1
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Roy S, Nag Chowdhury S, Kundu S, Sar GK, Banerjee J, Rakshit B, Mali PC, Perc M, Ghosh D. Time delays shape the eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. Sci Rep 2023; 13:14331. [PMID: 37653103 PMCID: PMC10471784 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-41519-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2023] [Accepted: 08/28/2023] [Indexed: 09/02/2023] Open
Abstract
We study the intricate interplay between ecological and evolutionary processes through the lens of the prisoner's dilemma game. But while previous studies on cooperation amongst selfish individuals often assume instantaneous interactions, we take into consideration delays to investigate how these might affect the causes underlying prosocial behavior. Through analytical calculations and numerical simulations, we demonstrate that delays can lead to oscillations, and by incorporating also the ecological variable of altruistic free space and the evolutionary strategy of punishment, we explore how these factors impact population and community dynamics. Depending on the parameter values and the initial fraction of each strategy, the studied eco-evolutionary model can mimic a cyclic dominance system and even exhibit chaotic behavior, thereby highlighting the importance of complex dynamics for the effective management and conservation of ecological communities. Our research thus contributes to the broader understanding of group decision-making and the emergence of moral behavior in multidimensional social systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sourav Roy
- Department of Mathematics, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 700032, India
| | - Sayantan Nag Chowdhury
- Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California, Davis, CA, 95616, USA
| | - Srilena Kundu
- Department of Ecology & Evolution, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 60637, USA
| | - Gourab Kumar Sar
- Physics and Applied Mathematics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, 700108, India
| | - Jeet Banerjee
- BYJU'S, Think & Learn Pvt. Ltd., IBC Knowledge Park, 4/1 Bannerghatta Main Road, Bangalore, 560029, India
| | - Biswambhar Rakshit
- Department of Mathematics, Amrita School of Physical Sciences, Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham, Coimbatore, 641112, India
| | | | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000, Maribor, Slovenia
- Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung, 404332, Taiwan
- Alma Mater Europaea, Slovenska ulica 17, 2000, Maribor, Slovenia
- Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080, Vienna, Austria
- Department of Physics, Kyung Hee University, 26 Kyungheedae-ro, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea
| | - Dibakar Ghosh
- Physics and Applied Mathematics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, 700108, India.
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2
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Zhou X, Belloum A, Lees MH, van Engers T, de Laat C. Costly incentives design from an institutional perspective: cooperation, sustainability and affluence. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2022. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2022.0393] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Incentives are usually introduced by the regulator entity (third-party), to promote cooperation in a market. The implementation of incentives is always costly and thus might fail to be enforced sustainably. This work aims at exploring the effects of incentives from an institutional perspective, while coping with the scenario where the third-party is part of the system but not composed by players. The evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework is applied to identify the incentives that lead to pure cooperation. In contrast to traditional EGT, this paper introduces an elimination mechanism that can reduce the market size. The incentives identified in the EGT analysis are further examined in simulation experiments which measure the market size, affluence and sustainability. The findings show: (1) light punishment leads to a reduction of the market size, yet heavier punishment is beneficial to the market size and wealth; (2) mixed incentives will generally lead to different wealth of the third party and of the participants. While under moderate strength, the wealth of both parties is the same and their overall wealth is maximal; (3) for sustainability, pure punishment (resp. reward) is sustainable (resp. unsustainable), the sustainability of mixed incentives depends on both their strength and agents’ rationality level.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xin Zhou
- Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,The Netherlands
| | - Adam Belloum
- Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,The Netherlands
| | - Michael H. Lees
- Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,The Netherlands
| | - Tom van Engers
- Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,The Netherlands
| | - Cees de Laat
- Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,The Netherlands
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3
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Feng C, Yang Q, Azem L, Atanasova KM, Gu R, Luo W, Hoffman M, Lis S, Krueger F. An fMRI investigation of the intention-outcome interactions in second- and third-party punishment. Brain Imaging Behav 2021; 16:715-727. [PMID: 34533770 DOI: 10.1007/s11682-021-00555-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/31/2021] [Indexed: 01/06/2023]
Abstract
Second-party punishment (SPP) and third-party punishment (TPP) are two basic forms of costly punishment that play an essential role in maintaining social orders. Despite scientific breakthroughs in understanding that costly punishment is driven by an integration of the wrongdoers' intention and the outcome of their actions, so far, few studies have compared the neurocognitive processes associated with the intention-outcome integration between SPP and TPP. Here, we combined economic exchange games measuring SPP and TPP with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the neuropsychological architectures underlying the intention-outcome integration during one-shot interactions with anonymous partners across four types of norm violations (no norm, accidental, attempted, and intentional violations). Our behavioral findings showed that third-parties punished only attempted norm violations less frequently than second-parties. Our neuroimaging findings revealed higher activities in the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) for attempted norm violations during TPP relative to SPP; more activities in these regions with less punishment frequency; and enhancement of functional connectivity of the right TPJ with the right dlPFC and dorsomedial PFC. Our findings demonstrated specific psychological and neural mechanisms of intention-outcome interactions between SPP and TPP -helping to unravel the complex neurocognitive processes of costly punishment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chunliang Feng
- Key Laboratory of Brain, Cognition and Education Sciences, Ministry of Education, China; School of Psychology, Center for Studies of Psychological Application, and Guangdong Key Laboratory of Mental Health and Cognitive Science, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, China.
| | - Qun Yang
- Department of Psychology, Jing Hengyi School of Education, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China
| | - Lydia Azem
- Center of Psychological Psychotherapy, ZPP, Central Institute of Mental Health, Mannheim, Germany
| | - Konstantina M Atanasova
- Institute of Psychiatric and Psychosomatic Psychotherapy, Central Institute of Mental Health, Mannheim; Medical Faculty, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany
| | - Ruolei Gu
- CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Beijing, China.,Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
| | - Wenbo Luo
- Research Center of Brain and Cognitive Neuroscience, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian, China
| | - Morris Hoffman
- Second Judicial District, State of Colorado, Denver, CO, USA
| | - Stefanie Lis
- Institute of Psychiatric and Psychosomatic Psychotherapy, Central Institute of Mental Health, Mannheim; Medical Faculty, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany
| | - Frank Krueger
- School of Systems Biology, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA. .,Department of Psychology, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany.
