1
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Deka A, Eksin C, Ndeffo-Mbah ML. Analyzing the use of non-pharmaceutical personal protective measures through self-interest and social optimum for the control of an emerging disease. Math Biosci 2024; 375:109246. [PMID: 38971368 DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2024.109246] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/19/2024] [Revised: 05/27/2024] [Accepted: 07/01/2024] [Indexed: 07/08/2024]
Abstract
Non-pharmaceutical personal protective (NPP) measures such as face masks use, and hand and respiratory hygiene can be effective measures for mitigating the spread of aerosol/airborne diseases, such as COVID-19, in the absence of vaccination or treatment. However, the usage of such measures is constrained by their inherent perceived cost and effectiveness for reducing transmission risk. To understand the complex interaction of disease dynamics and individuals decision whether to adopt NPP or not, we incorporate evolutionary game theory into an epidemic model such as COVID-19. To compare how self-interested NPP use differs from social optimum, we also investigated optional control from a central planner's perspective. We use Pontryagin's maximum principle to identify the population-level NPP uptake that minimizes disease incidence by incurring the minimum costs. The evolutionary behavior model shows that NPP uptake increases at lower perceived costs of NPP, higher transmission risk, shorter duration of NPP use, higher effectiveness of NPP, and shorter duration of disease-induced immunity. Though social optimum NPP usage is generally more effective in reducing disease incidence than self-interested usage, our analysis identifies conditions under which both strategies get closer. Our model provides new insights for public health in mitigating a disease outbreak through NPP.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aniruddha Deka
- Veterinary Integrative Biosciences, School of Veterinary Medicine, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA; Department of Population Health and Pathobiology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA.
| | - Ceyhun Eksin
- Industrial & Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA
| | - Martial L Ndeffo-Mbah
- Veterinary Integrative Biosciences, School of Veterinary Medicine, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA; Epidemiology & Biostatistics, School of Public Health, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA
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2
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Bera RK, Rana S, Bhattacharya S. Interaction intensity in strategic fitness: A quantifying yardstick of selection optimization for evolutionary game. Math Biosci 2024; 375:109241. [PMID: 38936543 DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2024.109241] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/21/2023] [Revised: 05/22/2024] [Accepted: 06/21/2024] [Indexed: 06/29/2024]
Abstract
The notion of the fitness of a strategy has been assimilated as the reproductive success in the evolutionary game. Initially, this fitness was tied to the game's pay-off and the strategy's relative frequency. However, density dependence becomes exigent in order to make ecologically reliable fitness. However, the contributions of each different type of interaction to the species's overall growth process were surprisingly under-explored. This oversight has occasionally led to either more or less prediction of strategy selection compared to the actual possibility. Moreover, density regulation of the population has always been analysed in a general way compared to strategy selection. In this context, our study introduces the concept of mean relative death payoff, which helps in assessing interaction intensity coefficients and integrates them into strategic fitness. Based on this fitness function, we develop the frequency-density replicator dynamics, which eventually provides distinguishing criteria for directional and balancing selection. Our optimized, evolutionarily stable strategy emerges as a superior alternative to the conventional trade-off between selection forces and ecological processes. More significantly, mean relative death pay-off has both conditional and quantitative roles in getting a stable population size. As a case study, we have extensively analysed the evolution of aggression using the Hawk-Dove game. We have shown that pure Dove selection is always beneficial for species growth rather than pure Hawk selection, and the condition of selection is dependent on external mortality pressure. However, the condition of coexistence is independent of external mortality pressure, representing a strong evolutionary selection that optimizes population density governed by interaction intensity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ritesh Kumar Bera
- Agricultural and Ecological Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203, BT Road, Kolkata, 700108, West Bengal, India.
| | - Sourav Rana
- Department of Statistics, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, 700035, West Bengal, India.
| | - Sabyasachi Bhattacharya
- Agricultural and Ecological Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203, BT Road, Kolkata, 700108, West Bengal, India.
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3
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Wang G, Su Q, Wang L, Plotkin JB. The evolution of social behaviors and risk preferences in settings with uncertainty. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2024; 121:e2406993121. [PMID: 39018189 PMCID: PMC11287271 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2406993121] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/08/2024] [Accepted: 06/13/2024] [Indexed: 07/19/2024] Open
Abstract
Humans update their social behavior in response to past experiences and changing environments. Behavioral decisions are further complicated by uncertainty in the outcome of social interactions. Faced with uncertainty, some individuals exhibit risk aversion while others seek risk. Attitudes toward risk may depend on socioeconomic status; and individuals may update their risk preferences over time, which will feedback on their social behavior. Here, we study how uncertainty and risk preferences shape the evolution of social behaviors. We extend the game-theoretic framework for behavioral evolution to incorporate uncertainty about payoffs and variation in how individuals respond to this uncertainty. We find that different attitudes toward risk can substantially alter behavior and long-term outcomes, as individuals seek to optimize their rewards from social interactions. In a standard setting without risk, for example, defection always overtakes a well-mixed population engaged in the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, whereas risk aversion can reverse the direction of evolution, promoting cooperation over defection. When individuals update their risk preferences along with their strategic behaviors, a population can oscillate between periods dominated by risk-averse cooperators and periods of risk-seeking defectors. Our analysis provides a systematic account of how risk preferences modulate, and even coevolve with, behavior in an uncertain social world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Guocheng Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing100871, China
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
| | - Qi Su
- Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai200240, China
- Ministry of Education of China, Key Laboratory of System Control and Information Processing, Shanghai200240, China
- Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Control and Management, Shanghai200240, China
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing100871, China
- Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing100871, China
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19014
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4
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Betz K, Fu F, Masuda N. Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Environmental Feedback in a Network with Two Communities. Bull Math Biol 2024; 86:84. [PMID: 38847946 PMCID: PMC11161456 DOI: 10.1007/s11538-024-01310-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/26/2024] [Accepted: 05/08/2024] [Indexed: 06/10/2024]
Abstract
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying population dynamics in various manners. We propose and analyze an eco-evolutionary game dynamics model on a network with two communities such that players interact with other players in the same community and those in the opposite community at different rates. In our model, we consider two-person matrix games with pairwise interactions occurring on individual edges and assume that the environmental state depends on edges rather than on nodes or being globally shared in the population. We analytically determine the equilibria and their stability under a symmetric population structure assumption, and we also numerically study the replicator dynamics of the general model. The model shows rich dynamical behavior, such as multiple transcritical bifurcations, multistability, and anti-synchronous oscillations. Our work offers insights into understanding how the presence of community structure impacts the eco-evolutionary dynamics within and between niches.
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Affiliation(s)
- Katherine Betz
- Department of Mathematics, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, 14260-2900, USA
| | - Feng Fu
- Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 03755, USA
- Department of Biomedical Data Science, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth, Lebanon, NH, 03755, USA
| | - Naoki Masuda
- Department of Mathematics, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, 14260-2900, USA.
- Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Data Science, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, 14260-2900, USA.
- Center for Computational Social Science, Kobe University, Kobe, 657-8501, Japan.
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5
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Wang L, Liu Y, Guo R, Zhang L, Liu L, Hua S. The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics. Proc Biol Sci 2024; 291:20240182. [PMID: 38864335 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2024.0182] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/30/2024] [Accepted: 03/28/2024] [Indexed: 06/13/2024] Open
Abstract
In contemporary society, the effective utilization of public resources remains a subject of significant concern. A common issue arises from defectors seeking to obtain an excessive share of these resources for personal gain, potentially leading to resource depletion. To mitigate this tragedy and ensure sustainable development of resources, implementing mechanisms to either reward those who adhere to distribution rules or penalize those who do not, appears advantageous. We introduce two models: a tax-reward model and a tax-punishment model, to address this issue. Our analysis reveals that in the tax-reward model, the evolutionary trajectory of the system is influenced not only by the tax revenue collected but also by the natural growth rate of the resources. Conversely, the tax-punishment model exhibits distinct characteristics when compared with the tax-reward model, notably the potential for bistability. In such scenarios, the selection of initial conditions is critical, as it can determine the system's path. Furthermore, our study identifies instances where the system lacks stable points, exemplified by a limit cycle phenomenon, underscoring the complexity and dynamism inherent in managing public resources using these models.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lichen Wang
- College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, People's Republic of China
| | - Yuyuan Liu
- College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, People's Republic of China
| | - Ruqiang Guo
- College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, People's Republic of China
| | - Liang Zhang
- College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, People's Republic of China
| | - Linjie Liu
- College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, People's Republic of China
- College of Economics and Management, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, People's Republic of China
| | - Shijia Hua
- College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, People's Republic of China
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6
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Nabi KN, Kabir KMA. Modelling the dynamic vaccination game with evolutionary feedback: exploring pairwise interactions and vaccine strategies. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2024; 11:rsos.240460. [PMID: 39100173 PMCID: PMC11295992 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.240460] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2023] [Revised: 04/24/2024] [Accepted: 05/13/2024] [Indexed: 08/06/2024]
Abstract
A novel approach rooted in co-evolutionary game theory has been introduced to investigate how the interaction between human decision-making and the dynamics of the epidemic environment can shape vaccine acceptance during disease outbreaks. This innovative framework combines two key game concepts: the cooperation-defection game and the cost-benefit vaccination game. By doing so, it enables us to delve into the various factors that influence the success of a vaccination campaign amid an outbreak. Within this framework, individuals engage in a thorough evaluation of the risks, benefits and incentives associated with either cooperating by getting vaccinated or defecting by refusing the vaccine. Additionally, it involves a careful analysis of the costs and benefits linked to vaccine acceptance. The outcomes of this study stress the importance of two main factors: the effectiveness of the vaccine and the prevalence of a cooperative culture within society. This insight into the strategic interactions between individuals and their decisions about vaccination holds significant implications for public health policymakers. It equips to boost vaccination coverage and address vaccine hesitancy within society ultimately contributing to better public health outcomes during epidemic outbreaks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Khondoker Nazmoon Nabi
- Department of Mathematics, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, Dhaka1000, Bangladesh
| | - K. M. Ariful Kabir
- Department of Mathematics, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, Dhaka1000, Bangladesh
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7
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Cheng H, Sysoeva L, Wang H, Yuan H, Zhang T, Meng X. Evolution of Cooperation in Spatio-Temporal Evolutionary Games with Public Goods Feedback. Bull Math Biol 2024; 86:67. [PMID: 38700758 DOI: 10.1007/s11538-024-01296-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/24/2024] [Accepted: 04/08/2024] [Indexed: 05/23/2024]
Abstract
In biology, evolutionary game-theoretical models often arise in which players' strategies impact the state of the environment, driving feedback between strategy and the surroundings. In this case, cooperative interactions can be applied to studying ecological systems, animal or microorganism populations, and cells producing or actively extracting a growth resource from their environment. We consider the framework of eco-evolutionary game theory with replicator dynamics and growth-limiting public goods extracted by population members from some external source. It is known that the two sub-populations of cooperators and defectors can develop spatio-temporal patterns that enable long-term coexistence in the shared environment. To investigate this phenomenon and unveil the mechanisms that sustain cooperation, we analyze two eco-evolutionary models: a well-mixed environment and a heterogeneous model with spatial diffusion. In the latter, we integrate spatial diffusion into replicator dynamics. Our findings reveal rich strategy dynamics, including bistability and bifurcations, in the temporal system and spatial stability, as well as Turing instability, Turing-Hopf bifurcations, and chaos in the diffusion system. The results indicate that effective mechanisms to promote cooperation include increasing the player density, decreasing the relative timescale, controlling the density of initial cooperators, improving the diffusion rate of the public goods, lowering the diffusion rate of the cooperators, and enhancing the payoffs to the cooperators. We provide the conditions for the existence, stability, and occurrence of bifurcations in both systems. Our analysis can be applied to dynamic phenomena in fields as diverse as human decision-making, microorganism growth factors secretion, and group hunting.
