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Li X, Bainbridge WA, Bakkour A. Item memorability has no influence on value-based decisions. Sci Rep 2022; 12:22056. [PMID: 36543818 PMCID: PMC9772201 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-26333-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2022] [Accepted: 12/13/2022] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
While making decisions, we often rely on past experiences to guide our choices. However, not all experiences are remembered equally well, and some elements of an experience are more memorable than others. Thus, the intrinsic memorability of past experiences may bias our decisions. Here, we hypothesized that individuals would tend to choose more memorable options than less memorable ones. We investigated the effect of item memorability on choice in two experiments. First, using food images, we found that the same items were consistently remembered, and others consistently forgotten, across participants. However, contrary to our hypothesis, we found that participants did not prefer or choose the more memorable over the less memorable items when choice options were matched for the individuals' valuation of the items. Second, we replicated these findings in an alternate stimulus domain, using words that described the same food items. These findings suggest that stimulus memorability does not play a significant role in determining choice based on subjective value.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xinyue Li
- Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, 5848 S University Ave, Chicago, IL, 60637, USA
| | - Wilma A Bainbridge
- Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, 5848 S University Ave, Chicago, IL, 60637, USA
- Neuroscience Institute, University of Chicago, 5812 S Ellis Ave, Chicago, IL, 60637, USA
| | - Akram Bakkour
- Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, 5848 S University Ave, Chicago, IL, 60637, USA.
- Neuroscience Institute, University of Chicago, 5812 S Ellis Ave, Chicago, IL, 60637, USA.
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2
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Comparing attribute-based and memory-based preferential choice. DECISION 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s40622-021-00302-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
AbstractCommon theories of multiattribute preferential choice predict that people choose options that have on average better attribute values than alternative options. However, following an alternative memory-based view on preferences people might sometimes prefer options that are more similar to memorized options that were experienced positively in the past. In two incentivized preferential choice experiments (N = 32, N = 28), we empirically compare these theoretical accounts, finding support for the memory-based value theory. Computational modeling using predictive model comparison showed that only a few participants could be described by a model that uses sums of subjectively weighted attribute values when experience was available. Most participants’ choices resembled the predictions of the memory-based model, according to which preferences are based on the similarity between novel and old memorized options. Further, people whose experience consisted of direct sensory exposure, like tasting a portion of food, were also those with higher likelihoods of a memory-based process, compared to people whose exposure was indirect. These results highlight the central role of memory and experience in preferential choices and add to the growing evidence for memory and similarity-based processes in the domain of human preferences.
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3
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Kraemer PM, Weilbächer RA, Mechera-Ostrovsky T, Gluth S. Cognitive and neural principles of a memory bias on preferential choices. CURRENT RESEARCH IN NEUROBIOLOGY 2022; 3:100029. [PMID: 36685759 PMCID: PMC9846459 DOI: 10.1016/j.crneur.2022.100029] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2021] [Revised: 01/31/2022] [Accepted: 01/31/2022] [Indexed: 01/25/2023] Open
Abstract
Value-based decisions depend on different forms of memory. However, the respective roles of memory and valuation processes that give rise to these decisions are often vaguely described and have rarely been investigated jointly. In this review article, we address the problem of memory-based decision making from a neuroeconomic perspective. We first describe the neural and cognitive processes involved in decisions requiring memory processes, with a focus on episodic memory. Based on the results of a systematic research program, we then spotlight the phenomenon of the memory bias, a general preference for choice options that can be retrieved from episodic memory more successfully. Our findings indicate that failed memory recall biases neural valuation processes as indicated by altered effective connectivity between the hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. This bias can be attributed to meta-cognitive beliefs about the relationship between subjective value and memory as well as to uncertainty aversion. After summarizing the findings, we outline potential future research endeavors to integrate the two research traditions of memory and decision making.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Sebastian Gluth
- Department of Psychology, University of Hamburg, Germany
- Corresponding author. Von-Melle-Park 11, 20146, Hamburg, Germany.
