Monitoring of learning for emotional faces: how do fine-grained categories of emotion influence participants’ judgments of learning and beliefs about memory?

Effects of personality traits and mood induction on metamemory judgments and metacognitive beliefs

Although the effects of mood and personality traits on memory performance have previously been studied, their relationship to the metamemory and metacognitive processes is still unknown. In this study, we investigated the effects of mood induction (positive and negative) and personality traits (extroverted and neurotics) on metacognitive beliefs, memory confidence, the judgment of learning (JOL) and feeling of knowing (FOK) judgments during face-name recognition tasks. One hundred twenty-seven participants who met the criteria based on their extraverted and neurotic personality scores on the Big Five Personality Inventory were randomly assigned to positive and negative mood induction conditions. We found that neurotics showed lower JOL judgments and accuracy than extroverts. The interaction effect between mood and personality significantly affected JOL and FOK accuracy, indicating that while extraverts were more accurate during positive induction, neurotics were more accurate during negative induction. In addition, neurotics were underconfident in their memory and reported more negative metacognitive beliefs than extroverts. We concluded that memory and metamemory processes are distinguishable in their relationships with mood states and personality traits. Our data also showed that JOL and FOK are distinct processes that support domain-specific metacognitive judgments.

The disconnect between metamemory and memory for emotional images

Emotional information is reliably predicted to be remembered better than neutral information, and this has been found for words, images, and facial expressions. However, many studies find that these judgments of learning (JOLs) are not predictive of memory performance (e.g. [Hourihan, K. L. (2020). Misleading emotions: Judgments of learning overestimate recognition of negative and positive emotional images. Cognition and Emotion, 34(4), 771-782. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2019.1682972]). The present study investigates and rules out numerous potential causes for this discrepancy between memory predictions and performance, including (1) reactivity to making JOLs, (2) idiosyncrasies of specific images used, (3), type of memory test, and (4) effects of fluency. Three additional experiments investigate whether JOLs can become more predictive of memory performance, either by experience with the task or by manipulating prior beliefs about memory for emotional images. In all experiments, we found the same effect: Emotional images are inaccurately predicted to be remembered better than neutral images. The results suggest that emotion is used as a heuristic for learning, resulting in low metamnemonic accuracy for emotional stimuli.

Higher judgements of learning for emotional words: processing fluency or memory beliefs?

Previous research has shown that emotionally-valenced words are given higher judgements of learning (JOLs) than are neutral words. The current study examined potential explanations for this emotional salience effect on JOLs. Experiment 1 replicated the basic emotionality/JOL effect. In Experiments 2A and 2B, we used pre-study JOLs and assessed memory beliefs qualitatively, finding that, on average, participants believed that positive and negative words were more memorable than neutral words. Experiment 3 utilised a lexical decision task, resulting in lower reaction times (RTs) for positive words than for neutral words, but equivalent RTs for negative and neutral words, suggesting that processing fluency may partially account for higher JOLs for positive words, but not for negative words. Finally, we conducted a series of moderation analyses in Experiment 4 which assessed the relative contributions of fluency and beliefs to JOLs by measuring both factors in the same participants, showing that RTs made no significant contribution to JOLs for either positive or negative words. Our findings suggest that although positive words may be more fluently processed than neutral words, memory beliefs are the primary factor underlying higher JOLs for both positive and negative words.

Influence of emotional stimuli on metacognition: A study in arithmetic

We investigate the role of negative emotional stimuli on direct and indirect metacognition, and document age-related differences in this role during adulthood. Participants were presented with negative or neutral pictures while asked to select which of two available strategies was the better strategy to find approximate estimates of two-digit multiplication problems. Following each strategy selection, participants provided either a direct (confidence judgment; Expt. 1) or an indirect (opt-out judgment; Expt. 2) evaluation of their strategy choice. Negative emotional stimuli decreased metacognitive accuracy for arithmetic strategy selection, but only when indirect metacognitive measures were collected. No differences were found when direct metacognitive judgments were requested. The effects of emotional stimuli on indirect metacognition and lack of effects on direct metacognition were found in both young and older adults. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the mechanisms underlying the effects of emotion on metacognition in young and older adults.

Investigating the replicability and boundary conditions of the mnemonic advantage for disgust

Research has demonstrated that people remember emotional information better than neutral information. However, such research has almost exclusively defined emotion in terms of valence and arousal. Discrete emotions may affect memory above and beyond such dimensions, with recent research indicating that disgusting information is better remembered than frightening information. We initially sought to determine whether participants are sensitive to the effects of discrete emotions when predicting their future memory performance. Participants in Experiment 1 were more confident in their memory for emotional (both frightening and disgusting) images relative to neutral images, but confidence did not differ between frightening and disgusting images. However, because we did not replicate the mnemonic advantage of disgust, subsequent experiments were concerned with testing the replicability of this effect. Because metamemorial judgments sometimes eliminate memory effects, participants in Experiment 2 did not make such judgments. Even so, the effect did not replicate. The disgust advantage was ultimately replicated in Experiment 3, where participants completed a secondary task at encoding. The disgust advantage is replicable but appears less robust than previously recognised. A single-paper meta-analysis indicated that the effect is more likely under divided attention, perhaps because the mechanisms which mediate disgust-memory are relatively automatic.