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4
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Bahramian A, Parastesh F, Pham VT, Kapitaniak T, Jafari S, Perc M. Collective behavior in a two-layer neuronal network with time-varying chemical connections that are controlled by a Petri net. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2021; 31:033138. [PMID: 33810759 DOI: 10.1063/5.0045840] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/29/2021] [Accepted: 03/02/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
In this paper, we propose and study a two-layer network composed of a Petri net in the first layer and a ring of coupled Hindmarsh-Rose neurons in the second layer. Petri nets are appropriate platforms not only for describing sequential processes but also for modeling information circulation in complex systems. Networks of neurons, on the other hand, are commonly used to study synchronization and other forms of collective behavior. Thus, merging both frameworks into a single model promises fascinating new insights into neuronal collective behavior that is subject to changes in network connectivity. In our case, the Petri net in the first layer manages the existence of excitatory and inhibitory links among the neurons in the second layer, thereby making the chemical connections time-varying. We focus on the emergence of different types of collective behavior in the model, such as synchronization, chimeras, and solitary states, by considering different inhibitory and excitatory tokens in the Petri net. We find that the existence of only inhibitory or excitatory tokens disturbs the synchronization of electrically coupled neurons and leads toward chimera and solitary states.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alireza Bahramian
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, Amirkabir University of Technology, No. 350, Hafez Ave., Valiasr Square, Tehran 159163-4311, Iran
| | - Fatemeh Parastesh
- Department of Biomedical Engineering, Amirkabir University of Technology, No. 350, Hafez Ave., Valiasr Square, Tehran 159163-4311, Iran
| | - Viet-Thanh Pham
- Nonlinear Systems and Applications, Faculty of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Ton Duc Thang University, Ho Chi Minh City 758307, Vietnam
| | - Tomasz Kapitaniak
- Division of Dynamics, Lodz University of Technology, Stefanowskiego 1/15, 90-924 Lodz, Poland
| | - Sajad Jafari
- Center for Computational Biology, Chennai Institute of Technology, Chennai, Tamil Nadu 600069, India
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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5
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Nag Chowdhury S, Kundu S, Banerjee J, Perc M, Ghosh D. Eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the presence of policing. J Theor Biol 2021; 518:110606. [PMID: 33582077 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110606] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2020] [Revised: 12/31/2020] [Accepted: 01/24/2021] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game as a basis for long-term apprehension of the essential social dilemma related to cooperation among unrelated individuals. We upgrade the contemporary PD game with an inclusion of evolution-induced act of punishment as a third competing strategy in addition to the traditional cooperators and defectors. In a population structure, the abundance of ecologically-viable free space often regulates the reproductive opportunities of the constituents. Hence, additionally, we consider the availability of free space as an ecological footprint, thus arriving at a simple eco-evolutionary model, which displays fascinating complex dynamics. As possible outcomes, we report the individual dominance of cooperators and defectors as well as a plethora of mixed states, where different strategies coexist followed by maintaining the diversity in a socio-ecological framework. These states can either be steady or oscillating, whereby oscillations are sustained by cyclic dominance among different combinations of cooperators, defectors, and punishers. We also observe a novel route to cyclic dominance where cooperators, punishers, and defectors enter a coexistence via an inverse Hopf bifurcation that is followed by an inverse period doubling route.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sayantan Nag Chowdhury
- Physics and Applied Mathematics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B. T. Road, Kolkata 700108, India
| | - Srilena Kundu
- Physics and Applied Mathematics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B. T. Road, Kolkata 700108, India
| | - Jeet Banerjee
- BYJU'S, Think & Learn Pvt. Ltd., IBC Knowledge Park, 4/1 Bannerghatta Main Road, Bangalore 560029, India.
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan; Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria.
| | - Dibakar Ghosh
- Physics and Applied Mathematics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B. T. Road, Kolkata 700108, India.
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6
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Shen C, Jusup M, Shi L, Wang Z, Perc M, Holme P. Exit rights open complex pathways to cooperation. J R Soc Interface 2021; 18:20200777. [PMID: 33435841 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2020.0777] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in which cooperators and defectors interact with another actor type called exiters. Rather than being exploited by defectors, exiters exit the game in favour of a small pay-off. We find that this simple extension of the game allows cooperation to flourish in well-mixed populations when iterations or reputation are added. In networked populations, however, the exit option is less conducive to cooperation. Instead, it enables the coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and exiters through cyclic dominance. Other outcomes are also possible as the exit pay-off increases or the network structure changes, including network-wide oscillations in actor abundances that may cause the extinction of exiters and the domination of defectors, although game parameters should favour exiting. The complex dynamics that emerges in the wake of a simple option to exit the game implies that nuances matter even if our analyses are restricted to incentives for rational behaviour.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chen Shen
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People's Republic of China.,Tokyo Tech World Hub Research Initiative, Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
| | - Marko Jusup
- Tokyo Tech World Hub Research Initiative, Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People's Republic of China
| | - Zhen Wang
- Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL) and School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, People's Republic of China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia.,Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung 404332, Taiwan, Republic of China.,Complexity Science Hub Vienna, 1080 Vienna, Austria
| | - Petter Holme
- Tokyo Tech World Hub Research Initiative, Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
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7
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Zhang Y, Li Y, Deng W, Huang K, Yang C. Complex networks identification using Bayesian model with independent Laplace prior. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2021; 31:013107. [PMID: 33754749 DOI: 10.1063/5.0031134] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2020] [Accepted: 12/10/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Identification of complex networks from limited and noise contaminated data is an important yet challenging task, which has attracted researchers from different disciplines recently. In this paper, the underlying feature of a complex network identification problem was analyzed and translated into a sparse linear programming problem. Then, a general framework based on the Bayesian model with independent Laplace prior was proposed to guarantee the sparseness and accuracy of identification results after analyzing influences of different prior distributions. At the same time, a three-stage hierarchical method was designed to resolve the puzzle that the Laplace distribution is not conjugated to the normal distribution. Last, the variational Bayesian was introduced to improve the efficiency of the network reconstruction task. The high accuracy and robust properties of the proposed method were verified by conducting both general synthetic network and real network identification tasks based on the evolutionary game dynamic. Compared with other five classical algorithms, the numerical experiments indicate that the proposed model can outperform these methods in both accuracy and robustness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yichi Zhang
- School of Automation, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
| | - Yonggang Li
- School of Automation, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
| | - Wenfeng Deng
- School of Automation, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
| | - Keke Huang
- School of Automation, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
| | - Chunhua Yang
- School of Automation, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
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8
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Fu Y, Zhang Y, Guo Y, Xie Y. Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with the celebrity effect in complex networks. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2021; 31:013130. [PMID: 33754779 DOI: 10.1063/5.0033335] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/15/2020] [Accepted: 12/28/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
How long-term cooperation is maintained in a society is an important and interesting question. The evolutionary game theory is often used as the basic framework to study this topic. The social status of game participants has an important influence on individual decision-making. Enlightened by this thought, we present a classification imitation model where the mechanisms of the celebrity effect and incomplete egoism are presented. The celebrity effect is reflected in each strategy update process to probe how individual decision-making is dynamically adjusted by comparing the social status of both parties in the game. The incomplete egoism refers to the irrational imitation of celebrities while self-interest is ignored. With this model, the group cooperation decision-making mechanism led by celebrities is revealed. Large-scale Monte Carlo simulations show that the incomplete egoism of individuals cannot stimulate cooperation but guarantee the stable existence of cooperation. Furthermore, the scale-free and community structure of the network enables cooperation to spread widely and maintains long-term survival. Our conclusion might provide practically new insight into the understanding and controlling of cooperation in the complex social systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yanyu Fu
- School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
| | - Yan Zhang
- School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
| | - Yu Guo
- Software Institute, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
| | - Yunya Xie
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
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9
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Xia C, Gracia-Lázaro C, Moreno Y. Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2020; 30:063122. [PMID: 32611098 DOI: 10.1063/5.0009758] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/16/2023]
Abstract
The understanding of cooperative behavior in social systems has been the subject of intense research over the past few decades. In this regard, the theoretical models used to explain cooperation in human societies have been complemented with a growing interest in experimental studies to validate the proposed mechanisms. In this work, we rely on previous experimental findings to build a theoretical model based on two cooperation driving mechanisms: second-order reputation and memory. Specifically, taking the donation game as a starting point, the agents are distributed among three strategies, namely, unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and discriminators, where the latter follow a second-order assessment rule: shunning, stern judging, image scoring, or simple standing. A discriminator will cooperate if the evaluation of the recipient's last actions contained in his memory is above a threshold of (in)tolerance. In addition to the dynamics inherent to the game, another imitation dynamics, involving much longer times (generations), is introduced. The model is approached through a mean-field approximation that predicts the macroscopic behavior observed in Monte Carlo simulations. We found that, while in most second-order assessment rules, intolerance hinders cooperation, it has the opposite (positive) effect under the simple standing rule. Furthermore, we show that, when considering memory, the stern judging rule shows the lowest values of cooperation, while stricter rules show higher cooperation levels.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chengyi Xia
- Tianjin Key Laboratory of Intelligence Computing and Novel Software Technology, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, People's Republic of China
| | - Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
- Instituto de Biocomputación y Física de Sistemas Complejos (BIFI), Universidad de Zaragoza, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain
| | - Yamir Moreno
- Instituto de Biocomputación y Física de Sistemas Complejos (BIFI), Universidad de Zaragoza, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain
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10
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Liu S, Zhang L, Wang B. Individual diversity between interdependent networks promotes the evolution of cooperation by means of mixed coupling. Sci Rep 2019; 9:11163. [PMID: 31371732 PMCID: PMC6671968 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-47013-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/01/2018] [Accepted: 06/05/2019] [Indexed: 11/27/2022] Open
Abstract
Along with the rapid development of network-based information technology, such as cloud computing, big data, the IoT, and so on, human society has stepped into a new era of complex networks. People's life and production activities depend more and more on various complex networks to ensure security and reliability. The complex interrelationships between human and nature establish a link to explain the cooperation of individual behaviour, especially for individual diversity. However, existing researches mostly ignore the influence of individual diversity on networks involved in individual behaviour to strategy selection. Therefore, it needs further research on how to consider both individual diversity and independent networks in the evolution of cooperative behaviour. To address this issue, we extend a simple game model into the interdependent networks through the mixed coupling (i.e., utility and probability) in this work. Also, we divide the kinds of strategic behaviour of a player in one layer concerning individual diversity. Moreover, there exists an optimal region of mixed coupling between networks such that cooperation can be promoted. Finally, experimental results can open the path to understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation within various interconnected and interrelated real-world systems newly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sicheng Liu
- School of Automation Science and Electrical Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, 100191, China
- Engineering Research Center of Complex Product Advanced Manufacturing Systems, Ministry of Education, Beijing, 100191, China
| | - Lin Zhang
- School of Automation Science and Electrical Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, 100191, China.