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4
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Wang S, Feng SF, Bornstein AM. Mixing memory and desire: How memory reactivation supports deliberative decision-making. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2021; 13:e1581. [PMID: 34665529 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1581] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/07/2020] [Revised: 08/24/2021] [Accepted: 09/16/2021] [Indexed: 11/09/2022]
Abstract
Memories affect nearly every aspect of our mental life. They allow us to both resolve uncertainty in the present and to construct plans for the future. Recently, renewed interest in the role memory plays in adaptive behavior has led to new theoretical advances and empirical observations. We review key findings, with particular emphasis on how the retrieval of many kinds of memories affects deliberative action selection. These results are interpreted in a sequential inference framework, in which reinstatements from memory serve as "samples" of potential action outcomes. The resulting model suggests a central role for the dynamics of memory reactivation in determining the influence of different kinds of memory in decisions. We propose that representation-specific dynamics can implement a bottom-up "product of experts" rule that integrates multiple sets of action-outcome predictions weighted based on their uncertainty. We close by reviewing related findings and identifying areas for further research. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Neuroscience > Cognition Neuroscience > Computation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shaoming Wang
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York, USA
| | - Samuel F Feng
- Department of Mathematics, Khalifa University of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE.,Khalifa University Centre for Biotechnology, Khalifa University of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE
| | - Aaron M Bornstein
- Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California-Irvine, Irvine, California, USA.,Center for the Neurobiology of Learning & Memory, University of California-Irvine, Irvine, California, USA.,Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California-Irvine, Irvine, California, USA
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5
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Botvinik-Nezer R, Bakkour A, Salomon T, Shohamy D, Schonberg T. Memory for individual items is related to nonreinforced preference change. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2021; 28:348-360. [PMID: 34526380 DOI: 10.1101/lm.053411.121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/17/2021] [Accepted: 07/14/2021] [Indexed: 01/11/2023]
Abstract
It is commonly assumed that memories contribute to value-based decisions. Nevertheless, most theories of value-based decision-making do not account for memory influences on choice. Recently, new interest has emerged in the interactions between these two fundamental processes, mainly using reinforcement-based paradigms. Here, we aimed to study the role memory processes play in preference change following the nonreinforced cue-approach training (CAT) paradigm. In CAT, the mere association of cued items with a speeded motor response influences choices. Previous studies with this paradigm showed that a single training session induces a long-lasting effect of enhanced preferences for high-value trained stimuli, that is maintained for several months. We hypothesized that CAT increases memory of trained items, leading to enhanced accessibility of their positive associative memories and in turn to preference changes. In two preregistered experiments, we found evidence that memory is enhanced for trained items and that better memory is correlated with enhanced preferences at the individual item level, both immediately and 1 mo following CAT. Our findings suggest that memory plays a central role in value-based decision-making following CAT, even in the absence of external reinforcements. These findings contribute to new theories relating memory and value-based decision-making and set the groundwork for the implementation of novel nonreinforced behavioral interventions that lead to long-lasting behavioral change.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rotem Botvinik-Nezer
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel.,School of Neurobiology, Biochemistry, and Biophysics, Faculty of Life Science, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel.,Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, USA
| | - Akram Bakkour
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027, USA.,Department of Psychology, the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637, USA
| | - Tom Salomon
- School of Neurobiology, Biochemistry, and Biophysics, Faculty of Life Science, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel
| | - Daphna Shohamy
- Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027, USA.,Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027, USA.,the Kavli Institute for Brain Science, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027, USA
| | - Tom Schonberg
- Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel.,School of Neurobiology, Biochemistry, and Biophysics, Faculty of Life Science, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel
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6
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The influence of visual attention on memory-based preferential choice. Cognition 2021; 215:104804. [PMID: 34167016 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104804] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/13/2020] [Revised: 05/20/2021] [Accepted: 06/04/2021] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
Many decisions rely on past experiences. Recent research indicates that people's choices are biased towards choosing better-remembered options, even if these options are comparatively unattractive (i.e., a memory bias). In the current study, we used eye tracking to compare the influence of visual attention on preferential choice between memory-based and non-memory-based decisions. Participants completed the remember-and-decide task. In this task, they first learned associations between screen locations and snack items. Then, they made binary choices between snack items. These snacks were either hidden and required recall (memory-based decisions), or they were visible (non-memory-based decisions). Remarkably, choices were more strongly influenced by attention in memory-based compared to non-memory-based decisions. However, visual attention did not mediate the memory bias on preferential choices. Finally, we adopt and expand a recently proposed computational model to provide a comprehensive description of the role of attention in memory-based decisions. In sum, the present work elucidates how visual attention interacts with episodic memory and preference formation in memory-based decisions.
