The influence of chromatic and achromatic variability on chromatic induction and perceived colour

The effect of scene articulation on transparent layer constancy

In this article, we examine the influence of scene articulation on transparent layer constancy. We argue that the term articulation may be understood as an aspect of the more general concept naturalness of a stimulus that relates to the degree of enrichment compared with a minimal stimulus and to the extent to which a stimulus contains regularities that are typically found in natural scenes. We conducted two matching experiments, in which we used strongly reduced scenes and operationalized articulation by the number of background reflectances (numerosity). The results of the first experiment show that higher numerosity actually leads to an increase in transparent layer constancy when reflectances are randomly drawn from a fixed population. However, this advantage disappears if the spatial mean and the variation of the subset colors are controlled as in our second experiment. Furthermore, our results suggest that the mechanism underlying transparent layer constancy leads to a rather stable compromise between two matching criteria, namely, proximal identity and constant filter properties according to our perceptual model. For filters with an additive component, which appear more or less hazy, we observed improved recovered filter properties and correspondingly higher degrees of transparent layer constancy, suggesting an additional mechanism in this type of filter.

Transparency perception: the key to understanding simultaneous color contrast

The well-known simultaneous color contrast effect is traditionally explained in terms of visual color constancy mechanisms correcting for the confounding influence of ambient illumination on the retinal color signal. Recent research, however, suggests that the traditional gross quantitative laws of simultaneous color contrast, which are readily compatible with this functional explanation, should be revised and replaced by others, which are not readily understandable in terms of this perspective. Here, we show that the revised laws of simultaneous color contrast are well accounted for by an alternative theory explaining the simultaneous contrast effect in terms of mechanisms subserving the perception of transparent media.

Role of eye movements in chromatic induction

There exist large interindividual differences in the amount of chromatic induction [Vis. Res. 49, 2261 (2009)]. One possible reason for these differences between subjects could be differences in subjects' eye movements. In experiment 1, subjects either had to look exclusively at the background or at the adjustable disk while they set the disk to a neutral gray as their eye position was being recorded. We found a significant difference in the amount of induction between the two viewing conditions. In a second experiment, subjects were freely looking at the display. We found no correlation between subjects' eye movements and the amount of induction. We conclude that eye movements only play a role under artificial (forced looking) viewing conditions and that eye movements do not seem to play a large role for chromatic induction under natural viewing conditions.

Color constancy

A quarter of a century ago, the first systematic behavioral experiments were performed to clarify the nature of color constancy-the effect whereby the perceived color of a surface remains constant despite changes in the spectrum of the illumination. At about the same time, new models of color constancy appeared, along with physiological data on cortical mechanisms and photographic colorimetric measurements of natural scenes. Since then, as this review shows, there have been many advances. The theoretical requirements for constancy have been better delineated and the range of experimental techniques has been greatly expanded; novel invariant properties of images and a variety of neural mechanisms have been identified; and increasing recognition has been given to the relevance of natural surfaces and scenes as laboratory stimuli. Even so, there remain many theoretical and experimental challenges, not least to develop an account of color constancy that goes beyond deterministic and relatively simple laboratory stimuli and instead deals with the intrinsically variable nature of surfaces and illuminations present in the natural world.

Perceiving colour at a glimpse: The relevance of where one fixates

We used classification images to examine whether certain parts of a surface are particularly important when judging its colour, such as its centre, its edges, or where one is looking. The scene consisted of a regular pattern of square tiles with random colours from along a short line in colour space. Targets defined by a square array of brighter tiles were presented for 200ms. The colours of the tiles within the target were biased by an amount that led to about 70% of the responses being correct. Subjects fixated a point that fell within the target's lower left quadrant and reported each target's colour. They tended to report the colour of the tiles near the fixation point. The influence of the tiles' colour reversed at the target's border and was weaker outside the target. The colour at the border itself was not particularly important. When coloured tiles were also presented before (and after) target presentation they had an opposite (but weaker) effect, indicating that the change in colour is important. Comparing the influence of tiles outside the target with that of tiles at the position at which the target would soon appear suggests that when judging surface colours during the short "glimpses" between saccades, temporal comparisons can be at least as important as spatial ones. We conclude that eye movements are important for colour vision, both because they determine which part of the surface of interest will be given most weight and because the perceived colour of such a surface also depends on what one looked at last.

