selfishness. The former two are costly to the actor; therefore, from the perspective of natural selection, their existence can be regarded as mysterious. One potential setup which encourages the evolution of altruism and spite is repeated interaction. Players can behave conditionally based on their opponent's previous actions in the repeated interaction. On the one hand, the retaliatory strategy (who behaves altruistically when their opponent behaved altruistically and behaves non-altruistically when the opponent player behaved non-altruistically) is likely to evolve when players choose altruistic or selfish behavior in each round. On the other hand, the anti-retaliatory strategy (who is spiteful when the opponent was not spiteful and is not spiteful when the opponent player was spiteful) is likely to evolve when players opt for spiteful or mutualistic behavior in each round. These successful conditional behaviors can be favored by natural selection. Here, we notice that information on opponent players' actions is not always available. When there is no such information, players cannot determine their behavior according to their opponent's action. By investigating the case of altruism, a previous study (Kurokawa, 2017, Mathematical Biosciences, 286, 94-103) found that persistent altruistic strategies, which choose the same action as the own previous action, are favored by natural selection. How, then, should a spiteful conditional strategy behave when the player does not know what their opponent did? By studying the repeated game, we find that persistent spiteful strategies, which choose the same action as the own previous action, are favored by natural selection. Altruism and spite differ concerning whether retaliatory or anti-retaliatory strategies are favored by natural selection; however, they are identical concerning whether persistent strategies are favored by natural selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shun Kurokawa
- School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 1-1 Asahidai, Nomi, Ishikawa 923-1292, Japan.
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2
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Allen B, McAvoy A. The coalescent in finite populations with arbitrary, fixed structure. Theor Popul Biol 2024; 158:150-169. [PMID: 38880430 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2024.06.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2023] [Revised: 06/03/2024] [Accepted: 06/12/2024] [Indexed: 06/18/2024]
Abstract
The coalescent is a stochastic process representing ancestral lineages in a population undergoing neutral genetic drift. Originally defined for a well-mixed population, the coalescent has been adapted in various ways to accommodate spatial, age, and class structure, along with other features of real-world populations. To further extend the range of population structures to which coalescent theory applies, we formulate a coalescent process for a broad class of neutral drift models with arbitrary - but fixed - spatial, age, sex, and class structure, haploid or diploid genetics, and any fixed mating pattern. Here, the coalescent is represented as a random sequence of mappings [Formula: see text] from a finite set G to itself. The set G represents the "sites" (in individuals, in particular locations and/or classes) at which these alleles can live. The state of the coalescent, Ct:G→G, maps each site g∈G to the site containing g's ancestor, t time-steps into the past. Using this representation, we define and analyze coalescence time, coalescence branch length, mutations prior to coalescence, and stationary probabilities of identity-by-descent and identity-by-state. For low mutation, we provide a recipe for computing identity-by-descent and identity-by-state probabilities via the coalescent. Applying our results to a diploid population with arbitrary sex ratio r, we find that measures of genetic dissimilarity, among any set of sites, are scaled by 4r(1-r) relative to the even sex ratio case.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, 400 The Fenway, Boston, MA, 02115, USA.