Blessedly forgetful and blissfully unaware: a positivity bias in memory for (re)constructions of imagined past and future events

People frequently consider the alternatives of the events that can happen in the future and of the events that already happened in the past in everyday life. The current study investigates the effects of engaging in imagination of hypothetical future (Experiment 1) and past (Experiment 2) events on memory and metamemory. We demonstrate, across two experiments, that imagination of positive future and positive past events yielded greater memory performance than negative events, as well as receiving higher vividness and plausibility ratings. In addition, simulation of a negative event occurring positively in the future or having occurred positively in the past produced higher memory performance, compared to simulation of a positive event occurring / having occurred negatively. However, participants' predictions for their subsequent memory performance did not reflect their increased tendency to remember positive or could-be / could-have-been positive events neither for future nor past reconstructions. These findings are interpreted in the framework of positivity bias which suggests that people have a tendency towards positivity when simulating future events; and we extend this positivity bias to reconstructions of the hypothetical past events as well.

How influenceable is our metamemory for pictorial material? The impact of framing and emotionality on metamemory judgments

Metamemory refers to the ability to monitor and control one´s own memory processes which plays an important role in everyday life when accuracy of memory is required. The present study intends to give new insights into the complex relationship between confidence in memory and accuracy of metamemory judgments for negative emotional and neutral pictorial stimuli. Judgments of learning (JOLs) were investigated in order to provide important theoretical information for practical applications in everyday life. A balanced 2×2 factorial experimental design was used to explore the impact of framing in terms of remembering or forgetting as well as emotionality on JOLs. With respect to the already known complex relationship of confidence in memory and accuracy of confidence statements, the present results emphasize this complexity by showing that there is no interaction between the factors framing and emotionality but significant main effects of these two factors with respect to JOLs. Furthermore, accuracy of JOLs is not influenced by framing in terms of remembering and forgetting. Both framing conditions lead to overconfident judgments, regardless of whether confidence in memory is influenced by framing. Emotionality, on the other hand, enhances memory accuracy regardless of whether the subjective feeling of remembering influences confidence in memory or not. The present findings highlight the need to strengthen the collective consciousness about the influenceability of confidence in memory and the fact that a high confidence in memory is not inevitably accompanied by accurate memories.

Misleading emotions: judgments of learning overestimate recognition of negative and positive emotional images

Research has shown that memory predictions are higher for emotional words, pictures, and facial expressions, relative to neutral stimuli, with recognition memory performance often not following the same pattern as predictions. Memory predictions for negative emotional images have not yet been examined. The current study examined how memory predictions and recognition memory for negative and positive emotional images differed from neutral images. Participants studied a mixed list of positive, negative, and neutral images and predicted future recognition by providing judgements of learning (JOLs). JOLs were highest for negative images, followed by positive images and then neutral images. However, recognition accuracy showed the opposite pattern: neutral images were recognised most accurately and negative images were the most poorly recognised. Participants incorporate beliefs and subjective experience in predicting recognition of emotional images, but fail to account for the influences of study and test conditions.

Beliefs about memory decline in aging do not impact judgments of learning (JOLs): A challenge for belief-based explanations of JOLs

The cue-utilization framework (Koriat, 1997) and the analytic processing theory (Dunlosky, Mueller, & Tauber, 2015) identify people's beliefs about their memory as central to how judgments of learning (JOLs) are made. This assumption is supported by ample evidence. However, researchers have almost exclusively explored the impact of participants' beliefs about the materials or the learning task, and none have evaluated the impact of beliefs about a person on JOLs. Thus, to inform JOL theory, we evaluated the degree to which JOLs are related to the belief that "memory declines with aging in adulthood." In seven experiments, college-aged participants studied words, made JOLs, and took a memory test. Participants made JOLs predicting memory performance for an average younger adult (i.e., 18-21 years old) or for an average older adult (i.e., 65+ years old). Most important, beliefs about aging in adulthood were not always sufficient to produce cue effects on JOLs, which contrasts with expectations from the aforementioned theories. An important challenge for future research will be to discover factors that moderate belief effects. To guide such explorations, we discuss possible explanations for why beliefs about aging would have demonstrated little to no relationship with people's JOLs.