Errors in Judging Information about Reflections in Mirrors

Grounding Intuitive Physics in Perceptual Experience

This review article explores the foundation of laypeople's understanding of the physical world rooted in perceptual experience. Beginning with a concise historical overview of the study of intuitive physics, the article presents the hypothesis that laypeople possess accurate internalized representations of physical laws. A key aspect of this hypothesis is the contention that correct representations of physical laws emerge in ecological experimental conditions, where the scenario being examined resembles everyday life experiences. The article critically examines empirical evidence both supporting and challenging this claim, revealing that despite everyday-life-like conditions, fundamental misconceptions often persist. Many of these misconceptions can be attributed to a domain-general heuristic that arises from the overgeneralization of perceptual-motor experiences with physical objects. To conclude, the article delves into ongoing controversies and highlights promising future avenues in the field of intuitive physics, including action-judgment dissociations, insights from developmental psychology, and computational models integrating artificial intelligence.

Virtual Mirror and Beyond: The Psychological Basis for Avatar Embodiment via a Mirror

In virtual reality (VR), a virtual mirror is often used to display the VR avatar to the user for enhancing the embodiment. The reflected image of the synchronization of the virtual body with the user’s movement is expected to be recognized as the user’s own reflection. In addition to the visuo-motor synchrony, there are some mirror reflection factors that are probably involved in avatar embodiment. This paper reviews literature on the psychological studies that involve mirror-specific self-identification and embodied perception to clarify how the reflected image of the virtual body is embodied. Furthermore, subjective misconceptions about mirror reflections reported in naïve optics have also been reviewed to discuss the potential of virtual mirror displays to modulate avatar embodiment.

Effects of Symmetry and Apparent Distance in a Parasagittal-Mirror Variant of the Rubber Hand Illusion Paradigm

When I see my face in a mirror, its apparent position (behind the glass) is not one that my own face could be in. I accept the face I see as my own because I have an implicit understanding of how mirrors work. The situation is different if I look at the reflection of my right hand in a parasagittal mirror (parallel to body midline) when my left hand is hidden behind the mirror. It is as if I were looking through a window at my own left hand. The experience of body ownership has been investigated using rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigms, and several studies have demonstrated ownership of a rubber hand viewed in a frontal mirror. Our “proof of concept” study was the first to combine use of a parasagittal mirror and synchronous stroking of both a prosthetic hand (viewed in the mirror) and the participant’s hand, with a manipulation of distance between the hands. The strength of the RHI elicited by our parasagittal-mirror paradigm depended not on physical distance between the hands (30, 45, or 60 cm) but on apparent distance between the prosthetic hand (viewed in the mirror) and the participant’s hand. This apparent distance was reduced to zero when the prosthetic hand and participant’s hand were arranged symmetrically (e.g., 30 cm in front of and behind the mirror). Thus, the parasagittal-mirror paradigm may provide a distinctive way to assess whether competition for ownership depends on spatial separation between the prosthetic hand and the participant’s hand.

Multisensory integration of visual cues from first- to third-person perspective avatars in the perception of self-motion

In the perception of self-motion, visual cues originating from an embodied humanoid avatar seen from a first-person perspective (1^st-PP) are processed in the same way as those originating from a person's own body. Here, we sought to determine whether the user's and avatar's bodies in virtual reality have to be colocalized for this visual integration. In Experiment 1, participants saw a whole-body avatar in a virtual mirror facing them. The mirror perspective could be supplemented with a fully visible 1^st-PP avatar or a suggested one (with the arms hidden by a virtual board). In Experiment 2, the avatar was viewed from the mirror perspective or a third-person perspective (3^rd-PP) rotated 90° left or right. During an initial embodiment phase in both experiments, the avatar's forearms faithfully reproduced the participant's real movements. Next, kinaesthetic illusions were induced on the static right arm from the vision of passive displacements of the avatar's arms enhanced by passive displacement of the participant's left arm. Results showed that this manipulation elicited kinaesthetic illusions regardless of the avatar's perspective in Experiments 1 and 2. However, illusions were more likely to occur when the mirror perspective was supplemented with the view of the 1st-PP avatar's body than with the mirror perspective only (Experiment 1), just as they are more likely to occur in the latter condition than with the 3^rd-PP (Experiment 2). Our results show that colocalization of the user's and avatar's bodies is an important, but not essential, factor in visual integration for self-motion perception.

