Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution

Advances in Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD), guaranteed by the principles of quantum mechanics, is one of the most promising solutions for the future of secure communication. Integrated quantum photonics provides a stable, compact, and robust platform for the implementation of complex photonic circuits amenable to mass manufacture, and also allows for the generation, detection, and processing of quantum states of light at a growing system’s scale, functionality, and complexity. Integrated quantum photonics provides a compelling technology for the integration of QKD systems. In this review, we summarize the advances in integrated QKD systems, including integrated photon sources, detectors, and encoding and decoding components for QKD implements. Complete demonstrations of various QKD schemes based on integrated photonic chips are also discussed.

Quantum Key Distribution: Modeling and Simulation through BB84 Protocol Using Python3

Autonomous "Things" is becoming the future trend as the role, and responsibility of IoT keep diversifying. Its applicability and deployment need to re-stand technological advancement. The versatile security interaction between IoTs in human-to-machine and machine-to-machine must also endure mathematical and computational cryptographic attack intricacies. Quantum cryptography uses the laws of quantum mechanics to generate a secure key by manipulating light properties for secure end-to-end communication. We present a proof-of-principle via a communication architecture model and implementation to simulate these laws of nature. The model relies on the BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with two scenarios, without and with the presence of an eavesdropper via the interception-resend attack model from a theoretical, methodological, and practical perspective. The proposed simulation initiates communication over a quantum channel for polarized photon transmission after a pre-agreed configuration over a Classic Channel with parameters. Simulation implementation results confirm that the presence of an eavesdropper is detectable during key generation due to Heisenberg's uncertainty and no-cloning principles. An eavesdropper has a 0.5 probability of guessing transmission qubit and 0.25 for the polarization state. During simulation re-iterations, a base-mismatch process discarded about 50 percent of the total initial key bits with an Error threshold of 0.11 percent.