The use of adult isolation facilities in a UK infectious diseases unit

General Information

Many bacteria, viruses, parasites, fungi and prions may cause serious infections and lead to the isolation of those who are infected from those who are susceptible. Isolation may be done in single rooms or in special isolation units. A modern isolate for patients with infections comprises (1) a sluice with a good space for dressing and undressing of personal protective equipment (PPE) and for hand hygiene, (2) a large patient room and (3) a bathroom/disinfection room with own decontaminator or autoclave and with separate entrance from the patient’s room. Isolates for airborne and droplet-transmitted infections have in addition a defined negative air pressure and hepafiltered exhaust. In all isolates, doors must be closed in such a way that contaminants do not escape the isolate. A modern isolate for patients with impaired immune defence is similar to the infection isolates, with following exceptions: usually no need for decontaminator, hepafiltered clean air into the room and with a defined positive air pressure. A positive pressure isolate should never be used for patients with infections, and a negative pressure isolate should never be used for patients with impaired immune defence, except if the patient also has an infection that needs isolation.

Strict Isolation

Strict isolation: suspected highly infectious and transmissible virulent and pathogenic microbes, highly resistant bacterial strains and agents that are not accepted in any form of distribution in the society or in the environment. Examples are completely resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis, viral haemorrhagic fevers like Ebola and Lassa, pandemic severe influenza and coronavirus like SARS, MERS, etc. In most countries, strict isolation is a rarely used isolation regime but should be a part of the national preparedness plan. For instance, in Norway, strict isolation has not been used for the last 50–60 years, except for one case of imported Ebola infection in 2014. Patients in need of strict isolation should be placed in a separate isolation ward or building.

Infection spread by contact, droplet and airborne infection, aerosols, re-aerosols, airborne microbe-carrying particles, skin cells, dust, droplets and droplet nuclei. At the same time, it is always contact transmission (contaminated environment, equipment, textiles and waste).

The source of infection is usually a patient but may also be a symptomless carrier or a zoonotic disease.

Background Information: Isolation Routines

The isolation of patients with suspected or documented infections—to not spread to others—has been discussed for hundreds of years. Guidelines are many, methods are different, attitudes show vide variations, routines and procedures are still changing, regulations by law may be absent, and some healthcare professionals may be afraid of adverse outcomes of isolation [1–44]. Microbes that are spread in the environment, on the hands and equipment are invisible. The invisible agent does not call on attention before the infection; clinical disease, hospital infection or nosocomial infection is a factum that can be registered [23, 28, 29, 35–37]. How to stop the transmission is often “to believe and not believe” in infection control.

Evaluating a major innovation in hospital design: workforce implications and impact on patient and staff experiences of all single room hospital accommodation

Background

New hospital design includes more single room accommodation but there is scant and ambiguous evidence relating to the impact on patient safety and staff and patient experiences.

Objectives

To explore the impact of the move to a newly built acute hospital with all single rooms on care delivery, working practices, staff and patient experience, safety outcomes and costs.

Design

(1) Mixed-methods study to inform a pre-/post-‘move’ comparison within a single hospital, (2) quasi-experimental study in two control hospitals and (3) analysis of capital and operational costs associated with single rooms.

Setting

Four nested case study wards [postnatal, acute admissions unit (AAU), general surgery and older people’s] within a new hospital with all single rooms. Matched wards in two control hospitals formed the comparator group.

Data sources

Twenty-one stakeholder interviews; 250 hours of observation, 24 staff interviews, 32 patient interviews, staff survey (n = 55) and staff pedometer data (n = 56) in the four case study wards; routinely collected data at ward level in the control hospitals (e.g. infection rates) and costs associated with hospital design (e.g. cleaning and staffing) in the new hospital.

Results

(1) There was no significant change to the proportion of time spent by nursing staff on different activities. Staff perceived improvements (patient comfort and confidentiality), but thought the new accommodation worse for visibility and surveillance, teamwork, monitoring, safeguarding and remaining close to patients. Giving sufficient time and attention to each patient, locating other staff and discussing care with colleagues proved difficult. Two-thirds of patients expressed a clear preference for single rooms, with the benefits of comfort and control outweighing any disadvantages. Some patients experienced care as task-driven and functional, and interaction with other patients was absent, leading to a sense of isolation. Staff walking distances increased significantly after the move. (2) A temporary increase in falls and medication errors within the AAU was likely to be associated with the need to adjust work patterns rather than associated with single rooms, although staff perceived the loss of panoptic surveillance as the key to increases in falls. Because of the fall in infection rates nationally and the low incidence at our study site and comparator hospitals, it is difficult to conclude from our data that it is the ‘single room’ factor that prevents infection. (3) Building an all single room hospital can cost 5% more but the difference is marginal over time. Housekeeping and cleaning costs are higher.

Conclusions

The nature of tasks undertaken by nurses did not change, but staff needed to adapt their working practices significantly and felt ill prepared for the new ways of working, with potentially significant implications for the nature of teamwork in the longer term. Staff preference remained for a mix of single rooms and bays. Patients preferred single rooms. There was no strong evidence that single rooms had any impact on patient safety but housekeeping and cleaning costs are higher. In terms of future work, patient experience and preferences in hospitals with different proportions of single rooms/designs need to be explored with a larger patient sample. The long-term impact of single room working on the nature of teamwork and informal learning and on clinical/care outcomes should also be explored.

Funding

The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.

Is antibiotic resistance a problem? A practical guide for hospital clinicians

Antibiotic resistance is an important concern for patients, physicians, healthcare managers, and policymakers. Inappropriate antimicrobial prescribing fuels the evolution of resistance, while poor basic hygiene facilitates the spread of resistant microbes between patients and healthcare staff. The development of infection with a resistant pathogen may lead to poorer health and economic outcomes. The problem for the frontline clinician, however, is how to balance the responsibility of prudent prescribing with the risk of sub-optimally treating a patient who may be infected with a resistant pathogen. This article discusses how hospital physicians can use severity and risk factor assessment, and knowledge of local microbial epidemiology, to guide empiric antibiotic prescribing. Most patients hospitalised with a community acquired bacterial infection in the UK can still be managed with a traditional first line antibiotic(s). In contrast, regimens that account for resistance are often required in patients with hospital acquired infections, particularly if the patient is critically ill.

An audit of the use of isolation facilities in a UK National Health Service trust

To aid the ongoing battle against hospital-acquired infection in the UK, all acute National Health Service (NHS) trusts should have audit data about how dedicated isolation beds within the trust are being used. In a previously published audit, we demonstrated that one-third of patients admitted to a dedicated isolation room in Tayside were not thought to be an infection risk by experienced healthcare staff. Since this audit, Tayside's isolation facilities have moved from a small peripheral 'fever' hospital to a large central teaching hospital site. At the time of this move, and using the above audit data, we designed and implemented a guideline for general practitioners and hospital doctors regarding the admission of patients to an isolation bed. The aim of this study was to compare the use of isolation beds before and after the move to the new facilities, which we anticipated would increase the demand for isolation. The results show that by all three criteria used, the utilization of isolation beds has deteriorated following the move, mainly due to the increased admission of general medical 'boarders' and low-risk infection patients. At a time when hospital-acquired infections are increasing, NHS trusts should ensure that dedicated isolation beds are used appropriately.