Self-Body Recognition through a Mirror: Easing Spatial-Consistency Requirements for Rubber Hand Illusion

Considering that humans recognize mirror images as copies of the real world despite misinterpreting optical reflections, spatial disagreement may be accepted in rubber hand illusion (RHI) settings when a mirror is used to show a fake hand. The present study performed two experiments to reveal how self-body recognition of a fake hand via a mirror affects RHI. First, we tested whether illusory ownership of a fake hand seen in a mirror could be induced in our experimental environment (screening experiment). Subjective evaluations using an RHI questionnaire demonstrated that embodiment of the rubber hand was evoked in the presence or absence of a mirror. We then examined whether using a mirror image for RHI allows disagreement in orientation (45 ∘ ) between the rubber and actual hands (main experiment). The participants experienced RHI even when the actual and rubber hands were incongruent in terms of orientation. These findings suggest that using a mirror masks subtle spatial incongruency or degrades the contribution of visual cues for spatial recognition and facilitates multisensory integration for bodily illusions.

Can people detect errors in shadows and reflections?

The increasing sophistication of photo-editing software means that even amateurs can create compelling doctored images. Yet recent research suggests that people’s ability to detect image manipulations is limited. Given the prevalence of manipulated images in the media, on social networking sites, and in other domains, the implications of mistaking a fake image as real, or vice versa, can be serious. In seven experiments, we tested whether people can make use of errors in shadows and reflections to determine whether or not an image has been manipulated. Our results revealed that people’s ability to identify authentic and manipulated scenes based on shadow and reflection information increased with the size of the manipulation, but overall, detection rates remained poor. Consistent with theories of incomplete visual representation, one possible reason for these findings could be that people rarely encode the details of scenes that provide useful cues as to the authenticity of images. Overall, our findings indicate that people do not readily make use of shadow and reflection cues to help determine the authenticity of images—yet it remains possible that people could make use of these cues, but they are simply unaware of how to do so.

The Role of Visual Information in Body Size Estimation

The conscious representation of our physical appearance is important for many aspects of everyday life. Here, we asked whether different visual experiences of our bodies influence body width estimates. In Experiment 1, width estimates of three body parts (foot, hips, and shoulders) without any visual access were compared to estimates with visual feedback available in a mirror or from a first-person perspective. In the no visual access and mirror condition, participants additionally estimated their head width. There was no influence of viewing condition on body part width estimates. Consistent with previous research, all body part widths were overestimated with greater overestimation of hip and head width. In Experiment 2, participants estimated the size of unfamiliar noncorporeal objects to test whether this overestimation was partially due to the metric body size estimation method or our experimental conditions. Object width was overestimated with visual feedback in a mirror available as compared to when directly looking at the object, but only for objects placed at shoulder and head height. We conclude that at least some of the overestimation of body part width seems to be body specific and occurs regardless of the visual information provided about the own body.

It's out of my hands! Grasping capacity may not influence perceived object size

Linkenauger, Witt, and Proffitt (2011) found that the perceived size of graspable objects was scaled by perceived grasping capacity. However, it is possible that this effect occurred because object size was estimated on the same trial as grasping capacity. This may have led to a conflation of estimates of perceived action capacity and spatial properties. In 5 experiments, we tested Linkenauger et al.’s claim that right-handed observers overestimate the grasping capacity of their right hand relative to their left hand, and that this, in turn, leads them to underestimate the size of objects to-be-grasped in their right hand relative to their left hand. We replicated the finding that right handers overestimate the size and grasping capacity of their right hand relative to their left hand. However, when estimates of object size and grasping capacity were made in separate tasks, objects grasped in the right hand were not underestimated relative to those grasped in the left hand. Further, when grasping capacity was physically restricted, observers appropriately recalibrated their perception of their maximum grasp but estimates of object size were unaffected. Our results suggest that changes in action capacity may not influence perceived object size if sources of conflation are controlled for.

The action-specific account of perception suggests that an observer’s capacity for action scales how the environment appears to them and, specifically, how they perceive its spatial properties. However, contrary to the predictions of this account, the results of the present studies suggest that perceived object size is not influenced by either actual or perceived grasping capacity. First, although right handers perceived their right hand to be both larger and to have a greater grasping capacity than their left hand, size estimates for an object were not influenced by which hand was used to grasp that object. Second, in a stronger manipulation, we reduced both the actual and the perceived grasping capacity of one hand by taping its fingers together. Despite this causing a substantial reduction in action capacity, it did not influence estimates of object size. These results show that action capacity and spatial properties can be perceived independently.