| | - Alex McAvoy
- School of Data Science and Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA; Department of Mathematics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA
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3
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Fan J, Du H, Li G, He X. The effect of multi-tasks mechanism on cooperation in evolutionary game. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2024; 34:083101. [PMID: 39088350 DOI: 10.1063/5.0210787] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2024] [Accepted: 07/18/2024] [Indexed: 08/03/2024]
Abstract
Human games are inherently diverse, involving more than mere identity interactions. The diversity of game tasks offers a more authentic explanation in the exploration of social dilemmas. Human behavior is also influenced by conformity, and prosociality is a crucial factor in addressing social dilemmas. This study proposes a generalized prisoner's dilemma model of task diversity that incorporates a conformity-driven interaction. Simulation findings indicate that the diversity of multi-tasks and the path dependence contribute to the flourishing of cooperation in games. Conformity-driven interactions also promote cooperation. However, this promotion effect does not increase linearly, and only appropriate task sizes and suitable proportions of conformity-driven interactions yield optimal results. From a broader group perspective, the interplay of network adaptation, task size, and conformity-driven interaction can form a structure of attractors or repellents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jiarui Fan
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
| | - Haifeng Du
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
| | - Guangyu Li
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
| | - Xiaochen He
- School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
- School of Economics and Finance, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
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4
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Ge X, He X, Yang J, Zhao Y, Liu Y, Li L. Impact of discrepant accumulations strategy on collective cooperation in multilayer networks. Sci Rep 2024; 14:16932. [PMID: 39043873 PMCID: PMC11266721 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-67871-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/24/2024] [Accepted: 07/16/2024] [Indexed: 07/25/2024] Open
Abstract
Understanding large-scale cooperation among related individuals has been one of the largest challenges. Since humans are in multiple social networks, the theoretical framework of multilayer networks is perfectly suited for studying this fascinating aspect of our biology. To that effect, we here study the cooperation in evolutionary game on interdependent networks. Importantly, a part of players are set to adopt Discrepant Accumulations Strategy. Players employing this mechanism not only use their payoffs in the multilayer network as the basis for the updating process as in previous experiments, but also take into account the similarities and differences in strategies across different layers. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that considering the similarities and differences in strategies across layers when calculating fitness can significantly enhance the cooperation level in the system. By examining the behavior of different pairing modes within cooperators and defectors, the equilibrium state can be attributed to the evolution of correlated pairing modes between interdependent networks. Our results provide a theoretical analysis of the group cooperation induced by the Discrepant Accumulations Strategy. And we also discuss potential implications of these findings for future human experiments concerning the cooperation on multilayer networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xin Ge
- College of Information Science and Technology, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, 116026, China.
| | - Xi He
- College of Information Science and Technology, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, 116026, China
| | - Jian Yang
- College of Information Science and Technology, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, 116026, China
| | - Yixiang Zhao
- College of Information Science and Technology, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, 116026, China
| | - Yue Liu
- College of Information Science and Technology, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, 116026, China
| | - Lili Li
- College of Marine Electrical Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, 116026, China
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5
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Wang C, Perc M, Szolnoki A. Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs. Nat Commun 2024; 15:5349. [PMID: 38914550 PMCID: PMC11196707 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-024-49505-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/23/2023] [Accepted: 06/05/2024] [Indexed: 06/26/2024] Open
Abstract
Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an arbitrary number of strategies on graphs is still missing. Here, we solve this by drawing an analogy with the Balls-and-Boxes problem, based on which we show that the local configuration of multiplayer games on graphs is equivalent to distributing k identical co-players among n distinct strategies. We use this to derive the replicator equation for any n-strategy multiplayer game under weak selection, which can be solved in polynomial time. As an example, we revisit the second-order free-riding problem, where costly punishment cannot truly resolve social dilemmas in a well-mixed population. Yet, in structured populations, we derive an accurate threshold for the punishment strength, beyond which punishment can either lead to the extinction of defection or transform the system into a rock-paper-scissors-like cycle. The analytical solution also qualitatively agrees with the phase diagrams that were previously obtained for non-marginal selection strengths. Our framework thus allows an exploration of any multi-strategy multiplayer game on regular graphs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chaoqian Wang
- Department of Computational and Data Sciences, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 22030, USA.
