Overlooking the Obvious: Incentives to Lie

How Perceptions of Caller Honesty Vary During Vishing Attacks That Include Highly Sensitive or Seemingly Innocuous Requests

OBJECTIVE

To understand how aspects of vishing calls (phishing phone calls) influence perceived visher honesty.

BACKGROUND

Little is understood about how targeted individuals behave during vishing attacks. According to truth-default theory, people assume others are being honest until something triggers their suspicion. We investigated whether that was true during vishing attacks.

METHODS

Twenty-four participants read written descriptions of eight real-world vishing calls. Half included highly sensitive requests; the remainder included seemingly innocuous requests. Participants rated visher honesty at multiple points during conversations.

RESULTS

Participants initially perceived vishers to be honest. Honesty ratings decreased before requests occurred. Honesty ratings decreased further in response to highly sensitive requests, but not seemingly innocuous requests. Honesty ratings recovered somewhat, but only after highly sensitive requests.

CONCLUSIONS

The present results revealed five important insights: (1) people begin vishing conversations in the truth-default state, (2) certain aspects of vishing conversations serve as triggers, (3) other aspects of vishing conversations do not serve as triggers, (4) in certain situations, people's perceptions of visher honesty improve, and, more generally, (5) truth-default theory may be a useful tool for understanding how targeted individuals behave during vishing attacks.

APPLICATION

Those developing systems that help users deal with suspected vishing attacks or penetration testing plans should consider (1) targeted individuals' truth-bias, (2) the influence of visher demeanor on the likelihood of deception detection, (3) the influence of fabricated situations surrounding vishing requests on the likelihood of deception detection, and (4) targeted individuals' lack of concern about seemingly innocuous requests.

Contextual considerations for deception production and detection in forensic interviews

Most deception scholars agree that deception production and deception detection effects often display mixed results across settings. For example, some liars use more emotion than truth-tellers when discussing fake opinions on abortion, but not when communicating fake distress. Similarly, verbal and nonverbal cues are often inconsistent predictors to assist in deception detection, leading to mixed accuracies and detection rates. Why are lie production and detection effects typically inconsistent? In this piece, we argue that aspects of the context are often unconsidered in how lies are produced and detected. Greater theory-building related to contextual constraints of deception are therefore required. We reintroduce and extend the Contextual Organization of Language and Deception (COLD) model, a framework that outlines how psychological dynamics, pragmatic goals, and genre conventions are aspects of the context that moderate the relationship between deception and communication behavior such as language. We extend this foundation by proposing three additional aspects of the context - individual differences, situational opportunities for deception, and interpersonal characteristics - for the COLD model that can specifically inform and potentially improve forensic interviewing. We conclude with a forward-looking perspective for deception researchers and practitioners related to the need for more theoretical explication of deception and its detection related to the context.

Interpersonal Consequences of Deceptive Expressions of Sadness

Emotional expressions evoke predictable responses from observers; displays of sadness are commonly met with sympathy and help from others. Accordingly, people may be motivated to feign emotions to elicit a desired response. In the absence of suspicion, we predicted that emotional and behavioral responses to genuine (vs. deceptive) expressers would be guided by empirically valid cues of sadness authenticity. Consistent with this hypothesis, untrained observers (total N = 1,300) reported less sympathy and offered less help to deceptive (vs. genuine) expressers of sadness. This effect was replicated using both posed, low-stakes, laboratory-created stimuli, and spontaneous, real, high-stakes emotional appeals to the public. Furthermore, lens models suggest that sympathy reactions were guided by difficult-to-fake facial actions associated with sadness. Results suggest that naive observers use empirically valid cues to deception to coordinate social interactions, providing novel evidence that people are sensitive to subtle cues to deception.

Sitting in Judgment: How Body Posture Influences Deception Detection and Gazing Behavior

Body postures can affect how we process and attend to information. Here, a novel effect of adopting an open or closed posture on the ability to detect deception was investigated. It was hypothesized that the posture adopted by judges would affect their social acuity, resulting in differences in the detection of nonverbal behavior (i.e., microexpression recognition) and the discrimination of deceptive and truthful statements. In Study 1, adopting an open posture produced higher accuracy for detecting naturalistic lies, but no difference was observed in the recognition of brief facial expressions as compared to adopting a closed posture; trait empathy was found to have an additive effect on posture, with more empathic judges having higher deception detection scores. In Study 2, with the use of an eye-tracker, posture effects on gazing behavior when judging both low-stakes and high-stakes lies were measured. Sitting in an open posture reduced judges’ average dwell times looking at senders, and in particular, the amount and length of time they focused on their hands. The findings suggest that simply shifting posture can impact judges’ attention to visual information and veracity judgments (M_g = 0.40, 95% CI (0.03, 0.78)).

How Gullible are We? A Review of the Evidence from Psychology and Social Science

A long tradition of scholarship, from ancient Greece to Marxism or some contemporary social psychology, portrays humans as strongly gullible—wont to accept harmful messages by being unduly deferent. However, if humans are reasonably well adapted, they should not be strongly gullible: they should be vigilant toward communicated information. Evidence from experimental psychology reveals that humans are equipped with well-functioning mechanisms of epistemic vigilance. They check the plausibility of messages against their background beliefs, calibrate their trust as a function of the source's competence and benevolence, and critically evaluate arguments offered to them. Even if humans are equipped with well-functioning mechanisms of epistemic vigilance, an adaptive lag might render them gullible in the face of new challenges, from clever marketing to omnipresent propaganda. I review evidence from different cultural domains often taken as proof of strong gullibility: religion, demagoguery, propaganda, political campaigns, advertising, erroneous medical beliefs, and rumors. Converging evidence reveals that communication is much less influential than often believed—that religious proselytizing, propaganda, advertising, and so forth are generally not very effective at changing people's minds. Beliefs that lead to costly behavior are even less likely to be accepted. Finally, it is also argued that most cases of acceptance of misguided communicated information do not stem from undue deference, but from a fit between the communicated information and the audience's preexisting beliefs.

An empirical test of the decision to lie component of the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT)

Meta-analyses reveal that behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers are small. To facilitate lie detection, researchers are currently developing interviewing approaches to increase these differences. Some of these approaches assume that lying is cognitively more difficult than truth telling; however, they are not based on specific cognitive theories of lie production, which are rare. Here we examined one existing theory, Walczyk et al.'s (2014) Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT). We tested the Decision component. According to ADCAT, people decide whether to lie or tell the truth as if they were using a specific mathematical formula to calculate the motivation to lie from (a) the probability of a number of outcomes derived from lying vs. telling the truth, and (b) the costs/benefits associated with each outcome. In this study, participants read several hypothetical scenarios and indicated whether they would lie or tell the truth in each scenario (Questionnaire 1). Next, they answered several questions about the consequences of lying vs. telling the truth in each scenario, and rated the probability and valence of each consequence (Questionnaire 2). Significant associations were found between the participants' dichotomous decision to lie/tell the truth in Questionnaire 1 and their motivation to lie scores calculated from the Questionnaire 2 data. However, interestingly, whereas the expected consequences of truth telling were associated with the decision to lie vs. tell the truth, the expected consequences of lying were not. Suggestions are made to refine ADCAT, which can be a useful theoretical framework to guide deception research.