Combining local and global contributions to perceived colour: An analysis of the variability in symmetric and asymmetric colour matching

Are surfaces' colours judged from weighted averages of the light that they reflect to the eyes and the colour contrast at their borders? To find out we asked subjects to set the colour and luminance of test disks to match reference disks, on various backgrounds, and analysed the variability in their settings. Most of the variability between repeated settings was in luminance. The standard deviations in the set colour were smallest when the disk and background were the same colour, irrespective of the colour itself. Matches were equally precise for greenish or reddish disks on a grey background, as for grey disks on a greenish or reddish background. The precision was less dependent on the colour contrast at the disks' borders when the backgrounds were more complex and when there was a large luminance contrast at the disks' borders. Subjects were less precise when different colours surrounded the two disks. These findings are consistent with the perceived colour at any position being a weighted average of the local cone excitation ratio and the change in the cone excitation ratio at the borders of the surface in question. However, the involved weights must be variable and depend systematically on parameters such as the luminance contrast at the surface's borders and other chromatic contrasts within the scene.

Computational adaptation model and its predictions for color induction of first and second orders

The appearance of a patch of color or its contrast depends not only on the stimulus itself but also on the surrounding stimuli (induction effects-simultaneous contrast). A comprehensive computational physiological model is presented to describe chromatic adaptation of the first (retinal) and second (cortical) orders, and to predict the different chromatic induction effects. We propose that the chromatic induction of the first order that yields perceived complementary colors can be predicted by retinal adaptation mechanisms, contrary to previous suggestions. The second order of the proposed adaptation mechanism succeeds to predict the automatic perceived inhibition or facilitation of the central contrast of a texture stimulus, depending on the surrounding contrast. Furthermore, contrary to other models, this model is able to also predict the effect of variegated surrounding on the central perceived color.

Olive green or chestnut brown?

Reflectance and spectral power functions are poor predictors of color experiences. Only in completely relativized conditions (single observer, non-metameric set of stimuli, and single set of viewing conditions) is the relationship close. Variation in reflectance of Munsell chips experienced by color-normal observers as having a unique green hue encompasses approximately sixty percent of the complete range of hues falling under the category “green”; and in recent determinations of unique hues, ranges of yellow and green as well as green and blue unique hues overlap.

Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?

We make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.

Color realism and color illusions

As demonstrated by several example displays, color illusions challenge color realism, because they involve a one-to-many reflectance-to-color mapping. Solving this problem by differentiating between veridical and illusory colors corresponding to the same reflectance is hampered because of the lack of an appropriate criterion. However, the difference between veridical and illusory color perception can still be maintained.

Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?

I argue that Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) have not answered Hardin's objection to physicalism about color concerning the unitary-binary structure of the colors for two reasons. First, their account of unitary-binary structure seems unsatisfactory. Second, pace B&H, there are no physicalistically acceptable candidates to be the hue-magnitudes. I conclude with a question about the justification of physicalism about color.

Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision

In many cases of variation in color vision, there is no nonarbitrary way of choosing between variants. Byrne & Hilbert insist that there is an unknown standard for choosing, whereas eliminativists claim that all the variants are erroneous. A better response relativizes colors to perceivers, thereby providing a color realism that avoids the need to choose between variants.

Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?

Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) conceive of color perception as the representation of a physical property “out there.” In our view, their approach does not only have various internal problems, but is also apt to becloud both the intricate and still poorly understood role that “color” plays within perceptual architecture, and the complex coupling to the “external world” of the perceptual system as an entirety. We propose an alternative perspective, which avoids B&H's misleading dichotomy between a purely subjective and a realist conception of “color.”

An account of color without a subject?

While color realism is endorsed, Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) case for it stretches the notion of “physical property” beyond acceptable bounds. It is argued that a satisfactory account of color should do much more to respond to antirealist intuitions that flow from the specificity of color experience, and a pointer to an approach that does so is provided.