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000, Maribor, Slovenia
- Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor, Vošnjakova ulica 2, 2000, Maribor, Slovenia
- Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080, Vienna, Austria
- Department of Physics, Kyung Hee University, 26 Kyungheedae-ro, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, P.O. Box 49, H-1525, Budapest, Hungary
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6
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Wang X, Fu F, Wang L. Deterministic theory of evolutionary games on temporal networks. J R Soc Interface 2024; 21:20240055. [PMID: 38807526 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2024.0055] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/24/2024] [Accepted: 03/28/2024] [Indexed: 05/30/2024] Open
Abstract
Recent empirical studies have revealed that social interactions among agents in realistic networks merely exist intermittently and occur in a particular sequential order. However, it remains unexplored how to theoretically describe evolutionary dynamics of multiple strategies on temporal networks. Herein, we develop a deterministic theory for studying evolutionary dynamics of any [Formula: see text] pairwise games in structured populations where individuals are connected and organized by temporally activated edges. In the limit of weak selection, we derive replicator-like equations with a transformed payoff matrix characterizing how the mean frequency of each strategy varies over time, and then obtain critical conditions for any strategy to be evolutionarily stable on temporal networks. Interestingly, the re-scaled payoff matrix is a linear combination of the original payoff matrix with an additional one describing local competitions between any pair of different strategies, whose weights are solely determined by network topology and selection intensity. As a particular example, we apply the deterministic theory to analysing the impacts of temporal networks in the mini-ultimatum game, and find that temporally networked population structures result in the emergence of fairness. Our work offers theoretical insights into the subtle effects of network temporality on evolutionary game dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiaofeng Wang
- Department of Automation, School of Information Science and Technology, Donghua University , Shanghai 201620, People's Republic of China
- Engineering Research Center of Digitized Textile and Apparel Technology (Ministry of Education), Donghua University , Shanghai 201620, People's Republic of China
| | - Feng Fu
- Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College , Hanover, NH 03755, USA
- Department of Biomedical Data Science, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth , Lebanon, NH 03756, USA
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University , Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China
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7
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Chiba-Okabe H, Plotkin JB. Can institutions foster cooperation by wealth redistribution? J R Soc Interface 2024; 21:20230698. [PMID: 38471530 PMCID: PMC10932717 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2023.0698] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2023] [Accepted: 02/06/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Abstract
Theoretical models prescribe how institutions can promote cooperation in a population by imposing appropriate punishments or rewards on individuals. However, many real-world institutions are not sophisticated or responsive enough to ensure cooperation by calibrating their policies. Or, worse yet, an institution might selfishly exploit the population it governs for its own benefit. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in the presence of an institution that is autonomous, in the sense that it has its own interests that may or may not align with those of the population. The institution imposes a tax on the population and redistributes a portion of the tax revenue to cooperators, withholding the remaining revenue for itself. The institution adjusts its rates of taxation and redistribution to optimize its own long-term, discounted utility. We consider three types of institutions with different goals, embodied in their utility functions. We show that a prosocial institution, whose goal is to maximize the average payoff of the population, can indeed promote cooperation-but only if it is sufficiently forward-looking. On the other hand, an institution that seeks to maximize welfare among cooperators alone will successfully promote collective cooperation even if it is myopic. Remarkably, even a selfish institution, which seeks to maximize the revenue it withholds for itself, can nonetheless promote cooperation. The average payoff of the population increases when a selfish institution is more forward-looking, so that a population under a selfish regime can sometimes fare better than under anarchy. Our analysis highlights the potential benefits of institutional wealth redistribution, even when an institution does not share the interests of the population it governs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hiroaki Chiba-Okabe
- Program in Applied Mathematics and Computational Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Program in Applied Mathematics and Computational Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
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8
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Allen B. Symmetry in models of natural selection. J R Soc Interface 2023; 20:20230306. [PMID: 37963562 PMCID: PMC10645516 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2023.0306] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/27/2023] [Accepted: 10/20/2023] [Indexed: 11/16/2023] Open
Abstract
