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Coggan H, Page KM. The role of evolutionary game theory in spatial and non-spatial models of the survival of cooperation in cancer: a review. JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, INTERFACE 2022; 19:20220346. [PMID: 35975562 PMCID: PMC9382458 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2022.0346] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a branch of mathematics which considers populations of individuals interacting with each other to receive pay-offs. An individual’s pay-off is dependent on the strategy of its opponent(s) as well as on its own, and the higher its pay-off, the higher its reproductive fitness. Its offspring generally inherit its interaction strategy, subject to random mutation. Over time, the composition of the population shifts as different strategies spread or are driven extinct. In the last 25 years there has been a flood of interest in applying EGT to cancer modelling, with the aim of explaining how cancerous mutations spread through healthy tissue and how intercellular cooperation persists in tumour-cell populations. This review traces this body of work from theoretical analyses of well-mixed infinite populations through to more realistic spatial models of the development of cooperation between epithelial cells. We also consider work in which EGT has been used to make experimental predictions about the evolution of cancer, and discuss work that remains to be done before EGT can make large-scale contributions to clinical treatment and patient outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Helena Coggan
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
| | - Karen M Page
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
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Abstract
Cooperation is prevalent in nature, not only in the context of social interactions within the animal kingdom but also on the cellular level. In cancer, for example, tumour cells can cooperate by producing growth factors. The evolution of cooperation has traditionally been studied for well-mixed populations under the framework of evolutionary game theory, and more recently for structured populations using evolutionary graph theory (EGT). The population structures arising due to cellular arrangement in tissues, however, are dynamic and thus cannot be accurately represented by either of these frameworks. In this work, we compare the conditions for cooperative success in an epithelium modelled using EGT, to those in a mechanical model of an epithelium—the Voronoi tessellation (VT) model. Crucially, in this latter model, cells are able to move, and birth and death are not spatially coupled. We calculate fixation probabilities in the VT model through simulation and an approximate analytic technique and show that this leads to stronger promotion of cooperation in comparison with the EGT model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jessie Renton
- Department of Mathematics, University College London , Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT , UK
| | - Karen M Page
- Department of Mathematics, University College London , Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT , UK
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Szolnoki A, Chen X. Reciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players. Phys Rev E 2018; 98:022309. [PMID: 30253608 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.98.022309] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2018] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines proper comparison. Interestingly, both underconfident and overconfident individuals are capable of elevating the cooperation level significantly. While former players stimulate a local coordination of strategies, the presence of overconfident individuals enhances the spatial reciprocity mechanism. In both cases the propagations of competing strategies are influenced in a biased way resulting in a cooperation supporting environment. These effects are strongly related to the nonlinear character of invasion probabilities which is a common and frequently observed feature of microscopic dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
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Krieger MS, McAvoy A, Nowak MA. Effects of motion in structured populations. J R Soc Interface 2017; 14:rsif.2017.0509. [PMID: 28978749 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2017.0509] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/14/2017] [Accepted: 09/05/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
In evolutionary processes, population structure has a substantial effect on natural selection. Here, we analyse how motion of individuals affects constant selection in structured populations. Motion is relevant because it leads to changes in the distribution of types as mutations march towards fixation or extinction. We describe motion as the swapping of individuals on graphs, and more generally as the shuffling of individuals between reproductive updates. Beginning with a one-dimensional graph, the cycle, we prove that motion suppresses natural selection for death-birth (DB) updating or for any process that combines birth-death (BD) and DB updating. If the rule is purely BD updating, no change in fixation probability appears in the presence of motion. We further investigate how motion affects evolution on the square lattice and weighted graphs. In the case of weighted graphs, we find that motion can be either an amplifier or a suppressor of natural selection. In some cases, whether it is one or the other can be a function of the relative reproductive rate, indicating that motion is a subtle and complex attribute of evolving populations. As a first step towards understanding less restricted types of motion in evolutionary graph theory, we consider a similar rule on dynamic graphs induced by a spatial flow and find qualitatively similar results, indicating that continuous motion also suppresses natural selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Madison S Krieger
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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Amaral MA, Perc M, Wardil L, Szolnoki A, da Silva Júnior EJ, da Silva JKL. Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration. Phys Rev E 2017; 95:032307. [PMID: 28415219 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.95.032307] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2016] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
''Three is a crowd" is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions as it does to frustrated configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relations within a triangle deserve special attention. With this motivation, we explore the impact of topological frustration on the evolutionary dynamics of the snowdrift game on a triangular lattice. This topology provides an irreconcilable frustration, which prevents anticoordination of competing strategies that would be needed for an optimal outcome of the game. By using different strategy updating protocols, we observe complex spatial patterns in dependence on payoff values that are reminiscent to a honeycomb-like organization, which helps to minimize the negative consequence of the topological frustration. We relate the emergence of these patterns to the microscopic dynamics of the evolutionary process, both by means of mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. For comparison, we also consider the same evolutionary dynamics on the square lattice, where of course the topological frustration is absent. However, with the deletion of diagonal links of the triangular lattice, we can gradually bridge the gap to the square lattice. Interestingly, in this case the level of cooperation in the system is a direct indicator of the level of topological frustration, thus providing a method to determine frustration levels in an arbitrary interaction network.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marco A Amaral
- Departamento de Física, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Caixa Postal 702, CEP 30161-970, Belo Horizonte-MG, Brazil
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
- CAMTP-Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Krekova 2, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
| | - Lucas Wardil
- Departamento de Fisica, Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto, Ouro Preto, MG, Brazil
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Post Office Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Elton J da Silva Júnior
- Departamento de Física, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Caixa Postal 702, CEP 30161-970, Belo Horizonte-MG, Brazil
| | - Jafferson K L da Silva
- Departamento de Física, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Caixa Postal 702, CEP 30161-970, Belo Horizonte-MG, Brazil
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Aleta A, Meloni S, Perc M, Moreno Y. From degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity for an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. Phys Rev E 2016; 94:062315. [PMID: 28085417 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.94.062315] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/03/2016] [Indexed: 06/06/2023]
Abstract
An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we study the weak prisoner's dilemma game, where the activity of each player is determined in a probabilistic manner either by its degree or by its payoff. While degree-correlated activity introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are particularly severe on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nuanced activity profile, which ultimately hinders systemic breakdowns of cooperation. To determine optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation, we introduce an exponential decay to payoff-correlated activity that determines how fast the activity of a player returns to its default state. We show that there exists an intermediate decay rate at which the resolution of the social dilemma is optimal. This can be explained by the emerging activity patterns of players, where the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by the increased activity of average-degree players, who through their collective influence in the network sustain a higher level of cooperation. The sudden drops in the fraction of cooperators observed with degree-correlated activity therefore vanish, and so does the need for the lengthy spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters. The absence of such asymmetric dynamic instabilities thus leads to an optimal resolution of social dilemmas, especially when the conditions for the evolution of cooperation are strongly adverse.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alberto Aleta
- Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza E-50018, Spain
| | - Sandro Meloni
- Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza E-50018, Spain
- Department of Theoretical Physics, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza E-50009, Spain
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, Maribor SI-2000, Slovenia
- CAMTP - Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Krekova 2, Maribor SI-2000, Slovenia
| | - Yamir Moreno
- Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza E-50018, Spain
- Department of Theoretical Physics, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza E-50009, Spain
- Complex Networks and Systems Lagrange Lab, Institute for Scientific Interchange, Turin 10126, Italy
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