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Kraemer PM, Fontanesi L, Spektor MS, Gluth S. Response time models separate single- and dual-process accounts of memory-based decisions. Psychon Bull Rev 2021; 28:304-323. [PMID: 32989719 PMCID: PMC7870645 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-020-01794-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022]
Abstract
Human decisions often deviate from economic rationality and are influenced by cognitive biases. One such bias is the memory bias according to which people prefer choice options they have a better memory of-even when the options' utilities are comparatively low. Although this phenomenon is well supported empirically, its cognitive foundation remains elusive. Here we test two conceivable computational accounts of the memory bias against each other. On the one hand, a single-process account explains the memory bias by assuming a single biased evidence-accumulation process in favor of remembered options. On the contrary, a dual-process account posits that some decisions are driven by a purely memory-driven process and others by a utility-maximizing one. We show that both accounts are indistinguishable based on choices alone as they make similar predictions with respect to the memory bias. However, they make qualitatively different predictions about response times. We tested the qualitative and quantitative predictions of both accounts on behavioral data from a memory-based decision-making task. Our results show that a single-process account provides a better account of the data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition to deepening our understanding of memory-based decision-making, our study provides an example of how to rigorously compare single- versus dual-process models using empirical data and hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation methods.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter M Kraemer
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 62a, 4055, Basel, Switzerland.
| | - Laura Fontanesi
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 62a, 4055, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Mikhail S Spektor
- Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25, Barcelona, 08005, Spain
- Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25, Barcelona, 08005, Spain
| | - Sebastian Gluth
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 62a, 4055, Basel, Switzerland
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8
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Weilbächer RA, Kraemer PM, Gluth S. The Reflection Effect in Memory-Based Decisions. Psychol Sci 2020; 31:1439-1451. [DOI: 10.1177/0956797620956315] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous research has indicated a bias in memory-based decision-making, with people preferring options that they remember better. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this memory bias remain elusive. Here, we propose that choosing poorly remembered options is conceptually similar to choosing options with uncertain outcomes. We predicted that the memory bias would be reduced when options had negative subjective value, analogous to the reflection effect, according to which uncertainty aversion is stronger in gains than in losses. In two preregistered experiments ( N = 36 each), participants made memory-based decisions between appetitive and aversive stimuli. People preferred better-remembered options in the gain domain, but this behavioral pattern reversed in the loss domain. This effect was not related to participants’ ambiguity or risk attitudes, as measured in a separate task. Our results increase the understanding of memory-based decision-making and connect this emerging field to well-established research on decisions under uncertainty.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Sebastian Gluth
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel
- Department of Psychology, University of Hamburg
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Gluth S, Kern N, Kortmann M, Vitali CL. Value-based attention but not divisive normalization influences decisions with multiple alternatives. Nat Hum Behav 2020; 4:634-645. [PMID: 32015490 PMCID: PMC7306407 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-0822-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 58] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/13/2019] [Accepted: 01/07/2020] [Indexed: 01/13/2023]
Abstract
Violations of economic rationality principles in choices between three or more options are critical for understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms of decision-making. A recent study reported that the relative choice accuracy between two options decreases as the value of a third (distractor) option increases and attributed this effect to divisive normalization of neural value representations. In two preregistered experiments, a direct replication and an eye-tracking experiment, we assessed the replicability of this effect and tested an alternative account that assumes value-based attention to mediate the distractor effect. Surprisingly, we could not replicate the distractor effect in our experiments. However, we found a dynamic influence of distractor value on fixations to distractors as predicted by the value-based attention theory. Computationally, we show that extending an established sequential sampling decision-making model by a value-based attention mechanism offers a comprehensive account of the interplay between value, attention, response times and decisions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sebastian Gluth
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland.
| | - Nadja Kern
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Maria Kortmann
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
| | - Cécile L Vitali
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
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10
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Gluth S, Meiran N. Leave-One-Trial-Out, LOTO, a general approach to link single-trial parameters of cognitive models to neural data. eLife 2019; 8:e42607. [PMID: 30735125 PMCID: PMC6392499 DOI: 10.7554/elife.42607] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2018] [Accepted: 02/07/2019] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
A key goal of model-based cognitive neuroscience is to estimate the trial-by-trial fluctuations of cognitive model parameters in order to link these fluctuations to brain signals. However, previously developed methods are limited by being difficult to implement, time-consuming, or model-specific. Here, we propose an easy, efficient and general approach to estimating trial-wise changes in parameters: Leave-One-Trial-Out (LOTO). The rationale behind LOTO is that the difference between parameter estimates for the complete dataset and for the dataset with one omitted trial reflects the parameter value in the omitted trial. We show that LOTO is superior to estimating parameter values from single trials and compare it to previously proposed approaches. Furthermore, the method makes it possible to distinguish true variability in a parameter from noise and from other sources of variability. In our view, the practicability and generality of LOTO will advance research on tracking fluctuations in latent cognitive variables and linking them to neural data.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Nachshon Meiran
- Department of PsychologyBen-Gurion University of the NegevBeer-ShevaIsrael
- Zlotowski Center for NeuroscienceBen-Gurion University of the NegevBeer-ShevaIsrael
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