Symmetry arguments are frequently used-often implicitly-in mathematical modelling of natural selection. Symmetry simplifies the analysis of models and reduces the number of distinct population states to be considered. Here, I introduce a formal definition of symmetry in mathematical models of natural selection. This definition applies to a broad class of models that satisfy a minimal set of assumptions, using a framework developed in previous works. In this framework, population structure is represented by a set of sites at which alleles can live, and transitions occur via replacement of some alleles by copies of others. A symmetry is defined as a permutation of sites that preserves probabilities of replacement and mutation. The symmetries of a given selection process form a group, which acts on population states in a way that preserves the Markov chain representing selection. Applying classical results on group actions, I formally characterize the use of symmetry to reduce the states of this Markov chain, and obtain bounds on the number of states in the reduced chain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA, USA
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9
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Inaba M, Akiyama E. Evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks through asymmetry between interaction and replacement. Sci Rep 2023; 13:9814. [PMID: 37330611 PMCID: PMC10276876 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-37074-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/29/2023] [Accepted: 06/15/2023] [Indexed: 06/19/2023] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is the foundation of society and has been the subject of numerous studies over the past three decades. However, the mechanisms underlying the spread of cooperation within a group are not yet fully comprehended. We analyze cooperation in multiplex networks, a model that has recently gained attention for successfully capturing certain aspects of human social connections. Previous studies on the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks have shown that cooperative behavior is promoted when the two key processes in evolution, interaction and strategy replacement, are performed with the same partner as much as possible, that is, symmetrically, in a variety of network structures. We focus on a particular type of symmetry, namely, symmetry in the scope of communication, to investigate whether cooperation is promoted or hindered when interactions and strategy replacements have different scopes. Through multiagent simulations, we found some cases where asymmetry can promote cooperation, contrasting with previous studies. These results hint toward the potential effectiveness of not only symmetrical but also asymmetrical approaches in fostering cooperation within particular groups under certain social conditions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Masaaki Inaba
- Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan.
| | - Eizo Akiyama
- Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan
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10
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Liu L, Chen X, Szolnoki A. Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game. eLife 2023; 12:82954. [PMID: 37204305 DOI: 10.7554/elife.82954] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2022] [Accepted: 04/26/2023] [Indexed: 05/20/2023] Open
Abstract
Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals' behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.
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Affiliation(s)
- Linjie Liu
- College of Science, Northwest A & F University, Yangling, China
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Budapest, Hungary
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11
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Kim JY, Lee KM. Evolution of fairness in the divide-a-lottery game. Sci Rep 2023; 13:7048. [PMID: 37120678 PMCID: PMC10148846 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-34131-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/29/2022] [Accepted: 04/25/2023] [Indexed: 05/01/2023] Open
Abstract
In this paper, we show that fairness can evolve in the divide-a-lottery game which is more general than the divide-a-dollar game by using an indirect evolutionary approach. In the divide-a-lottery game, the size of a pie is uncertain. Two players sequentially bid for a share and they get their bid if the allocation based on the bids turns out to be feasible and otherwise neither gets anything. In this game, rational players over-compete for a higher share, resulting in a high probability of failure in agreement, whereas fair players who dislike the disparity between shares lower their bids thereby reducing the failure probability and thus increasing the expected payoff. As a result, fairness strictly dominates rationality. This is the mechanism through which fairness evolves. However, this result is not robust against even a slight uncertainty about the opponent's type. Surprisingly, we show a contrasted simulation result that only rational players who are strictly dominated by fair players survive evolutionarily for most of the parameter values if players have even a slight chance of not knowing the opponent's type. Our simulation results in a local interaction model in which players only know the type of closer neighbors capture both insights and demonstrate that moderate proportions of both types coexist evolutionarily over time, and that the population average fitness of this polymorphic population is higher than monomorphic population consisting only of fair types or rational types.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jeong-Yoo Kim
- Department of Economics, Kyung Hee University, 1 Hoegi-dong, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, 137-701, Republic of Korea.
| | - Kyu-Min Lee
- College of Business, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Seoul, 02455, Republic of Korea.