Color realism redux

Our reply is in three parts. The first part concerns some foundational issues in the debate about color realism. The second part addresses the many objections to the version of physicalism about color (“productance physicalism”) defended in the target article. The third part discusses the leading alternative approaches and theories endorsed by the commentators.

Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies

Reflectance physicalism only provides a partial picture of the ontology of color. Byrne & Hilbert’ account is unsatisfactory because the replacement of reflectance functions by productance functions is ad hoc, unclear, and only leads to new problems. Furthermore, the effects of color contrast and differences in illumination are not really taken seriously: Too many “real” colors are tacitly dismissed as illusory, and this for arbitrary reasons. We claim that there cannot be an all-embracing ontology for color.

Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science

Byrne & Hilbert are right that it might be an objective fact that a particular tomato is unique red, but wrong that it cannot simultaneously be yellowish-red (not only objectively, but from somebody else's point of view). Sensory categorization varies among organisms, slightly among conspecifics, and sharply across taxa. There is no question of truth or falsity concerning choice of categories, only of utility and disutility. The appropriate framework for color categories is Nominalism and Pluralistic Realism.

Perceptual variation and access to colors

To identify the set of reflectances that constitute redness, the authors must first determine which surfaces are red. They do this by relying on widespread agreement among us. However, arguments based on the possible ways in which humans would perceive colors show that mere widespread agreement among us is not a satisfactory way to determine which surfaces are red.

Chromatic induction and the layout of colours within a complex scene

A target's apparent colour is influenced by the colours in its surrounding. If the surrounding consists of a single coloured surface, the influence is a shift 'away' from the surface's colour. If the surface is more than 1 degrees from the target area the shift is very small. If there are many surfaces, then not only the average luminance and chromaticity of the surfaces matters, but also the chromatic variability. It is not yet clear whether it makes any difference where the chromatic variability is within the scene, so we constructed stimuli in which the chromatic variability was restricted to certain regions. We found that it made very little difference where the chromatic variability was located. The extent to which the average colour of nearby surfaces influences the apparent colour of the target seems to depend on the average chromatic variability of the whole scene.

Parallels between hearing and seeing support physicalism

There are 2,000 hair cells in the cochlea, but only three cones in the retina. This disparity can be understood in terms of the differences between the physical characteristics of the auditory signal (discrete excitations and resonances requiring many narrowly tuned receptors) and those of the visual signal (smooth daylight excitations and reflectances requiring only a few broadly tuned receptors). We argue that this match supports the physicalism of color and timbre.

Surreptitious substitution

In this commentary I argue that Byrne & Hilbert commit a number of philosophical solecisms: They beg the question of “realism,” they take the phenomenon and the theoretical model to be the same thing, and they surreptitiously substitute data sets for the life-world.

Clarifying the problem of color realism

“The problem of color realism” as defined in the first section of the target article, is crucial to the argument laid out by Byrne & Hilbert. They claim that the problem of color realism “does not concern, at least in the first instance, color language or color concepts” (sect. 1.1). I argue that this claim is misconceived and that a different characterisation of the problem, and some of their preliminary assumptions makes their positive proposal less appealing.

Ecological considerations support color physicalism

We argue that any theory of color physicalism must include consideration of ecological interactions. Ecological and sensorimotor contingencies resulting from relative surface motion and observer motion give rise to measurable effects on the spectrum of light reflecting from surfaces. These contingencies define invariant manifolds in a sensory-spatial space, which is the physical underpinning of all subjective color experiences.

Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates

The authors favor a “color realism” theory that considers colors to be physical properties residing in objects that reflect, emit, or transmit light. It is opposed to the theory that colors are sensations or visual experiences. This commentary suggests that both theories are correct, and that context usually indicates which of these dual aspects is being considered.

True color only exists in the eye of the observer

The colors we perceive are the outcome of an attempt to meaningfully order the spectral information from the environment. These colors are not the result of a straightforward mapping of a physical property to a sensation, but arise from an interaction between our environment and our visual system. Thus, although one may infer from a surface’ reflectance characteristics that it will be perceived as “colored,” true colors only arise by virtue of the interaction of the reflected light with the eye (and brain) of an observer.

