1
|
Crupi V, Nelson JD, Meder B, Cevolani G, Tentori K. Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search. Cogn Sci 2018; 42:1410-1456. [PMID: 29911318 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12613] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2017] [Revised: 03/05/2018] [Accepted: 03/06/2018] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Searching for information is critical in many situations. In medicine, for instance, careful choice of a diagnostic test can help narrow down the range of plausible diseases that the patient might have. In a probabilistic framework, test selection is often modeled by assuming that people's goal is to reduce uncertainty about possible states of the world. In cognitive science, psychology, and medical decision making, Shannon entropy is the most prominent and most widely used model to formalize probabilistic uncertainty and the reduction thereof. However, a variety of alternative entropy metrics (Hartley, Quadratic, Tsallis, Rényi, and more) are popular in the social and the natural sciences, computer science, and philosophy of science. Particular entropy measures have been predominant in particular research areas, and it is often an open issue whether these divergences emerge from different theoretical and practical goals or are merely due to historical accident. Cutting across disciplinary boundaries, we show that several entropy and entropy reduction measures arise as special cases in a unified formalism, the Sharma-Mittal framework. Using mathematical results, computer simulations, and analyses of published behavioral data, we discuss four key questions: How do various entropy models relate to each other? What insights can be obtained by considering diverse entropy models within a unified framework? What is the psychological plausibility of different entropy models? What new questions and insights for research on human information acquisition follow? Our work provides several new pathways for theoretical and empirical research, reconciling apparently conflicting approaches and empirical findings within a comprehensive and unified information-theoretic formalism.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Vincenzo Crupi
- Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition, Department of Philosophy and Education, University of Turin
| | - Jonathan D Nelson
- School of Psychology, University of Surrey
- Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development
| | - Björn Meder
- Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development
| | | | - Katya Tentori
- Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Hattori I, Hattori M, Over DE, Takahashi T, Baratgin J. Dual frames for causal induction: the normative and the heuristic. THINKING & REASONING 2017. [DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2017.1316314] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Ikuko Hattori
- College of Letters, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan
| | - Masasi Hattori
- College of Comprehensive Psychology, Ritsumeikan University, Osaka, Japan
| | - David E. Over
- Psychology Department, Durham University, Durham, UK
| | - Tatsuji Takahashi
- School of Science and Engineering, Tokyo Denki University, Saitama, Japan
| | - Jean Baratgin
- Laboratoire CHArt, University of Paris 8 and Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Hattori M. Probabilistic representation in syllogistic reasoning: A theory to integrate mental models and heuristics. Cognition 2016; 157:296-320. [PMID: 27710779 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.09.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Revised: 09/02/2016] [Accepted: 09/08/2016] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
This paper presents a new theory of syllogistic reasoning. The proposed model assumes there are probabilistic representations of given signature situations. Instead of conducting an exhaustive search, the model constructs an individual-based "logical" mental representation that expresses the most probable state of affairs, and derives a necessary conclusion that is not inconsistent with the model using heuristics based on informativeness. The model is a unification of previous influential models. Its descriptive validity has been evaluated against existing empirical data and two new experiments, and by qualitative analyses based on previous empirical findings, all of which supported the theory. The model's behavior is also consistent with findings in other areas, including working memory capacity. The results indicate that people assume the probabilities of all target events mentioned in a syllogism to be almost equal, which suggests links between syllogistic reasoning and other areas of cognition.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Masasi Hattori
- College of Comprehensive Psychology, Ritsumeikan University, Japan.
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Children’s sequential information search is sensitive to environmental probabilities. Cognition 2014; 130:74-80. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.09.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2013] [Revised: 09/24/2013] [Accepted: 09/25/2013] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
|
5
|
Wakebe T, Sato T, Watamura E, Takano Y. Risk aversion in information seeking. JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 2012. [DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2011.596825] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
|
6
|
Abstract
One of the most popular paradigms to use for studying human reasoning involves the Wason card selection task. In this task, the participant is presented with four cards and a conditional rule (e.g., “If there is an A on one side of the card, there is always a 2 on the other side”). Participants are asked which cards should be turned to verify whether or not the rule holds. In this simple task, participants consistently provide answers that are incorrect according to formal logic. To account for these errors, several models have been proposed, one of the most prominent being the information gain model (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). This model is based on the assumption that people independently select cards based on the expected information gain of turning a particular card. In this article, we present two estimation methods to fit the information gain model: a maximum likelihood procedure (programmed in R) and a Bayesian procedure (programmed in WinBUGS). We compare the two procedures and illustrate the flexibility of the Bayesian hierarchical procedure by applying it to data from a meta-analysis of the Wason task (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). We also show that the goodness of fit of the information gain model can be assessed by inspecting the posterior predictives of the model. These Bayesian procedures make it easy to apply the information gain model to empirical data. Supplemental materials may be downloaded along with this article from www.springerlink.com.
