Vaccination games and imitation dynamics with memory

Delay induced stability switch in a mathematical model of CD8 T-cell response to SARS-CoV-2 mediated by receptor ACE2

The pathogen SARS-CoV-2 binds to the receptor angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) of the target cells and then replicates itself through the host, eventually releasing free virus particles. After infection, the CD8 T-cell response is triggered and appears to play a critical role in the defense against virus infections. Infected cells and their activated CD8 T-cells can cause tissue damage. Here, we established a mathematical model of within-host SARS-CoV-2 infection that incorporates the receptor ACE2, the CD8 T-cell response, and the damaged tissues. According to this model, we can get the basic reproduction number R0 and the immune reproduction number R1. We provide the theoretical proof for the stability of the disease-free equilibrium, immune-inactivated equilibrium, and immune-activated equilibrium. Finally, our numerical simulations show that the time delay in CD8 T-cell production can induce complex dynamics such as stability switching. These results provide insights into the mechanisms of SARS-CoV-2 infection and may help in the development of effective drugs against COVID-19.

Heterogeneous decision-making dynamics of threshold-switching agents on complex networks

In the classical two-player decision-making scenario, individuals may have different tendencies to take a certain action, given that there exists a sufficient number of neighbors adopting a particular option. This is ubiquitous in many real-life contexts including traffic congestion, crowd evacuation, and minimal vertex cover problem. Under best-response dynamics, we investigate the decision-making behaviors of heterogeneous agents on complex networks. Results of the networked games are twofold: for networks of uniform degree distribution (e.g., the lattice) and fraction of the strategy is of a linear function of the threshold setting. Moreover, the equilibrium analysis is provided and the relationship between the equilibrium dynamics and the change of the threshold value is given quantitatively. Next, if the games are played on networks with non-uniform degree distribution (e.g., random regular and scale-free networks), influence of the threshold-switching will be weakened. Robust experiments indicate that it is not the value of the average degree, but the degree distribution that influences how the strategy evolves affected by the threshold settings. Our result shows that the decision-making behaviors can be effectively manipulated by tuning the parameters in the utility function (i.e., thresholds) of some agents for more regular network structures.