Lightness of an object under two illumination levels

Information extraction from shadowed regions in images: an eye movement study

Natural scenes often contain variations in local luminance as a result of cast shadows and illumination from different directions. When making judgments about such scenes, it may be hypothesized that darker regions (with lower relative contrast due to a lack of illumination) are avoided as they may provide less detailed information than well-illuminated areas. We here test this hypothesis, first by presenting participants images of faces that were digitally modified to simulate the effect of a shadow over half of the image, and second by presenting photographs of faces taken with side illumination, also resulting in the appearance of a shadow across half of the face. While participants viewed these images, they were asked to perform different tasks on the images, to allow for the presentation of the different versions of each image (left shadow, right shadow, no shadow), and to distract the observers from the contrast and illumination manipulations. The results confirm our hypothesis and demonstrate that observers fixate the better illuminated regions of the images.

What visual illusions tell us about underlying neural mechanisms and observer strategies for tackling the inverse problem of achromatic perception

Research in lightness perception centers on understanding the prior assumptions and processing strategies the visual system uses to parse the retinal intensity distribution (the proximal stimulus) into the surface reflectance and illumination components of the scene (the distal stimulus—ground truth). It is agreed that the visual system must compare different regions of the visual image to solve this inverse problem; however, the nature of the comparisons and the mechanisms underlying them are topics of intense debate. Perceptual illusions are of value because they reveal important information about these visual processing mechanisms. We propose a framework for lightness research that resolves confusions and paradoxes in the literature, and provides insight into the mechanisms the visual system employs to tackle the inverse problem. The main idea is that much of the debate and confusion in the literature stems from the fact that lightness, defined as apparent reflectance, is underspecified and refers to three different types of judgments that are not comparable. Under stimulus conditions containing a visible illumination component, such as a shadow boundary, observers can distinguish and match three independent dimensions of achromatic experience: apparent intensity (brightness), apparent local intensity ratio (brightness-contrast), and apparent reflectance (lightness). In the absence of a visible illumination boundary, however, achromatic vision reduces to two dimensions and, depending on stimulus conditions and observer instructions, judgments of lightness are identical to judgments of brightness or brightness-contrast. Furthermore, because lightness judgments are based on different information under different conditions, they can differ greatly in their degree of difficulty and in their accuracy. This may, in part, explain the large variability in lightness constancy across studies.

A unified account of gloss and lightness perception in terms of gamut relativity

A recently introduced computational theory of visual surface representation, termed gamut relativity, overturns the classical assumption that brightness, lightness, and transparency constitute perceptual dimensions corresponding to the physical dimensions of luminance, diffuse reflectance, and transmittance, respectively. Here I extend the theory to show how surface gloss and lightness can be understood in a unified manner in terms of the vector computation of "layered representations" of surface and illumination properties, rather than as perceptual dimensions corresponding to diffuse and specular reflectance, respectively. The theory simulates the effects of image histogram skewness on surface gloss/lightness and lightness constancy as a function of specular highlight intensity. More generally, gamut relativity clarifies, unifies, and generalizes a wide body of previous theoretical and experimental work aimed at understanding how the visual system parses the retinal image into layered representations of surface and illumination properties.

The luminance misattribution in lightness perception

The Simultaneous Lightness Contrast is the condition whereby a grey patch on a dark background appears lighter than a physically identical patch on a light background. This is probably the most studied phenomenon in lightness perception. Although this phenomenon has been explained in terms of low-level mechanisms, convincing evidences supporting a high-level interpretation have been presented over the last decades. Two are the main highlevel interpretations. On one side, the layer approach claims that the visual system splits the luminance into separate overlapping layers, corresponding to separate physical contributions; whilst on the other side, the framework approach maintains that the visual system groups the luminance within a set of contiguous frameworks. One of the biggest weaknesses of the layer approach is that it cannot account properly for errors in lightness perception (Gilchrist, 2005 Current Biology, 15(9), 330-332). To extend the multiple layers interpretation to errors in lightness perception, in this study we show that the perceptual lightness difference among equal patches on different backgrounds increases even when the luminance contrast with their backgrounds shrinks. Specifically, it is shown that the perceptual lightness difference among equal patches on different backgrounds intensifies when a small-sized semi-transparent surface is interposed between the patches and the backgrounds. This result indicates that in these conditions the visual system besides decomposing the luminance into separate layers also becomes liable for a luminance misattribution. It is proposed that the photometric and geometric relationships among the luminance edges in the image might account for this misattribution.

