Predicting the Lifetime of Dynamic Networks Experiencing Persistent Random Attacks

Uncertainty in vulnerability of networks under attack

This study builds conceptual explanations and empirical examinations of the vulnerability response of networks under attack. Two quantities of "vulnerability" and "uncertainty in vulnerability" are defined by scrutinizing the performance loss trajectory of networks experiencing attacks. Both vulnerability and uncertainty in vulnerability quantities are a function of the network topology and size. This is tested on 16 distinct topologies appearing in infrastructure, social, and biological networks with 8 to 26 nodes under two percolation scenarios exemplifying benign and malicious attacks. The findings imply (i) crossing path, tree, and diverging tail are the most vulnerable topologies, (ii) complete and matching pairs are the least vulnerable topologies, (iii) complete grid and complete topologies show the most uncertainty for vulnerability, and (iv) hub-and-spoke and double u exhibit the least uncertainty in vulnerability. The findings also imply that both vulnerability and uncertainty in vulnerability increase with an increase in the size of the network. It is argued that in networks with no undirected cycle and one undirected cycle, the uncertainty in vulnerability is maximal earlier in the percolation process. With an increase in the number of cycles, the uncertainty in vulnerability is accumulated at the end of the percolation process. This emphasizes the role of tailoring preparedness, response, and recovery phases for networks with different topologies when they might experience disruption.

Non-Markovian recovery makes complex networks more resilient against large-scale failures

Non-Markovian spontaneous recovery processes with a time delay (memory) are ubiquitous in the real world. How does the non-Markovian characteristic affect failure propagation in complex networks? We consider failures due to internal causes at the nodal level and external failures due to an adverse environment, and develop a pair approximation analysis taking into account the two-node correlation. In general, a high failure stationary state can arise, corresponding to large-scale failures that can significantly compromise the functioning of the network. We uncover a striking phenomenon: memory associated with nodal recovery can counter-intuitively make the network more resilient against large-scale failures. In natural systems, the intrinsic non-Markovian characteristic of nodal recovery may thus be one reason for their resilience. In engineering design, incorporating certain non-Markovian features into the network may be beneficial to equipping it with a strong resilient capability to resist catastrophic failures.

Network recovery based on system crash early warning in a cascading failure model

This paper investigates the possibility of saving a network that is predicted to have a cascading failure that will eventually lead to a total collapse. We model cascading failures using the recently proposed KQ model. Then predict an impending total collapse by monitoring critical slowing down indicators and subsequently attempt to prevent the total collapse of the network by adding new nodes. To this end, we systematically evaluate five node addition rules, the effect of intervention delay and network degree heterogeneity. Surprisingly, unlike for random homogeneous networks, we find that a delayed intervention is preferred for saving scale free networks. We also find that for homogeneous networks, the best strategy is to wire newly added nodes to existing nodes in a uniformly random manner. For heterogeneous networks, however, a random selection of nodes based on their degree mostly outperforms a uniform random selection. These results provide new insights into restoring networks by adding nodes after observing early warnings of an impending complete breakdown.

Analysis and evaluation of the entropy indices of a static network structure

Although degree distribution entropy (DDE), SD structure entropy (SDSE), Wu structure entropy (WSE) and FB structure entropy (FBSE) are four static network structure entropy indices widely used to quantify the heterogeneity of a complex network, previous studies have paid little attention to their differing abilities to describe network structure. We calculate these four structure entropies for four benchmark networks and compare the results by measuring the ability of each index to characterize network heterogeneity. We find that SDSE and FBSE more accurately characterize network heterogeneity than WSE and DDE. We also find that existing benchmark networks fail to distinguish SDSE and FBSE because they cannot discriminate local and global network heterogeneity. We solve this problem by proposing an evolving caveman network that reveals the differences between structure entropy indices by comparing the sensitivities during the network evolutionary process. Mathematical analysis and computational simulation both indicate that FBSE describes the global topology variation in the evolutionary process of a caveman network, and that the other three structure entropy indices reflect only local network heterogeneity. Our study offers an expansive view of the structural complexity of networks and expands our understanding of complex network behavior.

The cost of attack in competing networks

Real-world attacks can be interpreted as the result of competitive interactions between networks, ranging from predator-prey networks to networks of countries under economic sanctions. Although the purpose of an attack is to damage a target network, it also curtails the ability of the attacker, which must choose the duration and magnitude of an attack to avoid negative impacts on its own functioning. Nevertheless, despite the large number of studies on interconnected networks, the consequences of initiating an attack have never been studied. Here, we address this issue by introducing a model of network competition where a resilient network is willing to partially weaken its own resilience in order to more severely damage a less resilient competitor. The attacking network can take over the competitor's nodes after their long inactivity. However, owing to a feedback mechanism the takeovers weaken the resilience of the attacking network. We define a conservation law that relates the feedback mechanism to the resilience dynamics for two competing networks. Within this formalism, we determine the cost and optimal duration of an attack, allowing a network to evaluate the risk of initiating hostilities.

Multiple tipping points and optimal repairing in interacting networks

Systems composed of many interacting dynamical networks-such as the human body with its biological networks or the global economic network consisting of regional clusters-often exhibit complicated collective dynamics. Three fundamental processes that are typically present are failure, damage spread and recovery. Here we develop a model for such systems and find a very rich phase diagram that becomes increasingly more complex as the number of interacting networks increases. In the simplest example of two interacting networks we find two critical points, four triple points, ten allowed transitions and two 'forbidden' transitions, as well as complex hysteresis loops. Remarkably, we find that triple points play the dominant role in constructing the optimal repairing strategy in damaged interacting systems. To test our model, we analyse an example of real interacting financial networks and find evidence of rapid dynamical transitions between well-defined states, in agreement with the predictions of our model.