Intended outcome expands in time

A matter of time: how musical training affects time perception

Musical training has been linked to changes in early attentional and perceptual processing. Thus, such an altered attentional and perceptual processing has enabled musicians to judge the duration differently than non-musicians. Although these claims seem intriguing, there are many questions that are not addressed yet, for example, how would the performance of musically-trained differ from that of untrained on visual and auditory temporal judgments? Is there any advantage to musically-trained person in temporal processing? To understand these questions, we thus conducted a series of Auditory and Visual Temporal Bisection Tasks on 32 musically-trained and 32 musically-untrained participants. We hypothesized that if music training modulates general sensitivity to temporal dimensions, then the temporal judgments of musically-trained participants would differ from those of untrained participants in both visual and auditory tasks. Each participant performed a total of 140 trials (70 visual and 70 auditory) in two different blocks. For each participant, a Point of Subjective Equality (PSE) was obtained for visual and auditory conditions. The findings revealed a significant modality effect on time perception, with auditory stimuli being consistently overestimated compared to visual stimuli. Surprisingly, the musically-trained group exhibited a tendency to underestimate duration relative to the musically-untrained participants. Although these results may appear counterintuitive at first glance, a detailed analysis indicates that the length of musical training plays a significant role in modulating temporal processing within the musically-trained group.

Action-outcome delays modulate the temporal expansion of intended outcomes

The phenomenon of intentional binding pertains to the perceived connection between a voluntary action and its anticipated result. When an individual intends an outcome, it appears to subjectively extend in time due to a pre-activation of the intended result, particularly evident at shorter action-outcome delays. However, there is a concern that the operationalisation of intention might have led to a mixed interpretation of the outcome expansion attributed to the pre-activation of intention, given the sensitivity of time perception and intentional binding to external cues that could accelerate the realisation of expectations. To investigate the expansion dynamics of an intended outcome, we employed a modified version of the temporal bisection task in two experiments. Experiment 1 considered the action-outcome delay as a within-subject factor, while experiment 2 treated it as a between-subject factor. The results revealed that the temporal expansion of an intended outcome was only evident under the longer action-outcome delay condition. We attribute this observation to working memory demands and attentional allocation due to temporal relevancy and not due to pre-activation. The discrepancy in effects across studies is explained by operationalising different components of the intentional binding effect, guided by the cue integration theory. Moreover, we discussed speculative ideas regarding the involvement of specific intentions based on the proximal intent distal intent (PIDI) theory and whether causality plays a role in temporal binding. Our study contributes to the understanding of how intention influences time perception and sheds light on how various methodological factors, cues, and delays can impact the dynamics of temporal expansion associated with an intended outcome.

The pursuit of the end: The effects of action-goal choices on temporal binding

The effect of action choice (whether one can choose their actions freely) on temporal binding (TB), the temporal contraction between a voluntary action and its effect, is controversial. The present study tried to distinguish action-goal choice (whether one could pursue the action-effect freely) from action choice. Experiments 1 and 2 focused on the effect of action-goal choice on TB while the congruency between actions and outcomes was manipulated (i.e., 50% in Experiment 1 and 80% in Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated the effect of action choice on TB when the outcome congruency was 80%. Results showed that free and instructed action-goals led to comparable magnitudes of TB while free actions led to a larger TB than instructed actions. Furthermore, the effect of outcome congruency on TB varied by action-goal choices (Experiment 2) but not action choices (Experiment 3). These results demonstrate the potential differences between action choice and action-goal choice.

Non-motor cues do not generate the perception of self-agency: A critique of cue-integration

How does one know that (s)he is the causal agent of their motor actions? Earlier theories of sense of agency have attributed the capacity for perception of self-agency to the comparator process of the motor-control/action system. However, with the advent of the findings implying a role of non-motor cues (like affective states, beliefs, primed concepts, and social instructions or previews of actions) in the sense of agency literature, the perception of self-agency is hypothesized to be generated even by non-motor cues (based on their relative reliability or weighting estimate); and, this theory is come to be known as the cue-integration of sense of agency. However, the cue-integration theory motivates skepticism about whether it is falsifiable and whether it is plausible that non-motor cues that are sensorily unrelated to typical sensory processes of self-agency have the capacity to produce a perception of self-agency. To substantiate this skepticism, I critically analyze the experimental operationalizations of cue-integration-with the (classic) vicarious agency experiment as a case study-to show that (1) the participants in these experiments are ambiguous about their causal agency over motor actions, (2) thus, these participants resort to reports of self-agency as heuristic judgments (under ambiguity) rather than due to cue-integration per se, and (3) there might not have occurred cue-integration based self-agency reports if these experimental operationalizations had eliminated ambiguity about the causal agency. Thus, I conclude that the reports of self-agency (observed in typical non-motor cues based cue-integration experiments) are not instances of perceptual effect-that are hypothesized to be produced by non-motor cues-but are of heuristic judgment effect.

