Using phage display technology to obtain Crybodies active against non-target insects

Mucin Protein of Aedes aegypti Interacts with Dengue Virus 2 and Influences Viral Infection

Dengue, caused by dengue virus (DENV), is the most prevalent vector-borne viral disease, posing a serious health concern to 2.5 billion people worldwide. DENV is primarily transmitted among humans by its mosquito vector Aedes aegypti; hence, the identification of a novel dengue virus receptor in mosquitoes is critical for the development of new anti-mosquito measures. In the current study, we have identified peptides which potentially interact with the surface of the virion particles and facilitate virus infection and movement during their life cycle in the mosquito vector. To identify these candidate proteins, we performed phage-display library screening against domain III of the envelope protein (EDIII), which plays an essential role during host cell receptor binding for viral entry. The mucin protein, which shared sequence similarity with the peptide identified in the screening, was cloned, expressed, and purified for in vitro interaction studies. Using in vitro pulldown and virus overlay protein-binding assay (VOPBA), we confirmed the positive interaction of mucin with purified EDIII and whole virion particles. Finally, blocking of mucin protein with anti-mucin antibodies partially reduced DENV titers in infected mosquitos. Moreover, mucin protein was found to be localized in the midgut of Ae. aegypti. IMPORTANCE Identification of interacting protein partners of DENV in the insect vector Aedes aegypti is crucial for designing vector control-based strategies and for understanding the molecular mechanism DENV uses to modulate the host, gain entry, and survive successfully. Similar proteins can be used in generating transmission-blocking vaccines.

Streamlined phage display library protocols for identification of insect gut binding peptides highlight peptide specificity

Phage display libraries have been used to isolate insect gut binding peptides for use as pathogen transmission blocking agents, and to provide artificial anchors for increased toxicity of bacteria-derived pesticidal proteins. Previously, phage clones displaying enriched peptides were sequenced by Sanger sequencing. Here we present a streamlined protocol for identification of insect gut binding peptides, using insect-appropriate feeding strategies, with next generation sequencing and tailored bioinformatics analyses. The bioinformatics pipeline is designed to eliminate poorly enriched and false positive peptides, and to identify peptides predicted to be stable and hydrophilic. In addition to developing streamlined protocols, we also sought to address whether candidate gut binding peptides can bind to insects from more than one order, which is an important consideration for safe, practical use of peptide-modified pesticidal proteins. To this end, we screened phage display libraries for peptides that bind to the gut epithelia of two pest insects, the Asian citrus psyllid, Diaphorina citri (Hemiptera) and beet armyworm, Spodoptera exigua (Lepidoptera), and one beneficial insect, the western honey bee, Apis mellifera (Hymenoptera). While unique peptide sequences totaling 13,427 for D. citri, 89,561 for S. exigua and 69,053 for A. mellifera were identified from phage eluted from the surface of the insect guts, final candidate pools were comprised of 53, 107 and 1423 peptides respectively. The benefits of multiple rounds of biopanning, along with peptide binding properties in relation to practical use of peptide-modified pesticidal proteins for insect pest control are discussed.

Making 3D-Cry Toxin Mutants: Much More Than a Tool of Understanding Toxins Mechanism of Action

3D-Cry toxins, produced by the entomopathogenic bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, have been extensively mutated in order to elucidate their elegant and complex mechanism of action necessary to kill susceptible insects. Together with the study of the resistant insects, 3D-Cry toxin mutants represent one of the pillars to understanding how these toxins exert their activity on their host. The principle is simple, if an amino acid is involved and essential in the mechanism of action, when substituted, the activity of the toxin will be diminished. However, some of the constructed 3D-Cry toxin mutants have shown an enhanced activity against their target insects compared to the parental toxins, suggesting that it is possible to produce novel versions of the natural toxins with an improved performance in the laboratory. In this report, all mutants with an enhanced activity obtained by accident in mutagenesis studies, together with all the variants obtained by rational design or by directed mutagenesis, were compiled. A description of the improved mutants was made considering their historical context and the parallel development of the protein engineering techniques that have been used to obtain them. This report demonstrates that artificial 3D-Cry toxins made in laboratories are a real alternative to natural toxins.

Replacement of loop2 and 3 of Cry1Ai in domain II affects specificity to the economically important insect Bombyx mori

Bacillus thuringiensis Cry1Ai belongs to three-domain Cry toxins and only shows growth inhibition effects against the agricultural pest Helicoverpa armigera, although it exhibits high toxicity against the non-target insect Bombyx mori. In previous studies, loop2 and loop3 on domain II from Cry1Ah were found to be related to binding and high toxicity against H. armigera. However, toxicity for B. mori of Cry1Ai-h-loop2, obtained by replacing loop 2 from Cry1Ah into Cry1Ai, was not modified. In this study, to further characterize the role of loop2 and loop3 in Cry1Ai, all of the amino acids in these two loops were substituted with the same amount of alanine residues. The Cry1Ai-loop3 mutant exhibited significantly lower toxicity against B. mori, but the toxicity of the loop2 mutant was not significantly changed. Furthermore, the double-exchange mutant Cry1Ai-h-loop2&3, replacing loop2 and loop3 from Cry1Ah into Cry1Ai, showed decreased toxicity against B. mori related to Cry1Ai. In addition, we found that the binding affinity of Cry1Ai-h-loop2&3 with brush border membrane vesicles (BBMVs) from the midgut of B. mori was lower than that of Cry1Ai, which correlates with the reduced toxicity.

Are Market GM Plants an Unrecognized Platform for Bioterrorism and Biocrime?

This article discusses a previously unrecognized avenue for bioterrorism and biocrime. It is suggested that new gene editing technologies may have the potential to create plants that are genetically modified in harmful ways, either in terms of their effect on the plant itself or in terms of harming those who would consume foods produced by that plant. While several risk scenarios involving GMOs-such as antibiotic resistant pathogens, synthetic biology, or mixing of non-GMO seeds with GMO seeds-have previously have been recognized, the new vulnerability is rooted in a different paradigm-that of clandestinely manipulating GMOs to create damage. The ability to actively inflict diseases on plants would pose serious health hazards to both humans and animals, have detrimental consequences to the economy, and directly threaten the food supply. As this is the first study of this kind, the full scope and impact of suck attacks-especially those involving the intended misuse of technologies such as gene-drives-merits further investigation. Herein, the plausibility of some of the new risks will be analyzed by, (1) Highlighting ownership and origination issues (esp. of event-specific GM-plants) as unrecognized risk factors; (2) Investigating the unique role of GMOs, why-and how-certified GMOs could become a new venue for such attacks; (3) Analyzing possible dual-use potentials of modern technologies and research oriented toward the advancement of GMOs, plant breeding and crop improvement. The identification and analysis of harmful genetic manipulations to utilize (covertly modified) plants (GMOs and non-GMOs) as an attack vector show that these concerns need to be taken seriously, raising the prospect not only of direct harm, but of the more likely effects in generating public concern, reputational harm of agricultural biotechnology companies, law-suits, and increased import bans of certain plants or their derived products.