The Whorfian brain: Neuroscientific approaches to linguistic relativity

Contingent capture by color is sensitive to categorical color perception

Contingent capture (CC) theory postulates that attention can only be captured by top-down matching stimuli. Although the contingent capture of attention is a well-known and thoroughly studied phenomenon, there is still no consensus on the characteristics of the top-down template which guides the search for colors. We tried to replicate the classical contingent capture effect on color (Experiment 1) and then added linguistic processing to this perceptual effect (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, attention was indeed captured by the cues of the same color as the target, while the cues of different colors were successfully ignored. In Experiment 2, the cue color was never identical to the target color but would either belong to the same linguistic category or not (i.e., linguistic matching and linguistic nonmatching cues). In both cases, cues were made to be equally perceptually distant from the target. Although, attention was captured by both cue types, the degree of capture was significantly higher for linguistic matching cues. Our research replicated the classic contingent capture effect but on color, and also demonstrated the effect of color categories in the search task. In short, we demonstrated the effect of color categories in the search task. Results show that the template for color search contains physical characteristics of color, as well as information about color category names.

Does pain hurt more in Spanish? The neurobiology of pain among Spanish-English bilingual adults

We previously found Spanish-English bilingual adults reported higher pain intensity when exposed to painful heat in the language of their stronger cultural orientation. Here, we elucidate brain systems involved in language-driven alterations in pain responses. During separate English- and Spanish-speaking fMRI scanning runs, 39 (21 female) bilingual adults rated painful heat intermixed between culturally evocative images and completed sentence reading tasks. Surveys of cultural identity and language use measured relative preference for US-American vs Hispanic culture (cultural orientation). Participants produced higher intensity ratings in Spanish compared to English. Group-level whole-brain differences in pain-evoked activity between languages emerged in somatosensory, cingulate, precuneus and cerebellar cortex. Regions of interest associated with semantic, attention and somatosensory processing showed higher average pain-evoked responses in participants' culturally preferred language, as did expression of a multivariate pain-predictive pattern. Follow-up moderated mediation analyses showed somatosensory activity mediated language effects on pain intensity, particularly for Hispanic oriented participants. These findings relate to distinct ('meddler', 'spotlight' and 'inducer') hypotheses about the nature of language effects on perception and cognition. Knowledge of language influences on pain could improve efficacy of culturally sensitive treatment approaches across the diversity of Hispanic adults to mitigate documented health disparities in this population.

Grounded Cognition Entails Linguistic Relativity: A Neglected Implication of a Major Semantic Theory

According to the popular Grounded Cognition Model (GCM), the sensory and motor features of concepts, including word meanings, are stored directly within neural systems for perception and action. More precisely, the core claim is that these concrete conceptual features reuse some of the same modality-specific representations that serve to categorize experiences involving the relevant kinds of objects and events. Research in semantic typology, however, has shown that word meanings vary significantly across the roughly 6500 languages in the world. I argue that this crosslinguistic semantic diversity has significant yet previously unrecognized theoretical consequences for the GCM. In particular, to accommodate the typological data, the GCM must assume that the concrete features of word meanings are not merely stored within sensory/motor brain systems, but are represented there in ways that are, to a nontrivial degree, language-specific. Moreover, it must assume that these conceptual representations are also activated during the nonlinguistic processing of the relevant kinds of objects and events (e.g., during visual perception and action planning); otherwise, they would not really be grounded, which is to say, embedded inside sensory/motor systems. Crucially, however, such activations would constitute what is traditionally called linguistic relativity-that is, the influence of language-specific semantic structures on other forms of cognition. The overarching aim of this paper is to elaborate this argument more fully and explore its repercussions. To that end, I discuss in greater detail the key aspects of the GCM, the evidence for crosslinguistic semantic diversity, pertinent work on linguistic relativity, the central claim that the GCM entails linguistic relativity, some initial supporting results, and some important limitations and future directions.