- Engineering Research Center of Complex Product Advanced Manufacturing Systems, Ministry of Education, Beijing, 100191, China.
| | - Baokui Wang
- Joint Exercises and Training Center, Joint Operations College, National Defense University, Beijing, 100091, China.
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11
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Fang Y, Benko TP, Perc M, Xu H, Tan Q. Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2019; 475:20190349. [PMID: 31423104 PMCID: PMC6694311 DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2019.0349] [Citation(s) in RCA: 31] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2019] [Accepted: 06/18/2019] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yinhai Fang
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
| | - Tina P. Benko
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
- Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
| | - Haiyan Xu
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
| | - Qingmei Tan
- College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211100, People's Republic of China
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12
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Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games. Sci Rep 2019; 9:8208. [PMID: 31160674 PMCID: PMC6547755 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-44725-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/18/2019] [Accepted: 05/22/2019] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Mechanisms and conditions for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation in multi-player social dilemma games remain an open question. This paper focuses on stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games with different exclusion strategies. We introduce four strategy types in the population, namely, cooperation, defection, loner and exclusion. Synchronous and asynchronous exclusion forms have been compared in finite-sized, well-mixed and structured populations. In addition, we verify that the asynchronous exclusion mechanism is indeed better than the synchronous exclusion mechanism in all cases. The benefits of the asynchronous exclusion are measured by comparing the probability that the system chooses the cooperative states in the two situations. In the well-mixed population cases, only when the investment amplification factor is small and the probability of exclusion success is high will the asynchronous exclusion mechanism have a relatively large advantage in promoting cooperation. However, in the structured population cases, the range of the investment amplification factor, in which the asynchronous exclusion mechanism has relatively large advantages in promoting cooperation, is somewhat different and is mainly in the middle of the interval under our parameters. Our study further corroborated that when non-participation and exclusion strategies exist, a structured population does not necessarily promote cooperation compared with a well-mixed population for some parameter combinations. Thus, we acquire a good understanding of the emergence of cooperation under different exclusion mechanisms.
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13
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Han Y, Deng Y, Cao Z, Lin CT. An interval-valued Pythagorean prioritized operator-based game theoretical framework with its applications in multicriteria group decision making. Neural Comput Appl 2019. [DOI: 10.1007/s00521-019-04014-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 42] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
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14
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Wu Y, Zhang Z, Chang S. Heterogeneous indirect reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2018; 28:123108. [PMID: 30599534 DOI: 10.1063/1.5066589] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2018] [Accepted: 11/19/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological system is cooperation. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that favor cooperation. Indirect reciprocity is a crucial factor for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolutionary games. In this work, we introduce a mechanism of heterogeneous indirect reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game, where an altruistic attribute is considered. The so-called altruistic attribute refers to the trait that when an altruistic individual cooperates, its neighbors, regardless of their strategies, can gain additional benefits. Intuitively, altruistic cooperative agents seem to do only what is beneficial for others, but in fact, their neighbors tend to cooperate in order to maintain the cooperative strategies of altruistic individuals. In this way, the neighbors of cooperative altruistic individuals not only guarantee their own additional benefits, but also indirectly protect the income of altruistic individuals, which strengthens the links between cooperative individuals, thus promoting the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of the results is verified on homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. Moreover, the results of individual heterogeneity corroborate the existing evidence that heterogeneity, almost irrespective of its origin, promotes cooperative actions. Our conclusions might provide additional insights into understanding the roots of cooperation in social systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yu'e Wu
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
| | - Zhipeng Zhang
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
| | - Shuhua Chang
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
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15
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Wu Y, Zhang S, Zhang Z. Environment-based preference selection promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game. Sci Rep 2018; 8:15616. [PMID: 30353150 PMCID: PMC6199282 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-34116-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2018] [Accepted: 10/11/2018] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
The impact of environment on individuals is particularly critical. In evolutionary games, adopting the strategy of the neighbor who performs better is nontrivial for the survival and maintenance of cooperation, in that such an action may help the agents to obtain higher benefit and more obvious evolutionary advantages. Inspired by this idea, we investigate the effect of the environment-based preference selection on the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma. A simple rule, incorporating individual preference selection via an adjustable parameter α to explore how the selection of the potential strategy sources influences individual behavior traits, is considered. Because social interaction may not be the only way of generating payoffs, we assume that the individual’s income is also affected by the environment. Besides, taking into account individual differences, we introduce the heterogeneity of the environment. Through numerous computing simulations, we find that environment-based preference selection, which accelerates the microscopic organization of cooperator clusters to resist the aggression of defectors, can truly promote cooperation within a large range of parameters. Our study indicates that the combination of heterogeneity and preference selection may be key for the sustainability of cooperation in structured populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yu'e Wu
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin, 300222, China
| | - Shuhua Zhang
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin, 300222, China.
| | - Zhipeng Zhang
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin, 300222, China
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16
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Liu L, Wang S, Chen X, Perc M. Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2018; 28:103105. [PMID: 30384651 DOI: 10.1063/1.5051422] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/08/2018] [Accepted: 09/23/2018] [Indexed: 06/08/2023]
Abstract
Pro-social punishment and exclusion are common means to elevate the level of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the combined use of these two strategies is quite common across human societies. However, it is still not known how a combined strategy where punishment and exclusion are switched can promote cooperation from the theoretical perspective. In this paper, we thus propose two different switching strategies, namely, peer switching that is based on peer punishment and peer exclusion, and pool switching that is based on pool punishment and pool exclusion. Individuals adopting the switching strategy will punish defectors when their numbers are below a threshold and exclude them otherwise. We study how the two switching strategies influence the evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game. We show that an intermediate value of the threshold leads to a stable coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and players adopting the switching strategy in a well-mixed population, and this regardless of whether the pool-based or the peer-based switching strategy is introduced. Moreover, we show that the pure exclusion strategy alone is able to evoke a limit cycle attractor in the evolutionary dynamics, such that cooperation can coexist with other strategies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Linjie Liu
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
| | - Shengxian Wang
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia; Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Josefstädterstraße 39, A-1080 Vienna, Austria
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17
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Coevolution of teaching ability and cooperation in spatial evolutionary games. Sci Rep 2018; 8:14097. [PMID: 30237479 PMCID: PMC6148002 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-32292-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2018] [Accepted: 09/04/2018] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Individuals with higher reputation are able to spread their social strategies easily. At the same time, one’s reputation is changing according to his previous behaviors, which leads to completely different teaching abilities for players. To explore the effect of the teaching ability influenced by reputation, we consider a coevolutionary model in which the reputation score affects the updating rule in spatial evolutionary games. More precisely, the updating probability becomes bigger if his/her partner has a positive reputation. Otherwise, the updating probability becomes smaller. This simple design describes the influence of teaching ability on strategy adoption effectively. Numerical results focus on the proportion of cooperation under different levels of the amplitude of change of reputation and the range of reputation. For this dynamics, the fraction of cooperators presents a growth trend within a wide range of parameters. In addition, to validate the generality of this mechanism, we also employ the snowdrift game. Moreover, the evolution of cooperation on Erdős-Rényi random graph is studied for the prisoner’s dilemma game. Our results may be conducive to understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation during the strategy adoptions in reality.
