Intent and the judgment of lies

Altruistic and self-serving goals modulate behavioral and neural responses in deception

People tell lies not only for their own self-interests but sometimes also to help others. Little is known about the ways in which different types of goals modulate behaviors and neural responses in deception. The present study investigated the neural processes associated with spontaneous deception that occurs with altruistic reasons (i.e. the money would be donated to charity), self-serving reasons (i.e. the participant receives all of the money) and mixed goals (i.e. the money would be equally split between the participant and the charity). Altruistic motivation for deception reduced the intensity of moral conflict and the subsequent mental cost of resolving this conflict, reflected by a smaller N2–P3 effect in the purely altruistic condition. When making decisions about whether to lie, self-interest was a stronger motivator than others’ interests, and the participants tended to lie more for themselves than for others. When the lie could be mutually beneficial for both of the self and others, the participants tended to lie even when they knew that they could be easily caught, but they actually lied for their own self-interest rather than for altruistic reasons. These findings shed light on the neural basis of ‘good lies’ and decision-making in mutually beneficial situations.

When is a lie acceptable? Work and private life lying acceptance depends on its beneficiary

In this article we show that when analyzing attitude towards lying in a cross-cultural setting, both the beneficiary of the lie (self vs other) and the context (private life vs. professional domain) should be considered. In a study conducted in Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden (N = 1345), in which participants evaluated stories presenting various types of lies, we found usefulness of relying on the dimensions. Results showed that in the joint sample the most acceptable were other-oriented lies concerning private life, then other-oriented lies in the professional domain, followed by egoistic lies in the professional domain; and the least acceptance was shown for egoistic lies regarding one's private life. We found a negative correlation between acceptance of a behavior and the evaluation of its deceitfulness.

The truth about lying

The standard view in social science and philosophy is that lying does not require the liar's assertion to be false, only that the liar believes it to be false. We conducted three experiments to test whether lying requires falsity. Overall, the results suggest that it does. We discuss some implications for social scientists working on social judgments, research on lie detection, and public moral discourse.

The neural basis of dishonest decisions that serve to harm or help the target

We conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study to elucidate the neurocognitive mechanisms of harmful and helpful dishonest decisions. During scanning, the subjects read scenarios concerning events that could occur in real-life situations and were asked to decide whether to tell a lie as though they were experiencing those events. Half of the scenarios consisted of harmful stories in which the dishonest decisions could be regarded as bad lies, and the other half consisted of helpful stories in which the dishonest decisions could be regarded as good lies. In contrast to the control decision-making task, we found that the decision-making tasks that involved honesty or dishonesty recruited a network of brain regions that included the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In the harmful stories, the right temporoparietal junction and the right medial frontal cortex were activated when the subjects made dishonest decisions compared with honest decisions. No region discriminated between the honest and dishonest decisions made in the helpful stories. These preliminary findings suggest that the neural basis of dishonest decisions is modulated by whether the lying serves to harm or help the target.

Dissociable neural systems for moral judgment of anti- and pro-social lying

Pro-social lying, which serves to benefit listeners, is considered more socially and morally acceptable than anti-social lying, which serves to harm listeners. However, it is still unclear whether the neural mechanisms underlying the moral judgment of pro-social lying differ from those underlying the moral judgment of anti-social lying. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the neural activities associated with moral judgment in anti- and pro-social lying. During fMRI scanning, subjects were provided with scenarios describing a protagonist's anti- and pro-social lying and were then asked to judge whether the protagonist's act was morally appropriate. The behavioral data showed that anti-social lying was mostly judged to be morally inappropriate and that pro-social lying was mainly judged to be morally appropriate. The functional imaging data revealed dissociable neural systems for moral judgment in anti- and pro-social lying. The anti-social lying, which was judged to be morally inappropriate, was associated with increased activity in the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex, right middle frontal gyrus, right precuneus/posterior cingulate gyrus, left posterior cingulate gyrus, and bilateral temporoparietal junction when compared with the control condition. The pro-social lying, which was judged to be morally appropriate, was associated with increased activity in the right middle temporal gyrus, right supramarginal gyrus, and the left middle cingulate gyrus when compared with the control condition. No overlapping activity was observed during the moral judgment of anti- and pro-social lying. Our data suggest that cognitive and neural processes for the moral judgment of lying are modulated by whether the lie serves to harm or benefit listeners.

Three-year-olds' understanding of the consequences of joint commitments

Here we investigate the extent of children's understanding of the joint commitments inherent in joint activities. Three-year-old children either made a joint commitment to assemble a puzzle with a puppet partner, or else the child and puppet each assembled their own puzzle. Afterwards, children who had made the joint commitment were more likely to stop and wait for their partner on their way to fetch something, more likely to spontaneously help their partner when needed, and more likely to take over their partner's role when necessary. There was no clear difference in children's tendency to tattle on their partner's cheating behavior or their tendency to distribute rewards equally at the end. It thus appears that by 3 years of age making a joint commitment to act together with others is beginning to engender in children a "we"-intentionality which holds across at least most of the process of the joint activity until the shared goal is achieved, and which withstands at least some of the perturbations to the joint activity children experience.

Children's and Adults' Conceptualization and Evaluation of Lying and Truth-telling

The present study examined children's and adults' categorization and moral judgment of truthful and untruthful statements. 7-, 9-and 11-year-old Chinese children and college students read stories in which story characters made truthful or untruthful statements and were asked to classify and evaluate the statements. The statements varied in terms of whether the speaker intended to help or harm a listener and whether the statement was made in a setting that called for informational accuracy or politeness. Results showed that the communicative intent and setting factors jointly influence children's categorization of lying and truth-telling, which extends an earlier finding (Lee & Ross, 1997) to childhood. Also, we found that children's and adults' moral judgments of lying and truth-telling were influenced by the communicative intent but not the setting factor. The present results were discussed in terms of Sweetser's (1987) folkloristic model of lying.