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Dragicevic AZ. The Unification of Evolutionary Dynamics through the Bayesian Decay Factor in a Game on a Graph. Bull Math Biol 2024; 86:69. [PMID: 38714590 DOI: 10.1007/s11538-024-01299-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2024] [Accepted: 04/18/2024] [Indexed: 05/10/2024]
Abstract
We unify evolutionary dynamics on graphs in strategic uncertainty through a decaying Bayesian update. Our analysis focuses on the Price theorem of selection, which governs replicator(-mutator) dynamics, based on a stratified interaction mechanism and a composite strategy update rule. Our findings suggest that the replication of a certain mutation in a strategy, leading to a shift from competition to cooperation in a well-mixed population, is equivalent to the replication of a strategy in a Bayesian-structured population without any mutation. Likewise, the replication of a strategy in a Bayesian-structured population with a certain mutation, resulting in a move from competition to cooperation, is equivalent to the replication of a strategy in a well-mixed population without any mutation. This equivalence holds when the transition rate from competition to cooperation is equal to the relative strength of selection acting on either competition or cooperation in relation to the selection differential between cooperators and competitors. Our research allows us to identify situations where cooperation is more likely, irrespective of the specific payoff levels. This approach provides new perspectives into the intended purpose of Price's equation, which was initially not designed for this type of analysis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arnaud Zlatko Dragicevic
- Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand.
- Sustainable Development, CIRANO, Montréal, Canada.
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2
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Chen YT. The replicator equation in stochastic spatial evolutionary games. Stoch Process Their Appl 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.spa.2022.11.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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Abstract
In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly heterogeneous spatial structures. As a result, one of the most difficult obstacles lies in making analytical deductions, either qualitative or quantitative, about the long-term outcomes of evolution. The "structure-coefficient" theorem is a well-known approach to this problem for mutation-selection processes under weak selection, but a general method of evaluating the terms it comprises is lacking. Here, we provide such a method for populations of fixed (but arbitrary) size and structure, using easily interpretable demographic measures. This method encompasses a large family of evolutionary update mechanisms and extends the theorem to allow for asymmetric contests to provide a better understanding of the mutation-selection balance under more realistic circumstances. We apply the method to study social goods produced and distributed among individuals in spatially heterogeneous populations, where asymmetric interactions emerge naturally and the outcome of selection varies dramatically, depending on the nature of the social good, the spatial topology, and the frequency with which mutations arise.
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Su Q, McAvoy A, Mori Y, Plotkin JB. Evolution of prosocial behaviours in multilayer populations. Nat Hum Behav 2022; 6:338-348. [PMID: 34980900 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-021-01241-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2020] [Accepted: 10/22/2021] [Indexed: 01/16/2023]
Abstract
Human societies include diverse social relationships. Friends, family, business colleagues and online contacts can all contribute to one's social life. Individuals may behave differently in different domains, but success in one domain may engender success in another. Here, we study this problem using multilayer networks to model multiple domains of social interactions, in which individuals experience different environments and may express different behaviours. We provide a mathematical analysis and find that coupling between layers tends to promote prosocial behaviour. Even if prosociality is disfavoured in each layer alone, multilayer coupling can promote its proliferation in all layers simultaneously. We apply this analysis to six real-world multilayer networks, ranging from the socio-emotional and professional relationships in a Zambian community, to the online and offline relationships within an academic university. We discuss the implications of our results, which suggest that small modifications to interactions in one domain may catalyse prosociality in a different domain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qi Su
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA. .,Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA. .,Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA.
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA. .,Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA.
| | - Yoichiro Mori
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA.,Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA.,Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA
| | - Joshua B Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA.,Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA.,Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA
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5
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Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection. J Math Biol 2021; 82:14. [PMID: 33534054 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-021-01568-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2020] [Revised: 11/14/2020] [Accepted: 01/17/2021] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
Abstract
In evolutionary dynamics, a key measure of a mutant trait's success is the probability that it takes over the population given some initial mutant-appearance distribution. This "fixation probability" is difficult to compute in general, as it depends on the mutation's effect on the organism as well as the population's spatial structure, mating patterns, and other factors. In this study, we consider weak selection, which means that the mutation's effect on the organism is small. We obtain a weak-selection perturbation expansion of a mutant's fixation probability, from an arbitrary initial configuration of mutant and resident types. Our results apply to a broad class of stochastic evolutionary models, in which the size and spatial structure are arbitrary (but fixed). The problem of whether selection favors a given trait is thereby reduced from exponential to polynomial complexity in the population size, when selection is weak. We conclude by applying these methods to obtain new results for evolutionary dynamics on graphs.
