Shifting self, shifting memory: testing the self-memory system model with hypnotic identity delusions

Hypnotizability and the Natural Human Ability to Alter Experience

There seems to be a natural, human ability to alter one's experience that already exists - prior to and apart from any hypnotic induction. Individual differences in this ability range from low to high and are largely commensurate with the person's assessed hypnotizability. More importantly, these preexisting, individual differences in the ability to alter experience seem to be the "substrate" that enables each individual's response to hypnotic suggestions. It is proposed that, with some notable exceptions, the hypnosis field's understanding of hypnotizability has been hindered by theorists' (and clinicians') tendency to consider the instruments that reveal hypnotic phenomena (i.e., hypnosis and suggestions) to be explanatory concepts.

Mysteries of hypnosis and the self are revealed by the psychology and neuroscience of empathy

This article reviews a growing body of research and theory in hypnosis and neuroscience that supports the empathic involvement theory (EIT) of hypnosis (Wickramasekera II, 2001; Wickramasekera II & Szlyk, 2003; Wickramasekera II, 2007c). The EIT is a unified transpersonal theory of hypnosis and the self, which weaves together empathic elements of Dzogchen, neodissociative, neuroscience, psychoanalytic, sociocognitive, and other theories by proposing that hypnotic phenomena are inherently characterized by their deep involvement with processes of empathy and the self. The EIT proposes that the experience of hypnosis is embodied in a system of neural networks in the brain that utilizes empathy-related processes, adaptive resonance between perceptual input and top-down expectancies, and connectionist learning algorithms to (a) empathically enact the affect, cognition, body language, response expectancies, social roles, sensations, etc. that are presented to them during hypnosis in accordance with socio-cognitive theories of hypnosis; (b) engage in a convergent psychophysiological relationship with another person in accordance with psychoanalytic, Ericksonian, and polyvagal/social engagement system theories; (c) alter the empathic self/other (theory of mind) coding of phenomenological experiences during hypnosis in accordance with aspects of the neo-dissociative and socio-cognitive traditions; and (d) develop an experiential understanding of the illusion of self that may lead, in some people, to its transcendence in accordance with Bon-Buddhist, Dzogchen, and transpersonal scholars. A unified definition of hypnosis is proposed based on findings in the empathic neuroscience of hypnosis as well as a working model of the neuromatrix of the self.

A hypnotic analogue of clinical confabulation

Confabulation-fabricated or distorted memories about oneself-occurs in many disorders, but there is no reliable technique for investigating it in the laboratory. The authors used hypnosis to model clinical confabulation by giving subjects a suggestion for either (a) amnesia for everything that had happened since they started university, (b) amnesia for university plus an instruction to fill in memory gaps, or (c) confusion about the temporal order of university events. They then indexed different types of memory on a confabulation battery. The amnesia suggestion produced the most confabulation, especially for personal semantic information. Notably, subjects confabulated by making temporal confusions. The authors discuss the theoretical implications of this first attempt to model clinical confabulation and the potential utility of such analogues.