Mood-congruent false memories persist over time

Effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity on true and false memory

Whereas the effects of emotional intensity (the perceived strength of an item's valence or arousal) have long been studied in true- and false-memory research, emotional ambiguity (the uncertainty that attaches to perceived emotional intensity) has only been studied recently. Available evidence suggests that emotional ambiguity has reliable effects on true memory that are distinct from those of emotional intensity. However, those findings are mostly restricted to recall, and the effects of emotional ambiguity on false memory remain unexplored. The current study addressed both limitations by measuring the effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity on true and false recognition. In two experiments, we manipulated valence ambiguity and valence intensity (Experiment 1) and arousal ambiguity and arousal intensity (Experiment 2) of Deese/Roediger/McDermott lists. Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted for Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and the combined data of the experiments to separate the effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity. Our results showed that both valence ambiguity and arousal ambiguity improved true recognition, and the effects of valence ambiguity remained robust even when controlling for valence intensity, arousal intensity, and arousal ambiguity. More importantly, for both valence and arousal, there was an interaction between ambiguity and intensity in false memory. Specifically, we found that valence ambiguity increased false recognition with positive valence, while arousal ambiguity amplified the effect of arousal intensity on false recognition. Our results are discussed in the context of the emotional ambiguity hypothesis and fuzzy-trace theory.

The Influence of Trait Emotion and Spatial Distance on Risky Choice Under the Framework of Gain and Loss

In the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, people are often faced with uncertain risky choice. Risky choice will be affected by different descriptions of the event's gain or loss framework, this phenomenon is known as the framing effect. With the continuous expansion and in-depth study of frame effects in the field of risky choice, researchers have found that the are quite different in different situations. People have different interpretations of the same event at different psychological distances, and will also be affected by their own emotions. Therefore, the current study examines the common influence of task frame, spatial distance, and trait emotion on risky choice through two studies. Study 1 used a 2 (framework: gain vs. loss) × 2 (trait sentiment: high vs. low) inter-subject design, and the dependent variable is the choice of the rescue plan for the classic "Asian disease" problem. The results revealed that trait anger did not predict individuals' risky choice preferences, and high trait anxiety led individuals to be more risk-averse. The framing effect exists in risky choice, and individuals prefer risk seeking in the loss frame. Study 2 used a 2 (spatial distance: distant vs. proximal) × 2 (framework: gain vs. loss) × 2 (trait sentiment: high vs. low) three-factor inter-subject design in which the dependent variable is the choice of rescue plan. The results indicate that the framing effect also exists in risky choice, and individuals prefer risk seeking in a loss frame. High trait anxiety lead individuals to be more risk-averse, while trait anger has no significant predictive effect on risk preference. Distant spatial distance lead individuals to increase their preference for risk-seeking under the gain frame, which leads to the disappearance of the framing effect. In conclusion, trait anxiety and spatial distance have a certain degree of influence on risky choice under the framework of gain and loss.

The Trajectory of Targets and Critical Lures in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott Paradigm: A Systematic Review

The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm has been used extensively to examine false memory. During the study session, participants learn lists of semantically related items (e.g., pillow, blanket, tired, bed), referred to as targets. Critical lures are items which are also associated with the lists but are intentionally omitted from study (e.g., sleep). At test, when asked to remember targets, participants often report false memories for critical lures. Findings from experiments using the DRM show the ease with which false memories develop in the absence of suggestion or misinformation. Given this, it is important to examine factors which influence the generalizability of the findings. One important factor is the persistence of false memory, or how long false memories last. Therefore, we conducted a systemic review to answer this research question: What is the persistence of false memory for specific items in the DRM paradigm? To help answer this question our review had two research objectives: (1) to examine the trajectory of target memory and false memory for critical lures and (2) to examine whether memory for targets exceeded false memory for critical lures. We included empirical articles which tested memory for the same DRM lists with at least two testing sessions. We discuss the results with respect to single-session delays, long-term memory recall and recognition, remember and know judgments for memory, and the effect of development, valence, warning, and connectivity on the trajectory of memory. Overall, the trajectory of targets showed a relatively consistent pattern of decrease across delay. The trajectory of critical lures was inconsistent. The proportion of targets versus critical lures across delay was also inconsistent. Despite the inconsistencies, we conclude that targets and critical lures have a dissimilar trajectory across delay and that critical lures are more persistent than targets. The findings with respect to long-term recall and recognition are consistent with both Fuzzy Trace Theory and Associative-Activation Theory of the DRM effect. The generation of false memory with brief delays (3-4 s) is better explained by Associative-Activation Theory. Examining the connectivity between target items, and critical lures, and the effect that has during study and retrieval, can provide insight into the persistence of false memory for critical lures.

