Criminalizing the brain: Neurocriminology and the production of strategic ignorance

Free will, quarantines, and moral enhancements: neuroabolitionism as an alternative to criminal law

This article critically navigates the complex debate surrounding free will and criminal justice, challenging traditional assumptions of moral responsibility and culpability. By exploring hard incompatibilism, which denies free will, I question the ethical justification of punitive sanctions and critically analyze the alternative models such as the public health-quarantine and nonconsensual neurobiological "moral" enhancements. These alternatives, however, introduce practical and ethical concerns. Advocating for a neuro-abolitionist perspective, through the proposition of five initial principles/debates, the article suggests a shift in integrating sociological abolitionism with insights from neuroscience. The discussion extends to the implications of hard incompatibilism and the pursuit of more humane and effective approaches to deviant behavior, ultimately calling for the abolition of punitive models and criminal law itself.

Irreducibly Social: Why Biocriminology's Ontoepistemology is Incompatible with the Social Reality of Crime

Professing interactionist bio + social terminology, contemporary biocriminology asserts a break from its biologically essentialist past. Assurances notwithstanding, whether biocriminology has undergone a decisive paradigm shift rejecting notions of biological criminals and bad brains remains uncertain. Unfortunately, discussions of biocriminology's assumptions are mired in politics, obscuring important scientific issues. Motivated to clarify misunderstanding, I address the ontoepistemology of biocriminology from a scientific realist perspective. Drawing on familiar notions of crime as a social construction, I explain how and why biocriminology's ontoepistemology is inconsistent with the social reality of crime for scientific not ideological reasons. I explain that recognizing crime is a social construction does not imply that crime is not real or objective and cannot be studied scientifically. On the contrary, the irreducibly social nature of crime requires that scientific realists reject assumptions of 'biological crime' as well as the biologically reductionist epistemology on which biocriminology depends.

‘Braining’ psychiatry: an investigation into how complexity is managed in the practice of neuropsychiatric research

Neuropsychiatry searches to understand mental disorders in terms of underlying brain activity by using brain imaging technologies. The field promises to offer a more objective foundation for diagnostic processes and to help developing forms of treatment that target the symptoms of a specific mental disorder. However, brain imaging technologies also reveal the brain as a complex network, suggesting that mental disorders cannot be easily linked to specific brain areas. In this paper, we analyze a case study conducted at a neuropsychiatry laboratory to explore how the complexity of the human brain is managed in light of the project of explaining mental disorders in terms of their neurological substrates. We use a combination of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to show how previously assigned diagnostic labels are constitutive of interpretations of experimental data and, therefore, remain unchallenged. Furthermore, we show how diagnostic labels become materialized in experimental design, in that the linking of symptoms of mental disorders to specific brain areas is treated as indicative of successfully designed experimental stimuli. In conclusion, we argue that while researchers acknowledge the complexity of the brain on a generic level, they do not grant this complexity to the brains of individuals diagnosed with a mental disorder.