Differences between predictions of how a reflection behaves based on the behaviour of an object, and how an object behaves based on the behaviour of its reflection

We studied adults' understanding of the relationship between objects and their reflections. Two studies investigated whether adults performed in a similar way when asked to predict the movement of a reflection in a flat mirror based on the movement of the corresponding object or, vice versa, predict the movement of the material object based on the movement of its reflection. We used simple movements in the experiments: movements in a straight line at various angles with respect to the mirror. Despite the simplicity of the task, some of the participants made incorrect predictions in a percentage of cases ranging from 0% to 54%, depending on the angle. Asymmetries between the two directions of prediction emerged, in particular in terms of types of error. Results confirmed a cognitive difference between deriving the reflected (virtual) world from the "real" (material) world and vice versa. In particular the expectation that something will be opposite in a mirror is more salient when people imagine how a reflection will be with respect to the material world rather than when they imagine how the material world will be with respect to a reflection.

New reflections on agency and body ownership: The moving rubber hand illusion in the mirror

No previous study has simultaneously examined body ownership and agency in healthy subjects during mirror self-observation. We used a moving rubber hand illusion to examine how both body ownership and agency are affected by seeing (i) the body moving in a mirror, compared with (ii) directly viewing the moving hand, and (iii) seeing a visually identical hand rotated by 180°. We elicited ownership of the hand using direct visual feedback, finding this effect was further enhanced when looking at the hand in a mirror, whereas rotating the hand 180° abolished ownership. Agency was similarly elicited using direct visual feedback, and equally so in the mirror, but again reduced for the 180° hand. We conclude that the reflected body in a mirror is treated as 'special' in the mind, and distinct from other external objects. This enables bodies and actions viewed in a mirror to be directly related to the self.

Processing convexity and concavity along a 2-D contour: figure-ground, structural shape, and attention

Interest in convexity has a long history in vision science. For smooth contours in an image, it is possible to code regions of positive (convex) and negative (concave) curvature, and this provides useful information about solid shape. We review a large body of evidence on the role of this information in perception of shape and in attention. This includes evidence from behavioral, neurophysiological, imaging, and developmental studies. A review is necessary to analyze the evidence on how convexity affects (1) separation between figure and ground, (2) part structure, and (3) attention allocation. Despite some broad agreement on the importance of convexity in these areas, there is a lack of consensus on the interpretation of specific claims--for example, on the contribution of convexity to metric depth and on the automatic directing of attention to convexities or to concavities. The focus is on convexity and concavity along a 2-D contour, not convexity and concavity in 3-D, but the important link between the two is discussed. We conclude that there is good evidence for the role of convexity information in figure-ground organization and in parsing, but other, more specific claims are not (yet) well supported.

Reflections on the hand: the use of a mirror highlights the contributions of interpreted and retinotopic representations in the rubber-hand illusion

In the rubber-hand illusion, observing a rubber hand stroked in synchrony with one's own hand results in mislocalisation of the own hand, which is perceived as being located closer to the rubber hand. This illusion depends on having the rubber hand placed at a plausible egocentric orientation with respect to the observer. In the present study, we took advantage of this finding in order to compare the relative influence on the illusion of the rubber hand's perceived retinotopic image against its real-world position. The rubber hand was positioned egocentrically (fingers away from the participant) or allocentrically (fingers towards the participant), while participants viewed it either directly or via a mirror that was placed facing the participant. In the mirror conditions, the orientation of the retinotopic image of the hand (either egocentric or allocentric) was opposed to its real-world orientation. We found that the illusion was elicited in both mirror conditions, to roughly the same extent. Thus either of two representations can elicit the rubber-hand illusion: a world-centred understanding of the scene, resulting from the inferred position of the hand based on its mirror reflection, or a purely visual retinotopic representation of the viewed hand. In the mirror conditions, the illusion was somewhat weaker than in the typical directly viewed egocentric condition. We attribute this to competition between two incompatible representations introduced by the presence of the mirror. Finally, in two control experiments we ruled out that this reduction was due to two properties of mirror reflections: the increased perceived distance of items and the reversal of the apparent handedness of the rubber hand.