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18
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Bian T, Deng Y. Identifying influential nodes in complex networks: A node information dimension approach. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2018; 28:043109. [PMID: 31906639 DOI: 10.1063/1.5030894] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/10/2023]
Abstract
In the field of complex networks, how to identify influential nodes is a significant issue in analyzing the structure of a network. In the existing method proposed to identify influential nodes based on the local dimension, the global structure information in complex networks is not taken into consideration. In this paper, a node information dimension is proposed by synthesizing the local dimensions at different topological distance scales. A case study of the Netscience network is used to illustrate the efficiency and practicability of the proposed method.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tian Bian
- Institute of Fundamental and Frontier Science, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
| | - Yong Deng
- Institute of Fundamental and Frontier Science, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
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19
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Zhang Y, Wang J, Ding C, Xia C. Impact of individual difference and investment heterogeneity on the collective cooperation in the spatial public goods game. Knowl Based Syst 2017. [DOI: 10.1016/j.knosys.2017.09.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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20
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Chaudhuri A, Paichayontvijit T. On the long-run efficacy of punishments and recommendations in a laboratory public goods game. Sci Rep 2017; 7:12286. [PMID: 28947764 PMCID: PMC5612960 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-12490-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/02/2017] [Accepted: 09/11/2017] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
We use decision-making experiments with human participants to study cooperation in a laboratory public goods game. Such games pose a conflict between cooperating, which is socially optimal and free-riding, which promotes individual self-interest. Prior research emphasizes the need for de-centralized peer-to-peer punishments as an evolutionarily stable response to the problem of free-riding, especially where interactions occur over long horizons. We show that a simple exhortative message appealing to participants’ goodwill can achieve high rates of cooperation in social dilemmas played over many rounds, even in the absence of punishments for free-riding.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand. .,660 Owen G Glenn Building, 12 rafton Road, Auckland, 1142, New Zealand.
| | - Tirnud Paichayontvijit
- Department of International Political Economy and Development, Rangsit University, Bangkok, Thailand
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21
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Zhou Y, Zhu YY, Zhang K, Wu HW, Peng RW, Fan RH, Wang M. Plasmonic band structures in doped graphene tubes. OPTICS EXPRESS 2017; 25:12081-12089. [PMID: 28786566 DOI: 10.1364/oe.25.012081] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2017] [Accepted: 05/09/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
We present theoretically the transport of plasmonic waves in doped graphene tube, which is made by rolling planar graphene sheet into a cylinder and periodic doping is applied on it. It is shown that periodic modulation of the Fermi level along the tube can open gaps in the dispersion relations of graphene plasmons and eventually create plasmonic band structures. The propagation of graphene plasmons is forbidden within the bandgaps; while within the band, the plasmonic waves present axially-extended field distributions and propagate along the tubes, yet well confined around the curved graphene surface. Furthermore, the bandgaps, propagation constants and propagation lengths of the modes in plasmonic band structures are significantly tuned by varying the Fermi level of graphene, which provides active controls over the plasmonic waves. Our proposed structures here may provide an approach to dynamically control the plasmonic waves in graphene-based subwavelength waveguides.
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22
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Structural power and the evolution of collective fairness in social networks. PLoS One 2017; 12:e0175687. [PMID: 28410385 PMCID: PMC5391959 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0175687] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2016] [Accepted: 03/29/2017] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
From work contracts and group buying platforms to political coalitions and international climate and economical summits, often individuals assemble in groups that must collectively reach decisions that may favor each part unequally. Here we quantify to which extent our network ties promote the evolution of collective fairness in group interactions, modeled by means of Multiplayer Ultimatum Games (MUG). We show that a single topological feature of social networks—which we call structural power—has a profound impact on the tendency of individuals to take decisions that favor each part equally. Increased fair outcomes are attained whenever structural power is high, such that the networks that tie individuals allow them to meet the same partners in different groups, thus providing the opportunity to strongly influence each other. On the other hand, the absence of such close peer-influence relationships dismisses any positive effect created by the network. Interestingly, we show that increasing the structural power of a network leads to the appearance of well-defined modules—as found in human social networks that often exhibit community structure—providing an interaction environment that maximizes collective fairness.
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23
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Social rank and social cooperation: Impact of social comparison processes on cooperative decision-making. PLoS One 2017; 12:e0175472. [PMID: 28388684 PMCID: PMC5384784 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0175472] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/17/2016] [Accepted: 03/27/2017] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Successful navigation of our complex social world requires the capability to recognize and judge the relative status of others. Hence, social comparison processes are of great importance in our interactions, informing us of our relative standing and in turn potentially motivating our behavior. However, so far few studies have examined in detail how social comparison can influence interpersonal decision-making. One aspect of social decision-making that is of particular importance is cooperative behavior, and identifying means of maintaining and promoting cooperation in the provision of public goods is of vital interest to society. Here, we manipulated social comparison by grading performance rankings on a reaction time task, and then measured cooperative decisions via a modified Public Goods Game (PGG). Findings revealed that individuals ranked highest tended to be more cooperative as compared to those who placed in the bottom rank. Interestingly, this effect was regardless of whether the comparison group members were the subsequent players in the PGG or not, and this effect was stronger in those with higher social orientation. In summary, the present research shows how different social comparison processes (assessed via social rankings) can operate in our daily interaction with others, demonstrating an important effect on cooperative behavior.
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24
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Ito H, Katsumata Y, Hasegawa E, Yoshimura J. The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games. Sci Rep 2017; 7:43377. [PMID: 28233837 PMCID: PMC5324166 DOI: 10.1038/srep43377] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/01/2016] [Accepted: 01/23/2017] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
The evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important issues in game theory. Previous studies have shown that cooperation can evolve only under highly limited conditions, and various modifications have been introduced to games to explain the evolution of cooperation. Recently, a utility function basic to game theory was shown to be dependent on current wealth as a conditional (state) variable in a dynamic version of utility theory. Here, we introduce this dynamic utility function to several games. Under certain conditions, poor players exhibit cooperative behavior in two types of chicken games (the hawk-dove game and the snowdrift game) but not in the prisoner’s dilemma game and the stag hunt game. This result indicates that cooperation can be exhibited by the poor in some chicken games. Thus, the evolution of cooperation may not be as limited as has been suggested in previous studies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hiromu Ito
- Department of International Health, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki, 852-8523, Japan.,Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan
| | - Yuki Katsumata
- Department of Mathematical and Systems Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan
| | - Eisuke Hasegawa
- Laboratory of Animal Ecology, Department of Ecology and Systematics, Graduate School of Agriculture, Hokkaido University, Sapporo 060-8589, Japan
| | - Jin Yoshimura
- Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan.,Department of Mathematical and Systems Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, 432-8561, Japan.,Department of Environmental and Forest Biology, State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, NY 13210, USA.,Marine Biosystems Research Center, Chiba University, Uchiura, Kamogawa, Chiba 299-5502, Japan
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25
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Human punishment is not primarily motivated by inequality. PLoS One 2017; 12:e0171298. [PMID: 28187166 PMCID: PMC5302803 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0171298] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/22/2016] [Accepted: 01/19/2017] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous theorizing about punishment has suggested that humans desire to punish inequality per se. However, the research supporting such an interpretation contains important methodological confounds. The main objective of the current experiment was to remove those confounds in order to test whether generating inequality per se is punished. Participants were recruited from an online market to take part in a wealth-alteration game with an ostensible second player. The participants were given an option to deduct from the other player’s payment as punishment for their behavior during the game. The results suggest that human punishment does not appear to be motivated by inequality per se, as inequality that was generated without inflicting costs on others was not reliably punished. Instead, punishment seems to respond primarily to the infliction of costs, with inequality only becoming relevant as a secondary input for punishment decisions. The theoretical significance of this finding is discussed in the context of its possible adaptive value.
