Toward ecoevolutionary dynamics

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation coupled with ecological feedback compensation

A simple theoretical model (or a demonstrative example) was developed to illustrate how the evolution of cooperation can be affected by the density-dependent survival competition, in which we assume that the fertility of an individual depends only on the pairwise interaction between him and other individuals based on Prisoner's Dilemma game, while its viability is only related to the density-dependent survival competitiveness. Our results show that not only cooperation could be evolutionarily stable if the advantage of cooperators in viability can compensate for the cost they pay for their fertility, but also the long-term stable coexistence of cooperation and defection is possible if none of cooperation and defection is evolutionarily stable. Moreover, for the stochastic evolutionary dynamics in a finite population, our analysis shows that the increase (or decrease) of the survival competitiveness of cooperators (or defectors) should be conductive to the evolutionary emergence of cooperation.

Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk-dove games

BACKGROUND

Classical matrix game models aim to find the endpoint of behavioural evolution for a set of fixed possible interaction outcomes. Here, we introduce an evolutionary model in which not only the players' strategies but also the payoff matrix evolves according to natural selection.

RESULTS

We start out from the hawk-dove matrix game and, in a way that is consistent with the monomorphic model setup of Maynard Smith and Price, introduce an evolving phenotypic trait that quantifies fighting ability and determines the probability of winning and the cost of losing escalated hawk-hawk fights. We define evolutionarily stable phenotypes as consisting of an evolutionarily stable strategy and an evolutionarily stable trait, which in turn describes a corresponding evolutionarily stable payoff matrix.

CONCLUSIONS

We find that the maximal possible cost of escalating fights remains constant during evolution assuming a separation in the time scales of fast behavioural and slow trait selection, despite the fact that the final evolutionarily stable phenotype maximizes the payoff of hawk-hawk fights. Our results mirror the dual nature of Darwinian evolution whereby the criteria of evolutionary success, as well as the successful phenotypes themselves, are a product of natural selection.

Competition for resources can reshape the evolutionary properties of spatial structure

Many evolving ecosystems have spatial structures that can be conceptualized as networks, with nodes representing individuals or homogeneous subpopulations and links the patterns of interaction and replacement between them. Prior models of evolution on networks do not take ecological niche differences and eco-evolutionary interplay into account. Here, we combine a resource competition model with evolutionary graph theory to study how heterogeneous topological structure shapes evolutionary dynamics under global frequency-dependent ecological interactions. We find that the addition of ecological competition for resources can produce a reversal of roles between amplifier and suppressor networks for deleterious mutants entering the population. Moreover, we show that this effect is a non-linear function of ecological niche overlap and discuss intuition for the observed dynamics using simulations and analytical approximations.

Time delays shape the eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation

We study the intricate interplay between ecological and evolutionary processes through the lens of the prisoner's dilemma game. But while previous studies on cooperation amongst selfish individuals often assume instantaneous interactions, we take into consideration delays to investigate how these might affect the causes underlying prosocial behavior. Through analytical calculations and numerical simulations, we demonstrate that delays can lead to oscillations, and by incorporating also the ecological variable of altruistic free space and the evolutionary strategy of punishment, we explore how these factors impact population and community dynamics. Depending on the parameter values and the initial fraction of each strategy, the studied eco-evolutionary model can mimic a cyclic dominance system and even exhibit chaotic behavior, thereby highlighting the importance of complex dynamics for the effective management and conservation of ecological communities. Our research thus contributes to the broader understanding of group decision-making and the emergence of moral behavior in multidimensional social systems.

On the evolution of natural product biosynthesis

Natural products are the raw material for drug discovery programmes. Bioactive natural products are used extensively in medicine and agriculture and have found utility as antibiotics, immunosuppressives, anti-cancer drugs and anthelminthics. Remarkably, the natural role and what mechanisms drive evolution of these molecules is relatively poorly understood. The exponential increase in genome and chemical data in recent years, coupled with technical advances in bioinformatics and genetics have enabled progress to be made in understanding the evolution of biosynthetic gene clusters and the products of their enzymatic machinery. Here we discuss the diversity of natural products, incorporating the mechanisms that govern evolution of metabolic pathways and how this can be applied to biosynthetic gene clusters. We build on the nomenclature of natural products in terms of primary, integrated, secondary and specialised metabolism and place this within an ecology-evolutionary-developmental biology framework. This eco-evo-devo framework we believe will help to clarify the nature and use of the term specialised metabolites in the future.

Biological control needs evolutionary perspectives of ecological interactions

While ecological interactions have been identified as determinant for biological control efficiency, the role of evolution remains largely underestimated in biological control programs. With the restrictions on the use of both pesticides and exotic biological control agents (BCAs), the evolutionary optimization of local BCAs becomes central for improving the efficiency and the resilience of biological control. In particular, we need to better account for the natural processes of evolution to fully understand the interactions of pests and BCAs, including in biocontrol strategies integrating human manipulations of evolution (i.e., artificial selection and genetic engineering). In agroecosystems, the evolution of BCAs traits and performance depends on heritable phenotypic variation, trait genetic architecture, selection strength, stochastic processes, and other selective forces. Humans can manipulate these natural processes to increase the likelihood of evolutionary trait improvement, by artificially increasing heritable phenotypic variation, strengthening selection, controlling stochastic processes, or overpassing evolution through genetic engineering. We highlight these facets by reviewing recent studies addressing the importance of natural processes of evolution and human manipulations of these processes in biological control. We then discuss the interactions between the natural processes of evolution occurring in agroecosystems and affecting the artificially improved BCAs after their release. We emphasize that biological control cannot be summarized by interactions between species pairs because pests and biological control agents are entangled in diverse communities and are exposed to a multitude of deterministic and stochastic selective forces that can change rapidly in direction and intensity. We conclude that the combination of different evolutionary approaches can help optimize BCAs to remain efficient under changing environmental conditions and, ultimately, favor agroecosystem sustainability.

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of multigames with mutations

Most environments favor defection over cooperation due to natural selection. Nonetheless, the emergence of cooperation is omnipresent in many biological, social, and economic systems, quite contrary to the well-celebrated Darwinian theory of evolution. Much research has been devoted to better understanding how and why cooperation persists among self-interested individuals despite their competition for limited resources. Here we go beyond a single social dilemma since individuals usually encounter various social challenges. In particular, we propose and study a mathematical model incorporating both the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. We further extend this model by considering ecological signatures like mutation and selfless one-sided contribution of altruist free space. The nonlinear evolutionary dynamics that results from these upgrades offer a broader range of equilibrium outcomes, and it also often favors cooperation over defection. With the help of analytical and numerical calculations, our theoretical model sheds light on the mechanisms that maintain biodiversity, and it helps to explain the evolution of social order in human societies.

Complex evolutionary dynamics due to punishment and free space in ecological multigames

The concurrence of ecological and evolutionary processes often arises as an integral part of various biological and social systems. We here study eco-evolutionary dynamics by adopting two paradigmatic metaphors of social dilemmas with contrasting outcomes. We use the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games as the backbone of the proposed mathematical model. Since cooperation is a costly proposition in the face of the Darwinian theory of evolution, we go beyond the traditional framework by introducing punishment as an additional strategy. Punishers bare an additional cost from their own resources to try and discourage or prohibit free-riding from selfish defectors. Our model also incorporates the ecological signature of free space, which has an altruistic-like impact because it allows others to replicate and potentially thrive. We show that the consideration of these factors has broad implications for better understanding the emergent complex evolutionary dynamics. In particular, we report the simultaneous presence of different subpopulations through the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, and we determine various stationary points using traditional game-theoretic concepts and stability analysis.