Moral judgements of fairness-related actions are flexibly updated to account for contextual information

AI contextual information shapes moral and aesthetic judgments of AI-generated visual art

Throughout history, art creation has been regarded as a uniquely human means to express original ideas, emotions, and experiences. However, as Generative Artificial Intelligence reshapes visual, aesthetic, legal, and economic culture, critical questions arise about the moral and aesthetic implications of AI-generated art. Despite the growing use of AI tools in art, the moral impact of AI involvement in the art creation process remains underexplored. Understanding moral judgments of AI-generated art is essential for assessing AI's impact on art and its alignment with ethical norms. Across three pre-registered experiments combining explicit and implicit paradigms with Bayesian modelling, we examined how information about AI systems influences moral and aesthetic judgments and whether human art is implicitly associated with positive attributes compared to AI-generated art. Experiment 1 revealed that factual information about AI backend processes reduced moral acceptability and aesthetic appeal in certain contexts, such as gaining financial incentives and art status. Experiment 2 showed that additional information about AI art's success had no clear impact on moral judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrated that an implicit association task did not reliably link human art with positive attributes and AI art with negative ones. These findings show that factual information about AI systems shapes judgments, while different information doses about AI art's success have limited moral impact. Additionally, implicit associations between human-made and AI-generated art are similar. This work enhances understanding of moral and aesthetic perceptions of AI-generated art, emphasizing the importance of examining human-AI interactions in an arts context, and their current and evolving societal implications.

Preschoolers' retrospective and prospective judgements of immanent justice following distributive actions

Prior research provided evidence for retrospective and prospective judgements of immanent justice in adults, but the developmental origins of judgements of immanent justice remain unknown. Both retrospective and prospective judgements were investigated in preschool age, using explicit and implicit measures. In Experiment 1, 2.5- and 4-year-olds were first shown events in which one agent distributed resources fairly or unfairly, and then they saw test events in which both distributors were damaged by a misfortune. Later, they were presented with a verbal task, in which they had to respond to two questions on evaluation of the deservingness, by using explicit measures. All children were likely to approve of deserved outcomes when deeds and outcomes were congruent (i.e., unfair distributor-misfortune), and only older ones were likely to disapprove when they were incongruent (i.e., fair distributor-misfortune). In Experiment 2, 4-year-olds after seeing familiarization events of Experiment 1, were presented with two verbal questions to explore prospective judgements of immanent justice, by using explicit measures. In Experiment 3, 4-year-olds were first shown familiarization events of Experiment 1 and listened to respective narratives, then before the outcome was revealed they were assessed with a reaching task to investigate prospective judgements of immanent justice, by using implicit measures. Children reached the image depicting a bad outcome for the unfair distributor, and that illustrated a good outcome for the fair distributor. The results of the last two experiments demonstrated a fine ability to make prospective judgements at 4 years of life, and found that they were to be more prone to apply immanent justice reasoning to positive outcomes following good actions. Taken together, these results provide new evidence for preschoolers' retrospective and prospective judgements of immanent justice.

Cognitive processes in imaginative moral shifts: How judgments of morally unacceptable actions change

How do people come to consider a morally unacceptable action, such as “a passenger in an airplane does not want to sit next to a Muslim passenger and so he tells the stewardess the passenger must be moved to another seat”, to be less unacceptable? We propose they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives about how things could have been different that transform the unacceptable action to be less unacceptable. Five experiments identify the cognitive processes underlying this imaginative moral shift: an action is judged less unacceptable when people imagine circumstances in which it would have been moral. The effect occurs for immediate counterfactuals and reflective ones, but is greater when participants create an immediate counterfactual first, and diminished when they create a reflective one first. The effect also occurs for unreasonable actions. We discuss the implications for alternative theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes underlying moral judgments.

How Do Basic Personality Traits Map Onto Moral Judgments of Fairness-Related Actions?

Reliance on fairness norms is a core feature of moral behavior and judgment, and is conceptually and empirically linked with basic personality dimensions. However, the specific nature of these links is poorly understood. In this study ( N = 313, 68% female), we employed a novel third-party judgment paradigm, in which participants made moral judgments of various sharing actions of virtual others. This allowed us to capture individual variation in the relative importance of several fairness norms. We correlated these norm profiles with Big Five personality traits. We observed distinct associations between agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and extraversion and estimates of the importance of generosity, selfishness, relative generosity, and relative selfishness norms. Comparisons of these associations at the domain- versus facet-level of personality traits suggested these relations are specific to domain-level traits. These findings are an important step toward unraveling the complex links between fairness norms and basic personality traits.

Neural profiles of observing acceptance and rejection decisions in human mate choice copying

Mate choice copying refers to an agent copying the choice for a potential sexual/romantic partner made by a relevant model and has been observed across many species. This study investigated the neural profiles of two copying strategies in humans - acceptance and rejection copying - using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Female participants observed female models accepting, rejecting, or being undecided about (control), males as potential romantic partners before and after rating their own willingness to choose the same males. We found that observing acceptance shifted participants' own choices towards acceptance, while observing rejection shifted participants' choices towards rejection. A network of motivation-, conflict- and reinforcement learning related brain regions was activated for observing the models' decisions. The rostral anterior cingulate gyrus (rACCg) and the caudate in particular were activated more strongly when observing acceptance. Activation in the inferior parietal lobe directly scaled with the magnitude of changes in choices after observing acceptance, while activation in the ACCg also scaled with changes after observing rejection. These findings point to partly dissociable neural profiles for copying strategies that might be linked to different contributions of incentive-driven and vicarious motivation, potentially reflecting the presence or absence of internalised reward experiences.