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12
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Kanaev IA. Entropy and Cross-Level Orderliness in Light of the Interconnection between the Neural System and Consciousness. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 25:418. [PMID: 36981307 PMCID: PMC10047885 DOI: 10.3390/e25030418] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/30/2022] [Revised: 02/01/2023] [Accepted: 02/20/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
Despite recent advances, the origin and utility of consciousness remains under debate. Using an evolutionary perspective on the origin of consciousness, this review elaborates on the promising theoretical background suggested in the temporospatial theory of consciousness, which outlines world-brain alignment as a critical predisposition for controlling behavior and adaptation. Such a system can be evolutionarily effective only if it can provide instant cohesion between the subsystems, which is possible only if it performs an intrinsic activity modified in light of the incoming stimulation. One can assume that the world-brain interaction results in a particular interference pattern predetermined by connectome complexity. This is what organisms experience as their exclusive subjective state, allowing the anticipation of regularities in the environment. Thus, an anticipative system can emerge only in a regular environment, which guides natural selection by reinforcing corresponding reactions and decreasing the system entropy. Subsequent evolution requires complicated, layered structures and can be traced from simple organisms to human consciousness and society. This allows us to consider the mode of entropy as a subject of natural evolution rather than an individual entity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ilya A Kanaev
- Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, 135 Xingang Xi Rd, Guangzhou 510275, China
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13
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Turker M, Bingol HO. Multi-layer network approach in modeling epidemics in an urban town. THE EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL. B 2023; 96:16. [PMID: 36776155 PMCID: PMC9901843 DOI: 10.1140/epjb/s10051-023-00484-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/17/2022] [Accepted: 01/23/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
ABSTRACT The last three years have been an extraordinary time with the COVID-19 pandemic killing millions, affecting and distressing billions of people worldwide. Authorities took various measures such as turning school and work to remote and prohibiting social relations via curfews. In order to mitigate the negative impact of the epidemics, researchers tried to estimate the future of the pandemic for different scenarios, using forecasting techniques and epidemics simulations on networks. Intending to better represent the real-life in an urban town in high resolution, we propose a novel multi-layer network model, where each layer corresponds to a different interaction that occurs daily, such as "household", "work" or "school". Our simulations indicate that locking down "friendship" layer has the highest impact on slowing down epidemics. Hence, our contributions are twofold, first we propose a parametric network generator model; second, we run SIR simulations on it and show the impact of layers.
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Affiliation(s)
- Meliksah Turker
- Department of Computer Engineering, Bogazici University, Istanbul, 34342 Turkey
| | - Haluk O. Bingol
- Department of Computer Engineering, Bogazici University, Istanbul, 34342 Turkey
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14
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Wang S, Chen X, Xiao Z, Szolnoki A, Vasconcelos VV. Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations. J R Soc Interface 2023; 20:20220653. [PMID: 36722070 PMCID: PMC9890111 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2022.0653] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/05/2022] [Accepted: 01/03/2023] [Indexed: 02/02/2023] Open
Abstract
The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging problem for incentive-providing institutions. In particular, since the implementation of incentive is costly, to explore the optimal incentive protocol, which ensures the desired collective goal at a minimal cost, is worthy of study. In this work, we consider the positive and negative incentives for a structured population of individuals whose conflicting interactions are characterized by a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We establish an index function for quantifying the cumulative cost during the process of incentive implementation, and theoretically derive the optimal positive and negative incentive protocols for cooperation on regular networks. We find that both types of optimal incentive protocols are identical and time-invariant. Moreover, we compare the optimal rewarding and punishing schemes concerning implementation cost and provide a rigorous basis for the usage of incentives in the game-theoretical framework. We further perform computer simulations to support our theoretical results and explore their robustness for different types of population structures, including regular, random, small-world and scale-free networks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shengxian Wang
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, People’s Republic of China
- Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, People’s Republic of China
| | - Zhilong Xiao
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, People’s Republic of China
- School of Computer Science and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510006, People’s Republic of China
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, P.O. Box 49, Budapest 1525, Hungary
| | - Vítor V. Vasconcelos
- Computational Science Lab, Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1098XH, The Netherlands
- Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1012 GC, The Netherlands
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15
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Wang Y, Yang Y, Li A, Wang L. Stability of multi-layer ecosystems. J R Soc Interface 2023; 20:20220752. [PMCID: PMC9943886 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2022.0752] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/24/2023] Open
Abstract