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Richter H. Properties of network structures, structure coefficients, and benefit-to-cost ratios. Biosystems 2019; 180:88-100. [PMID: 30914346 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2019.03.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/17/2018] [Revised: 02/24/2019] [Accepted: 03/21/2019] [Indexed: 12/31/2022]
Abstract
In structured populations the spatial arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the interaction graph together with the structure of the graph itself determines the game dynamics and particularly whether or not fixation of cooperation (or defection) is favored. For networks described by regular graphs and for a single cooperator (and a single defector) the question of fixation can be addressed by a single parameter, the structure coefficient. This quantity is invariant with respect to the location of the cooperator on the graph and also does not vary over different networks. We may therefore consider it to be generic for regular graphs and call it the generic structure coefficient. For two and more cooperators (or several defectors) fixation properties can also be assigned by structure coefficients. These structure coefficients, however, depend on the arrangement of cooperators and defectors which we may interpret as a configuration of the game. Moreover, the coefficients are specific for a given interaction network modeled as a regular graph, which is why we may call them specific structure coefficients. In this paper, we study how specific structure coefficients vary over interaction graphs and analyze how spectral properties of interaction networks relate to specific structure coefficients. We also discuss implications for the benefit-to-cost ratios of donation games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hendrik Richter
- HTWK Leipzig University of Applied Sciences, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, Postfach 301166, D-04251 Leipzig, Germany.
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Richter H. Fixation properties of multiple cooperator configurations on regular graphs. Theory Biosci 2019; 138:261-275. [PMID: 30900107 DOI: 10.1007/s12064-019-00293-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/20/2018] [Accepted: 03/11/2019] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
Whether or not cooperation is favored in evolutionary games on graphs depends on the population structure and spatial properties of the interaction network. The population structure can be expressed as configurations. Such configurations extend scenarios with a single cooperator among defectors to any number of cooperators and any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the network. For interaction networks modeled as regular graphs and for weak selection, the emergence of cooperation can be assessed by structure coefficients, which can be specified for each configuration and each regular graph. Thus, as a single cooperator can be interpreted as a lone mutant, the configuration-based structure coefficients also describe fixation properties of multiple mutants. We analyze the structure coefficients and particularly show that under certain conditions, the coefficients strongly correlate to the average shortest path length between cooperators on the evolutionary graph. Thus, for multiple cooperators fixation properties on regular evolutionary graphs can be linked to cooperator path lengths.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hendrik Richter
- Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, HTWK Leipzig University of Applied Sciences, Postfach 301166, 04251, Leipzig, Germany.
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Chen YT. Wright–Fisher diffusions in stochastic spatial evolutionary games with death–birth updating. ANN APPL PROBAB 2018. [DOI: 10.1214/18-aap1390] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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Allen B, McAvoy A. A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure. J Math Biol 2018; 78:1147-1210. [PMID: 30430219 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-018-1305-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/11/2018] [Revised: 10/29/2018] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
We define a general class of models representing natural selection between two alleles. The population size and spatial structure are arbitrary, but fixed. Genetics can be haploid, diploid, or otherwise; reproduction can be asexual or sexual. Biological events (e.g. births, deaths, mating, dispersal) depend in arbitrary fashion on the current population state. Our formalism is based on the idea of genetic sites. Each genetic site resides at a particular locus and houses a single allele. Each individual contains a number of sites equal to its ploidy (one for haploids, two for diploids, etc.). Selection occurs via replacement events, in which alleles in some sites are replaced by copies of others. Replacement events depend stochastically on the population state, leading to a Markov chain representation of natural selection. Within this formalism, we define reproductive value, fitness, neutral drift, and fixation probability, and prove relationships among them. We identify four criteria for evaluating which allele is selected and show that these become equivalent in the limit of low mutation. We then formalize the method of weak selection. The power of our formalism is illustrated with applications to evolutionary games on graphs and to selection in a haplodiploid population.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA, 02115, USA. .,Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.
| | - Alex McAvoy
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA
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