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Affiliation(s)
- Haihui Cheng
- College of Mathematics and Systems Science, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, People's Republic of China
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, T6G 2G1, Canada
| | - Liubov Sysoeva
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, T6G 2G1, Canada
| | - Hao Wang
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, T6G 2G1, Canada
| | - Hairui Yuan
- College of Mathematics and Systems Science, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, People's Republic of China
| | - Tonghua Zhang
- Department of Mathematics, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, VIC, 3122, Australia
| | - Xinzhu Meng
- College of Mathematics and Systems Science, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, People's Republic of China.
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8
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Du C, Lu Y, Zhang Y, Shen C, Shi L, Guo H. Replicator-mutator dynamics with evolutionary public goods game-environmental feedbacks. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2024; 34:043114. [PMID: 38572947 DOI: 10.1063/5.0200761] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/29/2024] [Accepted: 03/08/2024] [Indexed: 04/05/2024]
Abstract
Feedback loops between strategies and the environment are commonly observed in socio-ecological, evolution-ecological, and psychology-economic systems. However, the impact of mutations in these feedback processes is often overlooked. This study proposes a novel model that integrates the public goods game with environmental feedback, considering the presence of mutations. In our model, the enhancement factor of the public goods game combines positive and negative incentives from the environment. By employing replicator-mutator (RM) equations, we provide an objective understanding of the system's evolutionary state, focusing on identifying conditions that foster cooperation and prevent the tragedy of the commons. Specifically, mutations play a crucial role in the RM dynamics, leading to the emergence of an oscillatory tragedy of the commons. By verifying the Hopf bifurcation condition, we establish the existence of a stable limit cycle, providing valuable insights into sustained oscillation strategies. Moreover, the feedback mechanism inherent in the public goods game model offers a fresh perspective on effectively addressing the classic dilemma of the tragedy of the commons.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chunpeng Du
- School of Mathematics, Kunming University, Kunming, Yunnan 650214, China
| | - Yikang Lu
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan 650221, China
| | - Yali Zhang
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan 650221, China
| | - Chen Shen
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan 650221, China
- Interdisciplinary Research Institute of Data Science, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201209, China
| | - Hao Guo
- Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
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9
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Han JX, Wang RW. Effects of environmental feedback on species with finite population. iScience 2024; 27:109055. [PMID: 38375231 PMCID: PMC10875565 DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2024.109055] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/30/2023] [Revised: 12/15/2023] [Accepted: 01/24/2024] [Indexed: 02/21/2024] Open
Abstract
In an unchanging environment, natural selection always selects species with high fitness. In this study, we build a co-evolutionary system to study the interaction between stochasticity in finite populations and environmental feedback. Positive feedback between species and environment is detrimental to the invasion success, whereas negative feedback is beneficial to invasion since feedback makes population size important enough to revise natural selection's preference. In competition scenario, positive and negative feedback will benefit the initially inferior species. When selection intensity is high, negative feedback may even cause natural selection to favor the initially inferior species. All of these effects are caused by feedback that allows the initially inferior species to have greater fitness than the initially dominant species. Our results emphasize that the effects of stochasticity in evolutionary path can be reinforced by feedback with environment and then reverse the preference of natural selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jia-Xu Han
- School of Ecology and Environment, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, P.R. China
- Zoology Department and Biodiversity Research Centre, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
| | - Rui-Wu Wang
- School of Ecology and Environment, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, P.R. China
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10
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Shen C, He Z, Shi L, Wang Z, Tanimoto J. Prosocial punishment bots breed social punishment in human players. J R Soc Interface 2024; 21:20240019. [PMID: 38471533 PMCID: PMC10932715 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2024.0019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2024] [Accepted: 02/14/2024] [Indexed: 03/14/2024] Open
Abstract
Prosocial punishment, an important factor to stabilize cooperation in social dilemma games, often faces challenges like second-order free-riders-who cooperate but avoid punishing to save costs-and antisocial punishers, who defect and retaliate against cooperators. Addressing these challenges, our study introduces prosocial punishment bots that consistently cooperate and punish free-riders. Our findings reveal that these bots significantly promote the emergence of prosocial punishment among normal players due to their 'sticky effect'-an unwavering commitment to cooperation and punishment that magnetically attracts their opponents to emulate this strategy. Additionally, we observe that the prevalence of prosocial punishment is greatly enhanced when normal players exhibit a tendency to follow a 'copying the majority' strategy, or when bots are strategically placed in high-degree nodes within scale-free networks. Conversely, bots designed for defection or antisocial punishment diminish overall cooperation levels. This stark contrast underscores the critical role of strategic bot design in enhancing cooperative behaviours in human/AI interactions. Our findings open new avenues in evolutionary game theory, demonstrating the potential of human-machine collaboration in solving the conundrum of punishment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chen Shen
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
| | - Zhixue He
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People’s Republic of China
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People’s Republic of China
| | - Zhen Wang
- Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL), Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of China
- School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, People’s Republic of China
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 816-8580, Japan
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11
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Sohel Mondal S, Ray A, Chakraborty S. Hypochaos prevents tragedy of the commons in discrete-time eco-evolutionary game dynamics. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2024; 34:023122. [PMID: 38377296 DOI: 10.1063/5.0190800] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/08/2023] [Accepted: 01/22/2024] [Indexed: 02/22/2024]
Abstract
While quite a few recent papers have explored game-resource feedback using the framework of evolutionary game theory, almost all the studies are confined to using time-continuous dynamical equations. Moreover, in such literature, the effect of ubiquitous chaos in the resulting eco-evolutionary dynamics is rather missing. Here, we present a deterministic eco-evolutionary discrete-time dynamics in generation-wise non-overlapping population of two types of harvesters-one harvesting at a faster rate than the other-consuming a self-renewing resource capable of showing chaotic dynamics. In the light of our finding that sometimes chaos is confined exclusively to either the dynamics of the resource or that of the consumer fractions, an interesting scenario is realized: The resource state can keep oscillating chaotically, and hence, it does not vanish to result in the tragedy of the commons-extinction of the resource due to selfish indiscriminate exploitation-and yet the consumer population, whose dynamics depends directly on the state of the resource, may end up being composed exclusively of defectors, i.e., high harvesters. This appears non-intuitive because it is well known that prevention of tragedy of the commons usually requires substantial cooperation to be present.
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Affiliation(s)
- Samrat Sohel Mondal
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
| | - Avishuman Ray
- Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA
| | - Sagar Chakraborty
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
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12
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Salles LFP, de Aguiar MAM, Marquitti FMD. Evolution of cooperation in a two-species system with a common resource pool. J Theor Biol 2024; 577:111670. [PMID: 37981098 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2023.111670] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/19/2023] [Revised: 10/27/2023] [Accepted: 11/08/2023] [Indexed: 11/21/2023]
Abstract
Understanding the evolution of cooperation is a major question in Evolutionary Biology. Here, we extend a previously proposed mathematical model in Evolutionary Game Theory that investigated how resource use by a single species composed of cooperators and defectors may lead to its maintenance or extinction. We include another species in the model, so as to investigate how different intra and interspecific interactions of cooperative or competitive nature among individuals that share the same essential resource may drive the survival and evolution of the species. Several outcomes emerge from the model, depending on the configuration of the payoff matrix, the individual contribution to the resource pool, the competition intensity between species, and the initial conditions of the system dynamics. Observed results include scenarios in which species thrive due to the action of cooperators, but also scenarios in which both species collapse due to lack of cooperation and, consequently, of resources. In particular, a high initial availability of resources may be the determinant factor to the survival of both species. Interestingly, cooperation may be more favored when individuals have less incentive to cooperate with others, and the survival of their populations may depend crucially on their competitive capacities.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Flavia Maria Darcie Marquitti
- Instituto de Física Gleb Wataghin, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, Brazil; Instituto de Biologia, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, Brazil.