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)-under uncertainty-rather than perceptual effects.

Intended emotions influence intentional binding with emotional faces: Larger binding for intended negative emotions

The effect of emotions on Intentional binding (IB) is equivocal. In addition, most studies on IB have not manipulated emotional content of intentions. This study investigates the effect of intended and outcome emotions using emotional faces (happy or disgust face in experiment 1 and a happy or angry face in experiment 3). To see whether the effects are due to priming, we used instructions with a happy-disgust pair in experiment 2 and happy-angry pair in experiment 4. Outcome emotional faces were not predictable. Results showed that intending a negative emotional face resulted in shorter action-outcome interval judgments compared to a happy face irrespective of the emotional content of the outcome face. This effect was absent in experiments 2 and 4 with instructed emotions. In addition to showing the importance of having explicit intentions, the results show that emotional content of our intentions does influence IB possibly due to prospective mechanisms.

Group congruent labelling leads to subjective expansion of time

Given top-down effects on perception, we examined the effect of group identity on time perception. We investigated whether the duration of an ambiguous sound clip is processed differently as a function of group congruent or incongruent source attribution. Group congruent (in-group) and incongruent (out-group) context was created by attributing the source of an identical ambiguous sound clip to Hindu or Muslim festivals. Participants from both the religious groups (Hindus and Muslims) prospectively listened to a 20 s long ambiguous sound clip and reproduced its duration (experiment 1a). Both groups reproduced significantly longer durations when the sound clip was associated with the group congruent compared to the group incongruent festival contexts. The two groups did not differ significantly in reproduced duration when the sound attributed to a non-religious common (busy city street) context (experiment 1b). With multiple durations (1, 5, 10 and 20 s), longer durations were reproduced for group congruent labelling at objectively longer durations (experiment 2). According to the internal clock model of time perception, the significant slope effect indicated that the group congruent context influences temporal experience through changes in pacemaker frequency. We argue that the duration appearing relevant to one's own group is processed differently possibly owing to differences in attentional deployment, which influences the pacemaker frequency.

The role of time perception in temporal binding: Impaired temporal resolution in causal sequences

Causality affects our perception of time; events that appear as causally related are perceived as closer together in time than unrelated events. This effect is known as temporal binding. One potential explanation of this effect is that causality slows an "internal clock" that is used in interval estimation. To explore this hypothesis, we first examined participants' perceived duration of a range of intervals between a causal action and an effect, or between two unrelated events. If (apparent) causality slows the internal clock, then plotting perceived duration against actual duration should reveal a shallower slope in the causality condition (a relative compression of perceived time). This pattern was found. We then examined an interesting corollary: that a slower rate during causal sequences would result in reduced temporal acuity. This is what we found: Duration discrimination thresholds were higher for causal compared to non-causal sequences. These results are compatible with a clock-slowing account of temporal binding. Implications for sensory recalibration accounts of binding are discussed.

Apparent speed of motion concomitant with action alters with delay

Multiple studies have shown action to affect perception of motion. The speed intended in the generation of a motion by action affects the apparent speed of the motion. However, it was unclear whether action with no intention of speed affects the apparent speed of a motion. In Experiment 1, we investigated the apparent speed of a motion following a key press action. We manipulated the delay from the action to the consequent motion for shifting the timing of efference copy and found the apparent speed decreasing with increases in the delay. This could be because it is known that speed irrelevant action caused expansion of perceived duration of the consequent stimulus and it might have influenced the result in Experiment 1, we investigated the apparent duration of the action consequent static (Ex. 2-1) and motion (Ex. 2-2) stimulus. We found that the apparent duration was not changed with delay. Moreover, the apparent speed and duration had different characteristics on delay. These results were discussed in terms of the sense of agency.