Instant Effects of Semantic Information on Visual Perception

Does our perception of an object change once we discover what function it serves? We showed human participants (n = 48, 31 females and 17 males) pictures of unfamiliar objects either together with keywords matching their function, leading to semantically informed perception, or together with nonmatching keywords, resulting in uninformed perception. We measured event-related potentials to investigate at which stages in the visual processing hierarchy these two types of object perception differed from one another. We found that semantically informed compared with uninformed perception was associated with larger amplitudes in the N170 component (150-200 ms), reduced amplitudes in the N400 component (400-700 ms), and a late decrease in alpha/beta band power. When the same objects were presented once more without any information, the N400 and event-related power effects persisted, and we also observed enlarged amplitudes in the P1 component (100-150 ms) in response to objects for which semantically informed perception had taken place. Consistent with previous work, this suggests that obtaining semantic information about previously unfamiliar objects alters aspects of their lower-level visual perception (P1 component), higher-level visual perception (N170 component), and semantic processing (N400 component, event-related power). Our study is the first to show that such effects occur instantly after semantic information has been provided for the first time, without requiring extensive learning.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT There has been a long-standing debate about whether or not higher-level cognitive capacities, such as semantic knowledge, can influence lower-level perceptual processing in a top-down fashion. Here we could show, for the first time, that information about the function of previously unfamiliar objects immediately influences cortical processing within less than 200 ms. Of note, this influence does not require training or experience with the objects and related semantic information. Therefore, our study is the first to show effects of cognition on perception while ruling out the possibility that prior knowledge merely acts by preactivating or altering stored visual representations. Instead, this knowledge seems to alter perception online, thus providing a compelling case against the impenetrability of perception by cognition.

Influence of language on perception and concept formation in a brain-constrained deep neural network model

A neurobiologically constrained model of semantic learning in the human brain was used to simulate the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts, either with or without verbal labels. Concept acquisition and semantic learning were simulated using Hebbian learning mechanisms. We measured the network's category learning performance, defined as the extent to which it successfully (i) grouped partly overlapping perceptual instances into a single (abstract or concrete) conceptual representation, while (ii) still distinguishing representations for distinct concepts. Co-presence of linguistic labels with perceptual instances of a given concept generally improved the network's learning of categories, with a significantly larger beneficial effect for abstract than concrete concepts. These results offer a neurobiological explanation for causal effects of language structure on concept formation and on perceptuo-motor processing of instances of these concepts: supplying a verbal label during concept acquisition improves the cortical mechanisms by which experiences with objects and actions along with the learning of words lead to the formation of neuronal ensembles for specific concepts and meanings. Furthermore, the present results make a novel prediction, namely, that such 'Whorfian' effects should be modulated by the concreteness/abstractness of the semantic categories being acquired, with language labels supporting the learning of abstract concepts more than that of concrete ones. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Linguistic Skill and Stimulus-Driven Attention: A Case for Linguistic Relativity

How does the language we speak affect our perception? Here, we argue for linguistic relativity and present an explanation through "language-induced automatized stimulus-driven attention" (LASA): Our respective mother tongue automatically influences our attention and, hence, perception, and in this sense determines what we see. As LASA is highly practiced throughout life, it is difficult to suppress, and even shows in language-independent non-linguistic tasks. We argue that attention is involved in language-dependent processing and point out that automatic or stimulus-driven forms of attention, albeit initially learned as serving a linguistic skill, account for linguistic relativity as they are automatized and generalize to non-linguistic tasks. In support of this possibility, we review evidence for such automatized stimulus-driven attention in language-independent non-linguistic tasks. We conclude that linguistic relativity is possible and in fact a reality, although it might not be as powerful as assumed by some of its strongest proponents.

Interactions between language, thought, and perception: Cognitive and neural perspectives

ABSTRACT The role that language plays in shaping non-linguistic cognitive and perceptual systems has been the subject of much theoretical and experimental attention over the past half-century. Understanding how language interacts with non-linguistic systems can provide insight into broader constraints on cognitive and brain organization. The papers that form this volume investigate various ways in which linguistic structure can interact with and influence how speakers think about and perceive the world, and the related issue of the constraints that in turn shape linguistic representations. These theoretical and empirical contributions support deeper understanding of the interactions between language, thought, and perception, and motivate new approaches for developing directional predictions at both the neural and cognitive levels.