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26
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Wu Y, Chang S, Zhang Z, Deng Z. Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks. Sci Rep 2017; 7:41076. [PMID: 28112276 PMCID: PMC5253654 DOI: 10.1038/srep41076] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2016] [Accepted: 12/12/2016] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Social reward, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation by proposing a reward model in network population, where a third strategy, reward, as an independent yet particular type of cooperation is introduced in 2-person evolutionary games. Specifically, a new kind of role corresponding to reward strategy, reward agents, is defined, which is aimed at increasing the income of cooperators by applying to them a social reward. Results from numerical simulations show that consideration of social reward greatly promotes the evolution of cooperation, which is confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. Moreover, we explore the microscopic mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation in the three-strategy model. As expected, the reward agents play a vital role in the formation of cooperative clusters, thus resisting the aggression of defectors. Our research might provide valuable insights into further exploring the nature of cooperation in the real world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yu'e Wu
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
| | - Shuhua Chang
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
| | - Zhipeng Zhang
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
| | - Zhenghong Deng
- Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
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27
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Ito H, Katsumata Y, Hasegawa E, Yoshimura J. What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory? PLoS One 2016; 11:e0159670. [PMID: 27487194 PMCID: PMC4972255 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0159670] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2016] [Accepted: 07/05/2016] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strategies: (1) the interpretation based on the utility criterion derived from expected utility theory and (2) the interpretation based on the quantitative criterion (amount of gain) derived from validity in the empirical context. A dynamic decision theory has recently been developed in which dynamic utility is a conditional (state) variable that is a function of the current wealth of a decision maker. We applied dynamic utility to the equal division in dove-dove contests in the hawk-dove game. Our results indicate that under the utility criterion, the half-share of utility becomes proportional to a player's current wealth. Our results are consistent with studies of the sense of fairness in animals, which indicate that the quantitative criterion has greater validity than the utility criterion. We also find that traditional analyses of repeated games must be reevaluated.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hiromu Ito
- Department of International Health, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki, Japan
- Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan
| | - Yuki Katsumata
- Department of Mathematical and Systems Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan
| | - Eisuke Hasegawa
- Laboratory of Animal Ecology, Department of Ecology and Systematics, Graduate School of Agriculture, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan
| | - Jin Yoshimura
- Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan
- Department of Mathematical and Systems Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan
- Department of Environmental and Forest Biology, State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, New York, United States of America
- Marine Biosystems Research Center, Chiba University, Uchiura, Kamogawa, Chiba, Japan
- * E-mail:
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28
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Karuza EA, Thompson-Schill SL, Bassett DS. Local Patterns to Global Architectures: Influences of Network Topology on Human Learning. Trends Cogn Sci 2016; 20:629-640. [PMID: 27373349 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.06.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 59] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/07/2016] [Revised: 06/03/2016] [Accepted: 06/03/2016] [Indexed: 01/01/2023]
Abstract
A core question in cognitive science concerns how humans acquire and represent knowledge about their environments. To this end, quantitative theories of learning processes have been formalized in an attempt to explain and predict changes in brain and behavior. We connect here statistical learning approaches in cognitive science, which are rooted in the sensitivity of learners to local distributional regularities, and network science approaches to characterizing global patterns and their emergent properties. We focus on innovative work that describes how learning is influenced by the topological properties underlying sensory input. The confluence of these theoretical approaches and this recent empirical evidence motivate the importance of scaling-up quantitative approaches to learning at both the behavioral and neural levels.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elisabeth A Karuza
- Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.
| | - Sharon L Thompson-Schill
- Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA; Department of Neurology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
| | - Danielle S Bassett
- Department of Bioengineering, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA; Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
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29
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Ye M, Hu G. Solving Potential Games With Dynamical Constraint. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS 2016; 46:1156-1164. [PMID: 25974960 DOI: 10.1109/tcyb.2015.2425411] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
We solve N -player potential games with dynamical constraint in this paper. Potential games with stable dynamics are first considered followed by one type of potential games without inherently stable dynamics. Different from most of the existing Nash seeking methods, we provide an extremum seeking-based method that does not require explicit information on the game dynamics or the payoff functions. Only measurements of the payoff functions are needed in the game strategy synthesis. Lie bracket approximation is used for the analysis of the proposed Nash seeking scheme. A singularly semi-globally practically uniformly asymptotically stable result is presented for potential games with stable dynamics and an ultimately bounded result is provided for potential games without inherently stable dynamics. For first-order perturbed integrator-type dynamics, we employ an extended-state observer to deal with the disturbance such that better convergence is achievable. Stability of the closed-loop system is proven and the ultimate bound is quantified. Numerical examples are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
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30
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Deng X, Liu Q, Deng Y, Mahadevan S. An improved method to construct basic probability assignment based on the confusion matrix for classification problem. Inf Sci (N Y) 2016. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ins.2016.01.033] [Citation(s) in RCA: 115] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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31
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Deng X, Zhang Q, Deng Y, Wang Z. A novel framework of classical and quantum prisoner's dilemma games on coupled networks. Sci Rep 2016; 6:23024. [PMID: 26975447 PMCID: PMC4792163 DOI: 10.1038/srep23024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2015] [Accepted: 02/22/2016] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks are attracting growing interest. While among previous studies, the role of quantum games in such a infrastructure is still virgin and may become a fascinating issue across a myriad of research realms. To mimick two kinds of different interactive environments and mechanisms, in this paper a new framework of classical and quantum prisoner's dilemma games on two-layer coupled networks is considered. Within the proposed model, the impact of coupling factor of networks and entanglement degree in quantum games on the evolutionary process has been studied. Simulation results show that the entanglement has no impact on the evolution of the classical prisoner's dilemma, while the rise of the coupling factor obviously impedes cooperation in this game, and the evolution of quantum prisoner's dilemma is greatly impacted by the combined effect of entanglement and coupling.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xinyang Deng
- School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400715, China
- Center for Quantitative Sciences, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN, 37232, USA
| | - Qi Zhang
- School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400715, China
| | - Yong Deng
- School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400715, China
- Big Data Decision Institute, Jinan University, Tianhe, Guangzhou, 510632, China
| | - Zhen Wang
- School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, 710072, China
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32
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Zhao D, Zhang Q, Wang D, Zhu Y. Experience Replay for Optimal Control of Nonzero-Sum Game Systems With Unknown Dynamics. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS 2016; 46:854-865. [PMID: 26529794 DOI: 10.1109/tcyb.2015.2488680] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
In this paper, an approximate online equilibrium solution is developed for an N -player nonzero-sum (NZS) game systems with completely unknown dynamics. First, a model identifier based on a three-layer neural network (NN) is established to reconstruct the unknown NZS games systems. Moreover, the identifier weight vector is updated based on experience replay technique which can relax the traditional persistence of excitation condition to a simplified condition on recorded data. Then, the single-network adaptive dynamic programming (ADP) with experience replay algorithm is proposed for each player to solve the coupled nonlinear Hamilton- (HJ) equations, where only the critic NN weight vectors are required to tune for each player. The feedback Nash equilibrium is provided by the solution of the coupled HJ equations. Based on the experience replay technique, a novel critic NN weights tuning law is proposed to guarantee the stability of the closed-loop system and the convergence of the value functions. Furthermore, a Lyapunov-based stability analysis shows that the uniform ultimate boundedness of the closed-loop system is achieved. Finally, two simulation examples are given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed control scheme.
