Parent perspectives on brain scans and genetic tests for OCD: Talking of difficult presents, desired pasts, and imagined futures

A consideration of the social dimensions and implications of neuroimaging research in global health, as related to the theory-ladened and theory-generating aspects of technology

Drawing on insights from sociology, anthropology, and the history of science and medicine, this paper considers some of the social dimensions and implications for neuroimaging research undertaken within low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). It highlights three key inter-connected issues: (1) technologies for enhancing understandings of ill-health are theory-laden; (2) such technologies are theory-generating; and (3) studies of mental ill-health can also introduce new idioms for understanding subjective distress. The paper unpacks and explores these issues. It argues that the use of neuroimaging technologies in population research has the potential to contribute to solidifying - or even introducing - a biological (and specifically brain-based) understanding of mental ill-health within the communities under study. Examples from studies of neuroscience and society in various high-income countries (HICs) where neuroimaging is popular within public discourse illustrates how this can happen, and with what effects. The social dimensions and implications of neuroimaging are issues that all researchers using these technologies need to not only anticipate, but also explicitly plan for (and potentially seek to mitigate). Without adequate consideration, neuroimaging research carries with it particular risks in relation to extending the epistemological coloniality associated with HIC-sponsored studies conducted within LMIC settings.

Neurobiological limits and the somatic significance of love: Caregivers' engagements with neuroscience in Scottish parenting programmes

While parents have long received guidance on how to raise children, a relatively new element of this involves explicit references to infant brain development, drawing on brain scans and neuroscientific knowledge. Sometimes called 'brain-based parenting', this has been criticised from within sociological and policy circles alike. However, the engagement of parents themselves with neuroscientific concepts is far less researched. Drawing on 22 interviews with parents/carers of children (mostly aged 0-7) living in Scotland, this article examines how they account for their (non-)use of concepts and understandings relating to neuroscience. Three normative tropes were salient: information about children's processing speed, evidence about deprived Romanian orphans in the 1990s, and ideas relating to whether or not children should 'self-settle' when falling asleep. We interrogate how parents reflexively weigh and judge such understandings and ideas. In some cases, neuroscientific knowledge was enrolled by parents in ways that supported biologically reductionist models of childhood agency. This reductionism commonly had generative effects, enjoining new care practices and producing particular parent and infant subjectivities. Notably, parents do not uncritically adopt or accept (sometimes reductionist) neurobiological and/or psychological knowledge; rather, they reflect on whether and when it is applicable to and relevant for raising their children. Thus, our respondents draw on everyday epistemologies of parenting to negotiate brain-based understandings of infant development and behaviour, and invest meaning in these in ways that cannot be fully anticipated (or appreciated) within straightforward celebrations or critiques of the content of parenting programmes drawing on neuropsychological ideas.