Community structure is reported to play a critical role in ecosystem stability, which indicates the ability of a system to return to equilibrium after perturbations. However, current studies rely on the assumption that the community consists of only a single-layer structure. In practice, multi-layer structures are common in ecosystems, e.g. the distributions of both microorganisms in strata and fish in the ocean usually stratify into multi-layer structures. Here we use multi-layer networks to model species interactions within each layer and between different layers, and study the stability of multi-layer ecosystems under different interaction types. We show that competitive interactions within each layer have a more substantial stabilizing effect in multi-layer ecosystems relative to their impact in single-layer ecosystems. Surprisingly, between different layers, we find that competition between species destabilizes the ecosystem. We further provide a theoretical analysis of the stability of multi-layer ecosystems and confirm the robustness of our findings for different connectances between layers, numbers of species in each layer, and numbers of layers. Our work provides a general framework for investigating the stability of multi-layer ecosystems and uncovers the double-sided role of competitive interactions in the stability of multi-layer ecosystems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ye Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People’s Republic of China
| | - Yuguang Yang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People’s Republic of China
| | - Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People’s Republic of China,Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People’s Republic of China
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People’s Republic of China,Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People’s Republic of China
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16
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Wang C, Szolnoki A. Evolution of cooperation under a generalized death-birth process. Phys Rev E 2023; 107:024303. [PMID: 36932485 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.107.024303] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/12/2022] [Accepted: 01/24/2023] [Indexed: 02/09/2023]
Abstract
According to the evolutionary death-birth protocol, a player is chosen randomly to die and neighbors compete for the available position proportional to their fitness. Hence, the status of the focal player is completely ignored and has no impact on the strategy update. In this paper, we revisit and generalize this rule by introducing a weight factor to compare the payoff values of the focal and invading neighbors. By means of evolutionary graph theory, we analyze the model on joint transitive graphs to explore the possible consequences of the presence of a weight factor. We find that focal weight always hinders cooperation under weak selection strength. Surprisingly, the results show a nontrivial tipping point of the weight factor where the threshold of cooperation success shifts from positive to negative infinity. Once focal weight exceeds this tipping point, cooperation becomes unreachable. Our theoretical predictions are confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations on a square lattice of different sizes. We also verify the robustness of the conclusions to arbitrary two-player prisoner's dilemmas, to dispersal graphs with arbitrary edge weights, and to interaction and dispersal graphs overlapping arbitrarily.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chaoqian Wang
- Department of Computational and Data Sciences, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030, USA
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
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17
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Li Q, Li S, Zhang Y, Chen X, Yang S. Social norms of fairness with reputation-based role assignment in the dictator game. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2022; 32:113117. [PMID: 36456315 DOI: 10.1063/5.0109451] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/16/2023]
Abstract
A vast body of experiments share the view that social norms are major factors for the emergence of fairness in a population of individuals playing the dictator game (DG). Recently, to explore which social norms are conducive to sustaining cooperation has obtained considerable concern. However, thus, far few studies have investigated how social norms influence the evolution of fairness by means of indirect reciprocity. In this study, we propose an indirect reciprocal model of the DG and consider that an individual can be assigned as the dictator due to its good reputation. We investigate the "leading eight" norms and all second-order social norms by a two-timescale theoretical analysis. We show that when role assignment is based on reputation, four of the "leading eight" norms, including stern judging and simple standing, lead to a high level of fairness, which increases with the selection intensity. Our work also reveals that not only the correct treatment of making a fair split with good recipients but also distinguishing unjustified unfair split from justified unfair split matters in elevating the level of fairness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qing Li
- Key Laboratory of Knowledge Automation for Industrial Processes of Ministry of Education, School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
| | - Songtao Li
- Key Laboratory of Knowledge Automation for Industrial Processes of Ministry of Education, School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
| | - Yanling Zhang
- Key Laboratory of Knowledge Automation for Industrial Processes of Ministry of Education, School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
| | - Shuo Yang
- Key Laboratory of Knowledge Automation for Industrial Processes of Ministry of Education, School of Automation and Electrical Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
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18
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Zhang W, Yu G, Fu W, Li R. Parental Psychological Control and Children's Prosocial Behavior: The Mediating Role of Social Anxiety and the Moderating Role of Socioeconomic Status. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH 2022; 19:11691. [PMID: 36141960 PMCID: PMC9517038 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph191811691] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/15/2022] [Revised: 09/13/2022] [Accepted: 09/14/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
Complementing internalizing and externalizing developmental outcomes of parental psychological control, in this study, we shift the focus to children's prosocial behaviors. Drawing on self-determination theory and problem-behavior theory, this study addresses the relationship between parental psychological control, social anxiety, socioeconomic status (SES), and children's prosocial behavior. The parental psychological control scale, social anxiety scale for children, and prosocial behavior were applied in the study. Participants were 1202 elementary school-age children in China. The present study showed that parental psychological control was negatively associated with prosocial behavior and social anxiety played a partial mediating role between parental psychological control and prosocial behavior. Meanwhile, SES moderated the relationship between parental psychological control and prosocial behavior. The effect of parental psychological control on prosocial behavior was more significant among students with low levels of SES than the higher ones. The findings showed that parenting plays an essential role in the development of children's prosociality.
