“Soft” Versus “Hard” Psychological Science: Biased Evaluations of Scientific Evidence That Threatens or Supports a Strongly Held Political Identity

Self-serving beliefs about science: Science justifies my weaknesses (but not other people's)

This research explored the strategic beliefs that people have about science and the extent to which it can explain moral and immoral behaviors. Although people do not believe that science is able to explain certain aspects of their mind, they might nevertheless accept a scientific explanation for their immoral behaviors if that explanation is exculpatory. In a first study, participants reflected on moral and immoral deeds that they performed or that other people performed. Participants were somewhat skeptic that science can account for people's behavior-except for when they reflected on the wrongdoings that they committed. Two further studies suggest that strategic belief in science arises because it enables external attributions for the behavior, outside of the wrongdoers' control. Implications are discussed for science understanding and communication.

Neuroscience explanations really do satisfy: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the seductive allure of neuroscience

Extraneous neuroscience information improves ratings of scientific explanations, and affects mock juror decisions in many studies, but others have yielded little to no effect. To establish the magnitude of this effect, we conducted a random-effects meta-analysis using 60 experiments from 28 publications. We found a mild but highly significant effect, with substantial heterogeneity. Planned subgroup analyses revealed that within-subjects studies, where people can compare the same material with and without neuroscience, and those using text, have stronger effects than between-subjects designs, and studies using brain image stimuli. We serendipitously found that effect sizes were stronger on outcomes of evaluating satisfaction or metacomprehension, compared with jury verdicts or assessments of convincingness. In conclusion, there is more than one type of neuroscience explanations effect. Irrelevant neuroscience does have a seductive allure, especially on self-appraised satisfaction and understanding, and when presented as text.

Moral conviction: A challenge in the age of science politicization

Social science research can help science practitioners understand why the public responds to scientific findings differentially-sometimes believing, sometimes not. Four decades of research finds that people interpret science in ways that make it easier to dismiss scientific findings or consensuses that go against specific attitudes, or positions in social and policy debates, that they wish to maintain. This may be the case especially when a person's position is a moral conviction-that is, it is not only their preferred position, but what they feel is the morally correct position. This chapter explores why moral conviction matters for understanding public response to scientific information in the age of politicization, where moral conviction comes from, and the ways in which it poses a challenge to the foundations of science.

At Least Bias Is Bipartisan: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and Conservatives

Both liberals and conservatives accuse their political opponents of partisan bias, but is there empirical evidence that one side of the political aisle is indeed more biased than the other? To address this question, we meta-analyzed the results of 51 experimental studies, involving over 18,000 participants, that examined one form of partisan bias-the tendency to evaluate otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports one's political beliefs or allegiances than when it challenges those beliefs or allegiances. Two hypotheses based on previous literature were tested: an asymmetry hypothesis (predicting greater partisan bias in conservatives than in liberals) and a symmetry hypothesis (predicting equal levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives). Mean overall partisan bias was robust ( r = .245), and there was strong support for the symmetry hypothesis: Liberals ( r = .235) and conservatives ( r = .255) showed no difference in mean levels of bias across studies. Moderator analyses reveal this pattern to be consistent across a number of different methodological variations and political topics. Implications of the current findings for the ongoing ideological symmetry debate and the role of partisan bias in scientific discourse and political conflict are discussed.