Cuttlefish retrieve whether they smelt or saw a previously encountered item

Beyond the Tricks: The Science and Comparative Cognition of Magic

Magic is an art form that has fascinated humans for centuries. Recently, the techniques used by magicians to make their audience experience the impossible have attracted the attention of psychologists, who, in just a couple of decades, have produced a large amount of research regarding how these effects operate, focusing on the blind spots in perception and roadblocks in cognition that magic techniques exploit. Most recently, this investigation has given a pathway to a new line of research that uses magic effects to explore the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals. This new branch of the scientific study of magic has already yielded new evidence illustrating the power of magic effects as a psychological tool for nonhuman animals. This review aims to give a thorough overview of the research on both the human and nonhuman perception of magic effects by critically illustrating the most prominent works of both fields of inquiry.

The Inner Lives of Cephalopods

The minds of cephalopods have captivated scientists for millennia, yet the extent that we can understand their subjective experiences remains contested. In this article, we consider the sum of our scientific progress towards understanding the inner lives of cephalopods. Here, we outline the behavioral responses to specific experimental paradigms that are helping us to reveal their subjective experiences. We consider evidence from three broad research categories, which help to illuminate whether soft-bodied cephalopods (octopus, cuttlefish, and squid) have an awareness of self, awareness of others, and an awareness of time. Where there are current gaps in the literature, we outline cephalopod behaviors that warrant experimental investigation. We argue that investigations, especially framed through the lens of comparative psychology, have the potential to extend our understanding of the inner lives of this extraordinary class of animals.

Novel object recognition in Octopus maya

The Novel Object Recognition task (NOR) is widely used to study vertebrates' memory. It has been proposed as an adequate model for studying memory in different taxonomic groups, allowing similar and comparable results. Although in cephalopods, several research reports could indicate that they recognize objects in their environment, it has not been tested as an experimental paradigm that allows studying different memory phases. This study shows that two-month-old and older Octopus maya subjects can differentiate between a new object and a known one, but one-month-old subjects cannot. Furthermore, we observed that octopuses use vision and tactile exploration of new objects to achieve object recognition, while familiar objects only need to be explored visually. To our knowledge, this is the first time showing an invertebrate performing the NOR task similarly to how it is performed in vertebrates. These results establish a guide to studying object recognition memory in octopuses and the ontological development of that memory.

The Case for Octopus Consciousness: Temporality

Temporality is one of the criteria that Birch has advanced for areas of cognitive ability that may underlie animal sentience. An ability to integrate and use information across time must be more than simply learning pieces of information and retrieving them. This paper looks at such wider use of information by octopuses across time. It evaluates accumulation of information about one’s place in space, as used across immediate egocentric localization by cuttlefish and medium distance navigation in octopuses. Information about useful items in the environment can be incorporated for future use by octopuses, including for shelter in antipredator situations. Finding prey is not random but can be predicted by environmental cues, especially by cuttlefish about future contingencies. Finally, the paper examines unlimited associative learning and constraints on learning, and the ability of cephalopods to explore and seek out information, even by play, for future use.

Cephalopod Behavior: From Neural Plasticity to Consciousness

It is only in recent decades that subjective experience - or consciousness - has become a legitimate object of scientific inquiry. As such, it represents perhaps the greatest challenge facing neuroscience today. Subsumed within this challenge is the study of subjective experience in non-human animals: a particularly difficult endeavor that becomes even more so, as one crosses the great evolutionary divide between vertebrate and invertebrate phyla. Here, we explore the possibility of consciousness in one group of invertebrates: cephalopod molluscs. We believe such a review is timely, particularly considering cephalopods' impressive learning and memory abilities, rich behavioral repertoire, and the relative complexity of their nervous systems and sensory capabilities. Indeed, in some cephalopods, these abilities are so sophisticated that they are comparable to those of some higher vertebrates. Following the criteria and framework outlined for the identification of hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species, here we propose that cephalopods - particularly the octopus - provide a unique test case among invertebrates for examining the properties and conditions that, at the very least, afford a basal faculty of consciousness. These include, among others: (i) discriminatory and anticipatory behaviors indicating a strong link between perception and memory recall; (ii) the presence of neural substrates representing functional analogs of thalamus and cortex; (iii) the neurophysiological dynamics resembling the functional signatures of conscious states in mammals. We highlight the current lack of evidence as well as potentially informative areas that warrant further investigation to support the view expressed here. Finally, we identify future research directions for the study of consciousness in these tantalizing animals.

Cuttlefish exert self-control in a delay of gratification task

The ability to exert self-control varies within and across taxa. Some species can exert self-control for several seconds whereas others, such as large-brained vertebrates, can tolerate delays of up to several minutes. Advanced self-control has been linked to better performance in cognitive tasks and has been hypothesized to evolve in response to specific socio-ecological pressures. These pressures are difficult to uncouple because previously studied species face similar socio-ecological challenges. Here, we investigate self-control and learning performance in cuttlefish, an invertebrate that is thought to have evolved under partially different pressures to previously studied vertebrates. To test self-control, cuttlefish were presented with a delay maintenance task, which measures an individual's ability to forgo immediate gratification and sustain a delay for a better but delayed reward. Cuttlefish maintained delay durations for up to 50-130 s. To test learning performance, we used a reversal-learning task, whereby cuttlefish were required to learn to associate the reward with one of two stimuli and then subsequently learn to associate the reward with the alternative stimulus. Cuttlefish that delayed gratification for longer had better learning performance. Our results demonstrate that cuttlefish can tolerate delays to obtain food of higher quality comparable to that of some large-brained vertebrates.

Dimensions of Animal Consciousness

How does consciousness vary across the animal kingdom? Are some animals 'more conscious' than others? This article presents a multidimensional framework for understanding interspecies variation in states of consciousness. The framework distinguishes five key dimensions of variation: perceptual richness, evaluative richness, integration at a time, integration across time, and self-consciousness. For each dimension, existing experiments that bear on it are reviewed and future experiments are suggested. By assessing a given species against each dimension, we can construct a consciousness profile for that species. On this framework, there is no single scale along which species can be ranked as more or less conscious. Rather, each species has its own distinctive consciousness profile.