When far is near: ERP correlates of crossmodal spatial interactions between tactile and mirror-reflected visual stimuli

Visuo-tactile integration occurs in a privileged way in peripersonal space, namely when visual and tactile stimuli are in spatial proximity. Here, we investigated whether crossmodal spatial effects (i.e. stronger crossmodal interactions for spatially congruent compared to incongruent visual and tactile stimuli) are also present when visual stimuli presented near the body are indirectly viewed in a mirror, thus appearing in far space. Participants had to attend to one of their hands throughout a block of stimuli in order to detect infrequent tactile target stimuli at that hand while ignoring tactile targets at the unattended hand, all tactile non-target stimuli, and any visual stimuli. Visual stimuli were presented simultaneously with tactile stimuli, in the same (congruent) or opposite (incongruent) hemispace with respect to the tactile stimuli. In one group of participants the visual stimuli were delivered near the participants' hands and were observed as indirect mirror reflections ('mirror' condition), while in the other group these were presented at a distance from the hands ('far' condition). The main finding was that crossmodal spatial modulations of ERPs recorded over and close to somatosensory cortex were present in the 'mirror' condition but not the 'far' condition. That is, ERPs were enhanced in response to tactile stimuli coupled with spatially congruent versus incongruent visual stimuli when the latter were viewed through a mirror. These effects emerged around 190 ms after stimuli onset, and were modulated by the focus of spatial attention. These results provide evidence that visual stimuli observed in far space via a mirror are coded as near-the-body stimuli according to their known rather than to their perceived location. This suggests that crossmodal interactions between vision and touch may be modulated by previous knowledge of reflecting surfaces (i.e. top-down processing).

Naïve predictions of motion and orientation in mirrors: From what we see to what we expect reflections to do

The study aimed to investigate naïve beliefs regarding the dynamic and static behavior of reflections. In the first three experiments, participants in the study made predictions about the correspondence between real and reflected movements or about the orientation of the reflection of a static object placed in front of a mirror. In Experiments 1 and 2, paper-and-pencil tasks were used and in Experiment 3 participants were asked to make their predictions while imagining that they were facing a mirror. Results revealed that a percentage of undergraduates (ranging from 25% to 35%) were unable to make correct predictions. We classified the errors into types and found that responses either conform to the belief that reflections do the same or that they do the opposite. This suggests an oversimplification of the geometry of mirror reflections in two directions: participants either generalize what they see when movements are parallel to the mirror or what they see when movements are orthogonal to the mirror. Findings from Experiment 4 confirmed that these two expectations fit in with what people perceive in mirrors. Findings from Experiment 5 confirmed that this is also in agreement with the relationship perceived when looking at similar movements and orientations "outside" mirrors.

Estimation and representation of head size (people overestimate the size of their head - evidence starting from the 15th century)

The head is a special part of our body since we do not see it directly. Four experiments were conducted to verify what healthy people know about the size of their head. As a control, we used the accuracy in estimating other people's heads (in all the experiments) and the estimation of the size of another part of the body, the hand (in Experiment 4). Results showed that people overestimate their own head size compared to its actual size when visual information is not provided (Experiments 1-4). They also overestimate their head size compared to the heads of others whether viewed directly (Experiment 1) or from memory (Experiment 2). Overestimation with respect to the actual size is reduced when visual information is provided (Experiments 1 and 4) and when proprioception is (presumably) increased by wearing a headband (Experiment 3). Overestimation with respect to actual size is not found for hands (Experiment 4). In the final study evidence emerged of head size overestimation in self-portraits as compared to portraits of others.

The Relationship Perceived between the Real Body and the Mirror Image

We analyse here people's perception of their reflections in mirrors placed in different positions. In two experiments, participants looked at their mirror image, in a third experiment they looked at another person's image. In both cases they were asked to answer a series of questions about how the virtual body appeared relative to the real body, focusing on different aspects. In experiment 1, they were asked to decide whether the reflections were identical, similar, different, or opposite in terms of the global relationship, orientation, and lateralisation (left-right arm). In experiment 2 they were instructed to make simple gestures and to evaluate if the gestures in the reflection were identical, opposite, similar, or different from theirs. Results show that ‘identity’ was preferred when the mirror was in front, and ‘opposition’ was preferred when the mirror was below. When opposition was experienced, it was attributed mainly to the exocentric frame of reference. Egocentric left – right reversal was not a common experience, although it was reported more frequently when the mirror was in front. The different roles of the exocentric and egocentric frames of reference were further tested in experiment 3, in which the condition of an observer looking at another person's reflection was studied. Contrary to the emphasis on the egocentric frame of reference in the literature on the ‘mirror question’, results presented in this paper demonstrate the importance of the exocentric frame of reference in influencing how observers react to their reflections.