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33
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Huang K, Zheng X, Li Z, Yang Y. Understanding Cooperative Behavior Based on the Coevolution of Game Strategy and Link Weight. Sci Rep 2015; 5:14783. [PMID: 26435188 PMCID: PMC4593172 DOI: 10.1038/srep14783] [Citation(s) in RCA: 40] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/07/2015] [Accepted: 09/09/2015] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
In reality, the dependency relationship among individuals is heterogeneous and time-varying. Based on this fact, we present a new mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight when analyzing the evolution of cooperation. In detail, we model the population on a regular network, on which the relationship between players is depicted by a weighted link, and prisoner's dilemma has been applied to describe the interaction of players. Further, the impact of this mechanism on the cooperative behavior has been outlined. By conducting large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we can easily draw a conclusion that this mechanism can promote cooperation efficiently. Compared with the traditional case, when the temptation of defection b is large, the fraction of cooperation is still able to keep in a high level. With a comprehensive examination of the distribution of stable link weight, it is evident that the coevolution mechanism would deviate the initial distribution. This mechanism induces the heterogeneity of players, which enhances the fraction of cooperation. Numerical simulations also indicate that an intermediate value of Δ/δ warrants an optimal resolution of prisoner's dilemma. The mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight has a practical significance and will provide new insight for the further research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Keke Huang
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
| | - Xiaoping Zheng
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
| | - Zhijie Li
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
| | - Yeqing Yang
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
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34
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Wang Z, Kokubo S, Jusup M, Tanimoto J. Dilemma strength as a framework for advancing evolutionary game theory: Reply to comments on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games". Phys Life Rev 2015; 14:56-8. [PMID: 26298212 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2015.07.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/13/2015] [Accepted: 07/15/2015] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Zhen Wang
- School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China; Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan.
| | - Satoshi Kokubo
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
| | - Marko Jusup
- Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 812-8581, Japan.
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan.
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35
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Xia CY, Meng XK, Wang Z. Heterogeneous Coupling between Interdependent Lattices Promotes the Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0129542. [PMID: 26102082 PMCID: PMC4477883 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0129542] [Citation(s) in RCA: 95] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/19/2015] [Accepted: 05/11/2015] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
In the research realm of game theory, interdependent networks have extended the content of spatial reciprocity, which needs the suitable coupling between networks. However, thus far, the vast majority of existing works just assume that the coupling strength between networks is symmetric. This hypothesis, to some extent, seems inconsistent with the ubiquitous observation of heterogeneity. Here, we study how the heterogeneous coupling strength, which characterizes the interdependency of utility between corresponding players of both networks, affects the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with two types of coupling schemes (symmetric and asymmetric ones). Compared with the traditional case, we show that heterogeneous coupling greatly promotes the collective cooperation. The symmetric scheme seems much better than the asymmetric case. Moreover, the role of varying amplitude of coupling strength is also studied on these two interdependent ways. Current findings are helpful for us to understand the evolution of cooperation within many real-world systems, in particular for the interconnected and interrelated systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cheng-Yi Xia
- Tianjin Key Laboratory of Intelligence Computing and Novel Software Technology, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
- Key Laboratory of Computer Vision and System (Ministry of Education), Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
| | - Xiao-Kun Meng
- Tianjin Key Laboratory of Intelligence Computing and Novel Software Technology, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
- Key Laboratory of Computer Vision and System (Ministry of Education), Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
| | - Zhen Wang
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
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36
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Chang S, Wang X. Modelling and computation in the valuation of carbon derivatives with stochastic convenience yields. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0125679. [PMID: 26010900 PMCID: PMC4444343 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0125679] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/11/2014] [Accepted: 03/17/2015] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
The anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emission has risen dramatically during the last few decades, which mainstream researchers believe to be the main cause of climate change, especially the global warming. The mechanism of market-based carbon emission trading is regarded as a policy instrument to deal with global climate change. Although several empirical researches about the carbon allowance and its derivatives price have been made, theoretical results seem to be sparse. In this paper, we theoretically develop a mathematical model to price the CO2 emission allowance derivatives with stochastic convenience yields by the principle of absence of arbitrage opportunities. In the case of American options, we formulate the pricing problem to a linear parabolic variational inequality (VI) in two spatial dimensions and develop a power penalty method to solve it. Then, a fitted finite volume method is designed to solve the nonlinear partial differential equation (PDE) resulting from the power penalty method and governing the futures, European and American option valuation. Moreover, some numerical results are performed to illustrate the efficiency and usefulness of this method. We find that the stochastic convenience yield does effect the valuation of carbon emission derivatives. In addition, some sensitivity analyses are also made to examine the effects of some parameters on the valuation results.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shuhua Chang
- Research Center for Mathematics and Economics, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
- Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
- * E-mail: (SC); (XW)
| | - Xinyu Wang
- Research Center for Mathematics and Economics, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
- * E-mail: (SC); (XW)
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37
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Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games. Phys Life Rev 2015; 14:1-30. [PMID: 25979121 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2015.04.033] [Citation(s) in RCA: 345] [Impact Index Per Article: 38.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/11/2015] [Revised: 04/20/2015] [Accepted: 04/20/2015] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
Why would natural selection favor the prevalence of cooperation within the groups of selfish individuals? A fruitful framework to address this question is evolutionary game theory, the essence of which is captured in the so-called social dilemmas. Such dilemmas have sparked the development of a variety of mathematical approaches to assess the conditions under which cooperation evolves. Furthermore, borrowing from statistical physics and network science, the research of the evolutionary game dynamics has been enriched with phenomena such as pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organization. Numerous advances in understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior over the last few decades have recently been distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and network reciprocity. However, when social viscosity is introduced into a population via any of the reciprocity mechanisms, the existing scaling parameters for the dilemma strength do not yield a unique answer as to how the evolutionary dynamics should unfold. Motivated by this problem, we review the developments that led to the present state of affairs, highlight the accompanying pitfalls, and propose new universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength. We prove universality by showing that the conditions for an ESS and the expressions for the internal equilibriums in an infinite, well-mixed population subjected to any of the five reciprocity mechanisms depend only on the new scaling parameters. A similar result is shown to hold for the fixation probability of the different strategies in a finite, well-mixed population. Furthermore, by means of numerical simulations, the same scaling parameters are shown to be effective even if the evolution of cooperation is considered on the spatial networks (with the exception of highly heterogeneous setups). We close the discussion by suggesting promising directions for future research including (i) how to handle the dilemma strength in the context of co-evolution and (ii) where to seek opportunities for applying the game theoretical approach with meaningful impact.