The Effects of Acute Moderate and High Intensity Exercise on Memory

Acute cardiovascular exercise can enhance correct remembering but its impact upon false remembering is less clear. In two experiments, we investigated the effect of acute bouts of exercise on correct and false remembering using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) memory test. In Experiment 1, healthy adults completed quiet rest or moderate intensity cycling prior to the memory test. In Experiment 2, a similar sample completed moderate intensity running, high intensity sprints, or a period of quiet rest prior to the memory test. In Experiment 1, acute moderate intensity exercise increased short-term correct, but not false, recall. Experiment 2 replicated these findings but also found an acute bout of high intensity exercise had no impact upon either type of short-term recall. Acute moderate intensity exercise, but not acute high intensity exercise, can improve short-term correct recall without an accompanying increase in false recall potentially through processing of contextually specific information during encoding.

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Decreases Emotional Memory Schemas

Mood-congruent memory bias is a critical characteristic of depression, but the underlying neural mechanism is largely unknown. Negative memory schemas might enhance encoding and consolidation of negative experiences, thereby contributing to the genesis and perpetuation of depressive pathology. To investigate this relationship, we aimed to perturb medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) processing, using neuronavigated transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) targeting the mPFC. Forty healthy volunteers first underwent a negative mood induction to activate negative schema processing after which they received either active inhibitory (N = 20) or control (N = 20) stimulation to the mPFC. Then, all participants performed the encoding of an emotional false memory task. Recall and recognition performance was tested the following morning. Polysomnographic data were recorded continuously during the night before and after encoding. We observed a significantly lower false recognition of negative critical lures following mPFC inhibition, but no differences in veridical memory. These findings were supported by reaction time data, showing a relative slower response to negative compared with positive critical lures. The current findings support previous causal evidence for a role of the mPFC in schema memory processing and further suggest a role of the mPFC in memory bias.

How influenceable is our metamemory for pictorial material? The impact of framing and emotionality on metamemory judgments

Metamemory refers to the ability to monitor and control one´s own memory processes which plays an important role in everyday life when accuracy of memory is required. The present study intends to give new insights into the complex relationship between confidence in memory and accuracy of metamemory judgments for negative emotional and neutral pictorial stimuli. Judgments of learning (JOLs) were investigated in order to provide important theoretical information for practical applications in everyday life. A balanced 2×2 factorial experimental design was used to explore the impact of framing in terms of remembering or forgetting as well as emotionality on JOLs. With respect to the already known complex relationship of confidence in memory and accuracy of confidence statements, the present results emphasize this complexity by showing that there is no interaction between the factors framing and emotionality but significant main effects of these two factors with respect to JOLs. Furthermore, accuracy of JOLs is not influenced by framing in terms of remembering and forgetting. Both framing conditions lead to overconfident judgments, regardless of whether confidence in memory is influenced by framing. Emotionality, on the other hand, enhances memory accuracy regardless of whether the subjective feeling of remembering influences confidence in memory or not. The present findings highlight the need to strengthen the collective consciousness about the influenceability of confidence in memory and the fact that a high confidence in memory is not inevitably accompanied by accurate memories.

The role of attention in immediate emotional false memory enhancement

Two experiments examined the effect of reduced attentional resources on false memory production for emotionally valenced stimuli using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Prior research has demonstrated that emotional information is often better remembered than neutral information and that enhanced memory for emotional information is dependent on either automatic or controlled neural processing (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). Behavioral studies designed to reduce attention resources at encoding have supported neuroimaging findings that indicate high arousal negative stimuli rely more on automatic processing but positive high arousal stimuli rely more on controlled processing. No study has yet examined the attentional resources required to produce emotionally valenced false memories. In Experiment 1, negative, positive, and neutral DRM lists were studied under full or divided attention (DA) conditions, and in Experiment 2, negative and neutral DRM lists were studied under fast (20 ms) or slow (2,000 ms) presentation conditions. Under DA and speeded presentation conditions, higher false memory recognition rates were found for negative compared with positive (Experiment 1) and neutral (Experiments 1 and 2) critical lures. This is the first demonstration of which we are aware that suggests negative false memories are associated with automatic neural processing, whereas positive and nonvalenced neutral false memories are associated with more controlled processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

The effect of anxiety on emotional recognition: evidence from an ERP study

Anxiety-related bias in the recognition memory based on trait anxiety has induced some studies. Their results, however, were conflicting. In fact, anxious differences not only differed from personality traits but also from different anxiety mood levels. We explored the emotional memory bias in both trait and state anxiety individuals, the high trait and high state anxiety group, the high trait and low state anxiety group, the low trait and high state anxiety group, and the low trait and low state anxiety group, on classic recognition paradigm using event-related potentials (ERPs). The behavioral results showed high state anxiety levels increased the d' of negative words, regardless of the trait anxiety of participant is high or low, and a lower d' of recognition memory for negative words than for neutral and positive words in all participants. Moreover, Electrophysiological results supported the findings of behavior, showing an earlier N400 (250-500 ms) latency elicited for new-negative words in high state level than in low state levels in right parietal region. These results suggested that the memory bias to negative events resides in state anxiety, but not in trait anxiety.