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13
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Das Bairagya J, Chakraborty S. Hostility prevents the tragedy of the commons in metapopulation with asymmetric migration: A lesson from queenless ants. Phys Rev E 2023; 108:064401. [PMID: 38243478 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.108.064401] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2023] [Accepted: 11/08/2023] [Indexed: 01/21/2024]
Abstract
A colony of the queenless ant species, Pristomyrmex punctatus, can broadly be seen as consisting of small-body sized worker ants and relatively larger body-sized cheater ants. Hence, in the presence of intercolony migration, a set of constituent colonies act as a metapopulation exclusively composed of cooperators and defectors. Such a setup facilitates an evolutionary game-theoretic replication-selection model of population dynamics of the ants in a metapopulation. Using the model, we analytically probe the effects of territoriality induced hostility. Such hostility in the ant metapopulation proves to be crucial in preventing the tragedy of the commons, specifically, the workforce, a social good formed by cooperation. This mechanism applies to any metapopulation-not necessarily the ants-composed of cooperators and defectors where interpopulation migration occurs asymmetrically, i.e., cooperators and defectors migrate at different rates. Furthermore, our model validates that there is evolutionary benefit behind the queenless ants' behavior of showing more hostility towards the immigrants from nearby colonies than those from the far-off ones. In order to calibrate our model's parameters, we have extensively used the data available on the queenless ant species, P. punctatus.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joy Das Bairagya
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
| | - Sagar Chakraborty
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
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14
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Zhao C, Zhu Y. Heterogeneous decision-making dynamics of threshold-switching agents on complex networks. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2023; 33:123133. [PMID: 38149990 DOI: 10.1063/5.0172442] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2023] [Accepted: 11/21/2023] [Indexed: 12/28/2023]
Abstract
In the classical two-player decision-making scenario, individuals may have different tendencies to take a certain action, given that there exists a sufficient number of neighbors adopting a particular option. This is ubiquitous in many real-life contexts including traffic congestion, crowd evacuation, and minimal vertex cover problem. Under best-response dynamics, we investigate the decision-making behaviors of heterogeneous agents on complex networks. Results of the networked games are twofold: for networks of uniform degree distribution (e.g., the lattice) and fraction of the strategy is of a linear function of the threshold setting. Moreover, the equilibrium analysis is provided and the relationship between the equilibrium dynamics and the change of the threshold value is given quantitatively. Next, if the games are played on networks with non-uniform degree distribution (e.g., random regular and scale-free networks), influence of the threshold-switching will be weakened. Robust experiments indicate that it is not the value of the average degree, but the degree distribution that influences how the strategy evolves affected by the threshold settings. Our result shows that the decision-making behaviors can be effectively manipulated by tuning the parameters in the utility function (i.e., thresholds) of some agents for more regular network structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chengli Zhao
- College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
| | - Yuying Zhu
- School of Artificial Intelligence, Tiangong University, Tianjin 300387, China
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15
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Liu DM, Wu ZX, Guan JY. Intercellular competitive growth dynamics with microenvironmental feedback. Phys Rev E 2023; 108:054105. [PMID: 38115538 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.108.054105] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/09/2023] [Accepted: 10/11/2023] [Indexed: 12/21/2023]
Abstract
Normal life activities between cells rely crucially on the homeostasis of the cellular microenvironment, but aging and cancer will upset this balance. In this paper we introduce the microenvironmental feedback mechanism to the growth dynamics of multicellular organisms, which changes the cellular competitive ability and thereby regulates the growth of multicellular organisms. We show that the presence of microenvironmental feedback can effectively delay aging, but cancer cells may grow uncontrollably due to the emergence of the tumor microenvironment (TME). We study the effect of the fraction of cancer cells relative to that of senescent cells on the feedback rate of the microenvironment on the lifespan of multicellular organisms and find that the average lifespan shortened is close to the data for non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in Canada from 1980 to 2015. We also investigate how the competitive ability of cancer cells affects the lifespan of multicellular organisms and reveal that there is an optimal value of the competitive ability of cancer cells allowing the organism to survive longest. Interestingly, the proposed microenvironmental feedback mechanism can give rise to the phenomenon of Parrondo's paradox: When the competitive ability of cancer cells switches between a too-high and a too-low value, multicellular organisms are able to live longer than in each case individually. Our results may provide helpful clues for targeted therapies aimed at the TME.
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Affiliation(s)
- De-Ming Liu
- Lanzhou Center for Theoretical Physics, Key Laboratory of Theoretical Physics of Gansu Province, and Key Laboratory of Quantum Theory and Applications of MoE, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China and Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China
| | - Zhi-Xi Wu
- Lanzhou Center for Theoretical Physics, Key Laboratory of Theoretical Physics of Gansu Province, and Key Laboratory of Quantum Theory and Applications of MoE, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China and Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China
| | - Jian-Yue Guan
- Lanzhou Center for Theoretical Physics, Key Laboratory of Theoretical Physics of Gansu Province, and Key Laboratory of Quantum Theory and Applications of MoE, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China and Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China
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16
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Sarkar S. Managing ecological thresholds of a risky commons. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:230969. [PMID: 37859831 PMCID: PMC10582602 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.230969] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/11/2023] [Accepted: 09/18/2023] [Indexed: 10/21/2023]
Abstract
Common resources are often overexploited and appear subject to critical transitions from one stable state to another antagonistic state. Many times resulting in tragedy of the commons (TOC)-exploitation of shared resources for personal gain/payoffs, leading to worse outcomes or extinction. An adequate response would be strategic interaction, such as inspection and punishment by institutions to avoid TOC. This strategic interaction is often coupled with dynamically changing common resources. However, effect of strategic interaction in complex, coupled socio-ecological systems is less studied. Here, we develop replicator equations using evolving games in which strategy and common resources co-evolve. We consider the shared commons as fish dynamics governed by the intrinsic growth rate, predation and harvesting. The joint dynamics exhibit an oscillatory TOC, revealing that institutions need to pay special attention to intrinsic growth rate and nonlinear interaction. Our research shows that the co-evolving system exhibits a broader range of dynamics when predation is present compared to the disengaged fishery system. We conclude that the usefulness, chances and challenges of modelling co-evolutionary games to create sustainable systems merit further research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sukanta Sarkar
- Odum School of Ecology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, USA
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17
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Shao J, Rong N, Wu Z, Gu S, Liu B, Shen N, Li Z. Siderophore-mediated iron partition promotes dynamical coexistence between cooperators and cheaters. iScience 2023; 26:107396. [PMID: 37701813 PMCID: PMC10494312 DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.107396] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/09/2023] [Revised: 04/26/2023] [Accepted: 07/11/2023] [Indexed: 09/14/2023] Open
Abstract
Microbes shape their habitats by consuming resources and producing a diverse array of chemicals that can serve as public goods. Despite the risk of exploitation by cheaters, genes encoding sharable molecules like siderophores are widely found in nature, prompting investigations into the mechanisms that allow producers to resist invasion by cheaters. In this work, we presented the chemostat-typed "resource partition model" to demonstrate that dividing the iron resource between private and public siderophores can promote stable or dynamic coexistence between producers and cheaters in a well-mixed environment. Moreover, our analysis shows that when microbes not only consume but also produce resources, chemical innovation leads to stability criteria that differ from those of classical consumer resource models, resulting in more complex dynamics. Our work sheds light on the role of chemical innovations in microbial communities and the potential for resource partition to facilitate dynamical coexistence between cooperative and cheating organisms.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jiqi Shao
- Center for Quantitative Biology, Academy for Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Nan Rong
- Center for Quantitative Biology, Academy for Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Zhenchao Wu
- Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Peking University Third Hospital, Beijing 100191, China
| | - Shaohua Gu
- Center for Quantitative Biology, Academy for Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
- Peking-Tsinghua Center for Life Sciences, Academy for Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Beibei Liu
- Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Peking University Third Hospital, Beijing 100191, China
| | - Ning Shen
- Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Peking University Third Hospital, Beijing 100191, China
| | - Zhiyuan Li
- Center for Quantitative Biology, Academy for Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
- Peking-Tsinghua Center for Life Sciences, Academy for Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
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18
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Ecotière C, Billiard S, André JB, Collet P, Ferrière R, Méléard S. Human-environment feedback and the consistency of proenvironmental behavior. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011429. [PMID: 37721943 PMCID: PMC10538744 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011429] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/12/2022] [Revised: 09/28/2023] [Accepted: 08/13/2023] [Indexed: 09/20/2023] Open
Abstract
Addressing global environmental crises such as anthropogenic climate change requires the consistent adoption of proenvironmental behavior by a large part of a population. Here, we develop a mathematical model of a simple behavior-environment feedback loop to ask how the individual assessment of the environmental state combines with social interactions to influence the consistent adoption of proenvironmental behavior, and how this feeds back to the perceived environmental state. In this stochastic individual-based model, individuals can switch between two behaviors, 'active' (or actively proenvironmental) and 'baseline', differing in their perceived cost (higher for the active behavior) and environmental impact (lower for the active behavior). We show that the deterministic dynamics and the stochastic fluctuations of the system can be approximated by ordinary differential equations and a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type process. By definition, the proenvironmental behavior is adopted consistently when, at population stationary state, its frequency is high and random fluctuations in frequency are small. We find that the combination of social and environmental feedbacks can promote the spread of costly proenvironmental behavior when neither, operating in isolation, would. To be adopted consistently, strong social pressure for proenvironmental action is necessary but not sufficient-social interactions must occur on a faster timescale compared to individual assessment, and the difference in environmental impact must be small. This simple model suggests a scenario to achieve large reductions in environmental impact, which involves incrementally more active and potentially more costly behavior being consistently adopted under increasing social pressure for proenvironmentalism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Claire Ecotière
- Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées, CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, IP Paris, Palaiseau, France
| | | | - Jean-Baptiste André
- Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, ENS, EHESS, PSL Research University, CNRS, Paris France
| | - Pierre Collet
- CPHT, CNRS, Ecole polytechnique, IP Paris, Palaiseau, France
| | - Régis Ferrière
- Institut de Biologie (IBENS), ENS-PSL, CNRS, INSERM, Paris, France
- Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
- iGLOBES International Research Laboratory, CNRS, ENS-PSL, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
| | - Sylvie Méléard
- Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées, CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, IP Paris, Palaiseau, France
- Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France
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19
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Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nat Commun 2023; 14:4153. [PMID: 37438341 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/04/2022] [Accepted: 06/22/2023] [Indexed: 07/14/2023] Open
Abstract
Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Christian Hilbe
- Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| | - Štěpán Šimsa
- IST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria
- Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
| | | | - Martin A Nowak
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
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20
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Jiang Y, Wang X, Liu L, Wei M, Zhao J, Zheng Z, Tang S. Nonlinear eco-evolutionary games with global environmental fluctuations and local environmental feedbacks. PLoS Comput Biol 2023; 19:e1011269. [PMID: 37379330 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011269] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2022] [Accepted: 06/13/2023] [Indexed: 06/30/2023] Open
Abstract
Environmental changes play a critical role in determining the evolution of social dilemmas in many natural or social systems. Generally, the environmental changes include two prominent aspects: the global time-dependent fluctuations and the local strategy-dependent feedbacks. However, the impacts of these two types of environmental changes have only been studied separately, a complete picture of the environmental effects exerted by the combination of these two aspects remains unclear. Here we develop a theoretical framework that integrates group strategic behaviors with their general dynamic environments, where the global environmental fluctuations are associated with a nonlinear factor in public goods game and the local environmental feedbacks are described by the 'eco-evolutionary game'. We show how the coupled dynamics of local game-environment evolution differ in static and dynamic global environments. In particular, we find the emergence of cyclic evolution of group cooperation and local environment, which forms an interior irregular loop in the phase plane, depending on the relative changing speed of both global and local environments compared to the strategic change. Further, we observe that this cyclic evolution disappears and transforms into an interior stable equilibrium when the global environment is frequency-dependent. Our results provide important insights into how diverse evolutionary outcomes could emerge from the nonlinear interactions between strategies and the changing environments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yishen Jiang
- School of Mathematical Sciences, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Key laboratory of Mathematics, Informatics and Behavioral Semantics (LMIB), Beihang University, Beijing, China
| | - Xin Wang
- Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Key laboratory of Mathematics, Informatics and Behavioral Semantics (LMIB), Beihang University, Beijing, China
- State Key Lab of Software Development Environment (NLSDE), Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, P.R.China
- Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Future Blockchain and Privacy Computing, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- PengCheng Laboratory, Shenzhen, China
| | - Longzhao Liu
- Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Key laboratory of Mathematics, Informatics and Behavioral Semantics (LMIB), Beihang University, Beijing, China
- State Key Lab of Software Development Environment (NLSDE), Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, P.R.China
- Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Future Blockchain and Privacy Computing, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- PengCheng Laboratory, Shenzhen, China
| | - Ming Wei
- School of Mathematical Sciences, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Key laboratory of Mathematics, Informatics and Behavioral Semantics (LMIB), Beihang University, Beijing, China
| | - Jingwu Zhao
- School of Law, Beihang University, Beijing, China
| | - Zhiming Zheng
- Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Key laboratory of Mathematics, Informatics and Behavioral Semantics (LMIB), Beihang University, Beijing, China
- State Key Lab of Software Development Environment (NLSDE), Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, P.R.China
- Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Future Blockchain and Privacy Computing, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- PengCheng Laboratory, Shenzhen, China
- Institute of Medical Artificial Intelligence, Binzhou Medical University, Yantai, China
- School of Mathematical Sciences, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
| | - Shaoting Tang
- Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Key laboratory of Mathematics, Informatics and Behavioral Semantics (LMIB), Beihang University, Beijing, China
- State Key Lab of Software Development Environment (NLSDE), Beihang University, Beijing, China
- Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, P.R.China
- Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Future Blockchain and Privacy Computing, Beihang University, Beijing, China
- PengCheng Laboratory, Shenzhen, China
- Institute of Medical Artificial Intelligence, Binzhou Medical University, Yantai, China
- School of Mathematical Sciences, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China
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21
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Chen X, Fu F. Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation. PNAS NEXUS 2023; 2:pgad176. [PMID: 37287707 PMCID: PMC10244001 DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad176] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/20/2022] [Revised: 05/14/2023] [Accepted: 05/16/2023] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Recent theory shows that extortioners taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can unilaterally claim an unfair share of the payoffs in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is thus suggested that against a fixed extortioner, any adapting coplayer should be subdued with full cooperation as their best response. In contrast, recent experiments demonstrate that human players often choose not to accede to extortion out of concern for fairness, actually causing extortioners to suffer more loss than themselves. In light of this, here we reveal fair-minded strategies that are unbending to extortion such that any payoff-maximizing extortioner ultimately will concede in their own interest by offering a fair split in head-to-head matches. We find and characterize multiple general classes of such unbending strategies, including generous ZD strategies and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) as particular examples. When against fixed unbending players, extortioners are forced with consequentially increasing losses whenever intending to demand a more unfair share. Our analysis also pivots to the importance of payoff structure in determining the superiority of ZD strategies and in particular their extortion ability. We show that an extortionate ZD player can be even outperformed by, for example, WSLS, if the total payoff of unilateral cooperation is smaller than that of mutual defection. Unbending strategies can be used to outlearn evolutionary extortioners and catalyze the evolution of Tit-for-Tat-like strategies out of ZD players. Our work has implications for promoting fairness and resisting extortion so as to uphold a just and cooperative society.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xingru Chen
- School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
- Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, 03755 NH, USA
| | - Feng Fu
- Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, 03755 NH, USA
- Department of Biomedical Data Science, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth, Lebanon, 03756 NH, USA
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22
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Liu L, Chen X, Szolnoki A. Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game. eLife 2023; 12:82954. [PMID: 37204305 DOI: 10.7554/elife.82954] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2022] [Accepted: 04/26/2023] [Indexed: 05/20/2023] Open
Abstract
Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals' behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.
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Affiliation(s)
- Linjie Liu
- College of Science, Northwest A & F University, Yangling, China
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Budapest, Hungary
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23
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Wang G, Su Q, Wang L, Plotkin JB. Reproductive variance can drive behavioral dynamics. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2216218120. [PMID: 36927152 PMCID: PMC10041125 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2216218120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2022] [Accepted: 02/10/2023] [Indexed: 03/18/2023] Open
Abstract
The concept of fitness is central to evolution, but it quantifies only the expected number of offspring an individual will produce. The actual number of offspring is also subject to demographic stochasticity-that is, randomness associated with birth and death processes. In nature, individuals who are more fecund tend to have greater variance in their offspring number. Here, we develop a model for the evolution of two types competing in a population of nonconstant size. The fitness of each type is determined by pairwise interactions in a prisoner's dilemma game, and the variance in offspring number depends upon its mean. Although defectors are preferred by natural selection in classical population models, since they always have greater fitness than cooperators, we show that sufficiently large offspring variance can reverse the direction of evolution and favor cooperation. Large offspring variance produces qualitatively new dynamics for other types of social interactions, as well, which cannot arise in populations with a fixed size or with a Poisson offspring distribution.
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Affiliation(s)
- Guocheng Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing100871, China
| | - Qi Su
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing100871, China
- Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing100871, China
| | - Joshua B. Plotkin
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104
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24
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Gros C. Generic catastrophic poverty when selfish investors exploit a degradable common resource. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2023; 10:221234. [PMID: 36778955 PMCID: PMC9905983 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.221234] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2022] [Accepted: 01/17/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
The productivity of a common pool of resources may degrade when overly exploited by a number of selfish investors, a situation known as the tragedy of the commons. Without regulations, agents optimize the size of their individual investments into the commons by balancing incurring costs with the returns received. The resulting Nash equilibrium involves a self-consistency loop between individual investment decisions and the state of the commons. As a consequence, several non-trivial properties emerge. For N investing actors we prove rigorously that typical payoffs do not scale as 1/N, the expected result for cooperating agents, but as (1/N)2. Payoffs are hence reduced with regard to the functional dependence on N, a situation denoted catastrophic poverty. We show that catastrophic poverty results from a fine-tuned balance between returns and costs. Additionally, a finite number of oligarchs may be present. Oligarchs are characterized by payoffs that are finite and not decreasing when N increases. Our results hold for generic classes of models, including convex and moderately concave cost functions. For strongly concave cost functions the Nash equilibrium undergoes a collective reorganization, being characterized instead by entry barriers and sudden death forced market exits.