Collapse
|
7
|
Information Seeking in a Non-Hypothesis Testing Task. PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 2010. [DOI: 10.1007/s12646-010-0046-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022] Open
|
8
|
Hattori M, Oaksford M. Adaptive Non-Interventional Heuristics for Covariation Detection in Causal Induction: Model Comparison and Rational Analysis. Cogn Sci 2010; 31:765-814. [DOI: 10.1080/03640210701530755] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/20/2022]
|
9
|
Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Behav Brain Sci 2009; 32:69-84; discussion 85-120. [PMID: 19210833 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x09000284] [Citation(s) in RCA: 164] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrationality is fundamental to many aspects of human life including the law, mental health, and language interpretation. But what is it to be rational? One answer, deeply embedded in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greece, is that rationality concerns reasoning according to the rules of logic--the formal theory that specifies the inferential connections that hold with certainty between propositions. Piaget viewed logical reasoning as defining the end-point of cognitive development; and contemporary psychology of reasoning has focussed on comparing human reasoning against logical standards. Bayesian Rationality argues that rationality is defined instead by the ability to reason about uncertainty. Although people are typically poor at numerical reasoning about probability, human thought is sensitive to subtle patterns of qualitative Bayesian, probabilistic reasoning. In Chapters 1-4 of Bayesian Rationality (Oaksford & Chater 2007), the case is made that cognition in general, and human everyday reasoning in particular, is best viewed as solving probabilistic, rather than logical, inference problems. In Chapters 5-7 the psychology of "deductive" reasoning is tackled head-on: It is argued that purportedly "logical" reasoning problems, revealing apparently irrational behaviour, are better understood from a probabilistic point of view. Data from conditional reasoning, Wason's selection task, and syllogistic inference are captured by recasting these problems probabilistically. The probabilistic approach makes a variety of novel predictions which have been experimentally confirmed. The book considers the implications of this work, and the wider "probabilistic turn" in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, for understanding human rationality.
Collapse
|
10
|
Perham N, Oaksford M. Deontic Reasoning With Emotional Content: Evolutionary Psychology or Decision Theory? Cogn Sci 2005; 29:681-718. [DOI: 10.1207/s15516709cog0000_35] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/31/2022]
|
11
|
Oaksford M, Moussakowski M. Negations and natural sampling in data selection: Ecological versus heuristic explanations of matching bias. Mem Cognit 2004; 32:570-81. [PMID: 15478751 DOI: 10.3758/bf03195848] [Citation(s) in RCA: 44] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Matching bias occurs when people ignore negations when testing a hypothesis--for example, if A, then not 2--and select possible data types that are named in the hypothesis (i.e., A and 2; Evans & Lynch, 1973). There are two explanations of this bias: the heuristic account and the contrast class account. The latter is part of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) ecological approach to data selection. On this account, a contrast set (i.e., birds that are not ravens) has a higher probability than the original set (i.e., birds that are ravens). This article reports two experiments in which these accounts make divergent predictions. The same materials were used as those in Yama (2001), who found more support for the heuristic approach. Experiment 1 replicated Yama with Western participants. Experiment 2 used a procedure introduced by Oaksford and Wakefield (2003). Rather than present participants with one of each of the four possible data types all at once, 50 were presented one at a time. The proportions of each data type reflected the relevant probabilities. The results supported the ecological approach, showing that people constructed contrast sets that strongly influenced their data selection behavior. The results were not consistent with the heuristic approach.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mike Oaksford
- School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales.
| | | |
Collapse
|
12
|
Abstract
Since it first appeared, there has been much research and critical discussion on the theory of optimal data selection as an explanation of Wason's (1966,1968) selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). In this paper, this literature is reviewed, and the theory of optimal data selection is reevaluated in its light. The information gain model is first located in the current theoretical debate in the psychology of reasoning concerning dual processes in human reasoning. A model comparison exercise is then presented that compares a revised version of the model with its theoretical competitors. Tests of the novel predictions of the model are then reviewed. This section also reviews experiments claimed not to be consistent with optimal data selection. Finally, theoretical criticisms of optimal data selection are discussed. It is argued either that the revised model accounts for them or that they do not stand up under analysis. It is concluded that some version of the optimal data selection model still provides the best account of the selection task. Consequently, the conclusion of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) original rational analysis (Anderson, 1990), that people's hypothesis-testing behavior on this task is rational and well adapted to the environment, still stands.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mike Oaksford
- School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales.
| | | |
Collapse
|
13
|
Abstract
Probabilistic accounts of Wason's selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 1996) are controversial, with some researchers failing to replicate the predicted effects of probability manipulations. This paper reports a single experiment in which participants sampled the data naturally-that is, sequentially. The proportions of possible data types (i.e., cards in the selection task) also reflected the probability manipulation. Other than this procedural difference, the materials were the same as those in Oberauer, Wilhelm, and Rosas-Diaz's (1999) Experiment 3, which failed to show probabilistic effects. Significant probabilistic effects were observed. Moreover, in a comparative model-fitting exercise, a revised version of the information gain model (Hattori, 1999, 2002; Oaksford & Chater, in press-b) was shown to provide better fits to these data than did competing explanations.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Mike Oaksford
- School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales.
| | | |
Collapse
|