Individual differences in the early recognition of moral information in lexical processing: An event-related potential study

Moralization and self-control strategy selection

To manage conflicts between temptation and commitment, people use self-control. The process model of self-control outlines different strategies for managing the onset and experience of temptation. However, little is known about the decision-making factors underlying strategy selection. Across three experiments (N = 317), we tested whether the moral valence of a commitment predicts how people advise attentional self-control strategies. In Experiments 1 and 2, people rated attentional focus strategies as significantly more effective for people tempted to break moral relative to immoral commitments, even when controlling for perceived temptation and trait self-control. Experiment 3 showed that as people perceived commitments to have more positive moral valence, they judged attentional focus strategies to be significantly more effective relative to attentional distraction strategies. Moreover, this effect was partly mediated by perceived differences in motivation. These results indicate that moralization informs decision-making processes related to self-control strategy selection.

Phrase Depicting Immoral Behavior Dilates Its Subjective Time Judgment

Intuitive moral emotions play a major role in forming our opinions and moral decisions. However, it is not yet known how we perceive the subjective time of moral-related information. In this study, we compared subjective durations of phrases depicting immoral, disgust, or neutral behaviors in a duration bisection task and found that phrases depicting immoral behavior were perceived as lasting longer than the neutral and disgusting phrases. By contrast, the subjective duration of the disgusting phrase, unlike the immoral phrase, was comparable to the neutral phrase. Moreover, the lengthening effect of the immoral phrase relative to the neutral phrase was significantly correlated to the anonymously prosocial tendency of the observer. Our findings suggest that immoral phrases induce embodied moral reaction, which alters emotional state and subsequently lengthens subjective time.

Recognizing Chinese Characters in Peripheral Vision: Different Levels of Processing of Character

It hasn't been clear how holistic and analytic processing contribute to character recognition yet. The current study focused on two issues: (1) whether configural processing is sufficient to support the performance of identifying characters in absence of analytic processing; (2) whether configural processing involves multiple levels of character recognition. We examined the inversion effect in different levels of character processing from foveal to peripheral vision. Participants were asked to identify the stimulus from nine alternatives after a stimulus (character, radical, and stroke) is presented either in upright or inverted orientation. The results showed that the identification of characters and radicals had robust peripheral inversion effects at the locations of 6.2° and 12.2°, but the identification accuracies of inverted stimulus (parts only) remained above chance. These findings suggested that the configural processing of characters could not be isolated from analytical processing in the periphery in the current study. Furthermore, the greater inversion effect shown for characters than radicals at 6.2° might indicate that holistic processing of characters involves two levels of configurations: character structure and radical processing. The peripheral inversion effect for stroke was also observed and the role of stroke-based analytic in character recognition was discussed.

Different influences of moral violation with and without physical impurity on face processing: An event-related potentials study

It has been widely accepted that moral violations that involve impurity (such as spitting in public) induce the emotion of disgust, but there has been a debate about whether moral violations that do not involve impurity (such as swearing in public) also induce the same emotion. The answer to this question may have implication for understanding where morality comes from and how people make moral judgments. This study aimed to compared the neural mechanisms underlying two kinds of moral violation by using an affective priming task to test the effect of sentences depicting moral violation behaviors with and without physical impurity on subsequent detection of disgusted faces in a visual search task. After reading each sentence, participants completed the face search task. Behavioral and electrophysiological (event-related potential, or ERP) indices of affective priming (P2, N400, LPP) and attention allocation (N2pc) were analyzed. Results of behavioral data and ERP data showed that moral violations both with and without impurity promoted the detection of disgusted faces (RT, N2pc); moral violations without impurity impeded the detection of neutral faces (N400). No priming effect was found on P2 and LPP. The results suggest both types of moral violation influenced the processing of disgusted faces and neutral faces, but the neural activity with temporal characteristics was different.

The time course of moral perception: an ERP investigation of the moral pop-out effect

Humans are highly attuned to perceptual cues about their values. A growing body of evidence suggests that people selectively attend to moral stimuli. However, it is unknown whether morality is prioritized early in perception or much later in cognitive processing. We use a combination of behavioral methods and electroencephalography to investigate how early in perception moral words are prioritized relative to non-moral words. The behavioral data replicate previous research indicating that people are more likely to correctly identify moral than non-moral words in a modified lexical decision task. The electroencephalography data reveal that words are distinguished from non-words as early as 200 ms after onset over frontal brain areas and moral words are distinguished from non-moral words 100 ms later over left-posterior cortex. Further analyses reveal that differences in brain activity to moral vs non-moral words cannot be explained by differences in arousal associated with the words. These results suggest that moral content might be prioritized in conscious awareness after an initial perceptual encoding but before subsequent memory processing or action preparation. This work offers a more precise theoretical framework for understanding how morality impacts vision and behavior.