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Affiliation(s)
- Claudius Gros
- Institute for Theoretical Physics, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany
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25
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Kleshnina M, McKerral JC, González-Tokman C, Filar JA, Mitchell JG. Shifts in evolutionary balance of phenotypes under environmental changes. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2022; 9:220744. [PMID: 36340514 PMCID: PMC9627443 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.220744] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/07/2022] [Accepted: 10/11/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
Environments shape communities by driving individual interactions and the evolutionary outcome of competition. In static, homogeneous environments a robust, evolutionary stable, outcome is sometimes reachable. However, inherently stochastic, this evolutionary process need not stabilize, resulting in a dynamic ecological state, often observed in microbial communities. We use evolutionary games to study the evolution of phenotypic competition in dynamic environments. Under the assumption that phenotypic expression depends on the environmental shifts, existing periodic relationships may break or result in formation of new periodicity in phenotypic interactions. The exact outcome depends on the environmental shift itself, indicating the importance of understanding how environments influence affected systems. Under periodic environmental fluctuations, a stable state preserving dominant phenotypes may exist. However, rapid environmental shifts can lead to critical shifts in the phenotypic evolutionary balance. This might lead to environmentally favoured phenotypes dominating making the system vulnerable. We suggest that understanding of the robustness of the system's current state is necessary to anticipate when it will shift to a new equilibrium via understanding what level of perturbations the system can take before its equilibrium changes. Our results provide insights in how microbial communities can be steered to states where they are dominated by desired phenotypes.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Jody C. McKerral
- College of Science and Engineering, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia
| | | | - Jerzy A. Filar
- School of Mathematics and Physics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
| | - James G. Mitchell
- College of Science and Engineering, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia
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26
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Salahshour M. Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation. PLoS Comput Biol 2022; 18:e1010429. [PMID: 36173936 PMCID: PMC9521931 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010429] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2021] [Accepted: 07/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
In many biological populations, such as human groups, individuals face a complex strategic setting, where they need to make strategic decisions over a diverse set of issues and their behavior in one strategic context can affect their decisions in another. This raises the question of how the interaction between different strategic contexts affects individuals’ strategic choices and social norms? To address this question, I introduce a framework where individuals play two games with different structures and decide upon their strategy in a second game based on their knowledge of their opponent’s strategy in the first game. I consider both multistage games, where the same opponents play the two games consecutively, and reputation-based model, where individuals play their two games with different opponents but receive information about their opponent’s strategy. By considering a case where the first game is a social dilemma, I show that when the second game is a coordination or anti-coordination game, the Nash equilibrium of the coupled game can be decomposed into two classes, a defective equilibrium which is composed of two simple equilibrium of the two games, and a cooperative equilibrium, in which coupling between the two games emerge and sustain cooperation in the social dilemma. For the existence of the cooperative equilibrium, the cost of cooperation should be smaller than a value determined by the structure of the second game. Investigation of the evolutionary dynamics shows that a cooperative fixed point exists when the second game belongs to coordination or anti-coordination class in a mixed population. However, the basin of attraction of the cooperative fixed point is much smaller for the coordination class, and this fixed point disappears in a structured population. When the second game belongs to the anti-coordination class, the system possesses a spontaneous symmetry-breaking phase transition above which the symmetry between cooperation and defection breaks. A set of cooperation supporting moral norms emerges according to which cooperation stands out as a valuable trait. Notably, the moral system also brings a more efficient allocation of resources in the second game. This observation suggests a moral system has two different roles: Promotion of cooperation, which is against individuals’ self-interest but beneficial for the population, and promotion of organization and order, which is at both the population’s and the individual’s self-interest. Interestingly, the latter acts like a Trojan horse: Once established out of individuals’ self-interest, it brings the former with itself. Importantly, the fact that the evolution of moral norms depends only on the cost of cooperation and is independent of the benefit of cooperation implies that moral norms can be harmful and incur a pure collective cost, yet they are just as effective in promoting order and organization. Finally, the model predicts that recognition noise can have a surprisingly positive effect on the evolution of moral norms and facilitates cooperation in the Snow Drift game in structured populations. How do moral norms spontaneously evolve in the presence of selfish incentives? An answer to this question is provided by the observation that moral systems have two distinct functions: Besides encouraging self-sacrificing cooperation, they also bring organization and order into the societies. In contrast to the former, which is costly for the individuals but beneficial for the group, the latter is beneficial for both the group and the individuals. A simple evolutionary model suggests this latter aspect is what makes a moral system evolve based on the individuals’ self-interest. However, a moral system behaves like a Trojan horse: Once established out of the individuals’ self-interest to promote order and organization, it also brings self-sacrificing cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mohammad Salahshour
- Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
- Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Radolfzell, Germany
- Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
- Department of Biology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
- * E-mail:
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27
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Liu Y, Wu B. Coevolution of vaccination behavior and perceived vaccination risk can lead to a stag-hunt-like game. Phys Rev E 2022; 106:034308. [PMID: 36266897 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.106.034308] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/27/2021] [Accepted: 08/15/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023]
Abstract
Voluntary vaccination is effective to prevent infectious diseases from spreading. Both vaccination behavior and cognition of the vaccination risk play important roles in individual vaccination decision making. However, it is not clear how the coevolution of the two shapes population-wide vaccination behavior. We establish a coupled dynamics of epidemic, vaccination behavior, and perceived vaccination risk with three different time scales. We assume that the increase of vaccination level inhibits the rise of perceived vaccination risk, and the increase of perceived vaccination risk inhibits the rise of vaccination level. It is shown that the resulting vaccination behavior is similar to the stag-hunt game, provided that the basic reproductive ratio is moderate and that the epidemic dynamics evolves sufficiently fast. This is in contrast with the previous view that vaccination is a snowdriftlike game. And we find that epidemic breaks out repeatedly and eventually leads to vaccine scares if these three dynamics evolve on a similar time scale. Furthermore, we propose some ways to promote vaccination behavior, such as controlling side-effect bias and perceived vaccination costs. Our work sheds light on epidemic control via vaccination by taking into account the coevolutionary dynamics of cognition and behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yuan Liu
- School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
| | - Bin Wu
- School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
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28
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Farahbakhsh I, Bauch CT, Anand M. Modelling coupled human-environment complexity for the future of the biosphere: strengths, gaps and promising directions. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2022; 377:20210382. [PMID: 35757879 PMCID: PMC9234813 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0382] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/15/2023] Open
Abstract
Humans and the environment form a single complex system where humans not only influence ecosystems but also react to them. Despite this, there are far fewer coupled human–environment system (CHES) mathematical models than models of uncoupled ecosystems. We argue that these coupled models are essential to understand the impacts of social interventions and their potential to avoid catastrophic environmental events and support sustainable trajectories on multi-decadal timescales. A brief history of CHES modelling is presented, followed by a review spanning recent CHES models of systems including forests and land use, coral reefs and fishing and climate change mitigation. The ability of CHES modelling to capture dynamic two-way feedback confers advantages, such as the ability to represent ecosystem dynamics more realistically at longer timescales, and allowing insights that cannot be generated using ecological models. We discuss examples of such key insights from recent research. However, this strength brings with it challenges of model complexity and tractability, and the need for appropriate data to parameterize and validate CHES models. Finally, we suggest opportunities for CHES models to improve human–environment sustainability in future research spanning topics such as natural disturbances, social structure, social media data, model discovery and early warning signals. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Ecological complexity and the biosphere: the next 30 years’.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Chris T Bauch
- Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada
| | - Madhur Anand
- School of Environmental Sciences, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada
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29
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Evolutionary Dynamics of Division of Labor Games for Underwater Searching Tasks. Symmetry (Basel) 2022. [DOI: 10.3390/sym14050941] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/10/2022] Open
Abstract
Division of labor in self-organized groups is a problem of both theoretical significance and application value. Many application problems in the real world require efficient task allocation. We propose a model combining bio-inspiration and evolutionary game theory. This research model theoretically analyzes the problem of target search in unknown areas for multi-robot systems. If the robot’s operating area is underwater, the problem becomes more complicated due to its information sharing restrictions. Additionally, it drives strategy updates and calculates the fixed probability of relevant strategies, using evolutionary game theory and the commonly used Fermi function. Our study estimates the fixed probability under arbitrary selection intensity and the fixed probability and time under weak selection for the two-player game model. In the multi-player game, we get these results for weak selection, which is conducive to the coexistence of the two strategies. Moreover, the conducted simulations confirm our analysis. These results help to understand and design effective mechanisms in which self-organizing collective dynamics appears in the form of maximizing the benefits of multi-agent systems in the case of the asymmetric game.
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30
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Majhi S. Dynamical robustness of complex networks subject to long-range connectivity. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2022. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2021.0953] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
In spite of a few attempts in understanding the dynamical robustness of complex networks, this extremely important subject of research is still in its dawn as compared to the other dynamical processes on networks. We hereby consider the concept of long-range interactions among the dynamical units of complex networks and demonstrate
for the first time
that such a characteristic can have noteworthy impacts on the dynamical robustness of networked systems, regardless of the underlying network topology. We present a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon on top of diverse network architectures. Such dynamical damages being able to substantially affect the network performance, determining mechanisms that boost the robustness of networks becomes a fundamental question. In this work, we put forward a prescription based upon self-feedback that can efficiently resurrect global rhythmicity of complex networks composed of active and inactive dynamical units, and thus can enhance the network robustness. We have been able to delineate the whole proposition analytically while dealing with all
d
-path adjacency matrices, having an excellent agreement with the numerical results. For the numerical computations, we examine scale-free networks, Watts–Strogatz small-world model and also Erdös–Rényi random network, along with Landau–Stuart oscillators for casting the local dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Soumen Majhi
- Department of Mathematics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 5290002, Israel
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31
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Zhang F, Cao M, Shi L, Wang R. Disease-Induced Cooperation Mitigates Populations Against Decline: The Cascade Effect of Cooperation Evolution. Front Ecol Evol 2022. [DOI: 10.3389/fevo.2022.758659] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Due to density-dependent selection, the ecological factors impacting population dynamics can play an important role in promoting cooperation, and accordingly, benefit a population from the eco-evolutionary feedback. This implies that cooperation between individuals could help resist the attack of infectious diseases. Yet, little is known about how cooperation evolves in response to infections. We here examined theoretically the impact of disease infections with various transmission types on cooperation evolution and its feedback to population dynamics. Results show that infected populations can evolve to be more cooperative, and the level of cooperation increases with the transmission rate, which can protect the population against decline due to infection and prevent population extinction driven by defection. A high transmission rate can stabilize population fluctuation, while a relatively low transmission rate could destabilize population dynamics. We argue that the mechanism underlying such stress-induced cooperation is analogous to the cascade effect of trophic interactions in food webs: reduction in selfishness from environmental stress indirectly relaxes the exploitation of cooperators by defectors. These findings emphasize the role of eco-evolutionary feedback in evolving cooperation and the ecological significance of cooperation evolution for populations withstanding disease infection.