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38
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Hu Y, Gao Y, An B. Multiagent reinforcement learning with unshared value functions. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS 2015; 45:647-662. [PMID: 25014990 DOI: 10.1109/tcyb.2014.2332042] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/03/2023]
Abstract
One important approach of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) is equilibrium-based MARL, which is a combination of reinforcement learning and game theory. Most existing algorithms involve computationally expensive calculation of mixed strategy equilibria and require agents to replicate the other agents' value functions for equilibrium computing in each state. This is unrealistic since agents may not be willing to share such information due to privacy or safety concerns. This paper aims to develop novel and efficient MARL algorithms without the need for agents to share value functions. First, we adopt pure strategy equilibrium solution concepts instead of mixed strategy equilibria given that a mixed strategy equilibrium is often computationally expensive. In this paper, three types of pure strategy profiles are utilized as equilibrium solution concepts: pure strategy Nash equilibrium, equilibrium-dominating strategy profile, and nonstrict equilibrium-dominating strategy profile. The latter two solution concepts are strategy profiles from which agents can gain higher payoffs than one or more pure strategy Nash equilibria. Theoretical analysis shows that these strategy profiles are symmetric meta equilibria. Second, we propose a multistep negotiation process for finding pure strategy equilibria since value functions are not shared among agents. By putting these together, we propose a novel MARL algorithm called negotiation-based Q-learning (NegoQ). Experiments are first conducted in grid-world games, which are widely used to evaluate MARL algorithms. In these games, NegoQ learns equilibrium policies and runs significantly faster than existing MARL algorithms (correlated Q-learning and Nash Q-learning). Surprisingly, we find that NegoQ also performs well in team Markov games such as pursuit games, as compared with team-task-oriented MARL algorithms (such as friend Q-learning and distributed Q-learning).
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39
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Paál T, Bereczkei T. Punishment as a means of competition: implications for strong reciprocity theory. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0120394. [PMID: 25811464 PMCID: PMC4374862 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0120394] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2014] [Accepted: 01/09/2015] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Strong negative reciprocity, that is, sanctions imposed on norm violators at the punisher's own expense, has powerful cooperation-enhancing effects in both real-life and experimental game situations. However, it is plausible that punishment may obtain alternative roles depending on social context and the personality characteristics of participants. We examined the occurrence of punishing behavior among 80 subjects in a strongly competitive Public Goods game setting. Despite the punishment condition, the amount of the contributions decreased steadily during the game. The amount of contributions had no significant effect on received and imposed punishments. The results indicate that certain social contexts (in this case, intensive competition) exert modifying effects on the role that punishment takes on. Subjects punished each other in order to achieve a higher rank and a financially better outcome. Punishment primarily functioned as a means of rivalry, instead of as a way of second-order cooperation, as strong reciprocity suggests. These results indicate the need for the possible modification of the social conditions of punishment mechanisms described by the strong reciprocity theory as an evolutionary explanation of human cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tünde Paál
- Institute of Psychology, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
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40
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Wang X, Nie S, Wang B. Dependency links can hinder the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on lattices and networks. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0121508. [PMID: 25798579 PMCID: PMC4370660 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0121508] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2015] [Accepted: 02/03/2015] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Networks with dependency links are more vulnerable when facing the attacks. Recent research also has demonstrated that the interdependent groups support the spreading of cooperation. We study the prisoner's dilemma games on spatial networks with dependency links, in which a fraction of individual pairs is selected to depend on each other. The dependency individuals can gain an extra payoff whose value is between the payoff of mutual cooperation and the value of temptation to defect. Thus, this mechanism reflects that the dependency relation is stronger than the relation of ordinary mutual cooperation, but it is not large enough to cause the defection of the dependency pair. We show that the dependence of individuals hinders, promotes and never affects the cooperation on regular ring networks, square lattice, random and scale-free networks, respectively. The results for the square lattice and regular ring networks are demonstrated by the pair approximation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xuwen Wang
- Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, 230026, P. R. China
| | - Sen Nie
- Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, 230026, P. R. China
| | - Binghong Wang
- Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, 230026, P. R. China
- College of Physics and Electronic Information Engineering, Wenzhou University, Wenzhou, Zhejiang, 325035, P. R. China
- School of Science, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, Sichuan, 621010, P. R. China
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41
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Wang T, Huang K, Wang Z, Zheng X. Impact of small groups with heterogeneous preference on behavioral evolution in population evacuation. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0121949. [PMID: 25793637 PMCID: PMC4367991 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0121949] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2014] [Accepted: 02/05/2015] [Indexed: 12/01/2022] Open
Abstract
Up to now, there have been a great number of mechanisms to explain the individual behavior and population traits, which seem of particular significance in evolutionary biology and social behavior analysis. Among them, small groups and heterogeneity are two useful frameworks to the above issue. However, vast majority of existing works separately consider both scenarios, which is inconsistent with realistic cases in our life. Here we propose the evolutionary games of heterogeneous small groups (namely, different small groups possess different preferences to dilemma) to study the collective behavior in population evacuation. Importantly, players usually face completely different dilemmas inside and outside the small groups. By means of numerous computation simulations, it is unveiled that the ratio of players in one certain small group directly decides the final behavior of the whole population. Moreover, it can also be concluded that heterogeneous degree of preference for different small groups plays a key role in the behavior traits of the system, which may validate some realistic social observations. The proposed framework is thus universally applicable and may shed new light into the solution of social dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tao Wang
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
| | - Keke Huang
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
| | - Zhen Wang
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
| | - Xiaoping Zheng
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
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42
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Huang K, Wang T, Cheng Y, Zheng X. Effect of heterogeneous investments on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game. PLoS One 2015; 10:e0120317. [PMID: 25781345 PMCID: PMC4363493 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0120317] [Citation(s) in RCA: 43] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2015] [Accepted: 02/09/2015] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Understanding the emergence of cooperation in spatial public goods game remains a grand challenge across disciplines. In most previous studies, it is assumed that the investments of all the cooperators are identical, and often equal to 1. However, it is worth mentioning that players are diverse and heterogeneous when choosing actions in the rapidly developing modern society and researchers have shown more interest to the heterogeneity of players recently. For modeling the heterogeneous players without loss of generality, it is assumed in this work that the investment of a cooperator is a random variable with uniform distribution, the mean value of which is equal to 1. The results of extensive numerical simulations convincingly indicate that heterogeneous investments can promote cooperation. Specifically, a large value of the variance of the random variable can decrease the two critical values for the result of behavioral evolution effectively. Moreover, the larger the variance is, the better the promotion effect will be. In addition, this article has discussed the impact of heterogeneous investments when the coevolution of both strategy and investment is taken into account. Comparing the promotion effect of coevolution of strategy and investment with that of strategy imitation only, we can conclude that the coevolution of strategy and investment decreases the asymptotic fraction of cooperators by weakening the heterogeneity of investments, which further demonstrates that heterogeneous investments can promote cooperation in spatial public goods game.