Effects of survival processing and retention interval on true and false recognition in the DRM and category repetition paradigms

Two experiments examined the effects of survival processing and delay on true and related false recognition. Experiment 1 used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm and found survival processing to increase true and related false recognition. Extending the delay from 5-mins to 1-day reduced true, but not false memory. Measures of the characteristics of true and false memories showed survival processing increased "remember" and "know" responses for related false memory, "know" responses for true memory and gist processing. Experiment 2 made use of the category repetition procedure and found a broadly similar pattern of results for true memory. However, related false memory was decreased by survival processing. Except for one result, no interactions were found between encoding task and delay. Overall, survival processing produced similar or different effects on true/false memory depending on the nature of the list. The mechanisms that might underpin these are evaluated and considered in relation to future work.

Mood impedes monitoring of emotional false memories: evidence for the associative theories

In the present experiment, we investigated whether warnings provided at the time of retrieval would reduce emotional false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. The provision of retrieval warnings allowed us to test specific predictions based on the associative theories (e.g., Activation-Monitoring Theory; AMT) and Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT) that have been used to account for false memories in the DRM paradigm. Participants were randomly assigned to either a no-warning group or a retrieval-warning group. In each group, mood-induction procedures were used to elicit a positive, negative, or neutral mood and participants were then presented with word lists comprised of positive, negative, or neutral words. Retrieval warnings reduced false recognition, regardless of the valence of the to-be-remembered information or participants' mood. Consistent with the associative theories' predictions, within the warning condition, positive moods yielded greater false recognition for positive critical lures, and negative moods yielded greater false recognition for negative critical lures, compared to neutral moods. These findings have important practical implications for our understanding of the effect of mood on memory.

Fear, Anger, and Risk Preference Reversals: An Experimental Study on a Chinese Sample

Fear and anger are basic emotions of the same valence which differ in terms of their certainty and control dimensions according to the Appraisal Tendency Framework, a theory addressing the relationship between specific emotions, and judgments and choices. Past research based on the Appraisal Theory revealed contradictory results for risky choice decision-making. However, these conclusions were drawn from Western samples (e.g., North American). Considering potential cultural differences, the present study aims to investigate whether the Appraisal Tendency hypothesis yields the same results in a Chinese sample. Our first study explores how dispositional fear and anger influence risk preferences through a classic virtual “Asia Disease Problem” task and the second study investigates how induced fear and anger influence risk preferences through an incentive-compatible task. Consistent with previous research, our results reveal that induced fear and anger have differential effects on risky decisions: angry participants prefer the risk-seeking option, whereas fearful participants prefer a risk-averse option. However, we find no associations between dispositional fear (or anger) and risky decisions.

Arousal-But Not Valence-Reduces False Memories at Retrieval

Mood affects both memory accuracy and memory distortions. However, some aspects of this relation are still poorly understood: (1) whether valence and arousal equally affect false memory production, and (2) whether retrieval-related processes matter; the extant literature typically shows that mood influences memory performance when it is induced before encoding, leaving unsolved whether mood induced before retrieval also impacts memory. We examined how negative, positive, and neutral mood induced before retrieval affected inferential false memories and related subjective memory experiences. A recognition-memory paradigm for photographs depicting script-like events was employed. Results showed that individuals in both negative and positive moods–similar in arousal levels–correctly recognized more target events and endorsed fewer false memories (and these errors were linked to remember responses less frequently), compared to individuals in neutral mood. This suggests that arousal (but not valence) predicted memory performance; furthermore, we found that arousal ratings provided by participants were more adequate predictors of memory performance than their actual belonging to either positive, negative or neutral mood groups. These findings suggest that arousal has a primary role in affecting memory, and that mood exerts its power on true and false memory even when induced at retrieval.

The effect of mood on false memory for emotional DRM word lists

In the present study, we investigated the effect of participants' mood on true and false memories of emotional word lists in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In Experiment 1, we constructed DRM word lists in which all the studied words and corresponding critical lures reflected a specified emotional valence. In Experiment 2, we used these lists to assess mood-congruent true and false memory. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three induced-mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral) and were presented with word lists comprised of positive, negative, or neutral words. For both true and false memory, there was a mood-congruent effect in the negative mood condition; this effect was due to a decrease in true and false recognition of the positive and neutral words. These findings are consistent with both spreading-activation and fuzzy-trace theories of DRM performance and have practical implications for our understanding of the effect of mood on memory.