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Affiliation(s)
- Weida Zhang
- School of Education, Renmin University of China, 59 Zhongguancun Ave., Haidian District, Beijing 100872, China
| | - Guoliang Yu
- School of Education, Renmin University of China, 59 Zhongguancun Ave., Haidian District, Beijing 100872, China
| | - Wangqian Fu
- Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, 19 Xinjiekouwai Ave., Haidian District, Beijing 100875, China
| | - Runqing Li
- School of Philosophy and Social Development, Shandong University, Jinan 250012, China
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19
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Abstract
Simplicial complexes describe the simple fact that in social networks a link can connect more than two individuals. As we show here, this has far-reaching consequences for epidemic spreading, in particular in the context of a multilayer network model, where one layer is a virtual social network and the other one is a physical contact network. The social network layer is responsible for the transmission of information via pairwise or higher order 2-simplex interactions among individuals, while the physical layer is responsible for the epidemic spreading. We use the microscopic Markov chain approach to derive the probability transition equations and to determine epidemic outbreak thresholds. We further support these results with Monte Carlo simulations, which are in good agreement, thus confirming the analytical tractability of the proposed model. We find that information transmission rates are frequently low when actual disease transmission rates in the physical network are low or medium, and we show that this can be mitigated effectively by introducing 2-simplex interactions in the social network. The relative ease of introducing higher-order interactions in virtual social networks means that this could be exploited to inhibit epidemic outbreaks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Junfeng Fan
- Tianjin Key Laboratory of Intelligence Computing and Novel Software Technology, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, People’s Republic of China
| | - Qian Yin
- Tianjin Key Laboratory of Intelligence Computing and Novel Software Technology, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, People’s Republic of China
| | - Chengyi Xia
- Tianjin Key Laboratory of Intelligence Computing and Novel Software Technology, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, People’s Republic of China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
- Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung 404332, Taiwan
- Alma Mater Europaea, Slovenska ulica 17 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
- Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
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Abstract
'Personal responsibility', one of the basic principles of social governance, requires one to be accountable for what one does. However, personal responsibility is far from the only norm ruling human interactions, especially in social and economic activities. In many collective communities such as among enterprise colleagues and family members, one's personal interests are often bound to others'-once one member breaks the rule, a group of people have to bear the punishment or sanction. Such a mechanism is termed 'joint liability'. Although many real-world cases have evidenced that joint liability can help to maintain collective collaboration, a deep and systematic theoretical analysis on how and when it promotes cooperation remains lacking. Here, we use evolutionary game theory to model an interacting system with joint liability, where one's losing credit could deteriorate the reputation of the whole group. We provide the analytical condition to predict when cooperation evolves and analytically prove that in the presence of punishment, being jointly liable greatly promotes cooperation. Our work stresses that joint liability is of great significance in promoting current economic prosperity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Guocheng Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China
| | - Qi Su
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.,Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.,Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China.,Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China
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