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32
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Barfuss W, Mann RP. Modeling the effects of environmental and perceptual uncertainty using deterministic reinforcement learning dynamics with partial observability. Phys Rev E 2022; 105:034409. [PMID: 35428165 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.105.034409] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2021] [Accepted: 02/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
Assessing the systemic effects of uncertainty that arises from agents' partial observation of the true states of the world is critical for understanding a wide range of scenarios, from navigation and foraging behavior to the provision of renewable resources and public infrastructures. Yet previous modeling work on agent learning and decision-making either lacks a systematic way to describe this source of uncertainty or puts the focus on obtaining optimal policies using complex models of the world that would impose an unrealistically high cognitive demand on real agents. In this work we aim to efficiently describe the emergent behavior of biologically plausible and parsimonious learning agents faced with partially observable worlds. Therefore we derive and present deterministic reinforcement learning dynamics where the agents observe the true state of the environment only partially. We showcase the broad applicability of our dynamics across different classes of partially observable agent-environment systems. We find that partial observability creates unintuitive benefits in several specific contexts, pointing the way to further research on a general understanding of such effects. For instance, partially observant agents can learn better outcomes faster, in a more stable way, and even overcome social dilemmas. Furthermore, our method allows the application of dynamical systems theory to partially observable multiagent leaning. In this regard we find the emergence of catastrophic limit cycles, a critical slowing down of the learning processes between reward regimes, and the separation of the learning dynamics into fast and slow directions, all caused by partial observability. Therefore, the presented dynamics have the potential to become a formal, yet practical, lightweight and robust tool for researchers in biology, social science, and machine learning to systematically investigate the effects of interacting partially observant agents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Wolfram Barfuss
- Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of Tübingen, 72076 Tübingen, Germany.,Department of Statistics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom
| | - Richard P Mann
- Department of Statistics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom
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33
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Chen YY, Rubenstein DR, Shen SF. Cooperation and Lateral Forces: Moving Beyond Bottom-Up and Top-Down Drivers of Animal Population Dynamics. Front Psychol 2022; 13:768773. [PMID: 35185719 PMCID: PMC8847757 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.768773] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2021] [Accepted: 01/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Biologists have long known that animal population dynamics are regulated by a combination of bottom-up (resource availability) and top-down forces (predation). Yet, economists have argued that human population dynamics can also be influenced by intraspecific cooperation. Despite awareness of the role of interspecific cooperation (mutualism) in influencing resource availability and animal population dynamics, the role of intraspecific cooperation (sociality) under different environmental conditions has rarely been considered. Here we examine the role of what we call “lateral forces” that act within populations and interact with external top-down and bottom-up forces in influencing population dynamics using an individual-based model linking environmental quality, intraspecific cooperation, and population size. We find that the proportion of cooperators is higher when the environment is poor and population sizes are greatest under intermediate resources levels due to the contrasting effects of resource availability on behavior and population size. We also show that social populations are more resilient to environmental change than non-social ones because the benefits of intraspecific cooperation can outweigh the effects of constrained resource availability. Our study elucidates the complex relationship between environmental harshness, cooperation, and population dynamics, which is important for understanding the ecological consequences of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ying-Yu Chen
- Biodiversity Research Center, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
| | - Dustin R Rubenstein
- Department of Ecology, Evolution and Environmental Biology, Center for Integrative Animal Behavior, Columbia University, New York, NY, United States
| | - Sheng-Feng Shen
- Biodiversity Research Center, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.,Institute of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, College of Life Science, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
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34
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Stuckey K, Dua R, Ma Y, Parker J, Newton PK. Optimal dynamic incentive scheduling for Hawk-Dove evolutionary games. Phys Rev E 2022; 105:014412. [PMID: 35193225 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.105.014412] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2021] [Accepted: 01/05/2022] [Indexed: 06/14/2023]
Abstract
The Hawk-Dove evolutionary game offers a paradigm of the trade-offs associated with aggressive and passive behaviors. When two (or more) populations of players compete, their success or failure is measured by their frequency in the population, and the system is governed by the replicator dynamics. We develop a time-dependent optimal-adaptive control theory for this dynamical system in which the entries of the payoff matrix are dynamically altered to produce control schedules that minimize and maximize the aggressive population through a finite-time cycle. These schedules provide upper and lower bounds on the outcomes for all possible strategies since they represent two extremizers of the cost function. We then adaptively extend the optimal control schedules over multiple cycles to produce absolute maximizers and minimizers for the system.
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Affiliation(s)
- K Stuckey
- Department of Aerospace & Mechanical Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA
| | - R Dua
- Department of Mathematics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA
| | - Y Ma
- Department of Physics & Astronomy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA
| | - J Parker
- Division of Biology and Biological Engineering, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125, USA
| | - P K Newton
- Department of Aerospace & Mechanical Engineering, Mathematics, and The Ellison Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA
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35
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McNamara JM. Game Theory in Biology: Moving beyond Functional Accounts. Am Nat 2021; 199:179-193. [DOI: 10.1086/717429] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- John M. McNamara
- School of Mathematics, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1UG, United Kingdom
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36
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Das Bairagya J, Mondal SS, Chowdhury D, Chakraborty S. Game-environment feedback dynamics in growing population: Effect of finite carrying capacity. Phys Rev E 2021; 104:044407. [PMID: 34781515 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.104.044407] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/15/2021] [Accepted: 09/28/2021] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
The tragedy of the commons (TOC) is an unfortunate situation where a shared resource is exhausted due to uncontrolled exploitation by the selfish individuals of a population. Recently, the paradigmatic replicator equation has been used in conjunction with a phenomenological equation for the state of the shared resource to gain insight into the influence of the games on the TOC. The replicator equation, by construction, models a fixed infinite population undergoing microevolution. Thus, it is unable to capture any effect of the population growth and the carrying capacity of the population although the TOC is expected to be dependent on the size of the population. Therefore, in this paper, we present a mathematical framework that incorporates the density dependent payoffs and the logistic growth of the population in the eco-evolutionary dynamics modeling the game-resource feedback. We discover a bistability in the dynamics: a finite carrying capacity can either avert or cause the TOC depending on the initial states of the resource and the initial fraction of cooperators. In fact, depending on the type of strategic game-theoretic interaction, a finite carrying capacity can either avert or cause the TOC when it is exactly the opposite for the corresponding case with infinite carrying capacity.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joy Das Bairagya
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur 208016, India
| | | | | | - Sagar Chakraborty
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur 208016, India
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37
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Adaptation strategies and collective dynamics of extraction in networked commons of bistable resources. Sci Rep 2021; 11:21987. [PMID: 34753992 PMCID: PMC8578606 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-01314-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/06/2021] [Accepted: 10/18/2021] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
When populations share common-pool resources (CPRs), individuals decide how much effort to invest towards resource extraction and how to allocate this effort among available resources. We investigate these dual aspects of individual choice in networked games where resources undergo regime shifts between discrete quality states (viable or depleted) depending on collective extraction levels. We study the patterns of extraction that emerge on various network types when agents are free to vary extraction from each CPR separately to maximize their short-term payoffs. Using these results as a basis for comparison, we then investigate how results are altered if agents fix one aspect of adaptation (magnitude or allocation) while letting the other vary. We consider two constrained adaptation strategies: uniform adaptation, whereby agents adjust their extraction levels from all CPRs by the same amount, and reallocation, whereby agents selectively shift effort from lower- to higher-quality resources. A preference for uniform adaptation increases collective wealth on degree-heterogeneous agent-resource networks. Further, low-degree agents retain preferences for these constrained strategies under reinforcement learning. Empirical studies have indicated that some CPR appropriators ignore—while others emphasize—allocation aspects of adaptation; our results demonstrate that structural patterns of resource access can determine which behavior is more advantageous.
