The claim that China's fertility restrictions contributed to the use of prenatal sex selection: A sceptical reappraisal

Recent sex ratio at birth in China

BACKGROUND

China's sex ratio at birth (SRB) has declined in the past decade but still exceeds the normal level. This study seeks to depict the SRB trend in the past two decades.

METHODS

We depicted the SRB trend, including SRB by birth order, children composition, residence and hukou type, education, race and province using latest data available from multiple data sources and standardisation and decomposition methods.

RESULTS

The SRB remained around 120 in the first decade from 2000 to 2010, and recently declined and approached the normal level during 2010-2020. The SRB for second births and first births converged to the normal level, whereas the SRB for third and above births exceeded the normal level. The rising proportion of second births increased, whereas the decreasing proportion of first births reduced the overall SRB. Parents with only daughters are more likely to abort a female fetus in pursuit of a son, while parents with only sons are more likely to abort a male fetus in pursuit of a daughter. It also shows difference in SRB by residence, hukou type, educational attainment and race. Urban SRB was lower than rural SRB, by the residence and hukou type, but higher than rural SRB after being standardised. Provinces still exhibit differences by original categorised policy even after the implementation of the universal two-child policy.

CONCLUSIONS

China's SRB has declined substantially during the past two decades, but the negative effects need to be tackled.

Son Preference of Immigrants to the United States: Data from U.S. Birth Certificates, 2004-2013

Son preference has existed for centuries in many cultures and societies. In some Asian countries, including China and India, the sex ratio at birth (SRB, number of male infants divided by number of female infants times 100) is elevated above the worldwide biological norm of about 105. We investigate whether this ratio is elevated in the U.S. for immigrant women. We analyze U.S. birth certificates for 2004-2013 and categorize births by mother's and father's race/ethnicity; mother's place of birth, and birth order of the child. The SRB is elevated for two groups of women: Chinese women born in China for children of birth order 2 and higher, and Indian women born in India for children of birth order 3 and higher. The SRB is not elevated for Chinese and Indian women born in the U.S., nor for Mexican women, Black women, nor White women, regardless of place of birth. The race/ethnicity of the child's father does not appear to be a strong factor in the SRB. In the early twenty-first century the elevated SRB for Chinese and Indian women born in China and India respectively suggests sex selection for higher order births in the U.S.

The Astonishing Population Averted by China's Birth Restrictions: Estimates, Nightmares, and Reprogrammed Ambitions

China launched an unprecedented program to control its population in 1971. Experts have dismissed the official estimate of 400 million births averted by this program as greatly exaggerated yet neglect to provide their own estimates. Counterfactual projections based on fertility declines in other countries suggest that China's program-averted population numbered 360-520 million as of 2015. The low end of this range is based on Vietnam-China's best national comparator, with a two-child program of its own-and the high end is based on a 16-country comparator selected, ironically, by critics of the official estimate. The latter comparator further implies that China's one-child program itself averted a population of 400 million by 2015, three-quarters of the total averted population. All such estimates are projected to double by 2060, due mostly to counterfactual population momentum. These and other findings presented herein affirm the astonishing impact of China's draconian policy choices and challenge the current consensus that rapid socioeconomic progress drove China's fertility well below two children per family. International comparisons of fertility and income suggest instead that China's very low fertility arrived two or three decades too soon. If China had not harshly enforced a norm of 1.5-children during the last quarter century, most mothers would have had two children, one-half birth higher than observed.