The Perceptual Contrast of Impossible Shadow Edges

Luminance ratios along shadow edges remain the same even when they cross reflectance borders. According to Gilchrist (1988, Perception & Psychophysics43 415–424) this so-called ratio-invariance property is a crucial factor in the perception of shadows. However, Soranzo and Agostini (2004, Perception33 1359–1368) suggested that in some conditions (named ‘impossible shadows’), a luminance pattern might still be perceived as a shadow even if the ratio-invariance property along its edge is violated. This can occur when an edge is collinear with another edge (contextual edge) which incorporates it, shares the same polarity, and generates a larger ratio. The hypothesis that impossible shadows are actually perceived as shadows is here tested by comparing the perceptual contrast of a luminance edge in the absence of a contextual edge (control condition) to that of both possible shadow edges (where the contextual and mediating edge share the same ratio) and impossible shadow edges (where the ratio of the contextual edge is larger rather than that at the mediating edge). We found that the perceived contrast of luminance edges shrinks in both possible and impossible shadow conditions rather than in the control condition. This evidence supports the hypothesis that a luminance pattern might be perceived as a shadow even when the ratio-invariance property is violated.

Coming to terms with lightness and brightness: effects of stimulus configuration and instructions on brightness and lightness judgments

To recover surface reflectance and illuminance from the raw luminance signal, the visual system must use prior assumptions and strategies that make use of additional sources of information. Indeed, it has been found that depending on experimental conditions, lightness (apparent reflectance) may refer to judgments that are similar to brightness judgments (apparent luminance), that are similar to local brightness-contrast judgments, or that represent an independent third dimension of achromatic experience which exists only when the illumination across regions of the display is visibly non-uniform (L. E. Arend & B. Spehar, 1993a, 1993b). This means that lightness data generated in one experimental condition may not be comparable to lightness data measured in other conditions. We investigate this problem with regard to a history of data on simultaneous brightness-contrast by measuring brightness, brightness-contrast, and lightness in stimuli similar to those used in Gilchrist's edge-substitution studies (A. Gilchrist, S. Delman, & A. Jacobsen, 1983) and in stimuli similar to those used to test Gilchrist's intrinsic-image model against his newer anchoring model (A. Gilchrist, 2006). Our results clarify confusions that appear to stem from comparing different types of lightness judgments and from inadvertently using brightness as an index of lightness under conditions where independent lightness judgments are possible.

Lightness constancy: Object identity and temporal integration

Studies of lightness constancy typically involve the comparison of two objects of the same shade that have been placed under different illuminations. In this study, we introduce factors such as object identity and immediate prior experience to measure the effect of these manipulations on constancy. In the first experiment, conditions sufficient to reproduce classical constancy failure (illumination difference, target values, articulation level) were determined. In the second experiment a lightness judgment was made for a gray target that was then seen to move into another illumination level for the second match. Motion was used in an attempt to stress the target?s identity. The shade was still judged significantly lighter when placed under the higher than under the lower illumination. Failure of constancy thus occurred even when object identity was not in question. In the third experiment a priming paradigm was used, to assess the strength of constancy: one shade would appear in one illumination level and another shade in the other illumination level. Motion was used to trick observers into thinking that only a single object was presented. The estimated shade varied as a function of the shade of the prime. In the last experiment, observers were asked to make another match when the object was removed from view: the match of its true color independent of illumination. The value of this match-from-memory was based on the value obtained in the higher illumination level. Taken together, the experiments show that through object identity, immediate prior experience can influence lightness in systematic fashion.