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38
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Nakamaru M, Onuma A. Ecological features benefiting sustainable harvesters in socio-ecological systems: a case study of Swiftlets in Malaysia. ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS : A PUBLICATION OF THE ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 2021; 31:e02413. [PMID: 34260776 DOI: 10.1002/eap.2413] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2020] [Revised: 12/17/2020] [Accepted: 03/22/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
A major challenge in biodiversity management is overharvesting by unsustainable harvesters. If a scenario could be created where sustainable harvesters benefit more than the unsustainable ones, even in the short term, the issue of overharvesting would be solved. Everyone would then follow the lead of sustainable harvesters. However, creating such a scenario is not an easy task; the difficulty is intensified if the habitat is open access and there is no property rights system. Swiftlets in Sarawak, Malaysia, present a special case where sustainable harvesters are believed to be more beneficial than unsustainable harvesters. Edible nests built by adult Swiftlets are used as ingredients for a traditional luxurious soup in Chinese cuisine. A rise in nest prices has increased the instances of unsustainable harvesters wrongfully collecting nests along with the eggs and fledglings, which are then abandoned. Swiftlets live in caves and build nests on cave ceilings. It is known that Swiftlets escape from cave ceilings when these harvesters take the nests, never to return to the same place. This ecological feature appears to work as the Swiftlet's indirect punishment against unsustainable harvesters. This study constructs a stage-structured population model and examines the effect of property rights and the indirect punishment by Swiftlets on the population dynamics of the bird, and on the economic return of both sustainable and unsustainable harvesters. Our findings are as follows: the indirect punishment by Swiftlets provides sustainable harvesters a higher short-term return than unsustainable harvesters under the property rights system, as long as Swiftlets return to their original cave after escaping from the unsustainable harvesters. While previous studies regarding the management of the commons have stressed the importance of rules and regulations for sustainable harvesting without considering the ecological uniqueness of each species, this study suggests that ecological exploration and the discovery of ecological features are also essential for designing a sustainable framework.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mayuko Nakamaru
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo, 108-0023, Japan
- Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1, Ookayama, Meguro, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan
| | - Ayumi Onuma
- Keio University, 2-15-45, Mita, Minato, Tokyo, 108-8345, Japan
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39
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Arefin MR, Tanimoto J. Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2021. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2021.0240] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between the evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such games under the premise of the replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations between cooperation and defection. Besides replicator dynamics, here we have employed aspiration dynamics, in which individuals, instead of comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their payoffs by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start with a brief review of feedback-evolving games with replicator dynamics and then comprehensively discuss such games with aspiration dynamics. Interestingly, the tenacious cycles, as perceived in replicator dynamics, cannot be observed in aspiration dynamics. Our analysis reveals that a parameter
θ
—which depicts the strength of cooperation in enhancing the environment—plays a pivotal role in comprehending the dynamics. In particular, with the symmetric aspiration level, if replete and depleted states, respectively, experience Prisoner's Dilemma and Trivial games, the rich environment is achievable only when
θ
> 1. The case
θ
< 1 never allows us to reach the replete state, even with a higher cooperation level. Furthermore, if cooperators aspire less than defectors, then the enhanced state can be achieved with a relatively lower
θ
value compared with the opposite scenario because too much expectation from cooperation can be less beneficial.
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Affiliation(s)
- Md. Rajib Arefin
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
| | - Jun Tanimoto
- Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
- Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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40
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Wang G, Su Q, Wang L. Evolution of state-dependent strategies in stochastic games. J Theor Biol 2021; 527:110818. [PMID: 34181968 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110818] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2021] [Revised: 06/06/2021] [Accepted: 06/22/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
In a population of interacting individuals, the environment for interactions often changes due to individuals' behaviors, which in turn drive the evolution of individuals' behaviors. The interplay between the environment and individuals' behaviors has been demonstrated to remarkably influence the evolutionary outcomes. In reality, in highly cognitive species such as social primates and human beings, individuals are often capable of perceiving the environment change and then differentiate their strategies across different environment states. We propose a model of environmental feedback with state-dependent strategies: individuals have perceptions of distinct environment states and therefore take distinct sub-strategies under each of them; based on the sub-strategy, individuals then decide their behaviors; their behaviors subsequently modify the environment state. We use the theory of stochastic games and evolutionary dynamics to analyze this idea. We find that when environment changes slower than behaviors, state-dependent strategies (i.e. taking different sub-strategies under different environment states) can outperform state-independent strategies (i.e. taking an identical sub-strategy under all environment states), such as Win-Stay, Lose-Shift, the most leading strategy among state-independent strategies. The intuition is that delayed environmental feedback provides chances for individuals with state-dependent strategies to exploit those with state-independent strategies. Our results hold (1) in both well-mixed and structured populations; (2) when the environment switches between two or more states. Furthermore, the environment changing rate decides if state-dependent strategies benefit global cooperation. The evolution sees the rise of the cooperation level for fast environment switching and the decrease otherwise. Our work stresses that individuals' perceptions of different environment states are beneficial to their survival and social prosperity in a changing world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Guocheng Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Qi Su
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA; Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA19104, USA; Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China; Center for Multi-Agent Research, Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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41
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Evolutionary Dynamics of Gig Economy Labor Strategies under Technology, Policy and Market Influence. GAMES 2021. [DOI: 10.3390/g12020049] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
The emergence of the modern gig economy introduces a new set of employment considerations for firms and laborers that include various trade-offs. With a game-theoretical approach, we examine the influences of technology, policy and markets on firm and worker preferences for gig labor. Theoretically, we present new conceptual extensions to the replicator equation and model oscillating dynamics in two-player asymmetric bi-matrix games with time-evolving environments, introducing concepts of the attractor arc, trapping zone and escape. While canonical applications of evolutionary game theory focus on the evolutionary stable strategy, our model assumes that the system exhibits oscillatory dynamics and can persist for long temporal intervals in a pseudo-stable state. We demonstrate how changing market conditions result in distinct evolutionary patterns across labor economies. Informing tensions regarding the future of this new employment category, we present a novel payoff framework to analyze the role of technology on the growth of the gig economy. Regarding governance, we explore regulatory implications within the gig economy, demonstrating how intervals of lenient and strict policy alter firm and worker sensitivities between gig and employee labor strategies. Finally, we establish an aggregate economic framework to explain how technology, policy and market environments engage in an interlocking dance, a balancing act, to sustain the observable co-existence of gig and employee labor strategies.
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42
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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory has extensively investigated situations in which several games are competing against each other at the same time, but the model only assumes symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Now, the population is considered in heterogeneous environments, individuals in the population occupy a different quality of patches, and individual fitness depends not only on the interaction between individuals, but also on the quality of the environment. Here, by establishing a mathematical framework, we analyze the natural selection between two strategies and two games in heterogeneous environments. Furthermore, we analyze the natural selection of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Hawk–Dove games theoretically to demonstrate the dynamics of cooperators and defectors in their choice of environment and their respective games. As expected, the distribution of games and strategies changes with time. Based on different initial population compositions, we also discuss the invasion problem of games from different perspectives. To one’s surprise, we can find that good quality patches attract all individuals; the long-term dynamics in invariant rich environments is the same as the dynamics of symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hairui Yuan
- College of Mathematics and Systems Science, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, P. R. China
| | - Xinzhu Meng
- College of Mathematics and Systems Science, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, P. R. China
| | - Zhenqing Li
- State Key Laboratory of Vegetation and Environmental Change, Institute of Botany, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, P. R. China
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43
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Chiba E, Cuaresma DCN, Rabajante JF, Tubay JM, Areja Gavina MK, Yamamoto T, Yoshimura J, Morita S, Ito H, Okabe T. Improving environment drives dynamical change in social game structure. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2021; 8:201166. [PMID: 34035943 PMCID: PMC8097197 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.201166] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/01/2020] [Accepted: 04/19/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
The development of cooperation in human societies is a major unsolved problem in biological and social sciences. Extensive studies in game theory have shown that cooperative behaviour can evolve only under very limited conditions or with additional complexities, such as spatial structure. Non-trivial two-person games are categorized into three types of games, namely, the prisoner's dilemma game, the chicken game and the stag hunt game. Recently, the weight-lifting game has been shown to cover all five games depending on the success probability of weight lifting, which include the above three games and two trivial cases (all cooperation and all defection; conventionally not distinguished as separate classes). Here, we introduce the concept of the environmental value of a society. Cultural development and deterioration are represented by changes in this probability. We discuss cultural evolution in human societies and the biological communities of living systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Erika Chiba
- Faculty of Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 432-8561, Japan
| | - Diane Carmeliza N. Cuaresma
- Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 432-8561, Japan
- Mathematics Division, Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Physics, University of the Philippines Los Baños, College, Laguna 4031, Philippines
| | - Jomar F. Rabajante
- Mathematics Division, Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Physics, University of the Philippines Los Baños, College, Laguna 4031, Philippines
- Faculty of Education, University of the Philippines Open University, College, Laguna 4031, Philippines
| | - Jerrold M. Tubay
- Mathematics Division, Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Physics, University of the Philippines Los Baños, College, Laguna 4031, Philippines
| | - Maica Krizna Areja Gavina
- Mathematics Division, Institute of Mathematical Sciences and Physics, University of the Philippines Los Baños, College, Laguna 4031, Philippines
| | | | - Jin Yoshimura
- Faculty of Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 432-8561, Japan
- Department of International Health and Medical Anthropology, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki 852-8523, Japan
- Department of Biological Sciences, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan
- The University Museum, University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan
- Marine Biosystems Research Center, Chiba University, Uchiura, Kamogawa, Chiba 299-5502, Japan
- Department of Environmental and Forest Biology, State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, NY 13210, USA
| | - Satoru Morita
- Faculty of Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 432-8561, Japan
- Graduate School of Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 432-8561, Japan
| | - Hiromu Ito
- Department of International Health and Medical Anthropology, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki 852-8523, Japan
- Department of Environmental Sciences, Zoology, University of Basel, Basel 4051, Switzerland
| | - Takuya Okabe
- Faculty of Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 432-8561, Japan
- Graduate School of Integrated Science and Technology, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 432-8561, Japan
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Newton PK, Ma Y. Maximizing cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma evolutionary game via optimal control. Phys Rev E 2021; 103:012304. [PMID: 33601552 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.103.012304] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/15/2020] [Accepted: 12/21/2020] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
The prisoner's dilemma (PD) game offers a simple paradigm of competition between two players who can either cooperate or defect. Since defection is a strict Nash equilibrium, it is an asymptotically stable state of the replicator dynamical system that uses the PD payoff matrix to define the fitness landscape of two interacting evolving populations. The dilemma arises from the fact that the average payoff of this asymptotically stable state is suboptimal. Coaxing the players to cooperate would result in a higher payoff for both. Here we develop an optimal control theory for the prisoner's dilemma evolutionary game in order to maximize cooperation (minimize the defector population) over a given cycle time T, subject to constraints. Our two time-dependent controllers are applied to the off-diagonal elements of the payoff matrix in a bang-bang sequence that dynamically changes the game being played by dynamically adjusting the payoffs, with optimal timing that depends on the initial population distributions. Over multiple cycles nT (n>1), the method is adaptive as it uses the defector population at the end of the nth cycle to calculate the optimal schedule over the n+1st cycle. The control method, based on Pontryagin's maximum principle, can be viewed as determining the optimal way to dynamically alter incentives and penalties in order to maximize the probability of cooperation in settings that track dynamic changes in the frequency of strategists, with potential applications in evolutionary biology, economics, theoretical ecology, social sciences, reinforcement learning, and other fields where the replicator system is used.
