The role of action intentionality and effector in the subjective expansion of temporal duration after saccadic eye movements

Eye did this! Sense of agency in eye movements

This study investigates the sense of agency (SoA) for saccades with implicit and explicit agency measures. In two eye tracking experiments, participants moved their eyes towards on-screen stimuli that subsequently changed color. Participants then either reproduced the temporal interval between saccade and color-change (Experiment 1) or reported the time points of these events with an auditory Libet clock (Experiment 2) to measure temporal binding effects as implicit indices of SoA. Participants were either made to believe to exert control over the color change or not (agency manipulation). Explicit ratings indicated that the manipulation of causal beliefs and hence agency was successful. However, temporal binding was only evident for caused effects, and only when a sufficiently sensitive procedure was used (auditory Libet clock). This suggests a feebler connection between temporal binding and SoA than previously proposed. The results also provide evidence for a relatively fast acquisition of sense of agency for previously never experienced types of action-effect associations. This indicates that the underlying processes of action control may be rooted in more intricate and adaptable cognitive models than previously thought. Oculomotor SoA as addressed in the present study presumably represents an important cognitive foundation of gaze-based social interaction (social sense of agency) or gaze-based human-machine interaction scenarios. PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: In this study, sense of agency for eye movements in the non-social domain is investigated in detail, using both explicit and implicit measures. Therefore, it offers novel and specific insights into comprehending sense of agency concerning effects induced by eye movements, as well as broader insights into agency pertaining to entirely newly acquired types of action-effect associations. Oculomotor sense of agency presumably represents an important cognitive foundation of gaze-based social interaction (social agency) or gaze-based human-machine interaction scenarios. Due to peculiarities of the oculomotor domain such as the varying degree of volitional control, eye movements could provide new information regarding more general theories of sense of agency in future research.

Sound reduces saccadic chronostasis illusion

The saccadic chronostasis illusion refers to the duration overestimation of the first visual stimulation after saccadic eye movement, which is also known as "stopped clock illusion." The present study investigated whether saccadic chronostasis would be observed in the auditory modality and whether the saccade-induced time dilation in the visual modality would be reduced by a synchronously presented sound. In each trial, a unisensory visual stimulus, unisensory sound, or bimodal audio-visual stimulus with a duration of 200-800 ms (probe stimulus) was presented at the saccade target location and temporally around the offset of the saccade, followed by a unisensory visual or auditory standard stimulus for a fixed 500 ms. Participants were required to identify which of the two stimuli (probe or standard) presented in the target modality (visual or auditory) was perceived as longer. The results showed that no saccadic chronostasis was observed in the auditory modality, regardless of whether the sound was presented alone or synchronously accompanied by a visual stimulus. Interestingly, the magnitude of the saccadic chronostasis illusion was reduced by the synchronously presented sound. Moreover, the combined effect of the saccade and sound on visual time perception fits well with the standard scalar model, and the weight of the cross-modal effect was higher than that of saccadic visual time dilation. These results suggest that sound dominates vision in time processing during saccades and linearly modulates saccadic chronostasis, which follows the Scalar Expectancy Theory.

Hand movements influence the perception of time in a prediction motion task

Human perception of time is far from accurate and is subject to distortions. Previous research has demonstrated that any manipulation that distorts the perceived velocity of visible moving objects may shift prediction motion (PM) performance during occlusion. However, it is not clear whether motor action has the same influence during occlusion in the PM task. This work evaluated the influence of action on PM performance in two experiments. In both cases, participants performed an interruption paradigm, evaluating if an occluded object had reappeared earlier or later than expected. This task was done simultaneously with a motor action. In Experiment 1, we compared the PM performance according to the timing of the action made while the object was still visible or occluded. In Experiment 2, participants had to perform (or not) a motor action if the target was green (or red). In both experiments, our results showed that the duration of the object's occlusion was underestimated in the specific case of acting during the occlusion period. These results suggest that action and temporal perception share similar neural bases. Future research is needed to confirm this hypothesis.

Consciousness as a Memory System

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.

The effect of perceptual history on the interpretation of causality

The ability to interpret spatiotemporal contingencies in terms of causal relationships plays a key role in human understanding of the external world. Indeed, the detection of such simple properties enables us to attribute causal attributes to interactions between objects. Here, we investigated the degree to which this perception of causality depends on recent experience, as has been found for other low-level properties of visual stimuli. Participants were shown launching sequences of colliding circles with varying collision lags and were asked to report their impression of causality. We found short-term attractive and long-term repulsive and attractive effects of perceptual history on the interpretation of causality. Stimuli directly following a causal impression were more likely to be judged as causal and vice versa. However, prior judgments on less recent (>5) trials biased current perception with both positive/attractive and negative/repulsive influences. We interpret these results in terms of two potential mechanisms: adaptive temporal binding windows and updating of internal representations of causality. Overall, these results demonstrate the important role of prior experience even for causality, a fundamental building block of how we understand our world.

How movements shape the perception of time

In order to keep up with a changing environment, mobile organisms must be capable of deciding both where and when to move. This precision necessitates a strong sense of time, as otherwise we would fail in many of our movement goals. Yet, despite this intrinsic link, only recently have researchers begun to understand how these two features interact. Primarily, two effects have been observed: movements can bias time estimates, but they can also make them more precise. Here we review this literature and propose that both effects can be explained by a Bayesian cue combination framework, in which movement itself affords the most precise representation of time, which can influence perception in either feedforward or active sensing modes.