Color and content

Those who identify colours with physical properties need to say how the content of colour experiences relate to their favoured identifications. This is because it is not plausible to hold that colour experiences represent things as having the physical properties in question. I sketch how physical realists about colour might tackle this item of unfinished business.

“Color realism” shows a subjectivist' mode of thinking

Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) assert that reflectances embody the reality of color, but metamerism smears the authors' “real” color categories into uselessness. B&H ignore this problem, possibly because they implicitly adopt a sort of subjectivism, whereby an object is defined by the percepts (or more generally by the measurements) it engenders. Subjectivism is unwieldy, and hence prone to such troubles.

Spatial position and perceived color of objects

Visual percepts are called veridical when a “real” object can be identified as their cause, and illusions otherwise. The perceived position and color of a flashed object may be called veridical or illusory depending on which viewpoint one adopts. Since “reality” is assumed to be fixed (independent of viewpoint) in the definition of veridicality (or illusion), this suggests that “perceived” position and color are not properties of “real” objects.

Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context

In visual science, color is usually regarded as a subjective phenomenon. The relationship between the specific color experiences that are evoked by a visual scene and the physical properties of the surfaces viewed in that scene are complex and highly dependent on spatial context. There is no simple correspondence between experienced color and a stable class of physical reflectances.

Byrne and Hilbert's chromatic ether

Because our only access to color qualities is through their appearance, Byrne & Hilbert's insistence on a strict distinction between apparent colors and real colors leaves them without a principled way of determining when, if ever, we see colors as they really are.

Beautiful red squares

The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.

Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties

Byrne & Hilbert defend color realism, which assumes that: (a) colors are properties of objects; (b) these objects are physical; hence, (c) colors are physical properties. I accept (a), agree that in a certain sense (b) can be defended, but reject (c). Colors are properties of perceptual objects – which also have underlying physical properties – but they are not physical properties.

Color as a material, not an optical, property

For all animals, color is an indicator of the substance and state of objects, for which purpose reflectance is just one among many relevant optical properties. This broader meaning of color is confirmed by linguistic evidence. Rather than reducing color to a simple physical property, it is more realistic to embrace its full phenomenology.

Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity

The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?

In favor of an ecological account of color

Byrne & Hilbert understate the difficulties facing their version of color realism. We doubt that they can fix reflectance types and magnitudes in a way that does not invoke relations to perceivers. B&H's account, therefore, resembles the dispositional or ecological accounts that they dismiss. This is a good thing, for a dispositional account is promising if understood in an ecological framework.

Color as a factor analytic approximation to Nature

Color vision provides accurate measures of the phase and intensity of daylight, and also a means of discriminating between objects. Neither property implies that objects are colored.

Hue magnitudes and Revelation

Revelation, the thesis that the full intrinsic nature of colors is revealed to us by color experiences, is false in Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) view, but in an interesting and nonobvious way. I show what would make Revelation true, given B&H's account of colors, and then show why that situation fails to obtain, and why that is interesting.

Surface color perception in constrained environments

Byrne & Hilbert propose that color can be identified with explicit properties of physical surfaces. I argue that this claim must be qualified to take into account constraints needed to make recovery of surface color information possible. When these constraints are satisfied, then a biological visual system can establish a correspondence between perceived surface color and specific surface properties.

Color: A vision scientist's perspective

Vision scientists are interested in three diverse entities: physical stimuli, neural states, and consciously perceived colors, and in the mapping rules among the three. In this worldview, the three kinds of entities have coequal status, and views that attribute color exclusively to one or another of them, such as color realism, have no appeal.

Do metamers matter?

Metamerism is a rather common feature of objects. The authors see it as problematic because they are concerned with a special case: metamerism in standard conditions. Such metamerism does not, however, pose a problem for color realists. There is an apparent problem in cases of metameric light sources, but to see such metamers as problematic is to fail to answer Berkeley's challenge.

Imprecise color constancy versus color realism

Byrne & Hilbert's thesis, that color be associated with reflectance-type, is questioned on the grounds that it is far from clear that the human visual system is able to determine a surface's reflectance-type with sufficient accuracy. In addition, a (friendly) suggestion is made as to how to amend the definition of reflectance-type in terms of CIE (Commission Internationale de l'Eclairage) coordinates under a canonical illuminant.