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Affiliation(s)
- P K Newton
- Department of Aerospace & Mechanical Engineering, Mathematics, and The Ellison Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA
| | - Y Ma
- Department of Physics & Astronomy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1191, USA
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Mukhopadhyay A, Chakraborty S. Replicator equations induced by microscopic processes in nonoverlapping population playing bimatrix games. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2021; 31:023123. [PMID: 33653037 DOI: 10.1063/5.0032311] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/07/2020] [Accepted: 01/27/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
This paper is concerned with exploring the microscopic basis for the discrete versions of the standard replicator equation and the adjusted replicator equation. To this end, we introduce frequency-dependent selection-as a result of competition fashioned by game-theoretic consideration-into the Wright-Fisher process, a stochastic birth-death process. The process is further considered to be active in a generation-wise nonoverlapping finite population where individuals play a two-strategy bimatrix population game. Subsequently, connections among the corresponding master equation, the Fokker-Planck equation, and the Langevin equation are exploited to arrive at the deterministic discrete replicator maps in the limit of infinite population size.
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Affiliation(s)
- Archan Mukhopadhyay
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
| | - Sagar Chakraborty
- Department of Physics, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 208016, India
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46
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Miele L, De Monte S. Aggregative cycles evolve as a solution to conflicts in social investment. PLoS Comput Biol 2021; 17:e1008617. [PMID: 33471791 PMCID: PMC7850506 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008617] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/07/2020] [Revised: 02/01/2021] [Accepted: 12/07/2020] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Multicellular organization is particularly vulnerable to conflicts between different cell types when the body forms from initially isolated cells, as in aggregative multicellular microbes. Like other functions of the multicellular phase, coordinated collective movement can be undermined by conflicts between cells that spend energy in fuelling motion and ‘cheaters’ that get carried along. The evolutionary stability of collective behaviours against such conflicts is typically addressed in populations that undergo extrinsically imposed phases of aggregation and dispersal. Here, via a shift in perspective, we propose that aggregative multicellular cycles may have emerged as a way to temporally compartmentalize social conflicts. Through an eco-evolutionary mathematical model that accounts for individual and collective strategies of resource acquisition, we address regimes where different motility types coexist. Particularly interesting is the oscillatory regime that, similarly to life cycles of aggregative multicellular organisms, alternates on the timescale of several cell generations phases of prevalent solitary living and starvation-triggered aggregation. Crucially, such self-organized oscillations emerge as a result of evolution of cell traits associated to conflict escalation within multicellular aggregates. In aggregative multicellular life cycles, cells come together in heterogenous aggregates, whose collective function benefits all the constituent cells. Current explanations for the evolutionary stability of such organization presume that alternating phases of aggregation and dispersal are already in place. Here we propose that, instead of being externally driven, the temporal arrangement of aggregative life cycles may emerge from the interplay between ecology and evolution in populations with differential motility. In our model, cell motility underpins group formation and allows cells to forage individually and collectively. Notably, slower cells can exploit the propulsion by faster cells within multicellular groups. When the level of such exploitation is let evolve, increasing social conflicts are associated to the evolutionary emergence of self-sustained oscillations. Akin to aggregative life cycles, resource exhaustion triggers group formation, whereas conflicts within multicellular groups restrain resource consumption, thus paving the way for the subsequent unicellular phase. The evolutionary transition from equilibrium coexistence to life cycles solves conflicts among heterogenous cell types by integrating them on a timescale longer than cell division, that comes to be associated to multicellular organization.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonardo Miele
- School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, U.K.
- Institut de Biologie de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure, Département de Biologie, Ecole Normale Supérieure, CNRS, INSERM, PSL Research University, Paris, France
- * E-mail: (LM); (SDM)
| | - Silvia De Monte
- Institut de Biologie de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure, Département de Biologie, Ecole Normale Supérieure, CNRS, INSERM, PSL Research University, Paris, France
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plőn, Germany
- * E-mail: (LM); (SDM)
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47
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Wang X, Fu F. Eco-evolutionary dynamics with environmental feedback: Cooperation in a changing world. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2020. [DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/132/10001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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48
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Denisov S, Vershinina O, Thingna J, Hänggi P, Ivanchenko M. Quasi-stationary states of game-driven systems: A dynamical approach. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2020; 30:123145. [PMID: 33380033 DOI: 10.1063/5.0019736] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/25/2020] [Accepted: 12/02/2020] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two complementary approaches to modeling evolution of player populations. The first addresses essentially finite populations by implementing the apparatus of Markov chains. The second assumes that the populations are infinite and operates with a system of mean-field deterministic differential equations. By using a model of two antagonistic populations, which are playing a game with stationary or periodically varying payoffs, we demonstrate that it exhibits metastable dynamics that is reducible neither to an immediate transition to a fixation (extinction of all but one strategy in a finite-size population) nor to the mean-field picture. In the case of stationary payoffs, this dynamics can be captured with a system of stochastic differential equations and interpreted as a stochastic Hopf bifurcation. In the case of varying payoffs, the metastable dynamics is much more complex than the dynamics of the means.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sergey Denisov
- Department of Computer Science, Oslo Metropolitan University, N-0130 Oslo, Norway
| | - Olga Vershinina
- Department of Applied Mathematics, Lobachevsky University, 603950 Nizhny Novgorod, Russia
| | - Juzar Thingna
- Center for Theoretical Physics of Complex Systems (IBS), Daejeon 34126, South Korea
| | - Peter Hänggi
- Institut für Physik, Universität Augsburg, D-86135 Augsburg, Germany
| | - Mikhail Ivanchenko
- Department of Applied Mathematics, Lobachevsky University, 603950 Nizhny Novgorod, Russia
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Glaubitz A, Fu F. Oscillatory dynamics in the dilemma of social distancing. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2020; 476:20200686. [PMID: 33363444 PMCID: PMC7735308 DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2020.0686] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2020] [Accepted: 11/02/2020] [Indexed: 01/27/2023] Open
Abstract
Social distancing as one of the main non-pharmaceutical interventions can help slow down the spread of diseases, like in the COVID-19 pandemic. Effective social distancing, unless enforced as drastic lockdowns and mandatory cordon sanitaire, requires consistent strict collective adherence. However, it remains unknown what the determinants for the resultant compliance of social distancing and their impact on disease mitigation are. Here, we incorporate into the epidemiological process with an evolutionary game theory model that governs the evolution of social distancing behaviour. In our model, we assume an individual acts in their best interest and their decisions are driven by adaptive social learning of the real-time risk of infection in comparison with the cost of social distancing. We find interesting oscillatory dynamics of social distancing accompanied with waves of infection. Moreover, the oscillatory dynamics are dampened with a non-trivial dependence on model parameters governing decision-makings and gradually cease when the cumulative infections exceed the herd immunity. Compared to the scenario without social distancing, we quantify the degree to which social distancing mitigates the epidemic and its dependence on individuals’ responsiveness and rationality in their behaviour changes. Our work offers new insights into leveraging human behaviour in support of pandemic response.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alina Glaubitz
- Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA
| | - Feng Fu
- Department of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA.,Department of Biomedical Data Science, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth, Lebanon, NH 03756, USA
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50
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Huang F, Cao M, Wang L. Learning enables adaptation in cooperation for multi-player stochastic games. J R Soc Interface 2020; 17:20200639. [PMID: 33202177 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2020.0639] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and population biology. However, the key question of how individuals, in the middle of challenging social dilemmas (e.g. the 'tragedy of the commons'), modulate their behaviours to adapt to the fluctuation of the environment has not yet been addressed satisfactorily. Using evolutionary game theory, we develop a framework of stochastic games that incorporates the adaptive mechanism of reinforcement learning to investigate whether cooperative behaviours can evolve in the ever-changing group interaction environment. When the action choices of players are just slightly influenced by past reinforcements, we construct an analytical condition to determine whether cooperation can be favoured over defection. Intuitively, this condition reveals why and how the environment can mediate cooperative dilemmas. Under our model architecture, we also compare this learning mechanism with two non-learning decision rules, and we find that learning significantly improves the propensity for cooperation in weak social dilemmas, and, in sharp contrast, hinders cooperation in strong social dilemmas. Our results suggest that in complex social-ecological dilemmas, learning enables the adaptation of individuals to varying environments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Huang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China.,Center for Data Science and System Complexity, Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands
| | - Ming Cao
- Center for Data Science and System Complexity, Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen 9747 AG, The Netherlands
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China
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