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Affiliation(s)
- Keke Huang
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China
| | - Tao Wang
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China
| | - Yuan Cheng
- School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing, 100029, China
| | - Xiaoping Zheng
- Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China
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43
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Gao ZK, Yang YX, Fang PC, Jin ND, Xia CY, Hu LD. Multi-frequency complex network from time series for uncovering oil-water flow structure. Sci Rep 2015; 5:8222. [PMID: 25649900 PMCID: PMC4316157 DOI: 10.1038/srep08222] [Citation(s) in RCA: 103] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/18/2014] [Accepted: 01/06/2015] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Uncovering complex oil-water flow structure represents a challenge in diverse scientific disciplines. This challenge stimulates us to develop a new distributed conductance sensor for measuring local flow signals at different positions and then propose a novel approach based on multi-frequency complex network to uncover the flow structures from experimental multivariate measurements. In particular, based on the Fast Fourier transform, we demonstrate how to derive multi-frequency complex network from multivariate time series. We construct complex networks at different frequencies and then detect community structures. Our results indicate that the community structures faithfully represent the structural features of oil-water flow patterns. Furthermore, we investigate the network statistic at different frequencies for each derived network and find that the frequency clustering coefficient enables to uncover the evolution of flow patterns and yield deep insights into the formation of flow structures. Current results present a first step towards a network visualization of complex flow patterns from a community structure perspective.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhong-Ke Gao
- School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
| | - Yu-Xuan Yang
- School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
| | - Peng-Cheng Fang
- School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
| | - Ning-De Jin
- School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
| | - Cheng-Yi Xia
- Key Laboratory of Computer Vision and System (Ministry of Education) and Tianjin Key Laboratory of Intelligence Computing and Novel Software Technology, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
| | - Li-Dan Hu
- School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
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44
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Martínez-Tur V, Peñarroja V, Serrano MA, Hidalgo V, Moliner C, Salvador A, Alacreu-Crespo A, Gracia E, Molina A. Intergroup conflict and rational decision making. PLoS One 2014; 9:e114013. [PMID: 25461384 PMCID: PMC4252077 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0114013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/12/2014] [Accepted: 11/03/2014] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The literature has been relatively silent about post-conflict processes. However, understanding the way humans deal with post-conflict situations is a challenge in our societies. With this in mind, we focus the present study on the rationality of cooperative decision making after an intergroup conflict, i.e., the extent to which groups take advantage of post-conflict situations to obtain benefits from collaborating with the other group involved in the conflict. Based on dual-process theories of thinking and affect heuristic, we propose that intergroup conflict hinders the rationality of cooperative decision making. We also hypothesize that this rationality improves when groups are involved in an in-group deliberative discussion. Results of a laboratory experiment support the idea that intergroup conflict –associated with indicators of the activation of negative feelings (negative affect state and heart rate)– has a negative effect on the aforementioned rationality over time and on both group and individual decision making. Although intergroup conflict leads to sub-optimal decision making, rationality improves when groups and individuals subjected to intergroup conflict make decisions after an in-group deliberative discussion. Additionally, the increased rationality of the group decision making after the deliberative discussion is transferred to subsequent individual decision making.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Miguel A. Serrano
- Department of Psychobiology, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
| | - Vanesa Hidalgo
- Laboratory of Social Neuroscience, Department of Psychobiology and IDOCAL, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
| | | | - Alicia Salvador
- Laboratory of Social Neuroscience, Department of Psychobiology and IDOCAL, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
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45
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Impact of roles assignation on heterogeneous populations in evolutionary dictator game. Sci Rep 2014; 4:6937. [PMID: 25377303 PMCID: PMC4223679 DOI: 10.1038/srep06937] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/31/2013] [Accepted: 10/20/2014] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation is a hot and challenging topic in the field of evolutionary game theory. Altruistic behavior, as a particular form of cooperation, has been widely studied by the ultimatum game but not by the dictator game, which provides a more elegant way to identify the altruistic component of behaviors. In this paper, the evolutionary dictator game is applied to model the real motivations of altruism. A degree-based regime is utilized to assess the impact of the assignation of roles on evolutionary outcome in populations of heterogeneous structure with two kinds of strategic updating mechanisms, which are based on Darwin's theory of evolution and punctuated equilibrium, respectively. The results show that the evolutionary outcome is affected by the role assignation and that this impact also depends on the strategic updating mechanisms, the function used to evaluate players' success, and the structure of populations.
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46
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Deng X, Wang Z, Liu Q, Deng Y, Mahadevan S. A belief-based evolutionarily stable strategy. J Theor Biol 2014; 361:81-6. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2014] [Revised: 07/03/2014] [Accepted: 07/07/2014] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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47
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Acedo-Carmona C, Gomila A. Personal trust increases cooperation beyond general trust. PLoS One 2014; 9:e105559. [PMID: 25144539 PMCID: PMC4140793 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0105559] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2014] [Accepted: 07/22/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
In this paper we present a new methodology which, while allowing for anonymous interaction, it also makes possible to compare decisions of cooperating or defecting when playing games within a group, according to whether or not players personally trust each other. The design thus goes beyond standard approaches to the role of trust in fostering cooperation, which is restricted to general trust. It also allows considering the role of the topology of the social network involved may play in the level of cooperation found. The results of this work support the idea that personal trust promotes cooperation beyond the level of general trust. We also found that this effect carries over to the whole group, making it more cohesive, but that higher levels of cohesion rely on a particular topology. As a conclusion, we hypothesize that personal trust is a psychological mechanism evolved to make human social life possible in the small groups our ancestors lived in, and that this mechanism persists and plays a role in sustaining cooperation and social cohesion.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Antoni Gomila
- Department of Psychology, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma de Mallorca, Spain
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48
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Wang X, Wu J, Shu G, Li Y. Punishment based on public benefit fund significantly promotes cooperation. PLoS One 2014; 9:e105126. [PMID: 25137051 PMCID: PMC4138163 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0105126] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/06/2014] [Accepted: 07/18/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all, tax system, a common tool to adjust the temperature of the economy, is widely used in human society. Inspired by this philosophy, players in this study would pay corresponding taxes in accordance with their payoff level. In this way, public benefit fund is established consequently and it would be utilized to punish defectors. There are two main methods for punishing: slight intensity of punishment (shortly, SLP) and severe intensity of punishment (shortly, SEP). When the totaling of public benefit fund keeps relatively fixed, SLP extends further, which means more defectors would be punished; by contrast, SEP has a smaller coverage. It is of interest to verify whether these two measures can promote cooperation and which one is more efficient. Simulate results reveal that both of them can promote cooperation remarkably. Specifically speaking, SLP shows constant advantage from the point of view either of fractions of cooperation or average payoff.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiuling Wang
- School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
| | - Jie Wu
- School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
| | - Gang Shu
- School of Physical Science and Technology, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
| | - Ya Li
- School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
- * E-mail:
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49
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Abstract
The quality of data plays an important role in business analysis and decision making, and data accuracy is an important aspect in data quality. Thus one necessary task for data quality management is to evaluate the accuracy of the data. And in order to solve the problem that the accuracy of the whole data set is low while a useful part may be high, it is also necessary to evaluate the accuracy of the query results, called relative accuracy. However, as far as we know, neither measure nor effective methods for the accuracy evaluation methods are proposed. Motivated by this, for relative accuracy evaluation, we propose a systematic method. We design a relative accuracy evaluation framework for relational databases based on a new metric to measure the accuracy using statistics. We apply the methods to evaluate the precision and recall of basic queries, which show the result's relative accuracy. We also propose the method to handle data update and to improve accuracy evaluation using functional dependencies. Extensive experimental results show the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed framework and algorithms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yan Zhang
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China
| | - Hongzhi Wang
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China
- * E-mail:
| | - Zhongsheng Yang
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China
| | - Jianzhong Li
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China
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50
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Duan H, Sun C. Swarm intelligence inspired shills and the evolution of cooperation. Sci Rep 2014; 4:5210. [PMID: 24909519 PMCID: PMC4049027 DOI: 10.1038/srep05210] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/24/2014] [Accepted: 05/02/2014] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Many hostile scenarios exist in real-life situations, where cooperation is disfavored and the collective behavior needs intervention for system efficiency improvement. Towards this end, the framework of soft control provides a powerful tool by introducing controllable agents called shills, who are allowed to follow well-designed updating rules for varying missions. Inspired by swarm intelligence emerging from flocks of birds, we explore here the dependence of the evolution of cooperation on soft control by an evolutionary iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game staged on square lattices, where the shills adopt a particle swarm optimization (PSO) mechanism for strategy updating. We demonstrate that not only can cooperation be promoted by shills effectively seeking for potentially better strategies and spreading them to others, but also the frequency of cooperation could be arbitrarily controlled by choosing appropriate parameter settings. Moreover, we show that adding more shills does not contribute to further cooperation promotion, while assigning higher weights to the collective knowledge for strategy updating proves a efficient way to induce cooperative behavior. Our research provides insights into cooperation evolution in the presence of PSO-inspired shills and we hope it will be inspirational for future studies focusing on swarm intelligence based soft control.
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Affiliation(s)
- Haibin Duan
- State Key Laboratory of Virtual Reality Technology and Systems, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China
- Science and Technology on Aircraft Control Laboratory, School of Automation Science and Electronic Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China
| | - Changhao Sun
- State Key Laboratory of Virtual Reality Technology and Systems, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China
- Science and Technology on Aircraft Control Laboratory, School of Automation Science and Electronic Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China
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