Simulated forward and backward self motion, based on realistic parameters, causes motion induced blindness

Consciousness as a Memory System

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.

A multiple-response frequency-tagging paradigm measures graded changes in consciousness during perceptual filling-in

Perceptual filling-in (PFI) occurs when a physically present visual target disappears from conscious perception, with its location filled-in by the surrounding visual background. These perceptual changes are complete, near instantaneous, and can occur for multiple separate locations simultaneously. Here, we show that contrasting neural activity during the presence or absence of multi-target PFI can complement other findings from multistable phenomena to reveal the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We presented four peripheral targets over a background dynamically updating at 20 Hz. While participants reported on target disappearances/reappearances via button press/release, we tracked neural activity entrained by the background during PFI using steady-state visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs) recorded in the electroencephalogram. We found background SSVEPs closely correlated with subjective report, and increased with an increasing amount of PFI. Unexpectedly, we found that as the number of filled-in targets increased, the duration of target disappearances also increased, suggesting that facilitatory interactions exist between targets in separate visual quadrants. We also found distinct spatiotemporal correlates for the background SSVEP harmonics. Prior to genuine PFI, the response at the second harmonic (40 Hz) increased before the first (20 Hz), which we tentatively link to an attentional effect, while no such difference between harmonics was observed for physically removed stimuli. These results demonstrate that PFI can be used to study multi-object perceptual suppression when frequency-tagging the background of a visual display, and because there are distinct neural correlates for endogenously and exogenously induced changes in consciousness, that it is ideally suited to study the NCC.